

THIS SERIES WILL BE COMPLETE IN THIRTY-ONE PARTS.

No. 4.

APRIL 5, 1897.

PEOPLE'S SERIES, ISSUED WEEKLY.

PRICE, 25 CENTS

VOL. 1.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, \$12.00 PER ANNUM.

THE PEOPLE'S PICTORIAL EDITION

OF THE

# CONFEDERATE SOLDIER

IN THE

CIVIL




WAR

1861-1865.

LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY:  
COURIER-JOURNAL JOB PRINTING COMPANY,  
1897.







## BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK, MO.

(OAK HILLS, OR SPRINGFIELD),

AUGUST 10, 1861.

BY

BRIGADIER-GENERAL BEN MCCULLOCH.

HEADQUARTERS MCCULLOCH'S BRIGADE,  
CAMP WEIGHTMAN,  
NEAR SPRINGFIELD, MO., August 12, 1861.

HAVING taken position about ten miles from Springfield, I endeavored to gain the necessary information of the strength and position of the enemy stationed in and about the town. The information was very conflicting and unsatisfactory. I, however, made up my mind to attack the enemy in their position, and issued orders on the 9th instant to my force to start at 9 o'clock at night to attack at four different points at daylight. A few days before General Price, in command of the Missouri force, turned over his troops to me, and I assumed command of the entire force, comprising my own brigade, the brigade of Arkansas State forces under General Pearce, and General Price's Missourians.

My effective force was 5,300 infantry, fifteen pieces of artillery, and 6,000 horsemen, armed with flintlock muskets, rifles and shotguns. There were other horsemen with the army who were entirely unarmed, and instead of being a help were continually in the way. When the time arrived for the night march, it commenced to rain slightly, and fearing, from the want of cartridge boxes, that my ammunition would be ruined, I ordered the movement to be stopped, hoping to move the next morning. Many of my men had but twenty rounds of ammunition, and there was no more to be had.

While still hesitating in the morning the enemy were reported advancing, and I made arrangements to meet him. The attack was made simultaneously at 5:30 A. M., on our right and left flanks, and the enemy had gained the positions they desired. General Lyon attacked us on our left, and General Sigel on our right and rear. From these points batteries opened upon us. My command was soon ready. The Missourians, under Generals Slack, Clark, McBride, Parsons and Rains, were nearest the position taken by General Lyon with his main force. They were instantly turned to the left, and opened the battle with an incessant fire of small arms.

Woodruff opposed his battery to that of the enemy under Captain Totten, and a constant cannonading was kept up between these batteries during the battle. Hebert's regiment of Louisiana volunteers and McIntosh's regiment of Arkansas mounted riflemen were ordered to the front, and after passing the battery turned to the left, and soon engaged the enemy with regiments deployed. Colonel McIntosh dismounted his regiment, and the two marched up abreast to a fence around a large cornfield, when they met the left of the enemy already posted.

A terrible conflict of small arms took place here. The opposing force was a body of regular United States infantry, commanded by Captains Plummer and Gilbert. Notwithstanding the galling fire poured upon these two regiments, they leaped over the fence, and, gallantly led by their colonels, drove the enemy before them back upon the main body. During this time the Missourians, under General Price, were nobly attempting to sustain themselves in the center, and were hotly engaged on the sides of the height upon which the enemy were posted. Far on the right Sigel had opened his battery upon Churchill's and Greer's regiments, and gradually made his way to the Springfield road, upon each side of which the enemy was encamped, and in a prominent position had established his battery. I at once took two companies of the Louisiana regiment, which were nearest me, and marched them rapidly from the front and right to the rear, with orders to Colonel McIntosh to bring up the rest.

When we arrived near the enemy's battery we found that Reid's battery had opened upon it, and it was already in confusion. Advantage was taken of it, and soon the Louisianians were gallantly charging among the guns, and swept the cannoners away. Five guns were here taken, and Sigel's command, completely routed, were in rapid retreat with a single gun, followed by some companies of the Texas regiment and a portion of Colonel Major's Missouri regiment of cavalry. In the pursuit many of the enemy were killed and taken prisoners, and their last gun captured.


Having cleared our right and rear, it was necessary to turn all our attention to the center, under General Lyon, who was pressing upon the Missourians, having driven them back. To this point McIntosh's regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Embry, and Churchill's regiment on foot, Gratiot's regiment and McRea's battalion were sent to their aid.

A terrible fire of musketry was now kept up along the whole side and top of the hill upon which the enemy were posted. Masses of infantry fell back and again rushed

forward. The summit of the hill was covered with the dead and wounded. Both sides were fighting with desperation for the day. Carroll's and Greer's regiments, led gallantly by Captain Bradfute, charged the battery (Totten's), but the whole strength of the enemy were immediately in rear, and a deadly fire was opened upon them.

At this critical moment, when the fortunes of the day seemed to be at the turning point, two regiments of General Pearce's brigade were ordered to march from their position (as reserves) to support the center. The order was obeyed with alacrity, and General Pearce gallantly marched with his brigade to the rescue. Reid's battery was also ordered to move forward, and the Louisiana regiment was again called into action on the left of it. The battle then became general, and probably no two opposing forces ever fought with greater desperation. Inch by inch the enemy gave way, and were driven from their position. Totten's battery fell back; Missourians, Arkansans; Louisianians and Texans pushed forward. The incessant roll of musketry was deafening, and the balls fell thick as hailstones, but still our gallant Southerners pushed onward, and with one wild yell broke upon the enemy, pushing them back and strewing the ground with their dead. Nothing could withstand the impetuosity of our final charge. The enemy fled and could not again be rallied, and they were seen at 12 M. fast retreating among the hills in the distance.

Thus ended the battle. It lasted six hours and a half. The force of the enemy, between nine and ten thousand,



BRIG.-GEN. BEN MCCULLOCH, OF TEXAS.  
Killed at the Battle of Pea Ridge, Ark., March 7, 1862.  
[From a photo taken in 1861.]

was composed of well-disciplined troops, well armed, and a large part of them belonging to the old army of the United States. With every advantage on their side they have met with a signal repulse. The loss of the enemy is 800 killed, 1,000 wounded and 300 prisoners. We captured six pieces of artillery, several hundred stand of small arms and a number of their standards.

Major-General Lyon, chief in command, was killed, and many of their officers high in rank wounded.

Our loss was also severe, and we mourn the death of many a gallant officer and soldier. Our killed amounts to 265, and 800 wounded; also thirty missing. Colonel Weightman fell at the head of his brigade of Missourians while gallantly charging upon the enemy. His place will not easily be filled. Generals Slack and Clark, of Missouri, were severely wounded; General Price, slightly. Captain Hinson, of the Louisiana regiment; Captain McAlexander, of Churchill's regiment; Captains Bell and Brown, of Pearce's brigade, Lieutenants Walton and Weaver, all fell while nobly and gallantly doing their duty. Colonel McIntosh was slightly wounded by a grape shot while charging with the Louisiana regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Neal, Major F. Ward, Captains King, Pearson, Gibbs, Ramsaur, Porter, Lieutenants Dawson, Chambers, Johnson, King, Adams, Hardesty, McIvor, and Saddler were wounded while at the head of their companies.

\* \* \* \* \*

BEN MCCULLOCH,  
Brigadier-General Commanding.

SAID a hungry Confederate to the lady who met him at the door, when out foraging one day, "Madam, will you please give me something to eat? I haven't had a mouthful for three days—to-day, to-morrow and next day."

## MANASSAS.

(First Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861.)

BY CATHERINE M. WARFIELD.

They have met at last—as storm clouds  
Meet in Heaven!

And their thunders have been stilled,  
And their leaders crushed or killed,  
And their ranks, with terror thrilled,  
Rent and riven!

Like the leaves of Vallombrosa  
They are lying,  
In the moonlight, in the midnight,  
Dead and dying;  
Like those leaves before the gale  
Swept their legions, wild and pale;  
While the host that made them quail  
Stood defying.

When aloft in morning sunlight  
Flags were flaunted,  
And "swift vengeance on the rebel"  
Proudly vaunted,  
Little did they think that night  
Should close upon their shameful flight,  
And rebels, victors in the fight,  
Stand undaunted.

But peace to those who perished  
In our passes!  
Light be the earth above them;  
Green the grasses!  
Long shall Northmen rue the day  
When they met our stern array,  
And shrunk from battle's wild affray,  
At Manassas!

ORGANIZATION OF THE TROOPS IN THE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE PENINSULA,

COMMANDED BY

MAJ.-GEN. J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER, C. S. A.,

JANUARY 31, 1862.

## YORKTOWN, VICINITY AND SHIP POINT.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. G. J. RAINS COMMANDING.

Thirteenth Alabama; Second Florida; Sixth Georgia; Twenty-third Georgia; Fourteenth Louisiana; Louisiana Zouave Battalion; Second Mississippi; Fifteenth North Carolina; Thirty-second Virginia, two companies; Fifty-third Virginia, eight companies; One Hundred and Fifteenth Virginia militia; Maurin's Louisiana battery; Nelson's Louisiana battery; First Virginia artillery, three companies. Serving as heavy artillery—Barton's independent company; De Gourney's independent company; Duke's independent company; Elletot's independent company; Peyton's independent company; Preston's independent company.

## MULBERRY POINT BATTERY, LAND'S END, ETC.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. LAFAYETTE MCLAWS COMMANDING.

Eighth Alabama; Cobb's Legion; Tenth Georgia; Sixteenth Georgia; Greenville Guards; Second Louisiana; Fifth Louisiana; Tenth Louisiana; Fourteenth Virginia; Fifteenth Virginia; Thirty-second Virginia, two companies; Fifty-third Virginia, one company; Third Virginia (four companies) cavalry; First Virginia (five companies) artillery.

## GLOUCESTER POINT.

COLONEL C. A. CRUMP, COMMANDING.

Twenty-sixth Virginia; Ninth Virginia Militia; Twenty-first Virginia Militia; Eighty-seventh Virginia militia; Third Virginia (one company) cavalry; First Virginia (one company) artillery. Serving as heavy artillery—Bagley's company Virginia volunteers; Jordan's company Virginia volunteers; Montague's company Virginia volunteers; Otey's company Virginia volunteers.

## WILLIAMSBURG AND SPRATLEY'S.

COLONEL B. S. EWELL COMMANDING.

First Louisiana battery; Thirty-second Virginia, two companies; Fifty-third Virginia, one company.

## MATTHEWS COUNTY.

COLONEL J. G. BOHANNAN COMMANDING.

Sixty-first Virginia militia; Captain Todd's company Virginia cavalry.

## LEBANON CHURCH AND CAVALRY CAMPS.

(Near Yorktown.)

COLOLEL R. JOHNSTON COMMANDING.

Third Virginia (six companies) cavalry.

## JAMESTOWN ISLAND.

COLONEL HILL CARTER COMMANDING.

Fifty-second Virginia militia; First Virginia (one company) artillery; Jordan's independent company Virginia artillery; Rambaut's independent company Virginia artillery.



## SIEGE OF LEXINGTON, MISSOURI.

## OPERATIONS

FROM SEPTEMBER 10-20, 1861.

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL STERLING PRICE,  
Commanding Missouri State Guard.HEADQUARTERS MISSOURI STATE GUARD,  
CAMP WALLACE,  
LEXINGTON, MO., September 21, 1861.

I SUBMIT the following report of the action which terminated on the 20th instant with the surrender of the United States forces and property at this place to the army under my command:

After chastising the marauding armies of Lane and Montgomery and driving them out of the State, and after compelling them to abandon Fort Scott, as detailed in my last report, I continued my march toward this point with an army increasing hourly in numbers and enthusiasm.

On the 10th instant, just as we were about to encamp for the day a mile or two west of Rose Hill, I learned that a detachment of Federal troops and home guards were marching from Lexington to Warrensburg, to rob the bank in that place and plunder and arrest the citizens of Johnson county, in accordance with General Fremont's proclamation and instructions. Although my men were greatly fatigued by a number of days' continuous and rapid marching, I determined to press forward in order to surprise the enemy, if possible, at Warrensburg. Therefore, after resting a few hours, we resumed the march at sunset, and marched without intermission until 2 o'clock in the morning, when it became evident that the infantry, very few of whom had eaten a mouthful in twenty-two hours, could march no further. I then halted them, and went forward with the largest part of my mounted men until we came, about daybreak, within view of Warrensburg, where I ascertained that the enemy had hastily fled about midnight, burning the bridges behind them.

The rain began to fall about the same time. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that my men had been fasting for more than twenty-four hours, constrained me to abandon the idea of pursuing the enemy that day. My infantry and artillery having come up, we encamped at Warrensburg, whose citizens vied with each other in feeding my almost famished soldiers. An unusually violent storm delayed our march the next morning (September 12th) until about 10 o'clock. We then pushed forward rapidly, still hoping to overtake the enemy. Finding it impossible to do this with my infantry, I again ordered a detachment to move forward, and placing myself at their head continued the pursuit to within two and a half miles of Lexington, when, having learned that the enemy were already within town, and it being late and my men fatigued and utterly without provisions, I halted for the night.

About daybreak the next morning (September 13th) a sharp skirmish took place between our pickets and the enemy's outposts. This threatened to become general. Being unwilling, however, to risk a doubtful engagement when a short delay would make success certain, I fell back two or three miles and awaited the arrival of my infantry and artillery. These having come up, we advanced upon the town, driving the enemy's pickets until we came within a short distance of the city itself. Here the enemy attempted to make a stand, but they were speedily driven from every position and forced to take shelter within their intrenchments. We then took position within easy range of the college, which building they had strongly fortified, and opened upon them a brisk fire from Bledsoe's battery, which, in the absence of Captain Bledsoe, who had been wounded at Big Dry Wood, was gallantly commanded by Captain Emmett MacDonald, and by Parson's battery, under the skillful command of Captain Guibor.

Finding, after sunset, that our ammunition, the most of which had been left behind on the march from Springfield, was nearly exhausted, and that my men, thousands of whom had not eaten a particle in thirty-six hours, required rest and food, I withdrew to the fair-ground and encamped there. My ammunition wagons having been at last brought up, and large re-enforcements having been received, I again moved into town on Wednesday, the 18th instant, and began the final attack on the enemy's works.

Brigadier-General Rains' division occupied a strong position on the east and northeast of the fortifications, from which an effective cannonading was kept up on the enemy by Bledsoe's battery, under command, except on the last day, of Captain Emmett MacDonald, and another battery under command of Captain Churchill Clark, of St. Louis. Both these gentlemen, and the men and officers under their command, are deservedly commended in accompanying report of Brigadier-General Rains. General Parsons took a position southwest of the works, whence his battery, under command of Captain Guibor, poured a steady fire into the enemy. Skirmishers and sharpshooters

were also sent forward from both of these divisions to harass the enemy, as well as to cut them off from the water on the north, east and south of the college, and they did inestimable service in the accomplishment of these purposes.

Colonel Congreve Jackson's division and a part of General Steele's were posted near Generals Rains and Parsons as a reserve, but no occasion occurred to call them into action. They were, however, at all times vigilant and ready to rush upon the enemy.

Shortly after entering the city on the 18th, Colonel Rives, who commanded the Fourth Division in the absence of General Slack, led his regiment and Colonel Hughes' along the river bank to a point immediately beneath and west of the fortifications, General McBride's command and a portion of Colonel (General) Harris' having been ordered to re-enforce him. Colonel Rives, in order to cut off the enemy's means of escape, proceeded down the bank of the river to capture a steamboat which was lying just under their guns. At this moment a very heavy fire was opened upon him from Colonel Anderson's large dwelling-house on the summit of the bluffs, which the enemy were occupying as a hospital, and upon which a white flag was flying. Several companies of General Harris' command, and the gallant soldiers of the Fourth Division, who have won upon so many battlefields the proud distinction of always being among the bravest of the brave, immediately rushed upon and took the place. The important positions thus secured were within one hundred and twenty-five yards of the enemy's entrenchments. A company from Colonel Hughes' regiment then took possession of the boats, one of which was freighted with valuable stores.

General McBride's and General Harris' divisions meanwhile gallantly stormed and occupied the bluffs immediately north of Anderson's house. The possession of these heights enabled our men to harass the enemy so greatly that, resolving to regain them, they made upon the house a successful assault, and one which would have been honorable to them had it not been accompanied by an act of savage barbarity—the cold-blooded and cowardly murder of three defenseless men who had laid down their arms and surrendered themselves as prisoners.

The position thus retaken by the enemy was soon regained by the brave men who had been driven from it, and was thenceforward held by them to the very end of the contest. The heights to the left of Anderson's house, which had been taken, as before stated, by Generals McBride and Harris, and by part of Steele's command, under Colonel Boyd and Major Winston, were rudely fortified by our soldiers, who threw up breastworks as well as they could with their slender means.

On the morning of the 20th instant I caused a number of hemp bales to be transported to the river heights, where movable breastworks were speedily constructed out of them by Generals Harris and McBride, Colonel Rives and Major Winston, and their respective commands. Captain Kelly's battery (attached to General Steele's division) was ordered at the same time to the position occupied by General Harris' force, and quickly opened a very effective fire, under the direction of its gallant captain, upon the enemy.

These demonstrations, and particularly the continued advance of the hempen breastworks, which were as efficient as the cotton bales at New Orleans, quickly attracted the attention and excited the alarm of the enemy, who made many daring attempts to drive us back. They were, however, repulsed in every instance by the unflinching courage and fixed determination of our men.

In these desperate encounters the veterans of McBride's and Slack's divisions fully sustained their proud reputation, while Colonel Martin Green and his command, and Colonel Boyd and Major Winston and their commands, proved themselves worthy to fight by the side of the men who had by their courage and valor won imperishable honor in the bloody battle of Springfield.

After 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th, and after fifty-two hours of continuous firing, a white flag was displayed by the enemy on that part of the works nearest to Colonel Green's position, and soon after another was displayed opposite to Colonel Rives'. I immediately ordered a cessation of all firing on our part, and sent forward one of my staff officers to ascertain the object of the flag and to open negotiations with the enemy, if such should be their desire.

It was finally, after some delay, agreed by Colonel Marshall and the officers associated with him for that purpose by Colonel Mulligan, that the United States forces should lay down their arms and surrender themselves as prisoners of war to this army. These terms having been made known, were ratified by me and immediately carried into effect.

Our entire loss in this series of engagements amounts to twenty-five killed and seventy-two wounded. The enemy's loss was much greater.

The visible fruits of this almost bloodless victory are great—about 3,500 prisoners, among whom are Colonels Mulligan, Marshall, Peabody, White and Grover; Major Van Horn, and 118 other commissioned officers; five pieces of artillery and two mortars, over 3,000 stands of infantry arms, a large number of sabers, about 750 horses, many

sets of cavalry equipments, wagons, teams and ammunition, more than \$100,000 worth of commissary stores, and a large amount of other property. In addition to all this, I obtained the restoration of the great seal of the State and the public records, which had been stolen from their proper custodian, and about \$900,000 in money of which the bank at this place had been robbed, and which I have caused to be returned to it.

This victory has demonstrated the fitness of our citizen soldiers for the tedious operations of a siege as well as for a dashing charge. They lay for fifty-two hours in the open air without tents or covering, regardless of the sun and rain, and in the very presence of a watchful and desperate foe, manfully repelling every assault, and patiently awaiting any orders to storm the fortifications. No general ever commanded a braver or better army. It is composed of the best blood and the bravest men of Missouri.

Where nearly every one, officers and men, behaved so well, as is known to your Excellency, who was present with the army during the whole period embraced in this report, it is impossible to make special mention of individuals without seemingly making invidious distinctions; but I may be permitted to express my personal obligations to my volunteer aids, as well as my staff, for their efficient services and prompt attention to all my orders.

\* \* \* \* \*

STERLING PRICE,  
Major-General Commanding.

PAY OF OFFICERS, ENLISTED MEN, ETC.,  
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY.

General . . . . .	Per Month, \$500 00
Lieutenant-General . . . . .	450 00
Major-General . . . . .	350 00
Brigadier-General . . . . .	301 00
General commanding army, \$100 per month additional. A Lieutenant-General, Major-General and a Brigadier-General while serving in the field, \$50 per month additional.	

ENGINEER CORPS.	
Colonel . . . . .	Per Month, \$210 00
Major . . . . .	162 00
Captain . . . . .	140 00
First Lieutenant . . . . .	100 00
Second Lieutenant* . . . . .	90 00

ARTILLERY.	
Colonel . . . . .	Per Month, \$210 00
Lieutenant-Colonel . . . . .	185 00
Major . . . . .	150 00
Captain . . . . .	130 00
First Lieutenant . . . . .	90 00
Second Lieutenant* . . . . .	80 00

INFANTRY.	
Colonel . . . . .	Per Month, \$195 00
Lieutenant-Colonel . . . . .	170 00
Major . . . . .	150 00
Captain . . . . .	130 00
First Lieutenant . . . . .	90 00
Second Lieutenant* . . . . .	80 00

CAVALRY.	
Colonel . . . . .	Per Month, \$210 00
Lieutenant-Colonel . . . . .	185 00
Major . . . . .	162 00
Captain . . . . .	140 00
First Lieutenant . . . . .	100 00
Second Lieutenant* . . . . .	90 00

\* Lieutenants when serving as Adjutants, \$10 per month in addition to regular pay.

## OFFICERS OF GENERAL STAFF.

The pay of the officers of the general staff, except those of the medical department, shall be the same as that of the officers of cavalry of the same grade.

## ENLISTED MEN.—ENGINEER CORPS.

Sergeant, Major or Master-Workman . . . . .	Per Month, \$34 00
Quartermaster-Sergeant . . . . .	34 00
Sergeants . . . . .	34 00
Corporals or Overseer . . . . .	20 00
Privates—of the first class or Artificers, . . . . .	17 00
Privates—second class or laborers . . . . .	13 00
Musicians . . . . .	13 00

CAVALRY.	
Sergeant-Major . . . . .	Per Month, \$21 00
First Sergeants . . . . .	20 00
Sergeants . . . . .	17 00
Corporals, Farriers and Blacksmiths . . . . .	13 00
Musicians . . . . .	13 00
Privates . . . . .	12 00

## INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY.

Sergeant-Major . . . . .	Per Month, \$21 00
First Sergeants . . . . .	20 00
Sergeants . . . . .	17 00
Corporals and Artificers . . . . .	13 00
Musicians . . . . .	12 00
Privates . . . . .	11 00

Master Armorer, Master Carriage-maker, Master Blacksmith, \$34 per month; armorers, carriage-makers and blacksmiths, \$20 per month; artificers \$17, and laborers \$13 per month.





SIEGE OF LEXINGTON, MO., SEPTEMBER 13-20, 1861, RESULTING IN THE SURRENDER OF THE FEDERAL FORCES TO MAJOR-GENERAL STERLING PRICE, COMMANDING THE MISSOURI STATE GUARD.



THE BATTLE  
OF  
LEESBURG, BALL'S BLUFF AND  
EDWARD'S FERRY,

OCTOBER 21-22, 1861.

BY

BRIGADIER-GENERAL N. S. EVANS, C. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SEVENTH BRIGADE,  
LEESBURG, VA., October 31, 1861.

**I** SUBMIT the following report of the action of the Seventh Brigade in the battle of the 21st and 22d instant with the enemy at Leesburg, Va. On Saturday night, the 19th instant, about 7 o'clock P. M., the enemy commenced a heavy cannonading from three batteries, one playing on my intrenchment (known as Fort Evans), one on the Leesburg Turnpike and one on Edward's Ferry. Heavy firing was also heard in the direction of Dranesville.

tion till the enemy made further demonstration of the design of his attack. This force soon became warmly engaged with the enemy, and drove them back for some distance in the woods.

At about 10 o'clock I became convinced that the main point of attack would be at Ball's Bluff, and ordered Colonel Hunton with his regiment, the Eighth Virginia Volunteers, to repair immediately to the support of Colonel Jenifer. I directed Colonel Hunton to form line of battle immediately in the rear of Colonel Jenifer's command, and to drive the enemy to the river; that I would support his right with artillery. About 12:20 o'clock P. M. Colonel Hunton united his command with that of Colonel Jenifer, and both commands soon became hotly engaged with the enemy in their strong position in the woods.

Watching carefully the action, I saw the enemy was constantly being re-enforced, and at 2:30 o'clock P. M. I ordered Colonel Burt to march his regiment, the Eighteenth Mississippi Volunteers, and attack the left flank of the enemy, while Colonels Hunton and Jenifer attacked him in front. On arriving at his position, Colonel Burt was received with a tremendous fire from the enemy concealed in a ravine, and was compelled to divide his regiment to

At 8 o'clock P. M. the enemy surrendered his forces at Ball's Bluff, and the prisoners were marched to Leesburg. I then ordered my brigade (with the exception of the Thirtieth Mississippi Regiment, which remained in front of Edward's Ferry) to retire to the town of Leesburg and rest for the night.

On Tuesday morning I was informed by Colonel Barksdale that the enemy was still in considerable force at Edward's Ferry. I directed him to make a thorough reconnaissance of the position and strength of the enemy and attack him. At 2 o'clock P. M. he gallantly attacked a much superior force in their intrenchments, driving them to the bank of the river, killing thirty or forty and wounding a considerable number. About sundown, the enemy being strongly re-enforced and stationed in rifle-pits, Colonel Barksdale wisely retired with his regiment to Fort Evans, leaving a guard of two companies to watch the movements of the enemy, who, evidently expecting a renewed attack, retired during the night and recrossed the river at Edward's Ferry.

On Wednesday morning, finding my brigade very much exhausted, I left Colonel Barksdale, with his regiment, with two pieces of artillery and a cavalry force, as a grand



BATTLE OF BALL'S BLUFF, VIRGINIA. RETREAT OF THE FEDERALS.

At 12 o'clock at night I ordered my entire brigade to the Burnt Bridge, on the turnpike. The enemy had been reported as approaching from Dranesville in large forces. Taking a strong position on the north side of Goose Creek, I awaited his approach. Reconnoitering the turnpike on Sunday morning, the courier of General McCall was captured, bearing dispatches to General Meade to examine the roads leading to Leesburg. From this prisoner I learned the position of the enemy near Dranesville. During Sunday the enemy kept up a deliberate fire without any effect.

Early on Monday morning, the 21st instant, I heard the firing of my pickets at Big Spring, who had discovered that at an unguarded point the enemy had effected a crossing in force of five companies, and were advancing on Leesburg. Captain [W. L.] Duff, of the Seventeenth Regiment, immediately attacked him, driving him back, with several killed and wounded.

On observing the movements of the enemy from Fort Evans at 6 o'clock A. M., I found he had effected a crossing both at Edward's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, and I made preparations to meet him in both positions, and immediately ordered four companies of infantry (two of the Eighteenth, one of the Seventeenth and one of the Thirtieth) and a cavalry force to relieve Captain Duff; the whole force under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Jenifer, who was directed to hold the posi-

stop the flank movement of the enemy. At this time, about 3 o'clock, finding the enemy was in large force, I ordered Colonel Featherston with his regiment, the Seventeenth Mississippi, to repair at double-quick to the support of Colonel Burt, where he arrived in twenty minutes, and the action became general along my whole line, and was very hot and brisk for more than two hours, the enemy keeping up a constant fire with his batteries on both sides of the river. At about 6 o'clock P. M. I saw that my command had driven the enemy near the banks of the Potomac. I ordered my entire force to charge and to drive him into the river. The charge was immediately made by the whole command, and the forces of the enemy were completely routed, and cried out for quarter along his whole line.

In this charge the enemy was driven back at the point of the bayonet, and many killed and wounded by this formidable weapon. In the precipitate retreat of the enemy on the bluffs of the river many of his troops rushed into the water and were drowned, while many others in overloading the boats sunk them and shared the same fate. The rout now, about 7 o'clock, became complete, and the enemy commenced throwing his arms into the river. During this action I held Colonel W. Barksdale, with nine companies of his regiment, the Thirtieth Mississippi, and six pieces of artillery, as a reserve, as well as to keep up a demonstration against the force of the enemy at Edward's Ferry.

guard, and I ordered the other three regiments to fall back toward Carter's Mill to rest and to be collected in order. Colonel Hunton, with his regiment and two pieces of artillery, were halted at a strong position on the south bank of the Sycolin, about three miles south of Leesburg.

I would here state that in an interview on Monday night with the commissioned officers of the Federal army taken prisoners, I was convinced that they expected to be recaptured either during the night or the next day, and as the captured officers refused their parol not to take up arms against the Southern Confederacy till duly exchanged, I ordered the whole number to be immediately marched to Manassas. This parol was only offered to give them the liberty of the town, as I did not wish to confine them with privates.

The force of the enemy, as far as I have been able to ascertain, was five regiments and three pieces of artillery at Ball's Bluff, and four regiments, two batteries and a squadron of cavalry at Edward's Ferry, numbering in all about 8,000 troops. In addition to this force, three batteries of long-range were constantly firing on my troops from the Maryland side of the river.

The loss of the enemy, so far as known, is as follows: 1,300 killed, wounded and drowned; captured, 710 prisoners, 1,500 stand of arms, three pieces of cannon, one stand of colors, a large number of cartridge boxes, bayonet scabbards and a quantity of camp furniture. Among the killed



of the enemy was General Baker, formerly Senator from Oregon, and several other commissioned officers. Among the prisoners taken were twenty-two commissioned officers. General C. P. Stone commanded the Federal forces until 3 o'clock on the morning of the 22d, when he was superseded by Major-General N. P. Banks.

The engagement on our side was fought entirely with the musket. The artillery was in position to do effective service should the enemy have advanced from their cover. The enemy were armed with the minie musket, the Belgian gun and Springfield musket; a telescopic target rifle was also among the arms found. In closing my report I would call the attention of the general commanding to the heroism and gallantry displayed by the officers and men of the Seventh Brigade in the actions of the 21st and 22d of October. The promptness with which every commander obeyed, and the spirit with which their men executed, my orders to attack the enemy—in much superior force and in a position where he had great advantages—entitles them to the thanks of the Southern Confederacy. Without food or rest for more than twelve hours previous to the commencement of the battle, they drove an enemy four times their number from the soil of Virginia, killing and taking prisoners a greater number than our whole force engaged. To witness the patience, enthusiasm and devotion of the troops to our cause during an action of thirteen hours excited my warmest admiration.

As my entire brigade exceeded my most sanguine expectations in their intrepidity and endurance, I am unable to individualize any particular command, as the tenacity with which each regiment held their positions was equaled only by their undaunted courage and firm determination to conquer.

To my general staff I am much indebted. Major John D. Rogers, brigade quartermaster, was directed to conduct the baggage train beyond Goose Creek, which difficult duty was performed in the night with great regularity. Captain Orr, brigade commissary, was actively engaged in securing commissary stores and in providing cooked rations for the brigade. To my acting aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Charles B. Wildman, of the Seventeenth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, and my volunteer aid, Mr. William H. Rogers, I am particularly indebted for services on the field of battle. Lieutenant Wildman conducted the Eighteenth Regiment and Mr. Rogers the Seventeenth Regiment of Mississippi Volunteers to their respective positions in the action, and both repeatedly bore my orders under heavy fire. Captain A. L. Evans, assistant adjutant-general, though detained by other duty till 2 o'clock P. M., rendered valuable service. The medical staff, both brigade and regimental, were actively engaged during the day in removing the dead and wounded, and in patriotically administering relief to the dying on the field. I am pained to report the fall of the gallant Colonel E. R. Burt, of the Eighteenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers. He was mortally wounded about 4 o'clock P. M., while gallantly leading his regiment under a tremendous fire. His loss is truly severe to his regiment and to our common cause.

At about 2 o'clock P. M. on the 21st I sent a message to General R. L. Wright to bring his militia force to my assistance at Fort Evans. He reported to me in person that he was unable to get his men to turn out, though there were a great number in town and arms and ammunition were offered them.

The prisoners taken were sent to Manassas, under charge of Captain O. R. Singleton, Eighteenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, with his company, and Captain W. A. P. Jones, of the Seventeenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, and a detachment of cavalry, the whole under the command of Captain Singleton, who conducted 529 prisoners nearly twenty-five miles after the great fatigue of the battle.

\* \* \* \* \*

N. G. EVANS,  
Brigadier-General, Commanding Seventh Brigade.

#### CASUALTIES.

Return of casualties in the Seventh Brigade, First Corps, Army of the Potomac, at the battle of Leesburg (Ball's Bluff), Va., October 21 and 22, 1861:

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Thirteenth Mississippi . . . . .	1	3	2	2	1	1	7
Seventeenth Mississippi . . . . .	2	1	1	8	1	1	11
Eighteenth Mississippi * . . . .	22	7	56	1	1	1	85
Eighth Virginia † . . . . .	8	4	39	1	1	1	52
Total . . . . .	3	33	12	105	1	1	155

\* Colonel Burt, since dead.

† Three privates, since dead; one lieutenant captured.

## BOMBARDMENT

OF

## FORTS WALKER AND BEAUREGARD,

NOVEMBER 7, 1861.

BY

BRIG.-GEN. THOMAS F. DRAYTON, C. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS OF PROVISIONAL FORCES,  
THIRD MILITARY DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

CAMP LEE, HARDEEVILLE, November 24, 1861.

I HAVE the honor of presenting my official report of the engagement on the 7th instant between the Federal fleet, numbering fifteen war steamers and gunboats, and Forts Walker and Beauregard, upon Hilton Head and Bay Point, at the entrance of Port Royal Sound. The Fleet was commanded by Captain S. F. Dupont, flag officer of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, and the troops on board the transports by Brigadier-General [T. W.] Sherman. The distance between the forts is by Coast Survey two and five-eighths miles.

The enemy's fleet had been collecting in our waters since the morning of the 4th instant, and had increased in the afternoon to thirty-two war steamers and transports. On receiving a dispatch to this effect from Colonel William C. Heyward, commanding the troops at Camp Walker, I left my headquarters in Beaufort and repaired by steamer to Bay Point, which I reached at 6 P. M., passing on the way the ever-watchful little fleet of Flag Officer [Josiah] Tatnall, C. S. N.



BRIG.-GEN. THOMAS F. DRAYTON, OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

After remaining in consultation until 1:30 A. M. with Colonel R. G. M. Dunovant, commandant of the post, I took my departure, leaving him such general instructions as the uncertain mode and direction from which an attack might be expected would permit. I then visited Commodore Tatnall, and after an interchange of views took leave, crossed to Hilton Head Island, landed there at daylight on the 5th, and immediately dispatched a courier to Braddock's Point, south end of the island, ordering Captain Stuart's company, of Ninth Regiment, to march on Fort Walker, and embark thence to strengthen Captain Elliott's gunners in Fort Beauregard. This company did not leave on the 6th, as proposed, as Captain Sapord of the steamer Edith failed to comply with his orders to carry it across early in the morning. They were dispatched, however, by the first steamer at my disposal on the 7th, and before they had reached half-way across the bay they were cut off from Bay Point by the advancing fleet of the enemy, and obliged to seek shelter in Skull Creek, where Captain Stuart disembarked his whole command in safety.

On inspecting Fort Walker, shortly after my arrival, I found twenty guns, of various caliber, mounted upon the ramparts, thirteen of which were on the channel battery, viz., one 10-inch columbiad in the center, flanked to the right by five 32-pounders and one 9-inch Dahlgren rifle cannon, and to the left by six other cannon in the following order: one 32-pounder, one 8-inch columbiad, three 42-pounders and one rifled 24-pounder; north bastion, one 32-pounder; south bastion, one 32-pounder, one 8-inch howitzer and one long 12-pounder; south flank of bastion, one navy 32-pounder; demi-lune, two 24-pounders; redan, one navy 8-inch howitzer. Of these eight guns, one in the north bastion and two in the south flank could occasionally be used against the ships of war. The rest were for the land defense.

To man the guns within the fort, and for an infantry reserve outside, we had, until re-enforcements came from

Savannah on the afternoon of the 6th, two companies of Colonel Wagener's First Regiment Artillery, South Carolina Militia, numbering 152 men; three companies of Colonel Heyward's Ninth [Eleventh] Regiment, South Carolina Volunteers, 210 men; four companies of Colonel R. G. M. Dunovant's Twelfth Regiment, South Carolina Volunteers, under Major Jones, 260 men. Total, 622 men.

There were stationed on the beach at Camp Lookout, six miles off, Captain I. H. Screven's Mounted Guerrillas, numbering sixty-five, who acted as scouts and couriers.

About 9 o'clock A. M. of the 5th, Commodore Tatnall, who had boldly attacked the enemy's gunboats on the previous day, again gallantly steamed out to exchange shots with them, but he was met by too large a force, and therefore retired slowly behind our forts. The enemy followed and engaged both batteries for about forty-five minutes, with no other injury than three men slightly burned in Fort Beauregard from the explosion of a caisson struck by a rifle shell.

On the 6th instant the fleet and transports, which had increased to about forty-five sail, would probably have attacked us had not the weather been very boisterous. In the afternoon, about 4 o'clock, we received our first re-enforcements from Georgia, 450 infantry, under command of Captain Berry, C. S. A., and Captain Read's battery of two 12-pounder howitzers and fifty men.

I had reason for supposing that this assistance would have arrived sooner, for General A. R. Lawton, commanding provisional forces in Georgia, wrote from Savannah to Colonel W. C. Heyward, on the 4th instant, 8:30 P. M., as follows: "From a dispatch received to-day from General Ripley, I infer that you (Colonel W. C. Heyward) have been sufficiently re-enforced from his command until the plans of the enemy shall be more fully developed."

Two hours after the gallant Georgians came to the rescue, I received the welcome intelligence that Colonel De Saussure's Fifteenth Regiment, South Carolina Volunteers, 650 strong, had landed at Seabrook's Wharf, upon Skull Creek, and were close at hand. At last the memorable 7th dawned upon us bright and serene, not a ripple upon the broad expanse of water to disturb the accuracy of fire from the broad decks of that magnificent armada about advancing in battle array to vomit forth its iron hail with all the spiteful energy of long-suppressed rage and conscious strength. At 9:25 A. M. one 9-inch Dahlgren gun opened fire upon the steamship Wabash, flagship of Captain S. F. Dupont, which led the van, closely succeeded by fourteen other large steamers and gunboats. The shell from the Dahlgren exploded near the muzzle and was harmless. Other shots followed from both forts, and soon the fire became general on land and water. In spite of our fire, directed with deliberation and coolness, the fleet soon passed both batteries apparently unharmed, and then returning delivered in their changing rounds a terrific shower of shot and shell in flank and front.

Besides this moving battery, the fort was enfiladed by two gunboats anchored to the north of the mouth of Fish Hall Creek, and another at a point on the edge of the shoals to the south. This enfilading fire on so still a sea annoyed and damaged us excessively, particularly as we had no gun on either flank of the bastion to reply with, for the 32-pounder on the right flank was shattered very early by a round shot, and on the north flank, for want of a carriage, no gun had been mounted.

After the fourth fire the 10-inch columbiad bounded over the limber and became useless. The 24-pounder rifled cannon was choked while ramming down a shell, and lay idle during nearly the whole engagement. The shells for the 9-inch Dahlgren were also too large. The fourth shell attempted to be rammed home could not be driven below the trunnions, and was then at great risk discharged. Thus far the fire of the enemy had been endured and replied to with the unruffled courage of veterans. At 10:30 our gunners became so fatigued that I left the fort, accompanied by one of my volunteer aids, Captain H. Rose, and went back to Captain Read's battery (one and three-quarter miles in the rear of the fort) and brought the greater part of his men back to take the places of our exhausted men inside the fort. It was while thus engaged with Captain Read's company that Colonel W. H. Stiles rode up and reported his regiment about two miles off. I instantly directed my aid, Lieutenant Drayton, to accompany Colonel Stiles to the road along which his regiment was advancing, and to station it in position by the side of the other Georgia troops. On entering the fort with Captain Read's company they were cordially greeted by both officers and men.

The vigorous attack from the fleet continued unabated, with still no decided advantage to any of their ships. About 12:30 P. M. I again went out of the fort with my assistant adjutant-general, Captain Young, for the purpose of mustering together the infantry and reserves, and have them in readiness for any eventuality. Before leaving, however, I turned over the command to Colonel Heyward, with directions to hold out as long as any effective fire could be returned.

Having mounted our horses, we rejoined the troops



near Hospital No. 2. I received information through one of the vedettes that a steamer and small boats were sounding close to the beach. I detached Captain Berry, with three companies of his battalion, under the guidance of Captain Ephraim Barnard, volunteer aid, to watch the enemy, beat them back if they attempted to land, and give notice if he wanted support. I then, with some of my staff, rode to collect together the other troops, who, through ignorance of our island roads, had lost their way and had not yet come up. On the road leading to the wharf on Skull Creek, about one and one-fourth miles from Fort Walker, I unexpectedly met General Ripley and staff. Saluting him, I inquired if he visited the island to assume command, and whether he wished to go back with me into the fort. He said no, but that he would return to Coosa-whatchie to collect and bring back two or three regiments to my support. We then moved from under the fire of the ships to the shelter of some myrtles, where we could not be seen. I then stated to him the incidents of the morning; how the men had fought; that the day was going against us, and I was then collecting my forces for any emergency that might arise; and, if compelled to defend the island, it should be retained to the last extremity. We then parted, he taking the road toward the ferry, and I in pursuit of the purposes which brought me out of the fort.

On reaching my reserves at Hospital No. 2 I learned that the enemy had ceased making soundings, and had gone back to sea, whereupon I dispatched Captain Read to order Captain Berry to return from the beach.

Two o'clock had now arrived when I noticed our men coming out of the fort, which they had bravely defended for four and a half hours against fearful odds, and then only retiring when all but three of the guns on the water-front had been disabled, and only five hundred pounds of powder in the magazine, commencing the action with 220 men inside the fort, afterward increased to 255 by the accession from Read's battery. These heroic men retired slowly and sadly from their well-fought guns, which to have defended longer would have exhibited the energy of despair rather than the manly pluck of the true soldier.

The defense of this post involved a two-fold preparation, first, to repel the attack from the fleet, and secondly, an assault by the beach from the troops upon the transports. By the beach we had to provide against an attack from the north under cover of the bluff south of Fish Hall Creek, and from the south by the beach under cover of the woods, between where a picket of twenty-five men were posted, under Captain Paul H. Seabrook; and lastly, by the road leading from the beach to the second hospital. To guard against surprise either by Fish Hall Creek or by the beach, when I was returning to the fort with a portion of Captain Read's company, I at the same time led up Colonel De Saussure's regiment to the hollow west of the road and directed them to lie down. They were perfectly masked from the fire of the fort, but not from that of the fleet, for the watchmen at the mastheads gave notice of their position, compelling Colonel De Saussure after a short time to fall back under a heavy fire to a less dangerous locality.

Had the intrenched camp, with storehouses and magazines, been made in time several lives and large quantities of public property might have been saved; but it was impossible to have made this within the short time and with the diminutive force at my disposal, for on my arrival at headquarters in Beaufort on the night of the 17th of October the number of troops at Camp Walker was but 362, afterward increased on the 24th to 622 by the accession of four companies under Major Jones of the Twelfth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers. To this may be added the engineer force of some sixty men, who, with the soldiers, worked incessantly day and night. As for evidence of what they accomplished: The 8-inch columbiad on the water-front was only mounted on the 1st of November; one 8-inch howitzer, in the salient of the south bastion, mounted on the 4th; one 32-pounder, on the right flank of bastion, mounted on the 5th; one 8-inch howitzer, mounted on a ship carriage; embrasure cut through parapet of demi-lune on the night of the 5th; covered way and hot-shot furnace for 42-pounders, constructed of earth and dry masonry, on the morning of the 6th, together with wads of moss and hay for same; splinter proof, occupying only one-half terre-plein behind the principal traverse, was finished on the morning of the engagement (7th instant), the material not having arrived before the 4th instant. The retreat was commenced about 3 P. M. toward Ferry Point, about six miles off, Colonel De Saussure's regiment and Captain I. Read's company of artillery bringing up the rear. At 1:30 A. M., by the aid of Commodore Tatnall's fleet, the steamers St. Johns and Edisto, and three large flats, capable of holding 150 men each, the troops were

all safely embarked, without provisions, no ammunition but what was contained in the cartridge boxes (the 100,000 cartridges I had made requisition for, and been anxiously expecting, not having reached us until after the battle), and fearing that our retreat would be cut off by the enemy's gunboats at Skull Creek, no other alternative was left but to leave the island and concentrate upon the mainland, where we would be enabled to fight the enemy on more equal terms should he venture beyond the protection of his fleet and attack us there. The muskets captured by the enemy, with the exception of some ten or fifteen, were those left in the fort, shattered by shot and shell; others left in camp belonging to men on sick leave, or to those engaged in heating hot-shot furnaces two days before the fight, and some boxes of arms which had been left on the wharf the night before the battle, belonging to the sick men of Colonel De Saussure's regiment, who had been left behind at Lightwood Knot, and which could have been saved, with a box of swords, if the captains of the steamers Edisto and St. Johns had not refused to take them on board when directed to do so.

To Captain Tatnall, Flag Officer, C. S. N., and the officers and men of his little fleet, I can not too highly express my admiration of their intrepidity and hardihood in attacking the enemy's gunboats on the 4th and 5th instants. These encounters, by interrupting their soundings and the location of their buoys, no doubt prevented our being attacked on Tuesday, the 5th instant, before our re-enforcements reached us. I must acknowledge the assistance extended to us by the gallant Commodore

Beauregard. The rapid advance of the enemy's fleet, however, to the attack on the batteries cut off and compelled her, at the risk of being intercepted, to turn back and seek shelter in Skull Creek, on the shores of which Captain Stuart's company safely disembarked and joined me in the afternoon; and here again was exhibited another act of heroism on the part of our veteran commodore, who, in order to save the Emma, interposed his own frail flag steamer between her and the advancing flagship of Commodore Dupont, drawing upon himself her entire broadside, and thus diverting the huge leviathan temporarily from her course, secured the safety of the Emma at the peril of his own vessel. The non-arrival of any re-enforcements at Camp Walker until the night of the 6th instant also prevented me from sending the four companies of the Twelfth Regiment, South Carolina Volunteers, under Major Jones, to the support of the other six companies of the regiment at Bay Point.

The delays and dangers incident to the manner in which troops and supplies of all kinds were landed at the forts of Port Royal, and the absence of all means of retreat in case of disaster, had attracted my most serious attention immediately after I assumed command at Beaufort, on the evening of the 7th instant. I immediately took steps for remedying the first and providing for the last.

With the double object of landing supplies in all weather at Bay Point, and at the same time of furnishing the means of retreat beyond the range of the enemy's guns, I directed one of my volunteer aids, Captain T. R. S. Elliott, to make an examination of the adjacent creeks to the north of the fort. He reported that about three miles from the mouth of Moss Creek there was a depth of water sufficient for steamers drawing seven feet at low water, and that from thence a causeway of 300 yards over the marsh might easily be made, and furnish a sure means of transportation, and thus avoid the losses and delays which had previously occurred in landing from the steamers into flats upon the beach.

From the point above indicated in Moss Creek flats were to have been provided and stationed to convey the soldiers in case of emergency across the creek, thence by land to Station Creek, where other flats were to be placed for the same object as at Moss Creek. Landing at St. Helena, the transit to White Hall Ferry, opposite Beaufort, was comparatively safe.

On Hilton Head I also commenced repairing the wharf at Seabrook's Landing, on Skull Creek, with a view of transporting stores to Fort Walker when the weather was too boisterous to land them in the surf. The completion of the wharf was prevented, however, by the unexpected attack of the enemy, though in its incomplete state it had already been put to successful use. I succeeded, however, in obtaining from Charleston two flats and two troop boats, and from Savannah three large flats, capable of containing 150 men each, which reached Jenkins' Island Ferry in time to assist in embarking our troops on the night of the retreat. Three other smaller ones were sent at the same time to White Hall Ferry, which assisted in performing the same good offices for Colonel Duvant's command. The rest of the scheme, for want of time and flats, could not be carried out in the manner I intended.


For the purpose of sending messages between Forts Walker and Beauregard, and thence to my headquarters at Beaufort, I had prepared, by the assistance of Captain Lynah, another of my aids, a number of signal flags, the designs of which had already been prepared and painted, and only needed a few more days to have been put into operation.

In alluding as I have to these matters I do not mean to reflect upon any person, or to say these pressing wants could have been supplied anterior to the period when I entered upon my new duties. My design has been to exhibit the condition in which I found my command, and to show that I have left no effort untried to improve it.

#### CASUALTIES.

The following is a correct list of killed, wounded, missing and prisoners:

COMMAND.	Killed	Wounded	Captured	Missing	Aggregate
Fort Walker	10	20	..	..	30
Fort Beauregard	..	13	..	..	13
Fifteenth South Carolina	1	15	..	..	16
Sick in Hospital	..	..	3	..	3
Command not Stated	..	..	4	..	4
Total	11	48	3	4	66



PLAN OF FORT WALKER.

#### FORT BEAUREGARD.

with his boats on the night of our retreat from the island.

The attack upon the fort, though not so concentrated and heavy as that upon Walker, was, nevertheless, very severe. Its armament was nineteen guns, of which the following, viz., one 8-inch Rodman, bored to 24-pounder and rifled; two 42-pounders; one 10-inch columbiad; two 42-pounders, reamed to eight inches, and one 32-pounder in hot-shot battery, were the only guns capable of being used against the fleet.

The force on Bay Point was 640 men, commanded by Colonel R. G. M. Duvant, Twelfth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers. Of the above 149 garrisoned Fort Beauregard, under the immediate command of Captain Stephen Elliott, Jr., Beaufort Volunteer Artillery, Company A, Ninth Regiment, South Carolina Volunteers. The infantry force of Colonel Duvant's regiment was intrusted with the protection of the eastern part of the island, and of the defense of the bastion line at the Island Narrows, where an attack was expected from the enemy.

Knowing how small a force Captain Elliott had to command his batteries, I ordered, as soon as I reached Hilton Head, on the 5th instant, Captain Stuart's company (Hamilton Guards), Ninth [Company E, Eleventh] Regiment, South Carolina Volunteers, to march upon Fort Walker from Braddock's Point, and take thence the steamer Edith for Bay Point; but the unfortunate failure of Captain Sapord of the Edith to fulfill his appointment at the hour designated prevented me from rendering support to Captain Elliott as I desired. But on Thursday morning, 7th instant, having obtained the steamer Emma, I dispatched Captain Stuart's company on her to Fort



The heads of the quartermaster's and commissary's departments, Major E. Willis and Captain C. D. Owens, discharged their several duties with economy and fidelity. These officers and their assistants were unwearied, and earnest were their efforts to save the public property left at the headquarters in Beaufort. I must likewise make honorable mention of Colonel W. C. Heyward, Ninth [Eleventh] Regiment, South Carolina Volunteers, who commanded in Fort Walker and its vicinity, and who during the battle made the best use of the means at his disposal. Colonel John A. Wagener, First Regiment Artillery, South Carolina Militia, supported by Major Arthur M. Huger, of the same regiment, was placed in the immediate command of all the batteries, nine of which, upon the water-front, were manned by the German Artillery, Companies A and B, Captains H. Harms and D. Werner, First Regiment Artillery, South Carolina Militia, all of whom fought under the flag of their adopted country with an enthusiasm which could not have been surpassed had they been fighting in defense of their own fatherland.

The remaining four batteries on the left flank of the water-front were under direction of Captain Josiah Bedon's, Canady's and White's companies, Ninth [Eleventh] Regiment, South Carolina Volunteers. Major F. D. Lee, South

## BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

## HISTORICAL CORRESPONDENCE.

REPORTS OF GENERAL IRWIN McDOWELL, COMMANDING UNITED STATES FORCES.

CENTREVILLE, July 21, 1861—5:45 P. M.

We passed Bull Run. Engaged the enemy, who, it seems had just been re-enforced by General Johnston. We drove them for several hours, and finally routed them. They rallied and repulsed us, but only to give us again the victory, which seemed complete. But our men, exhausted with the fatigue and thirst, and confused by firing into each other, were attacked by the enemy's reserves, and driven from the position we had gained, overlooking Manassas. After this the men could not be rallied, but slowly left the field. In the meantime the enemy out-flanked Richardson at Blackburn's Ford, and we have now to hold Centreville till our men can get behind it.

IRWIN McDOWELL,  
Brigadier-General Commanding.  
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TOWNSEND.

## BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

## RETURN OF CAPTURES AND ABSTRACT OF FEDERAL PRISONERS TAKEN.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST CORPS,  
FAIRFAX COURTHOUSE, October 12, 1861.

Return of captured ordnance and ordnance stores turned in to Ordnance Department, Army of Potomac, up to August 16, 1861: One 30-pounder Parrott gun with three hundred rounds of ammunition; nine 10-pounder Parrott guns, with one hundred rounds of ammunition each; three 6-pounder brass guns, with one hundred rounds of ammunition each; three 12-pounder brass howitzers, with one hundred rounds of ammunition each; two 12-pounder boat howitzers, with one hundred rounds of ammunition each; nine James rifled field-pieces, with one hundred rounds of ammunition each; thirty-seven caissons, six traveling forges, four battery wagons, splendidly equipped; sixty-four artillery horses, with harness; 500,000 rounds small-arm ammunition, 4,500 sets accouterments, cartridge boxes, etc.; 4,000 muskets.

No accurate return of drums, swords, pistols, knap-



BOMBARDMENT OF FORT WALKER, S. C., NOVEMBER 7, 1861. INTERIOR VIEW OF THE FORT. [From an old sketch, the property of Mrs. Frank Leslie.]

Carolina Engineers and constructing engineer of Fort Walker, not only fought gallantly at the batteries, but afforded valuable assistance at other points in the work during the contest. Captain Joseph A. Yates, Battalion South Carolina Artillery, and acting ordnance officer, was zealous in the execution of all the duties assigned to him. Toward the close of the fight he was severely wounded. Dr. Ogier and his able assistants, Drs. W. C. Ravenel and William Elliott, a volunteer from Savannah, Ga., were present and rendered efficient service in the hospitals. I can not but regret the painful wound which has been the cause of the resignation of Dr. Ogier as medical director in my military district.

In conclusion, I can not but express my high appreciation of the gallant behavior of my aids, Captain Henry E. Young and Lieutenant J. E. Drayton, as also that of the gentlemen comprising my volunteer staff, Captains L. Cheves, H. Rose, E. Lynah, J. E. Eddings, J. I. Middleton, Jr., and Joseph A. Huger.

THOMAS F. DRAYTON,  
Brigadier-General Commanding.

"DON'T be uneasy," said an anxious mother to the conscript officer. "Sir, I'd rather see my son in his coffin than to see him go into the army." "Don't give yourself any uneasiness on that subject," said the officer; "I assure you that he will soon be there."

FAIRFAX COURTHOUSE, July 21, 1861.

The men have thrown away their haversacks in the battle and left them behind; they are without food; have eaten nothing since breakfast. We are without artillery ammunition. The larger part of the men are a confused mob—entirely demoralized. It was the opinion of all the commanders that no stand could be made this side of the Potomac. We will, however, make the attempt at Fairfax Courthouse. From a prisoner we learn that 20,000 from Johnston joined last night, and they march on us to-night.

IRWIN McDOWELL.  
COLONEL TOWNSEND.

FAIRFAX COURTHOUSE, July 22, 1861.

Many of the volunteers did not wait for authority to proceed to the Potomac, but left on their own decision. They are now pouring through this place in a state of utter disorganization. They could not be prepared for action by to-morrow morning even were they willing. I learn from prisoners that we are to be pressed here to-night and to-morrow morning, as the enemy's force is very large and they are elated. I think we heard cannon on our rear guards. I think now, as all my commanders thought at Centreville, there is no alternative but to fall back to the Potomac, and I shall proceed to do so with as much regularity as possible.

IRWIN McDOWELL.  
COLONEL TOWNSEND.

sacks, canteens, bridles, etc., can be obtained. One 6-pounder gun and one 12-pounder howitzer were found spiked, but they were easily withdrawn. One of the enemy's caissons exploded in the field, in addition to those captured.

Hospital equipments turned in up to August 16, 1861: five medicine chests, partially filled; six cases surgical instruments, two sets of panniers, seven ambulances.

Returns of litters, instruments, supplies, etc., are all very incomplete, so much having been appropriated by surgeons of regiments, etc., besides the loss from plundering by privates and citizens.

Quartermaster's stores turned in up to August 16, 1861: 870 axes, spades and intrenching tools, two sets carpenter's and blacksmith's tools, twelve sets harness, twenty-three extra traces for artillery, seven platform and other scales, 1,650 camp cooking utensils, 2,700 camp mess utensils, 302 pairs pantaloons, drawers and socks; 700 blankets, twenty-two tents and flies, twenty-one wagons, thirty-three horses, twenty-five trunks and carpet-bags, one coil rope.

SAID a Federal soldier the other day: "A Johnny Reb got away with me entirely one day after we captured him at Resaca. He said to me that they had found out how to fight us without getting fired at in return. They simply stood a negro upon the breastworks and fired at us from behind him. The result was that we did not fire back, for fear of killing the negro."



## BATTLE OF DRANESVILLE, VA.,

DECEMBER 20, 1861.

BY

BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, C. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS OUTPOSTS ARMY OF  
THE POTOMAC,

December 23, 1861.

ON the 20th instant I was placed in command of four regiments of infantry, 150 cavalry and a battery of four pieces of artillery, viz.: Eleventh Virginia, Colonel S. Garland, Jr.; Sixth South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Secrest; Tenth Alabama, Colonel J. H. Forney, and First Kentucky, Colonel Thomas H. Taylor; making an aggregate force of 1,600 infantry; Sumter Flying Artillery (four pieces), Captain A. S. Cutts; One Hundredth [V.] North Carolina Cavalry, Major Gordon, and Fifty-second [V.] Virginia Cavalry, Captain Pitzer, for the purpose of covering an expedition of all the wagons of our army that could be spared (after hay) to the left of Dranesville.

I proceeded at once by the nearest route, at daylight, toward Dranesville.

Knowing the situation of the enemy's advance posts, I sent the cavalry forward far in advance of the infantry, to take possession of the two turnpikes to the right of Dranesville, leading directly to the enemy's advanced posts, so as to prevent any communication of our movements reaching them, and with the main body I followed on to take a position with two regiments and a section of artillery on each turnpike, also to the right of Dranesville, and close enough to their intersection to form a continuous line.

Such a position I knew I could hold against almost any odds, but as my cavalry came in sight of the turnpike Captain Pitzer discovered the enemy on the ridge and sent me word immediately. I galloped forward at once, and, reconnoitering for myself, found that a portion of the enemy was in possession of the ridge, and I could hear distinctly artillery carriages passing up the Georgetown turnpike in considerable numbers, and presently saw the cannons, mounted on limber boxes, passing up toward Dranesville. I knew, too, that the enemy's infantry were in advance, and I at once suspected that he was either marching upon Leesburg or had received intelligence through a spy of our intended forage expedition and was marching upon it. In either case our wagons would have fallen an easy prey to him, and I saw at once that my only way to save them was to make a vigorous attack upon his rear and left flank, and to compel him to desist from such a purpose.

I sent back for the infantry to hurry forward, and sent Captain Pitzer with his detachment of cavalry to gain the roads toward Leesburg, give notice to our wagons to return at once to camp and keep between them and the enemy, threatening his front and flank; and I will state here, parenthetically, that this duty was performed by Captain Pitzer and his gallant little detachment in the most creditable manner, all our wagons reaching camp safely.

In the meantime the enemy's skirmishers took possession of the dense pine in our front, and as our infantry was met by my messenger three-fourths of a mile back, it was some time coming up. Colonel Garland's regiment, leading, was directed to deploy two companies on each side of the road to clear the ground of the enemy's skirmishers. One of these companies, having mistaken its direction, went too far to the right, and Colonel Garland had to replace it with another. The pines were cleared at double-quick, and the battery was ordered in position and fired very effectively during the whole of the engagement to the front.

The infantry were placed in position as follows: Garland's regiment on the right of the road, a little in advance of the artillery; Secrest's (South Carolina) on the left of the road. Forney's regiment, arriving later, replaced Garland's, which moved by the flank to the right; and the First Kentucky, Colonel Taylor, at first intended as a reserve, was ordered to take position on the Sixth South Carolina.

As our infantry was well secured from the enemy's view, their artillery fire, which opened about fifteen minutes after ours began, had little effect upon the infantry, but played with telling effect along the road, as from its position and the straightness of the road in our rear, it raked the latter with shell and round shot completely. Their caissons and limbers were behind in a brick house, completely protected from our shot, while our limbers and caissons were necessarily crowded and exposed. There was no outlet to right or left for a mile back by which the artillery could change its position. When our forces took their position the fire of the artillery caused great commotion in the enemy's lines, and a part evidently took to their heels. The right wing was ordered forward, and the

Tenth Alabama rushed with a shout in a shower of bullets, under the gallant lead of their colonel (Forney) and Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, the latter falling in the charge. A part of this regiment crossed the road and took position along a fence, from which the enemy felt the truthness of their aim at short range. The colonel was here severely wounded, and had to retire. In his absence the command devolved upon Major Woodward.

The Eleventh Virginia, holding position on the right of the Tenth Alabama, were not so much exposed to the fire of the enemy, and consequently suffered less. The Sixth South Carolina gradually gained ground also to the front, and being, together with the Tenth Alabama, exposed to the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters from a two-story brick house, suffered most. My orders to Colonel Taylor, First Kentucky, were given through Colonel Forney, and I soon knew by the commotion on my left that it was in place. The thicket where the Sixth South Carolina and First Kentucky operated was so dense that it was impossible to see either their exact position or their progress in the fight, and I regret to say that the First Kentucky and the Sixth South Carolina mistook each other for the enemy, and a few casualties occurred in consequence; but with that exception the whole force acted with admirable unison, and advanced upon the enemy with the steadiness of veterans, driving him several times from his position with heavy loss. When the action had lasted about two hours I found that the enemy, being already in force larger than my own, was recovering from his disorder and receiving heavy re-enforcements. I could not, with my small number, being beyond the reach of re-enforcements, force his position without fearful sacrifice, and seeing that his artillery, superior to ours in numbers and position only, was pouring a very destructive fire into Cutt's bat-



MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, OF VIRGINIA.

tery, I decided to withdraw the latter at once, preparatory to retiring from the field, judging, too, that I had given our wagons sufficient time to get beyond the reach of the enemy.

The battery suffered greatly. Its position was necessarily such that it could fire only to the front, and the caissons and limbers had no cover whatever from such a fire. Three or four cannoneers had been shot at their posts and several wounded, and every shot of the enemy was dealing destruction on either man, limber or horse.

The conduct of the brave, true and heroic Cutts attracted my admiration frequently during the action—now acting No. 1 and now as gunner, and still directing and disposing the whole with perfect self-command and a devotion to his duty that was, I believe, scarcely ever equaled. He executed my orders to withdraw his battery under a ricochet fire of great accuracy.

One piece I found it necessary to detail some infantry (Eleventh Virginia) to assist in conducting to the rear, which was done by them under great personal exposure.

Having secured the artillery, I sent orders to the four regimental commanders to disengage themselves from the enemy and retire slowly and in perfect order to the railroad, where a stand would be made. This delicate duty was performed admirably, and our troops marched back leisurely, bringing with them all the wounded that could be found.

The men gathered up their blankets as they passed the points where they had been deposited before the fight. I regret to say, however, that one of the regiments reached the road this side of their blankets and knapsacks, thus missing them entirely, a circumstance which the enemy will construe into precipitate flight. The enemy was evidently too much crippled to follow in pursuit, and after a short halt at the railroad I proceeded to Fryingpan Church, where the wounded were cared for.

Early next morning, with the two fresh regiments fur-

nished me (the Ninth Georgia and Eighteenth Virginia) and a detachment of cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Baker, I proceeded toward the scene of action of the previous day, the cavalry being sent in advance. Learning that the enemy had evacuated Dranesville and had left some of our wounded there, I pushed on to that place to recover them and to take care of the dead. I found our dead on the field, and proceeded at once to remove them all to Centreville for interment. The wounded (about ten) were left by the enemy at a house at Dranesville, who intended to send for them the next day. They had been cared for with the utmost devotion by several of the ladies of the place. They were also removed to Centreville, except two, who were not able to survive the removal, and so, at their own desire and on the surgeon's advice, were left in charge of the ladies.

As to the strength of the enemy, if the concurrent statements of the citizens residing along his route of march can be credited, he had fifteen regiments of infantry, several batteries and seven companies of cavalry. The latter had started in the direction of our wagons just before the action began, but were then recalled.

Our wounded, who were for the time prisoners, say that the enemy's loss was acknowledged by them to be very heavy, and among the officers killed or mortally wounded was Colonel Kane, of Utah notoriety, and citizens living below declared that they carried off twenty wagon loads of killed and wounded, besides many dead before them on their horses, and that as soon as their dead and wounded were removed they left the field precipitately, leaving behind much of the material which we left on the field, but which we recovered next day.

I can not speak in too high terms of Colonel Forney, that gallant son of Alabama, whose conspicuous bravery, leading his men in a galling fire, was the admiration of all; nor of his lieutenant-colonel (Martin), who, with the battle cry of "Forward!" on his lips, fell, bravely encouraging his men. Nor can I do more than simple justice to the officers and men of that regiment, who seemed determined to follow their colonel wherever he would lead.

Colonel Garland and Major Langhorne, of the Eleventh Virginia, behaved with great coolness under fire, and the men of that regiment, though deprived by locality from sharing as much of the danger of the engagement as the Tenth Alabama Regiment, yet acquitted themselves to my entire satisfaction.

The Sixth South Carolina and First Kentucky were, I regret to say, too much screened from my view to afford me the privilege of bearing witness by personal observation of individual prowess; but that the Sixth South Carolina, under the fearless Secrest, did its whole duty, let the list of killed and wounded and her battle flag, bathed in blood, with its staff shivered in the hand of the bearer, be silent but eloquent witnesses. Their major (Woodward) was painfully wounded, but bore himself heroically notwithstanding. From the sounds that I could distinctly hear from the left I felt assured that the First Kentucky, under the gallant Taylor, the intrepid Major Crossland and daring Desha, was all right.

Our batteries' loss in killed and wounded was great, and the men deserve great credit for their devotion to their pieces under such perilous circumstances. The detachment of North Carolina Cavalry, under Major Gordon, was of great service in watching the approaches to our flanks, though the ground was extremely unfavorable for cavalry.

Had we effected the safety of our wagons—constituting the greater part of the available means of transportation of this army—with great loss to ourselves, without inflicting much on the enemy, alone would have been a triumph of which the brave men of the four regiments under my command could be proud; but when it is considered what overwhelming odds were against us, notwithstanding which we saved the transportation, inflicted upon the enemy a loss severer than our own, rendering him unequal to the task of pursuit, retired in perfect order and bringing with us nearly all our wounded, we may rightly call it a glorious success. Our entire loss is as follows:

COMMANDS.	Killed	Wounded	Missing
Eleventh Virginia Volunteers	6	15	..
Sixth South Carolina Volunteers	18	45	..
Tenth Alabama Volunteers	15	45	6
First Kentucky Volunteers	1	23	2
Cutt's Battery	3	15	..
Cavalry	..	..	..
Total	43	143	8

The list of killed has been materially increased by deaths which have occurred since the battle, as the number found dead on the field was only twenty-seven.

J. E. B. STUART,  
Brigadier-General Commanding.



## BOMBARDMENT OF FORT HENRY,

FEBRUARY 6, 1862.

BY

BRIG.-GEN. LLOYD TILGHMAN, C. S. A.,  
Commanding Fort Henry.

RICHMOND, VA., August 9, 1862.

ON Monday, February 3d, in company with Major Gilmer, of the engineers, I completed the inspection of the main work as well as outworks at Fort Heiman, south of Tennessee River, as far as I had been able to perfect them, and also the main work, intrenched camp and exterior line of rifle-pits at Fort Henry. At 10 A. M. on that morning (the pickets on both sides of the Tennessee river extended well in our front, having reported no appearance of the enemy), I left, in company with Major Gilmer, for Fort Donelson, for the purpose of inspecting with him the defenses of that place. Tuesday, the 4th instant, was



BRIG.-GEN. LLOYD TILGHMAN, OF KENTUCKY.  
[Killed at Champion's Hill, Mississippi, May 16, 1863.]

spent in making a thorough examination of all the defenses at Fort Donelson. At noon I heard heavy firing at Fort Henry for half an hour. At 4 P. M. a courier reached me from Colonel Heiman, at Fort Henry, informing me that the enemy was landing in strong force at Bailey's Ferry, three miles below, and on the east bank of the river.

Delaying no longer than was necessary to give all proper orders for the arrangement of matters at Fort Donelson, I left with an escort of Tennessee cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Gantt, for Fort Henry, accompanied by Major Gilmer, reaching that place at 11:30 P. M. I soon became satisfied that the enemy was really in strong force at Bailey's Ferry, with every indication of re-enforcements arriving constantly. Colonel Heiman, of the Tenth Tennessee, commanding, with most commendable alacrity and good judgment, had thrown forward to the outworks covering the Dover Road two pieces of light artillery, supported by a detachment from the Fourth Mississippi Regiment, under the command of Captain W. C. Red. Scouting parties of cavalry, operating on both sides of the river, had been pushed forward to within a very short distance of the enemy's lines. Without a moment's delay after reaching the fort I proceeded to arrange the available force to meet whatever contingency might arise.

The First Brigade, under Colonel Heiman, was composed of the Tenth Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel MacGavock commanding; the Twenty-seventh Alabama, under Colonel Hughes; the Forty-eighth Tennessee, under Colonel Voorhies; light battery of four pieces, commanded by Captain Culbertson, and the Tennessee battalion of cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gantt. Total, officers and men, 1,444. The Second Brigade, Colonel Joseph Drake (Fourth Mississippi Regiment) commanding, was composed of the Fourth Mississippi, under Major Adaire; the Fifteenth Arkansas, Colonel Gee; the Fifty-first Tennessee, Colonel Browder; the Alabama Battalion, Major Garvin; a light battery of three pieces, under Captain Crain; the Alabama battalion of cavalry; Captain Milner's company of cavalry, with Captain Padgett's spy company, and a detachment of rangers, under Acting Captain Milton. Total, officers and men, 1,215. The heavy artillery, under the command of Captain Taylor, numbering seventy-five men, were placed at the guns in Fort Henry.

As indicated some time since to the general commanding the department, I found it impossible to hold the commanding ground south of the Tennessee River with the small force of badly armed men at my command, and, not-

withstanding the fact that all my defenses were commanded by the high ground on which I had commenced the construction of Fort Heiman, I deemed it proper to trust to the fact that the extremely bad roads leading to that point would prevent the movement of heavy guns by the enemy, by which I might be annoyed, and, leaving the Alabama battalion of cavalry and Captain Padgett's spy company on the western bank of the river, transferred the force encamped on that side to the opposite bank. At the time of receiving the first intimation of the approach of the enemy the Forty-eighth and Fifty-first Tennessee regiments, having only just reported, were encamped at Danville and at the mouth of Sandy River, and had to be moved from five to twenty miles in order to reach Fort Henry. This movement, together with the transfer of the Twenty-seventh Alabama and Fifteenth Arkansas regiments from Fort Heiman across the river, was all perfected by 5 A. M. on the morning of the 5th.

Early on the morning of the 5th the enemy was plainly to be seen at Bailey's Ferry, three miles below. The large number of heavy transports reported by our scouts gave evidence of the fact that the enemy was there in force, even at that time, and the arrival every hour of additional boats showed conclusively that I should be engaged with a heavy force by land, while the presence of seven gunboats and fifty-four guns indicated plainly that a joint attack was contemplated by land and water.

On leaving Fort Donelson I ordered Colonel Head to hold his own and Colonel Sugg's regiments, Tennessee Volunteers, with two pieces of artillery, ready to move at a moment's warning, with three days' cooked rations, and without camp equipage or wagon train of any kind, except enough to carry the surplus ammunition.

On the morning of the 5th I ordered him, in case nothing more had been heard from the country below, on the Cumberland, at the time of the arrival of my messenger, indicating an intention on the part of the enemy to invest Fort Donelson, to move out with the two regiments and the two pieces of artillery and take position at the Furnace, half way on the Dover Road to Fort Henry. The force embraced in this order was about 750 men, to act as circumstances might dictate.

Thus matters stood at 9 A. M. on the morning of the 5th. The wretched military position of Fort Henry and the small force at my disposal did not permit me to avail myself of the advantages to be derived from the system of outworks built with the hope of being re-enforced in time, and compelled me to determine to concentrate my efforts by land within the rifle-pits surrounding the camp of the Tenth Tennessee and Fourth Mississippi regiments in case I deemed it possible to do more than operate solely against the attack by the river. Accordingly, my entire command was paraded and placed in the rifle-pits around the above camps, and minute instructions given, not only to brigades, but to regiments and companies, as to the exact ground each was to occupy. Seconded by the able assistance of Major Gilmer, of the engineers, of whose valuable service I thus early take pleasure in speaking, and by Colonels Heiman and Drake, everything was arranged to make a formidable resistance against anything like fair odds.

It was known to me on the day before that the enemy had reconnoitered the roads leading to Fort Donelson from Bailey's Ferry by way of Iron Mountain Furnace, and at 10 A. M. on the 5th I sent forward from Fort Henry a strong reconnoitering party of cavalry. They had not advanced more than one and a half miles in the direction of the enemy when they encountered their reconnoitering party. Our cavalry charged them in gallant style, upon which the enemy's cavalry fell back, with a loss of only one man on each side. Very soon the main body of the Federal advance guard, composed of a regiment of infantry and a large force of cavalry, was met, upon which our cavalry retreated.


On receipt of this news I moved out in person with five companies of the Tenth Tennessee, five companies of the Fourth Mississippi and fifty cavalry, ordering at the same time two additional companies of infantry to support Captain Red at the outworks. Upon advancing well to the front I found that the enemy had retired. I returned to camp at 5 P. M., leaving Captain Red re-enforced at the outworks. The enemy was again re-enforced by the arrival of a number of large transports.

At night the pickets from the west bank reported the landing of troops on that side (opposite Bailey's Ferry), their advance picket having been met one and a half miles from the river. I at once ordered Captain Hubbard, of the Alabama cavalry, to take fifty men, and, if possible, surprise them. The inclemency of the weather, the rain having commenced to fall in torrents, prevented anything being accomplished. Early on the morning of the 6th Captain Padgett reported the arrival of five additional transports over night, and the landing of a large force on the west bank of the river at the point indicated above. From that time up to 9 o'clock it appeared as though the force on the east bank was again re-enforced, which was subsequently proven to be true.

The movements of the fleet of gunboats at an early hour prevented any communication, except by a light barge, with the western bank, and by 10 A. M. it was plain that the boats intended to engage the fort with their entire force, aided by an attack on our right and left flanks from the two land forces in overwhelming numbers. To understand properly the difficulties of my position it is right that I should explain fully the unfortunate location of Fort Henry in reference to resistance by a small force against an attack by land co-operating with the gunboats, as well as its disadvantages in even an engagement with boats alone. The entire fort, together with the intrenched camp spoken of, is enfiladed from three or four points on the opposite shore, while three points on the eastern bank completely command them both, all at easy cannon range. At the same time the intrenched camp, arranged as it was in the best possible manner to meet the case, was two-thirds of it completely under the control of the fire of the gunboats. The history of military engineering records no parallel to this case. Points within a few miles of it, possessing great advantages and few disadvantages, were totally neglected, and a location fixed upon without one redeeming feature, or filling one of the many requirements of a site for a work such as Fort Henry. The work itself was well built; it was completed long before I took command, but strengthened greatly by myself in building embrasures and epaulements of sand bags. An enemy had but to use their most common sense in obtaining the advantage in high water, as was the case, to have complete and entire control of this position.

I am guilty of no act of injustice in this frank avowal of the opinions entertained by myself, as well as by all other officers who have become familiar with the location of Fort Henry; nor do I desire the defects of location to have an undue influence in directing public opinion in relation to the battle of the 6th instant. The fort was built when I took charge, and I had no time to build anew. With this seeming digression, rendered necessary, as I believe, to a correct understanding of the whole affair, I will proceed with the details of the subsequent movements of the troops under my command.

By 10 A. M. on the 6th the movements of the gunboats and land force indicated an immediate engagement, and in such force as gave me no room to change my previously conceived opinions as to what, under such circumstances, should be my course. The case stood thus: I had at my command a grand total of 2,610 men, only one-third of whom had been at all disciplined or well armed. The high water in the river filling the sloughs gave me but one route by which to retire, if necessary, and that route for some distance in a direction at right angles to the line of approach of the enemy, and over roads well-nigh impassable for artillery, cavalry or infantry. The enemy had seven gunboats, with an armament of fifty-four guns, to engage the eleven guns at Fort Henry. General Grant



MAP OF FORT HENRY.

was moving up the east bank of the river from his landing, three miles below, with a force of 12,000 men, verified afterward by his own statement; while General Smith, with 6,000 men, was moving up the west bank, to take a position within four or five hundred yards, which would enable him to enfilade my entire works.

The hopes (founded on a knowledge of the fact that the enemy had reconnoitered on the two previous days thoroughly the several roads leading to Fort Donelson) that a portion only of the land force would co-operate with the gunboats in an attack on the fort were dispelled, and but little time left me to meet this change in the circumstances which surrounded me. I argued thus: Fort Donelson might possibly be held, if properly re-enforced, even though Fort Henry should fall; but the reverse of this proposition was not true. The force at Fort Henry was necessary to aid Fort Donelson, either in making a suc-



cessful defense, or in holding it long enough to answer the purpose of a new disposition of the entire army from Bowling Green to Columbus, which would necessarily follow the breaking of our center, resting on Forts Donelson and Henry. The latter alternative was all that I deemed possible. I knew that re-enforcements were difficult to be had, and that unless sent in such force as to make the defense certain, which I did not believe practicable, the fate of our right wing at Bowling Green depended upon a concentration of my entire division on Fort Donelson and the holding of that place as long as possible, trusting that the delay by an action at Fort Henry would give time for such re-enforcements as might reasonably be expected to reach a point sufficiently near Fort Donelson to co-operate with my division, by getting to the rear and right flank of the enemy, and in such a position as to control the roads over which a safe retreat might be effected. I hesitated not a moment. My infantry, artillery and cavalry, removed of necessity, to avoid the fire of the gunboats, to the outworks, could not meet the enemy there; my only chance was to delay the enemy every moment possible, and retire the command, now outside the main work, toward Fort Donelson, resolving to suffer as little

deliberation, steadily closed upon the fort, firing very wild until within 1,200 yards. The cool deliberation of our men told from the first shot, fired with tremendous effect. At 12:35 P. M. the bursting of our 24-pounder rifled gun disabled every man at the piece. This great loss was to us in a degree made up by our disabling entirely the Essex gunboat, which at once floated downstream. Immediately after the loss of this valuable gun we sustained another loss, still greater, in the closing up of the vent of the 10-inch columbiad, rendering that gun perfectly useless and defying all efforts to reopen it. The fire on both sides was now perfectly terrific. The enemy's entire force was engaged, doing us but little harm, while our shot fell with unerring certainty upon them, and with stunning effect. At this time a question presented itself to me with no inconsiderable degree of embarrassment. [The moment had arrived when I should join the main body of troops retiring toward Fort Donelson, the safety of which depended upon a protracted defense of the fort. It was equally plain that the gallant men working the batteries, for the first time under fire, with all their heroism, needed my presence. Colonel Heiman, the next in command, had returned to the fort for instructions. The men working the heavy guns were

great effect from the beginning of the action. I gave the flagship Cincinnati two shots, which had the effect to check a movement intended to enfilade the only guns now left me. It was very plain to be seen that the enemy were breaching the fort directly in front of our guns, and that I could not much longer sustain their fire without an unjustifiable exposure of the valuable lives of the men who had so nobly seconded me in this unequal struggle.

Several of my officers, Major Gilmer among the number, now suggested to me the propriety of taking the subject of a surrender into consideration. Every moment I knew was of vast importance to those retreating on Fort Donelson, and I declined, hoping to find men enough at hand to continue awhile longer the fire now so destructive to the enemy. In this I was disappointed. My next effort was to try the experiment of a flag of truce, which I waved from the parapets myself. This was precisely at 1:50 P. M. The flag was not noticed, I presume from the dense smoke that enveloped it, and leaping again into the fort, I continued the fire for five minutes, when, with the advice of my brother officers, I ordered the flag to be lowered, and, after an engagement of two hours and ten minutes with such an unequal force, the surrender was made to Flag Officer



FORT HENRY. BURSTING OF A TWENTY-FOUR-POUND GUN DURING THE BOMBARDMENT, FEBRUARY 6, 1862.

loss as possible. I retained only the heavy artillery company to fight the guns, and gave the order to commence the movement at once.

At 10:15 o'clock Lieutenant-Colonel MacGavock sent a messenger to me, stating that our pickets reported General Grant approaching rapidly and within half a mile of the advance work, and movements on the west bank indicated that General Smith was fast approaching also. The enemy, ignorant of any movement of my main body, but knowing that they could not engage them behind our intrenched camp until after the fort was reduced or the gunboats retired, without being themselves exposed to the fire of the latter, took a position north of the forks of the River Road, in a dense wood (my order being to retreat by way of the Stewart Road), to await the result.

At 11 A. M. the flotilla assumed their line of battle. I had no hope of being able successfully to defend the fort against such overwhelming odds, both in point of numbers and in caliber of guns. My object was to save the main body by delaying matters as long as possible, and to this end I bent every effort. At precisely 11:45 A. M. the enemy opened from their gunboats on the fort. I waited a few moments until the effects of the first shots of the enemy were fully appreciated. I then gave the order to return the fire, which was gallantly responded to by the brave little band under my command. The enemy, with great

becoming exhausted with the rapid firing. Another gun became useless by an accident, and yet another by the explosion of a shell immediately after, striking the muzzle, involving the death of two men and disabling several others. The effect of my absence at such a critical moment would have been disastrous. At the earnest solicitation of many of my officers and men I determined to remain, and ordered Colonel Heiman to join his command and keep up the retreat in good order, while I should fight the guns as long as one man was left, and sacrifice myself to save the main body of my troops.

No sooner was this decision made known than new energy was infused. The enemy closed upon the fort to within 600 yards, improving very much in their fire, which now began to tell with great effect upon the parapets, while the fire from our guns (now reduced to seven) was returned with such deliberation and judgment that we scarcely missed a shot. A second one of the gunboats retired, but I believe was brought into action again.

At 1:10 P. M. so completely broken down were the men that but for the fact that four only of our guns were then really serviceable I could not well have worked a greater number. The fire was still continued with great energy and tremendous effect upon the enemy's boats.

At 1:30 P. M. I took charge of one of the 32-pounders, to relieve the chief of that piece, who had worked with

Foot, represented by Captain Stembel, commanding the gunboat Cincinnati, and was qualified by the single condition that all officers should retain their side arms, and both officers and men should be treated with the highest consideration due prisoners of war, which was promptly and gracefully acceded to by Commodore Foote.

The retreat of the main body was effected in good order, though involving the loss of about twenty prisoners, who from sickness and other causes were unable to encounter the heavy roads. The rear of the army was overtaken at a distance of some three miles from Fort Henry by a body of the enemy's cavalry, but, on being engaged by a small body of our men, under Major Garvin, were repulsed and retired.

This fact alone shows the necessity of the policy pursued by me in protracting the defense of the fort as long as possible, which only could have been done by my consenting to stand by the brave little band. No loss was sustained by our troops in this affair with the enemy.

I have understood from the prisoners that several pieces of artillery also were lost, it being impossible to move them over four or five miles with the indifferent teams attached to them.

The entire absence of transportation rendered any attempt to move the camp equipage of the regiments impossible. This may be regarded as fortunate, as the roads



were utterly impassable, not only from the rains, but the back water of the Tennessee River. A small amount of quartermaster's and commissary stores, and what was left of the ordnance stores, were lost to us also.

The tents of the Alabama regiment were left on the west bank of the river, the gunboats preventing an opportunity to cross them over.

Our casualties may be reported strictly as follows: Killed by the enemy, two; wounded severely by the enemy (one since dead), three; wounded slightly by the enemy, two; killed by premature explosion, two; wounded seriously by premature explosion, one; slightly wounded, one; temporarily disabled by explosion of rifle gun, five. Making total killed, five; seriously wounded, three; slightly wounded, three; disabled, five; missing, five. Total casualties, twenty-one. The total casualties of the enemy were stated in my presence on the following morning to be seventy-three, including one officer of the Essex killed, and Captain Porter, commanding the Essex, badly scalded. The enemy report the number of shots that struck their vessels to have been seventy-four, twenty-eight of which struck the flagship Cincinnati, so disabling her as to compel her to return to Cairo. The Essex received twenty-two shots, one of which passed, we know, entirely through the ship, opening one of her boilers and taking off the head of Captain Porter's aid-de-camp. Several shots passed entirely through the Cincinnati, while her outer works were completely riddled. The weak points in all their vessels were known to us, and the cool precision of our firing developed them, showing conclusively that this class of boats, though formidable, can not stand the test of even the 32-pounders, much less the 24-caliber rifled shot or that of the 10-inch columbiad. It should be remembered that these results were principally from no heavier metal than the ordinary 32-pounders, using solid shot, being fired at point-blank, giving the vessels all the advantages of their peculiar structure, with planes meeting this fire at angles of forty-five degrees. The immense area forming what may be called the roof is in every respect vulnerable to either a plunging fire from even 32-pounders or a curved line of fire from heavy guns. In the latter case shell should be used in preference to shot.

Confident of having performed my whole duty to my government in the defense of Fort Henry with the totally inadequate means at my disposal, I have but little to add in support of the views before expressed. The reasons for the line of policy pursued by me are to my mind convincing.

Against such overwhelming odds as 16,000 well-armed men (exclusive of the force on the gunboats) to 2,610 badly armed, in the field, and fifty-four heavy guns against eleven medium ones in the fort, no tactics or bravery could avail.

The rapid movements of the enemy, with every facility at their command, rendered the defense from the beginning a hopeless one.

I succeeded in doing even more than was to be hoped for at first. I not only saved my entire command outside of the fort, but damaged materially the flotilla of the enemy, demonstrating thoroughly a problem of infinite value to us in the future.

Had I been re-enforced, so as to have justified my meeting the enemy at the advanced works, I might have made good the land defense on the east bank. I make no inquiry as to why I was not, for I have entire confidence in the judgment of my commanding-general. The elements even were against us, and had the enemy delayed their attack a few days, with the river rising, one-third of the entire fortifications (already affected by it) would have been washed away, while the remaining portion of the works would have been untenable by reason of the depth of water over the whole interior portion.

The number of officers surrendered was twelve; the number of non-commissioned officers and privates in the fort at the time of the surrender was sixty-six, while the number in the hospital boat, Patton, was sixteen. I take great pleasure in making honorable mention of all the officers and men under my command. To Captain Taylor, of the artillery, and the officers of his corps, Lieutenant Watts and Weller; to Captain G. R. G. Jones, in command of the right battery; to Captains Miller and Hayden, of the engineers; to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General McConico; to Captain H. L. Jones, brigade quartermaster; to Captain McLaughlin, quartermaster of the Tenth Tennessee, and to Surgeons Voorhies and Horton, of the Tenth Tennessee, the thanks of the whole country are due for their consummate devotion to our high and holy cause. To Sergeants John Jones, Hallam, Dubine and Silcurk; to Corporals Copass, Cavin and Renfro, in charge of the guns, as well as to all the men, I feel that a

large debt is due for their bravery and efficiency in working the heavy guns so long and so efficiently.

Officers and men alike seemed actuated but by one spirit—that of devotion to a cause in which was involved life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Every blow struck was aimed by cool heads, supported by strong arms and honest hearts.

I feel that it is a duty I owe to Colonel A. Heiman, commanding the Tenth Tennessee Regiment (Irish), to give this testimony of my high appreciation of him as a soldier and a man, due to his gallant regiment, both officers and men. I place them second to no regiment I have seen in the army.

To Captain Dixon, of the engineers, I owe (as does the whole country) my special acknowledgments of his ability and unceasing energies. Under his immediate eye were all the works proposed by myself at Fort Donelson and Heiman executed, while his fruitfulness in resources to meet the many disadvantages of position alone enabled us to combat its difficulties successfully.

To Lieutenant Watts, of the heavy artillery, as acting ordnance officer at Fort Henry, I owe this special notice of the admirable condition of the ordnance department at that post.

I take pleasure in acknowledging the marked courtesy and consideration of Flag Officer Foote, of the Federal Navy; of Captain Stembel and the other naval officers, to myself, officers and men. Their gallant bearing during the action gave evidence of a brave and therefore generous foe.

\* \* \* \* \*

LLOYD TILGHMAN,  
Brigadier-General Commanding.

TO GENERAL SAMUEL COOPER,  
Adjutant-General.



BATTLE BETWEEN FORT HENRY AND THE UNITED STATES GUNBOATS, FEBRUARY 6, 1862.  
[From a sketch by Rear Admiral Walke.]

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT.

[The following article was taken from the columns of the *Register*, published at Mobile, Ala., April, 1861.]

"Immediately after accepting his appointment to the reputation-tearing office of the Postmaster-Generalship Judge Reagan sedulously applied himself to 'set his house in order' and be ready for any emergency which daily deepening events might thrust upon him. War had not then taken its gory grasp of the land, and hopes were entertained that a pacific adjustment of the difficulty was possible. Whether the new Postmaster-General participated or not in this pleasant delusion we know not; but he proceeded to work as if it was wiser not to entertain any such expectation. The mail machinery of the South was still worked by the lever at Washington. To be ready for the withdrawal of this lever Judge Reagan promptly and patiently went on with the construction of a new one. His first office was his room at the Exchange Hotel, in Montgomery, and his first assistants—indeed, his only office staff for some time—were Mr. J. L. C. Danner, who was subsequently promoted to the chief clerkship of the Patent Office; Mr. J. C. Bach, still an efficient officer in the department and son of one of the most esteemed citizens of New Orleans, and Mr. W. W. Lester, since promoted to a principal clerkship in the Treasury Department. These constituted the department at its start. The first difficulty its chief had to contend with was one of much delicacy and demanding the utmost discrimination—the choice of assistants thoroughly fit to aid him in building up a new department under the deterring circumstances described in our last article. The act organizing the department provided for a chief of the contract, a chief of the appointment, a chief of the finance bureau, and a chief clerk, with such a number of clerks as was needed to perform all the duties assigned to the several divisions thus made. The chiefs of the three bureaus correspond with the first, second and third Assistant Postmaster-Generals of the old Government. How to fill these

important posts in the organization of the department did not long puzzle Judge Reagan. He decided on choosing as many of them and their assistants as he could from the most experienced men of Southern birth who had resigned office at Washington because of the accession of Lincoln. Thus determined, he selected the chief of the contract bureau in the person of H. St. George Offutt, of Missouri, who had just resigned an office which enabled him to bring to his duty a most valuable amount of the very thing the new Postmaster-General needed most in his first officers—official experience. The same motive induced him to invite B. N. Clements, of Tennessee, who had just quitted the chief clerkship of the old department, to come, and, as chief of the appointment bureau in the new, give its start the benefit of all the knowledge his former position necessarily enabled him to acquire. The control of the finance bureau he then handed to J. L. Harrell, of Alabama, reputed to be one of the best financiers in the South; and to the chief clerkship he called W. D. Miller, of Texas, a gentleman of high attainments and just that class of experience which eminently fitted him for this post. The organization was thus far complete before the end of March, and these were the men chosen to 'work up into life and move on' the postal machinery of the South. Of them now a little that is personal.

"Mr. Offutt, who was born in Hampshire County, Va., has all the appearance of the sleek, steady, clear-headed worker. He is now forty years of age, but looks younger. Unlike his chief, he takes pains to bear himself sprucely, as becometh one trained in metropolitan society. Having resided some time in Missouri, he 'hails' from that State. He commenced official life in 1845, as a clerk in the Auditor's Office for the Postoffice Department, at a salary of \$1,000 a year, but promotions duly followed, and at last, in 1856, they placed Mr. Offutt in the chief clerkship of the office, where he remained at a salary of \$2,000 a year until he resigned in March last, and took the post he now fills with marked benefit to the postal service of the South. He is said to be industrious, methodical and prescient. In manners he is easy and affable and somewhat sprightly.

"Mr. Clements was born in Lincoln County, Tennessee. He is a bachelor, and Swift says 'after twenty-five they have no age.' His father is known in the South as General Clements, of 'the Volunteer State,' and is the marshal of our government there. Although the county of Mr. C.'s birth has such an ominous name, it is the 'banner county' of the State, and was eager to secede from the State if she delayed very long in flinging off the old Union yoke. Mr. Clements was in the Mexican War in 1846, and is said to have gallantly distinguished himself. On his return he was appointed deputy marshal of Middle Tennessee. His first connection with the Postoffice Department was under Postmaster-General Brown, from whom he received a clerkship in 1857. He was promoted in another year to the chief clerkship of the whole department, at a salary of \$2,200, ample evidence of his capacity. This he retained until he resigned on the accession of Lincoln. Then Judge Reagan tendered him the important bureau he now holds, and in administering its multifarious duties all the experience, coolness and discrimination he possesses are of the utmost need. Mr. Clements is, physically and in manners, a fine specimen of the Tennessee gentleman, and in appearance shows signs of the bachelor. As an officer he works deliberately and perseveringly.

"Mr. Harrell was born twenty-eight years ago, in Greensborough County, Alabama. Having received an excellent education at the Howard College, in Marion, he went to Mobile and took charge of the financial business of the cotton factory of E. K. Carlisle. In 1855 he became connected as a partner and cashier with the banking firm of John Henley & Co., of Montgomery, Alabama. He remained there until a little before the time that Judge Reagan called him to take charge of the finance division of the department. Mr. Harrell is what Dickens styles a 'neat, dapper little gentleman.' He is retiring and agreeable in manner, painstaking and prompt in business, as precise and wary as the intricate and delicate nature of his duties requires. To his family honor we should add that he is a son-in-law of the noble Senator Yancey.

"We have thus briefly sketched the three heads of the bureaus in the Postoffice Department to give the reader an idea of the 'manner of men' whom Judge Reagan has selected to aid him in constructing and pushing the department ahead and producing the great results which we propose to show as the first fruits of his toils and the truest index to our present strength and proximate greatness."



## CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON,


FEBRUARY 16, 1862.

BY

BRIG.-GEN. GIDEON J. PILLOW, C. S. A.

COLUMBIA, TENN., February 18, 1862.

ON the 9th inst. General A. S. Johnston ordered me to proceed to Fort Donelson and take command of that post. On the 10th inst. I arrived at that place. In detailing the operations of the forces under my command at Fort Donelson it is proper to state the condition of that work and of the forces constituting its garrison. When I arrived I found the work on the river battery unfinished and wholly too weak to resist the force of heavy artillery. I found a 10-inch columbiad and a 32-pounder



BRIG.-GEN. GIDEON J. PILLOW, OF TENNESSEE.

rifled gun which had not been mounted. Deep gloom was hanging over the command, and the troops were greatly depressed and demoralized by the circumstances attending the surrender of Fort Henry, and the manner of retiring from that place. My first attention was given to the necessity of strengthening this work, mounting the two heavy guns, and to the construction of defensive works to protect the rear of the river battery. I imparted to the work all the energy which it was possible to do, working day and night with the whole command. The battery was without a competent number of artillerymen, and those that were there were not well instructed in the use of their guns.

To provide for this want I placed the artillery companies under active course of instruction in the use of their guns. I detailed Captain Ross, with his company of light artillery, to the command of one of the river batteries. These heavy guns being mounted, and provisions made for working them, and a proper supply of ammunition having been procured by my orders from Nashville, I felt myself prepared to test the effect of the fire of heavy metal against the enemy's gunboats, though the work stood much in need of more heavy pieces.

The armament of the batteries consisted of eight 32-pounders, three 32-pounder carronades, one 10-inch columbiad and one rifled gun of 32-pound caliber.

The selection of the site for the fort was an unfortunate one. While its command of the river was favorable, the site was commanded by the heights above and below on the river, and by a continuous range of hills all around the works to its rear. A field-work of very contracted dimensions had been constructed by the garrison to protect the battery; but the field-work was commanded by the hills already referred to, and lay open to a fire of artillery from every direction except from the hills below.

To guard against the effects of fire of artillery from these heights a line of defensive works, consisting of rifle pits and abatis for infantry, detached on our right but continuous on our left, with defenses for our light artillery, were laid off by Major Gilmer, engineer of General A. S. Johnston's staff (but on duty with me at the post), around the rear of the battery and on the heights from which artillery could reach our battery and inner field-work, enveloping the inner work and the town of Dover, where our principal supplies of commissary and quartermaster's stores were in depot.

These works, pushed with the utmost possible energy, were not quite completed, nor were my troops all in position, though nearly so, when Brigadier-General Floyd, my senior officer, reached that station. The works were laid off with great judgment and skill by Major Gilmer, and were well executed and designed for the defense of the

rear of the work, the only objection being to the length of the line, which, however, was unavoidable from the surroundings. The length of the line and the inadequacy of the force for its defense proved a source of embarrassment throughout the struggle which subsequently ensued in the defense of the position.

I had placed Brigadier-General Buckner in command of the right wing, and Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson in command of the left. By extraordinary efforts we had barely got these works in defensible condition when the enemy made an advance in force around and against the entire line of outer works.

## THE BATTLE OF THE TRENCHES.

The assault was commenced by the enemy's artillery against the center of our left wing, which was promptly responded to by Captain Green's battery of field artillery. After several hours of firing between the artillery of the two armies the enemy's infantry advanced to the conflict all along the line, which was kept up and increased in volume from one end of the line to the other for several hours, when at last the enemy made a vigorous assault against the right of our left wing, the position assaulted being a height commanded by Colonel A. Heiman and defended by his brigade, consisting of the Tenth Tennessee, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. MacGavoch, Colonel W. M. Voorhies', Colonel A. A. Hughes' and Colonel (J. W.) Head's regiments of Tennessee volunteers, and defended by Captain (Frank) Maney's field battery.

The assault was vigorously made and the position as vigorously defended, and resulted in the repulse of the enemy here and everywhere around the line. The result of the day's work pretty well tested the strength of our defensive line, and established beyond question the gallantry of the entire command, all of which fought gallantly their portion of the line.

The loss sustained by our forces in this engagement was not large, our men being mostly under shelter in the rifle pits; but we, nevertheless, had quite a number killed and wounded; yet, owing to the continued fighting which followed, it was impossible to get any official report of the casualties of the day.

On the same day our battery on the river was engaged with one of the enemy's gunboats, which occasioned quite a lively cannonading for more than an hour, in which the gallant Captain Joseph Dixon, of the engineer corps, was killed instantly at the battery. This officer had been on duty for some months at the post, and had shown great energy and professional skill, and by his gallant bearing on that day, while directing the operations, under my orders, had justly earned for himself high distinction.

His death was a serious loss to the service, and was a source of no little embarrassment in our after operations.

On the 12th (13th) we had quiet, but we saw the smoke of a large number of gunboats and steamboats a short distance below. We also received reliable information of the arrival of a large number of new troops, greatly increasing the strength of the enemy's forces, already said to be from 20,000 to 30,000 strong.


## BATTLE WITH THE GUNBOATS.

On the 13th (14th) these re-enforcements were seen advancing to their position in the line of investment, and while this was being done six of the enemy's iron-cased gunboats were seen advancing up the river, five of which were abreast and in line of battle, and the sixth some distance to the rear. When these gunboats arrived within a mile and a half of our battery they opened fire on it.

My orders to the officers (Captain Shuster and Standewitz (Stankiewitz or Starkovitch) † who commanded the lower battery of eight guns, and Captain Ross, who commanded the upper battery of four guns) were to hold their fire until the enemy's boats should come within point-blank range of their guns. This they did, though the ordeal of holding their fire while the enemy's shot and shell fell thick around their position was a severe restraint to their patriotic impulses; but, nevertheless, our batteries made no response until the enemy's gunboats got within range of their guns. Our entire line of batteries then opened fire. The guns of both parties were well served, the enemy constantly advancing, delivering direct fire against our batteries from his line of five gunboats, while the sixth boat, moving up in rear of the line, kept the air filled with shells, which fell thick and close around the position of our batteries.

The fight continued, the enemy steadily advancing slowly up the river, the shot and shell from fifteen heavy rifled guns tearing our parapets, and plunging deep into the earth around and over our batteries for nearly two hours, until his boats had reached within the distance of one hundred and fifty yards of our batteries. Having come in such close conflict, I could distinctly see the effects of our shot upon his iron-cased boats. We had given two or three well-directed shots from the heavy guns to one of his boats, when she instantly shrank back and drifted helpless below the line. Several shot struck another boat, tearing her iron case and splintering her timbers, and making them crack as if by a stroke of lightning, when she, too, fell back. Then a third received several severe shots, making her metal ring and her timbers crack, when the whole line gave way and fell rapidly back from our fire until they passed out of range.

Thus ended the first severe and close conflict of our



\* Hughes' regiment was the Twenty-seventh Alabama.


† Probably Stankiewitz.



heavy guns with the enemy's gunboats, testing their strength and the power of our heavy guns to resist them. The shot from our 32-pounder guns produced but little effect. They struck and rebounded, apparently doing but little damage; but I am satisfied, by close observation, that the timbers of the frame-work did not and could not withstand the shock of the 10-inch columbiad or 32-pounder rifled guns.

These gunboats never renewed the attack. I learned from citizens living on the river below that one of the injured boats sank, and that the others had to be towed to Cairo. This information may or may not be true, but it is certain that all of the boats were repulsed and driven back after a most vigorous and determined attack, and that two of the boats were badly damaged and a third more or less injured.

It is difficult to overestimate the gallant bearing and heroic conduct of the officers and men of our batteries,



BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN B. FLOYD, OF VIRGINIA.  
[From an old photograph.]

who so well and so persistently fought our guns until the enemy's determined advance brought his boats and guns into such close and desperate conflict. Where all did their duty so well it is almost impossible to discriminate. The captains already named and their lieutenants (whose names, for want of official reports, I can not give) all deserve the highest commendation. Lieutenant George S. Martin, whose company is at Columbus, Ky., but who was ordered to that post by Major-General Polk, commanding one of the guns, particularly attracted my attention by his energy and the judgment with which he fought his gun. The wadding of his gun having given out, he pulled off his coat and rammed it down his gun as wadding, and thus kept up the fire until the enemy were finally repulsed.

On the evening of this day we received information of the arrival of additional re-enforcements of infantry, cavalry and light artillery by steamboat, all of which were disembarked a short distance below our position.

#### BATTLE OF DOVER.

On the 14th inst. the enemy were busy throwing his forces of every arm around us, extending his line of investment and completely enveloping us.

On the evening of this day we ascertained that the enemy had received by steamboat additional re-enforcements. We were now surrounded by an immense force, said by prisoners, whom we had taken, to amount to fifty-two regiments, and every road and possible avenue of departure cut off, with the certainty that our sources of supply by river could soon be cut off by the enemy's batteries placed upon the river above us.

At a meeting of general officers, called by General Floyd, it was determined unanimously to give the enemy battle next day at daylight, so as to cut open a route of exit for our troops to the interior of the country, and thus save our army. We had knowledge that the principal portion of the enemy's forces were massed in encampment in front of the extreme left of our position, commanding the two roads leading to the interior, one of which we must take in retiring from our position.

We knew he had massed in encampment another large force on the Wynn's Ferry Road, opposite the center of our left wing, while still another was massed nearly in front of the left of our right wing, his fresh arrival of troops being encamped on the bank of the river two miles and a half below us, from which latter encampment a stream of fresh troops were constantly pouring around us on his line of investment, and strengthening his gen-

eral encampment on the extreme right. At each of his encampments and on each road he had in position a battery of field artillery and 24-pounder iron guns on siege carriages. Between these encampments on the roads was a thick undergrowth of brush and blackjack, making it impossible to advance or maneuver any considerable body of troops.

The plan of attack agreed upon and directed by General Floyd to be executed was, that with the main body of the forces defending our left wing, I should attack the right wing of the enemy, occupying and resting on the heights reaching to the bank of the river, accompanied by Colonel Forrest's brigade of cavalry; that General Buckner, with the forces under his command, and defending the right of our line, should strike the enemy's encampment and forces on the Wynn's Ferry Road; that the forces under Colonel Heiman should hold his position, and that each command should leave in the trenches troops to hold the same. In this order of battle it was easy to be seen that if my attack was successful and the enemy was routed his retreat would be along his line of investment, toward the Wynn's Ferry encampment, and thence toward his reserve, at the gunboats below. In other words, my success would roll the enemy's force in retreat over upon General Buckner, when by his attack in flank and rear we could cut up the enemy and put him completely to rout.

Accordingly dispositions were made to attack the enemy. At five o'clock on the morning of the 15th I moved out of my position to engage the enemy. In less than one-half hour our forces were engaged. The enemy was prepared to receive me in advance of his encampment, and he did receive me before I had assumed a line of battle and while I was moving against him without any formation for the engagement. For the first half hour of the engagement I was much embarrassed in getting the command in position properly to engage the enemy. Having extricated myself from the position and fairly engaged the enemy, we fought him for nearly two hours before I made any decided advance upon him. He contested the field most stubbornly.

The loss of both armies on this portion of the field was heavy—the enemy's particularly so, as I discovered by riding over the field after the battle. The enemy, having been forced to yield this portion of the field, retired slowly toward the Wynn's Ferry Road—Buckner's point of attack.

The fight was hotly contested and stubborn on both sides, and consumed the day till 12 o'clock to drive the enemy as far back as the center, where General Buckner's command was to flank him. While my command was slowly advancing and driving back the enemy I was anxiously expecting to hear General Buckner's command open fire in his rear, which not taking place, I was apprehensive of some misapprehension of orders, and came from the field of battle within the work to ascertain what was the matter. I there found the command of General Buckner, massed behind the ridge within the work, taking shelter from the enemy's artillery on the Wynn's Ferry Road, it having been forced to retire before the battery, as I learned from him. My force was still slowly advancing, driving the enemy toward the battery. I directed General Buckner immediately to move his command around to the rear of the battery, turning its left, keeping in the hollow, and attack and carry it. Before the movement was executed my forces, forming the attacking party on the right, with Colonel Forrest's regiment of cavalry, had reached the position of the battery. Colonel Forrest's cavalry gallantly charged a large body of infantry supporting the battery, driving it and forcing the battery to retire, and taking six pieces of artillery—four brass pieces and two 24-pounder iron pieces.

In pursuing the enemy, falling back from this position, General Buckner's forces became united with mine, and engaged the enemy in a hot contest of nearly an hour, with large forces of fresh troops that had now met us. This position of the enemy being carried by our joint forces, I called off the further pursuit, after seven and a half hours of continuous and bloody conflict. After the troops were called off from the pursuit, orders were immediately given to the different commands to form and retire to their original intrenchments.

The operations of the day had forced the entire command of the enemy around to our right and in front of General Buckner's position in the intrenchments, and when he reached his position he found the enemy advancing rapidly to take possession of his portion of our works. He had a stubborn conflict, lasting one and a half hours, to regain his position, and the enemy actually got possession of the extreme right of his works, and held them so firmly that he could not dislodge him. The position thus gained by the enemy was a most important and commanding one, being immediately in rear of our river battery and field-work for its protection. From it he could readily turn the intrenched work occupied by General Buckner and attack him in reverse, or he could advance, under cover of an intervening ridge, directly upon our battery and field-work. While the enemy held the position it was manifest we could not hold the main work or battery. Such was the


condition of the two armies at nightfall, after nine hours of conflict, on the 15th instant, in which our loss was severe, and leaving not less than 1,000 of the enemy dead upon the field. We left upon the field nearly all of his wounded, because we could not remove them. We left his dead unburied, because we could not bury them. Such carnage and conflict have perhaps never before occurred on this continent. We took about 300 prisoners and a large number of arms.

We had fought the battle to open the way for our army and to relieve us from an investment, which would necessarily reduce us and the position we occupied by famine. We had accomplished our object, but it occupied the whole day, and before we could prepare to leave, after taking in the wounded and dead, the enemy had thrown around us again in the night an immense force of fresh troops and reoccupied his original position in the line of investment, thus again cutting off our retreat. We had only about 13,000 troops all told; of these we had lost a large proportion in the three battles. The command had been in the trenches night and day for five days, exposed to the snow, sleet, mud and ice-water, without shelter, without adequate covering and without sleep. In this condition the general officers held a consultation, to determine what we should do. General Buckner gave it as his decided opinion that he could not hold his position a half-hour against an assault of the enemy, and said he was satisfied the enemy would attack him at daylight the next morning. The proposition was then made by the undersigned to again fight our way through the enemy's line and cut our way out. General Buckner said his command was so worn out, cut to pieces and demoralized that he could not make another fight; that it would cost the command three-fourths its present numbers to cut its way out; that it was wrong to sacrifice three-fourths of a command to save one-fourth, and that no officer had a right to cause such a sacrifice. General Floyd and Major Gilmer I understood to concur in this opinion. I then expressed the opinion that we could hold out another day, and in that time we could get steamboats and set the command over the river, and probable save a large portion of it. To this General Buckner replied that the enemy would certainly attack him in the morning, and that he could not hold his position a half-hour.

The alternative of these propositions was a surrender of the position and command. General Floyd said he would not surrender the command, nor would he surrender himself a prisoner. I had taken the same position. General Buckner said he was satisfied nothing else could be done, and that therefore he would surrender the command, if placed in authority. General Floyd said he would turn over the command to him if he could be allowed to withdraw his troops. To this General Buckner consented. Thereupon the command was turned over to me, I passing it instantly to General Buckner, saying I would neither surrender the command nor myself. I directed Colonel Forrest to cut his way out.

Under these circumstances General Buckner accepted the command, and sent a flag of truce to the enemy for an armistice of six hours, to negotiate for terms of capitulation. Before this flag and communication were delivered I retired from the garrison.

Before closing my report of the operations of the army at Fort Donelson I must, in justice to the brave officers



THE "WATER BATTERY" AT FORT DONELSON.

and men under my immediate command, say that harder fighting or more gallant conduct in officers and men I have never witnessed. In the absence of official reports of brigade and regimental commanders, of which I am deprived by the circumstances detailed in this report, I may not be able to do justice to the different corps. I will say, however, that the forces under my immediate command during the action bore themselves most gallantly throughout the long and bloody conflict. I speak with especial commendation of the brigades commanded by Colonels (William E.) Baldwin, (G. C.) Wharton, (John) McCausland, (J. M.) Simonton and (Joseph) Drake, and of Captains Maney and Green, who fought their guns under the constant and annoying fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, and of the concentrated fire from his field batteries, from which both commands suffered severely. Captain Maney was himself wounded, and had several lieutenants killed and wounded, and many of his company killed and wounded; so did Captains Porter and Graves.



Our total force in the field did not exceed 10,000 men, while from what I saw of the enemy's force, and from information derived from many prisoners of the enemy, we are sure he had between 30,000 and 40,000 men in the field.

Colonel Baldwin's brigade constituted the front of the attacking force, sustained immediately by Colonel Wharton's brigade. These two brigades deserve especial commendation for the manner in which they sustained the first shock of battle, and, under circumstances of great embarrassment, threw themselves into position and followed up the conflict throughout the day. Being mostly with these two brigades, I can speak from personal knowledge of the gallant conduct and bearing of the two brigade commanders, Colonels Baldwin and Wharton. I must also acknowledge my obligation to Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, who assisted me in the command of the forces with which I attacked the enemy, and who bore himself gallantly throughout the conflict; but having received no official report from him, I can not give the detailed operations of his command.

\* \* \* \* \*

GID. J. PILLOW,  
Brigadier-General, C. S. A.

THE APPROXIMATE AGGREGATE STRENGTH OF THE  
VARIOUS REGIMENTS AT FORT DONELSON  
WAS AS FOLLOWS:

ORGANIZATIONS.	Total	Aggregate
Third Tennessee . . . . .	750	
Eighteenth Tennessee . . . . .	625	
Thirty-second Tennessee . . . . .	400	
Fourteenth Mississippi . . . . .	650	
Forty-first Tennessee . . . . .	400	
Second Kentucky . . . . .	600	
Aggregate strength of Buckner's Division, under his own command, exclusive of two batteries of artillery . . . . .	4,011	3,425
Twenty-sixth Tennessee . . . . .	443	
Twenty-sixth Mississippi . . . . .		
Aggregate detached under General Pillow . . . . .		844
Aggregate infantry of Buckner's Division under him and General Pillow . . . . .		4,269

AT FORT DONELSON, SUMMARY OF KILLED AND  
WOUNDED IN THE SECOND DIVISION,  
CENTRAL ARMY OF KENTUCKY.

ORGANIZATIONS.	Killed	Wounded	Aggregate
In the Third Brigade, Colonel John C. Brown commanding . . . . .	38	246	284
Second Kentucky Regiment (about) . . . . .			80
Issaquena Battery (about) . . . . .			3
Porter's Battery (about) . . . . .			25
	38	246	392
In the two regiments of the Second Brigade, Colonel Baldwin, detached and under the command of General Pillow: . . . . .			
Twenty-sixth Tennessee . . . . .	11	78	
Twenty-sixth Mississippi . . . . .	11	68	
Staff and other officers . . . . .	2	15	
Aggregate . . . . .	24	161	185
Total . . . . .			577

ESTIMATES OF KILLED AND WOUNDED IN PORTIONS  
OF GENERAL PILLOW'S COMMAND, REPORT-  
ING THROUGH GENERAL BUCKNER.

ORGANIZATIONS.	Killed	Wounded
Colonel Heiman's brigade . . . . .	10	30
Colonel Gregg's regiment . . . . .	20	34
Major Brown's regiment . . . . .	18	55
Aggregate . . . . .	48	119
Total . . . . .		167

SUMMARY REPORT OF THE LOSSES OF EACH CON-  
FEDERATE STATE ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF  
FORT DONELSON, FEBRUARY 15, 1862.

	Engaged	Killed	Wounded	Total Killed and Wounded
Tennessee . . . . .	5,461	45	287	332
Kentucky . . . . .	918	32	117	149
Texas . . . . .	296	21	32	53
Arkansas . . . . .	270	7	17	24
Alabama . . . . .	376	3	9	12
Mississippi . . . . .	2,875	78	336	414
Virginia . . . . .	1,275	45	171	216
Artillery . . . . .	750	14	39	53
Cavalry . . . . .	1,112	8	16	24
Total amount . . . . .	13,339	253	1,024	1,277

## CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON,

FEBRUARY 16, 1862.

BY

BRIG.-GEN. SIMON B. BUCKNER, C. S. A.,  
Commanding Division.

RICHMOND, VA., August 11, 1862.

I HAVE the honor to make the following report of the operations of that portion of the Second Division of the Central Army of Kentucky which was detached from Bowling Green and Russellville, Ky., to aid in the defense of Fort Donelson and the village of Dover, on the Cumberland River, Tenn.

By the courtesy of Brigadier-General Grant, U. S. A., I was permitted to transmit to Clarksville, Tenn., a brief report of the surrender of Fort Donelson; but as I now learn it never reached the headquarters of General A. S. Johnston, I transmit herewith a copy.

I have been prevented from making an early report by the refusal of the Federal authorities during my imprisonment either to permit me to make a report or to receive the report of subordinate commanders. Such, indeed, was the discourtesy of the Federal War Department, that, though kept in solitary confinement during my imprisonment, and prevented from holding communication with any of my fellow-prisoners, a request on my part to be informed of the cause of a proceeding so unusual among nations pretending to follow the rules of civilized warfare, failed to elicit a response.



LIEUT.-GEN. SIMON B. BUCKNER, OF KENTUCKY.  
[From a photo taken in 1862.]

On February 11th ultimo Brigadier-General Floyd had resolved to concentrate his division and my own at Cumberland City, with a view of operating from some point on the railway west of that position in the direction of Fort Donelson or Fort Henry, thus maintaining his communications with Nashville by the way of Charlotte.

I reached Fort Donelson on the night of February 11th, with orders from General Floyd to direct General Pillow to send back at once to Cumberland City the troops which had been designated.

Before leaving Clarksville I had, by authority of General Floyd, ordered Scott's regiment of Louisiana cavalry to operate on the north side of the Cumberland River, in the direction of Fort Donelson, with a view to prevent the establishment of any of the enemy's field-batteries which might interfere with our transports. General Pillow declined to execute the order of which I was the bearer until he should have a personal interview with General Floyd.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 12th he left me temporarily in command, and proceeded himself in a steamer to Cumberland City. Before leaving he informed me that he had directed a reconnaissance to be made by Colonel Forrest's cavalry, with instructions in no event to bring on an engagement should the enemy approach in force.

General Pillow left me under the impression that he did not expect an immediate advance of the enemy, and regarded their approach from the direction of Fort Henry as impracticable. During the morning Forrest reported the enemy advancing in force, with the view of enveloping our line of defense, and for a time he was engaged with his usual gallantry in heavy skirmishing with them, at one time driving one of their battalions back on their artillery. About noon General Pillow returned and resumed

command, it having been determined to re-enforce the garrison with the remaining troops from Cumberland City and Clarksville.

The defenses were in a very imperfect condition. The space to be defended by the army was quadrangular in shape, being limited on the north by the Cumberland River, on the east and west by small streams now converted into deep sloughs by the high water, and on the south by our line of defense. The river line exceeded a mile in length. The line of defense was about two miles and a half long, and its distance from the river varied from one-fourth to three-fourths of a mile. The line of intrenchments consisted of a few logs rolled together, and but slightly covered with earth, forming an insufficient protection even against field artillery.

Not more than one-third of the line was completed on the morning of the 12th. It had been located, under direction of that able engineer officer Major Gilmer, near the crests of a series of ridges, which sloped backward to the river and were again commanded in places by other ridges at a still greater distance from the river. This chain of heights was intersected by deep valleys and ravines, which materially interfered with communications between different parts of the line. Between the village of Dover and the water batteries a broad and deep valley, extending directly back from the river and flooded by the high water, intersected the quadrangular area occupied by the army, and almost completely isolated the right wing. That part of the line which covered the land approach to the water batteries and constituted our right wing was assigned to me, with a portion of my division, consisting of the Third, or Colonel John C. Brown's Brigade, which was composed of the Third Tennessee Volunteers (which was Colonel Brown's regiment); Eighteenth Tennessee Regiment, Colonel Joseph B. Palmer; Thirty-second Tennessee Regiment, Colonel (E. C.) Cook; half of Colonel Baldwin's Second Brigade (temporarily attached to Colonel Brown's); Second Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel R. W. Hanson; Fourteenth Mississippi Volunteers, Major (W. L.) Doss; Forty-first Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel (Robert) Farquharson; Porter's battery of six field-pieces, and Graves' battery of six field-pieces.

The remaining regiments of Baldwin's brigade, the Twenty-sixth Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel (John M.) Lillard, and the Twenty-sixth Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel (A. E.) Reynolds, together with the brigade commander, were detached from my command by Brigadier-General Pillow, and assigned a position on the left of the line of intrenchments.

The work on my lines was prosecuted with energy, and was urged forward as rapidly as the limited number of tools would permit, so that by the morning of the 13th my position was in a respectable state of defense.

My disposition of the troops was as follows: Hanson's regiment on the extreme right; Palmer's regiment, with its reserve, in position to re-enforce Hanson; Porter's battery occupying the advanced salient, sweeping the road which led to the front, and flanking the intrenchments both to the right and to the left. The reserve of the Fourteenth Mississippi was held as its support; Brown's, Cook's and Farquharson's regiments were on the left. Graves' battery occupied a position near the extreme left of the intrenchments on the declivity of the hill, whence it swept the valley with its fire and flanked the position of Colonel Heiman to the east of the valley.

From three to five companies of each regiment were deployed as skirmishers in the rifle pits. The other companies of each regiment were massed in columns, sheltered from the enemy's fire behind the irregularities of the ground, and held in convenient positions to re-enforce any portion of the line that might be seriously threatened.

No serious demonstration was made on our lines on the 12th.

Early on the morning of the 13th a column of the enemy's infantry, which was apparently forming to move down the valley between my left and Heiman's right, was driven back by a few well-directed shots from Graves' battery.

About 10 o'clock in the morning the enemy made a vigorous attack upon Hanson's position, but was repulsed with heavy loss. The attack was subsequently renewed by three heavy regiments, but was again repulsed by the Second Kentucky Regiment, aided by a part of the Eighteenth Tennessee. In both these affairs, and also in a third repulse of the enemy from the same position, Porter's battery played a conspicuous part.

About 11 o'clock a strong attack was made on Colonel Heiman's position beyond my left. A well-directed fire from Graves' battery upon the flank of the assaulting column materially contributed to repulse the enemy with heavy loss.

The fire of the enemy's artillery and riflemen was incessant throughout the day, but was responded to by a well-directed fire from the intrenchments, which inflicted upon the assailant considerable loss, and almost silenced his fire late in the afternoon.

On the preceding night General Floyd had arrived and



assumed command of all the troops, and during the morning visited and inspected my lines. My loss during the day was thirty-nine in killed and wounded.

The enemy were comparatively quiet in front of my position during the 14th. On the morning of that day I was summoned to a council of general officers, in which it was decided unanimously, in view of the arrival of heavy re-enforcements of the enemy below, to make an immediate attack upon their right, in order to open our communications with Charlotte, in the direction of Nashville. It was urged that this attack should be made at once, before the disembarkation of the enemy's re-enforcements, supposed to be about 15,000 men. I proposed with my division to cover the retreat of the army should the sortie prove successful. I made the necessary dispositions preparatory to executing the movement; but early in the afternoon the order was countermanded by General Floyd, at the instance, as I afterward learned, of General Pillow, who, after drawing out his troops for the attack, thought it too late for the attempt.

On the night of the 14th it was unanimously decided, in a council of general officers and regimental commanders, to attack the enemy's right at daylight. The object of the attack was to force our way through his lines, recover our communications and effect our retreat upon Nashville by way of Charlotte, Tenn. This movement had become imperatively necessary in consequence of the vastly superior and constantly increasing force of the enemy, who had already completely enveloped our position. The general plan was for General Pillow to attack his extreme right, and for that portion of my division remaining under my command, after being relieved in the rifle pits by Colonel Head's regiment, to make an attack upon the right of the enemy's center, and if successful, to take up a position in advance of our works on the Wynn's Ferry Road, to cover the retreat of the whole army, after which my division was to act as the rear guard.

On Saturday morning, the 15th, a considerable portion of my division was delayed by the non-arrival of Head's regiment at the appointed time, and by the slippery condition of the icy road, which forbade a rapid march. My advance regiment, however (the Third Tennessee), reached its position by daylight, in rear of a portion of the intrenchments which had been occupied by General Pillow's troops. As no guards had been left in this portion of the line, and even a battery was left in position without a cannoner, I deployed the Third Tennessee in the rifle pits, to cover the formation of my division as it arrived. The regiments were formed partly in line and partly in column, and covered from the enemy's artillery fire by a slight acclivity in front. In the meantime the attack on the enemy's right was made in the most gallant and determined manner by the division of General Pillow. For the progress of that action I refer to the reports of Colonel Baldwin, Colonel Gregg and their subordinate commanders, which have been transmitted to me as the senior officer left with the army.

In front of my position the enemy had a heavy battery posted on the Wynn's Ferry Road, with another battery opposite my left—both sustained by a heavy infantry force. Major Davidson, acting chief of my artillery, established Graves' battery to the left of the Wynn's Ferry Road, and opened upon the enemy's batteries a destructive fire. I also directed a portion of the artillery to open upon the flank and left rear of the enemy's infantry, who were contesting the advance of General Pillow's division. In view of the heavy duty which I expected my division to undergo in covering the retreat of the army, I thought it inadvisable to attempt an assault at this time in my front until the enemy's batteries were, to some extent, crippled and their supports shaken by the fire of my artillery.

About 9 o'clock General Pillow urged an advance to relieve his forces. I accordingly sent forward the Fourteenth Mississippi, Major Doss, deployed as skirmishers. At the request of its commander I assigned the direction of its movements to Major Alexander Casseday, of my staff. The line of skirmishers was sustained by the Third and Eighteenth Tennessee. Their line of march unfortunately masked the fire of my artillery upon the Wynn's Ferry Road, but it continued to play with effect upon the force which was opposing General Pillow's advance. The combined attack compelled the enemy to retire, not, however, without inflicting upon my troops considerable loss. Under a misapprehension of instructions, at a time when my artillery was directed, over the heads of the advanced troops, upon the enemy's battery, these regiments withdrew without panic, but in some confusion, to the trenches,

after the enemy's infantry had been driven a considerable distance from their position. As the enemy's line of retreat was along the Wynn's Ferry Road, I now organized an attack further to my right, up a deep valley, which led from Heiman's left, in rear of the position occupied by the enemy's batteries.

In order to cover the advance of the infantry column I directed Captain Porter, with his artillerists, to serve Green's battery, which was already in position, and at the same time sent a request to Colonel Heiman to direct Maney's battery to open its fire, while he should deploy a line of skirmishers in advance of his position to cover the right of the valley. General Pillow was at this time, as I afterward learned, on the heights to my right, occupied by Heiman. Maney's, Porter's and Graves' batteries now opened a cross fire upon the enemy's battery and position, soon crippling some of his guns and driving their supports, while the Third, Eighteenth and Thirty-second Tennessee regiments, under their brigade commander, Colonel John C. Brown, moved steadily up the valley, preceded by their skirmishers, who soon became engaged with those of the enemy. This movement, combined with the brisk fire of three batteries, induced a rapid retreat of the enemy, who abandoned a section of his artillery. At the same time my infantry were thus penetrating the enemy's line of retreat. Forrest, with a portion of his cavalry, charged upon their right, while General Pillow's division, under the orders of General B. R. Johnson and Colonel Baldwin, were pressing their extreme right about half a mile to the left of this position.

In this latter movement a section of Graves' battery participated, playing with destructive effect upon the enemy's left, while about the same time the Second Ken-

request to know my opinion of the movement I replied that nothing had occurred to change my views of the necessity of the evacuation of the post, that the road was open, that the first part of our purpose was fully accomplished, and I thought we should at once avail ourselves of the existing opportunity to regain our communications. These seemed to be his own views; for he directed me to halt my troops and remain in position until he should have conversed with General Pillow, who was now within the intrenchments.


After that consultation he sent me an order to retire within the lines, and to repair as rapidly as possible to my former position on the extreme right, which was in danger of attack. The enemy made no attempt at pursuit. I secured the section of artillery which had been captured, and covered my retrograde movement by Hanson's and Farquharson's regiments. My troops were already much exhausted, but returned as rapidly as possible, a distance of two miles, to their positions. But a small portion of my division had reached their position when a division of the enemy, under command of General C. F. Smith, assaulted the extreme right of my position, falling upon Hanson's regiment before it had reached its rifle pits. This gallant regiment was necessarily thrown back in confusion upon the position of the Eighteenth Tennessee. At this period I reached that position, and, aided by a number of officers, I succeeded in hastily forming a line behind the crest of the hill which overlooked the detached works which had been seized by the enemy before Hanson had been able to throw his regiment into them. The enemy advanced gallantly upon this new position, but was repulsed with heavy loss. I re-enforced this position by other regiments as they successively arrived, and by a section of Graves' battery, while a section of Porter's battery was placed in its former position. During a contest of more than two hours the enemy threatened my left with a heavy column and made repeated attempts to storm my line on the right, but the well-directed fire of Porter's and Graves' artillery and the musketry fire of the infantry, repelled the attempts, and finally drove him to seek shelter behind the works he had taken and amid the irregularities of the ground.

There was probably no period of the action when his force was not from three to five times the strength of mine. Toward the close of the action I was re-enforced by the regiments of Colonels Quarles, Sugg and Bailey. Generals Floyd and Pillow also visited the position about the close of the action.

In a council of general and field officers, held after night, it was unanimously resolved that if the enemy had not re-occupied in strength the position in front of General Pillow the army should effect its retreat, and orders to assemble the regiments for that purpose were given by General Floyd; but as the enemy had late in the afternoon appeared in considerable force on the battlefield of the morning, a reconnoissance was ordered, I think, by General Pillow, under the instructions of General Floyd. The report of this reconnoissance, made by Colonel Forrest, has been fully stated by Generals Floyd and Pillow, and, from what I have been able to learn since, I am satisfied the information reported was correct.

Among other incidents showing that the enemy had not only re-occupied their former ground, but extended their lines still further to our left, is the fact that Overton's cavalry, following after Forrest's, was cut off from retreat by an infantry force of the enemy at the point where Forrest had crossed the stream on the river road. When the information of our re-investment was reported, General Floyd, General Pillow and myself were the only members of the council present. Both of these officers have stated the views of the council, but my recollection of some of the incidents narrated differ so materially from that of General Pillow, that, without intending any reflection upon either of those gentlemen, I feel called upon to notice some of the differences of opinion between us.

Both officers have correctly stated that I regarded the position of the army as desperate, and that an attempt to extricate it by another battle, in the suffering and exhausted condition of the troops, was almost hopeless. The troops had been worn down with watching, with labor, with fighting. Many of them were frosted by the intensity of the cold; all of them were suffering and exhausted by their incessant labors. There had been no regular issue of rations for a number of days, and scarcely any means of cooking. Their ammunition was nearly expended. We were completely invested by a force fully four times the strength of our own. In their exhausted condition they could not have made a march. An attempt to make a



Upper Battery.

Water Battery.

The opposing armies engaged, in the distance.

Federal Gunboats.

BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. [From an old India-ink sketch by Admiral Walke.]

tucky, under Colonel Hanson, charged in quick time, as if upon parade, through an open field and under a destructive fire, without firing a gun, upon a superior force of the enemy, who broke and fled in all directions. A large portion of the enemy's right dispersed through the woods, and made their way, as was afterward learned, to Fort Henry.

While this movement was going on I conducted one piece of artillery, under Captain Graves, along the Wynn's Ferry Road, supported by the Fourteenth Mississippi, and sent orders to the residue of Graves' battery, Porter's and Jackson's batteries and Farquharson's Tennessee Regiment to follow the movement with rapidity. I also sent to direct Hanson's regiment to rejoin me. The enemy, in his retreat, had now taken up a strong position on the road beyond the point where it crosses the valley. I directed the position to be attacked by the Third, Eighteenth and Thirty-second Tennessee Regiments, the first on the left, the others on the right of the road, while Graves' piece took position in the road within two hundred and fifty or three hundred yards of the enemy's guns. These regiments, under the immediate command of Colonel Brown, advanced gallantly to the attack, while Graves' piece responded with effect to the enemy's artillery. Notwithstanding their vast superiority in numbers, the enemy were driven, with very heavy loss, from their position, and retreated to the right of Wynn's Ferry Road, leaving it entirely open. In this position I waited the arrival of my artillery and reserves, either to continue the pursuit of the enemy or to defend the position I now held, in order that the army might pass out on the Forge Road, which was now completely covered by the position occupied by my division. But General Pillow had prevented my artillery from leaving the intrenchments, and had ordered Farquharson not to join me, and also sent me reiterated orders to return to my intrenchments on the extreme right.

I was in the act of returning to the lines when I met General Floyd, who seemed surprised at the order. At his



sortie would have been resisted by a superior force of fresh troops, and that attempt would have been the signal for the fall of the water batteries and the presence of the enemy's gunboats sweeping with the fire at close range the positions of our troops, who would thus have been assailed on their front, rear and right flank at the same instant. The result would have been a virtual massacre of the troops, more disheartening in its effects than a surrender.

In this opinion General Floyd coincided, and I am certain that both he and I were convinced that General Pillow agreed with us in opinion. General Pillow then asked our opinion as to the practicability of holding our position another day. I replied that my right was already turned, a portion of my intrenchments in the enemy's possession—they were in position to successfully assail my position and the water batteries—and that with my weakened and exhausted force, I could not successfully resist the assault which would be made at daylight by a vastly superior force. I further remarked that I understood the principal object of the defense of Donelson to be to cover the movement of General A. S. Johnston's army from Bowling Green to Nashville, and that if that movement was not completed it was my opinion that we should attempt a further defense, even at the risk of destruction of our entire force, as the delay of only a few hours might gain the safety of General Johnston's force. General Floyd remarked that General Johnston's army had already reached Nashville. I then expressed the opinion that it would be wrong to subject the army to a virtual massacre when no good could result from the sacrifice, and that the general officers owed it to their men, when further resistance was unavailing, to obtain the best terms of capitulation possible for them.

General Floyd expressed himself in similar terms, and in his opinion I understood General Pillow to acquiesce. General Floyd then announced his purpose to leave, with such portions of his division as could be transported in two small steamers, which were expected about daylight.

General Pillow, addressing General Floyd, then remarked that he thought there were no two persons in the Confederacy whom the Yankees would prefer to capture than himself and General Floyd, and asked the latter's opinion as to the propriety of his accompanying General Floyd. To this inquiry the latter replied that it was a question for every man to decide for himself. General Pillow then addressed the inquiry to me, to which I remarked that I could only reply as General Floyd had done, that it was a question for every officer to decide for himself, and that in my own case I regarded it as my duty to remain with my men and share their fate, whatever it might be. General Pillow, however, announced his purpose to leave, when General Floyd directed me to consider myself in command. I remarked that a capitulation would be as bitter to me as it could be to any one, but I regarded it as a necessity of our position, and I could not reconcile it with my sense of duty to separate my fortunes from those of my command. It is due to General Pillow to state that some time after the command had been transferred to me, and while preparations were making for his departure, he returned to the room, and said to General Floyd and myself that he wished it understood that he had thought it would have been better to have held the fort another day, in order to await the arrival of steamers to transport the troops across the river. I again recapitulated my reasons for thinking it impossible to hold our position; and whatever may have been General Pillow's opinion, he certainly impressed me with the belief that he again acquiesced in the necessity of a surrender.

It was now near daylight of Sunday morning, the 16th. I ordered the troops back to their positions in intrenchments, and addressed a note, a copy of which is inclosed, to the Federal commander, Brigadier-General U. S. Grant. His reply is also transmitted. When it was received but a small portion of the troops had returned to their lines. A portion of my field-guns had been spiked when the troops had been withdrawn under General Floyd's order. The gunners had not yet returned to the water batteries. A degree of confusion, amounting almost to a state of disorganization, resulting from the knowledge of our position, pervaded a considerable portion of the troops. A corps of not less than 15,000 of the enemy, with fifteen pieces of artillery, were in position to assault the extreme right of the line, which was effectually turned, and the water batteries exposed to assault without the power of resisting the attack. At the point most strongly threatened I could not have opposed at the time a thousand men.

Every road leading from the lines was effectually closed. Even the river road, by which the cavalry had left, and which was impassable by infantry, was closed by a force of the enemy within fifteen minutes after Forrest had passed, and Overton's cavalry was forced to return to the lines. The troops were broken down by unusual privations. Most of them had labored or fought almost incessantly for a week. From Thursday morning until Saturday night they had been almost constantly under fire. From Thursday evening until Sunday morning they had suffered intensely in a heavy snowstorm and from intense cold, almost without shelter, with insufficient food, and almost without sleep. They had behaved with a gallantry unsurpassed until the power of further endurance was exhausted. The supply of ammunition was very small.

The aggregate of the army, never greater than 12,000, was now reduced to less than 9,000 men after the departure of General Floyd's brigade. The investing force of the enemy was about 50,000 strong, and considerably exceeded that force by the following morning. Under these circumstances no alternative was left me but to accept the terms demanded by our ungenerous enemy. A copy of the order of General Grant, fixing the terms of surrender, is herewith inclosed.

I do not seek to avoid any responsibility which, in the judgment of the President, may attach to my action, which was guided in every instance by a feeling of duty. My chief wish is that he will find it consistent with the public interest to permit me still to unite my fortunes in the contest for independence with those of the brave men whose gallantry I have witnessed, whose dangers and hardships I have shared and in common with whom I have endured the privations of imprisonment among a vindictive and tyrannical foe.



FORT DONELSON, AS SEEN FROM THE BANKS OF THE RIVER.

I can not close this report without calling special attention to the gallant and able conduct of my brigade commanders, Colonel John C. Brown, of the Third Tennessee; William E. Baldwin, of the Fourteenth Mississippi; and R. W. Hanson, commanding the Second Kentucky, detached from Breckinridge's Kentucky brigade.

My aggregate force at the beginning of the contest, which was constantly diminishing, did not exceed 3,025 infantry and two batteries of artillery. Two of my regiments, in addition (844 men), were constantly under the command of General Pillow. The length of my lines exceeded three-fourths of a mile.

S. B. BUCKNER,

Brigadier-General, C. S. A.

Commanding Second Division, Central Army of Kentucky.

AN OFFICER'S WIT.—A gallant soldier and distinguished politician, who commanded one of the regiments, perpetrated an "Irish bull" one day which the other regiments of the brigade never suffered his men to hear the last of. Having halted on the march, and the men not falling in with sufficient rapidity when the order to move was given, the gallant colonel exclaimed: "Fall in there, men! Fall in quickly! If you don't fall in I'll march the regiment off and leave every man of you!" At the battle of Winchester, in June, 1863, this same officer (now a brigadier-general) was very deliberately forming his line of battle when the division commander grew impatient and sent an aid, who came galloping up to the old hero to say: "General, General — wants to know if you are proposing to have dress parade down here?" The instant retort was, "Go back and tell him yes; we are going to dress on the enemy." "Dress on the enemy" at once became a slang phrase among the men.

## THE BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE, OR ELKHORN TAVERN,

MARCH 6, 1862.

BY

BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALBERT PIKE, C. S. A.  
Commanding Department of Indian Territory.

DWIGHT MISSION, CHEROKEE NATION, I. T.,  
March 14, 1862.

ON February 25th I reached Cantonment Davis, near Fort Gibson, with Colonel Cooper's Choctaw and Chickasaw battalion, which had been encamped near the mouth of the Canadian. The same evening Colonel D. N. McIntosh's regiment of Creeks arrived at the same point. I had in charge a large amount of coin and other moneys for the different Indian tribes, and found delegations of the Osages, Comanches and Reserve Indians awaiting me, and the disposition of the moneys left unexpectedly in my hands, together with the dealings with the Indian tribes, detained me there three days.

The Choctaws, Chickasaws and Creeks refused to march until they were paid off, and as by their treaties with us they could not be taken out of the Indian country without their consent, I had no alternative but to submit. The payment of the Choctaws and Chickasaws occupied three days.


On the morning of the third day I left them behind at Fort Gibson, except O. G. Welch's squadron of Texans, part of the First Choctaw and Chickasaw regiment, with which, and the Creek regiment, whom I persuaded to move by the promise that they should be paid at the Illinois River, I marched to Park Hill, near that river, remained there one day, and not being overtaken, as I expected to be, by the Choctaw and Chickasaw troops, moved the next day, Monday, March 3d, toward Evansville, and the next day to Cincinnati, on the Cherokee line, where I overtook Colonel Stand Watie's regiment of Cherokees.

The next day, Wednesday, with Colonel Watie's regiment and Captain Welch's squadron, I reached Freshlag's Mill, and on Thursday overtook Colonel Drew's regiment of Cherokees at Smith's Mill, and came up with the rear of General McCulloch's division late that afternoon. That night I encamped within two miles of Camp Stephens, and at 9:30 o'clock received General Van Dorn's order, to the effect that the army would move at 8 o'clock, and that I would follow General McCulloch's division.

I sent to General McCulloch to ascertain at what hour the road would be clear for me to move, and received his reply that it would be clear at 12 o'clock, and that his train would not move until daylight. At 12 o'clock I marched with my command, overtook and passed General McCulloch's train, which was in motion, and had to wait until sunrise, a little south of Sugar Creek, until his infantry had passed it on a little bridge of rails. We followed closely in his rear until the head of my command had passed the houses on what is called Pea Vine Ridge, where we were halted, and Colonel Sims' Texas regiment, countermarching, passed us to the rear, an officer informing me that I was to countermarch and follow the other troops. I did so, and we were then marched off the Bentonville Road to the south through the woods. Soon after Captain Lomax, of General McCulloch's staff, informed me that the enemy had fortified a little place called Leetown, about four miles and a half to the south, which we were marching to attack, and that General McCulloch's orders were that my command, on reaching the spot, should form in line in rear of General McIntosh's brigade, which would itself be in rear of a line of infantry, and that when the firing should begin all were to dismount and charge together.

We had marched from the road in a southeasterly direction about a mile from the point where we left it, and were passing along a narrow road, between a piece of woods on our left and a fenced field on our right, when we discovered in front of us, at the distance of about three hundred yards, a battery of three guns, protected by five companies of regular cavalry. A fence ran from east to west through the woods, and behind this we formed in line, with Colonel Sims' regiment on the right, the squadron of Captain Welch next to him, and the regiments of Colonels Watie and Drew in continuation of the line on the left. The enemy was in a small prairie, about two hundred and fifty yards across, on the right of which was the fenced







## PROSPECTUS.

# The Confederate Soldier in the Civil War.

The publication of "The Soldier in Our Civil War," "Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War," and the "Pictorial Battles of the War," the three greatest and most stupendous "Pictorial Histories" ever published in this or any other country, renders necessary a companion volume giving the Confederate side of the late Civil War.

To fully appreciate the magnitude of the war and to completely understand the triumph won by the army and navy of the United States, it is necessary to read the history of both sides in the conflict. The story of the Confederate States upon the land and water possesses the same thrilling interest, offers as many acts of heroism and equally illustrates American manhood, valor and endurance.

### THE ENGRAVINGS

That will illustrate the "Confederate Soldier in the Civil War" will number over ONE THOUSAND, and will cover a space considerably over 30,000 square inches, costing over \$25,000. Are from sketches made by a corps of artists who followed the fortunes of the armies, and who justly rank among the heroes of the war, braving every hardship and peril of the war, often under fire, and in the most dangerous positions during the battles in the business of their vocation. They will represent portraits of the President and Vice-President of the Confederacy, members of the Cabinet and department officers, signers of the Constitution of the Confederacy, governors of the seceding States, officers of the army and navy, faithful and authentic sketches of places of note, battles, sieges, charges, camp life, bombardments, naval engagements, conflicts, gunboats, cruisers, rams, blockade runners, etc.

To the veteran these engravings will recall memories of familiar faces, of his life on the tented field or quarter-deck, of many a hard fought battle, of marches, bivouacs, camp fire, and the numerous scenes and incidents peculiar to the daily life of a soldier or sailor, while to his children and the present generation they will convey the reality of war with a vividness that nothing else can convey.

For fifteen years the editors have been collecting material and data for this work, the search has accumulated for them manuscript, archives, photographs, etc., inaccessible to any other persons. They bring to the execution of the work much experience, and a reputation for accuracy and sincerity, without prejudice or passion, so closely and earnestly have they studied their subject, and arranged their matter, that they are more masters of their subject than any men living.

It would be impossible to indicate the full contents of the book in the limited space on this circular; we, however, give below

### PARTIAL TABLE OF CONTENTS.

1. FOUNDATION and Formation of the Confederacy and the Secession of the Southern States and the prominent part taken by President Jefferson Davis, members of the Cabinet and governors of the seceding States.
2. ORDINANCES of Secession of the Southern States, including Maryland, Missouri, Arkansas and Tennessee—tables showing dates of secession and the votes thereon.
3. CONSTITUTIONS of the Confederate States; dates of the Ratification of the Constitution by the different States; names of the signers of the Constitution (with portraits).
4. GOVERNORS of the Southern (Confederate) States, 1861-1865, with terms of office (portraits).
5. CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, names of Senators and Members of the house, from each State and Territory, in the Provisional, First and Second Congresses.
6. THE CONFEDERATE TREASURY, State, Post Office, War, Navy, Justice and Patent Office departments.
7. Confederate Notes, Bonds, etc.
8. BATTLES OF THE WAR, from the Firing on Fort Sumter to the surrender at Appomattox, Sieges, Charges, Skirmishes, Marches, etc., as described by Generals R. E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, A. S. Johnston, J. E. Johnston, Beauregard and others.
9. The CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY, from the laying of the first keel to the sinking of its last vessel. Naval Engagements, Bombardments, Blockade Running, Operations of Cruisers and Privateers by Admirals Franklin Buchanan, Raphael Semmes, Captains Waddell, Mitchell, Bullock and others.
10. ROSTER OF THE OFFICERS of the Confederate States Army and Navy, and their commands (with portraits), compiled from the original archives of the Confederate Government.
11. NAVAL OFFICERS, Vessels, etc., in the Confederate service 1861-65.
12. ALPHABETICAL LIST of 2,261 battles of the Civil War.
13. IMPORTANT BATTLES of the Civil War, with dates, names of Corps, Divisions or Regiments engaged, and the Generals of both armies killed or wounded, also giving number of killed, wounded and missing, and the names of opposing commanders.
14. FEDERAL VESSELS destroyed by the Confederate Cruisers Alabama, Nashville, Olustee, Florida, Tallahassee, Shenandoah, Sumter, etc., etc.
15. ARMIES, Corps and Geographical Commands in the Confederate States.
16. ORGANIZATION (or Roster) of all the Confederate Corps, Divisions, Brigades, Regiments, etc., and the names of officers and the important battles of the war.
17. THE CONFEDERATE NAVY, giving names of vessels and their commanders; also names of the officers of the navy, Statistics of the Cost, Losses, Captures, and the Services of the Confederate Navy during the Civil War.
18. UNITED CONFEDERATE VETERANS, Virginia Veterans, Tennessee Bivouacs and other organizations.
19. CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS erected in the different parts of the United States.
20. CONFEDERATE POEMS, the martial melodies dear to Southern hearts, pathos and patriotism.
21. ABSTRACTS and returns from the Confederate armies and a vast accumulation of statistical and historical matter too lengthy to enumerate on this circular.

THERE WILL BE IN

## THE CONFEDERATE SOLDIER IN THE CIVIL WAR

Over One Thousand (1,000) Illustrations, including Colored Lithographs, Battle Scenes, Maps, Plans of Battles, Portraits of Distinguished Military and Naval Heroes, Statesmen, etc., measuring from ten (10) square inches to one hundred and eight (108) square inches (equal to one (1) page) each.

The book will be printed on highly finished paper, and contain 500 pages, size 11 1/2 x 16 inches.

### ✻ ✻ ✻ TERMS OF PUBLICATION. ✻ ✻ ✻

"The Confederate Soldier in the Civil War" will be published in serial form and sold by subscription only.

It will be published in Thirty-one (31) Parts, at Twenty-five (25) cents a part. Four (4) parts will be issued each month.

No subscription will be received except for the entire work.

COURIER-JOURNAL JOB PRINTING CO.,

INCORPORATED.

SUBSCRIPTION BOOK DEPARTMENT,

SOLICITING AGENTS WANTED IN EVERY TOWN AND COUNTY.

334-338 West Green Street, LOUISVILLE, KY.