

TO: LWV-Texas Board Members
LL Presidents/National Security
Arlington, Austin Area, Brazos Co.,
Dallas, Houston Area, Irving,
Kerrville Area, San Antonio Area,
San Marcos Area, Tarrant Co., and
Waco Area

LWV-Texas
November 2, 1989
Special Mailing
B.l.d.
National Security

FROM: Tom Burtis, Natl. Secty., LWV-Texas
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

I. U. S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE - CENTRAL TEXAS SEMINAR

Enclosed are invitations from the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., for members of LWV-Texas to attend any or all of five seminar sessions being held in Austin on November 13-14. Please pass this information on to any of your members who might be interested.

Please note that several of the sessions require telephone reservations. In particular, those desiring to attend the luncheon meeting on Monday should call as early as convenient for a luncheon reservation and mail their \$9 check to arrive by Friday, November 10.



Are We Heading for a More Peaceful World?

An invitation from the

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

to participate in a series of programs examining international peace and conflict resolution

Austin, Texas

November 13-14, 1989

The United States Institute of Peace...

For two hundred years, visionary Americans have called for the creation of an institution that would apply knowledge derived from history and the broadest possible research to the challenge of achieving peace among nations.

The United States Institute of Peace is a government agency created by Congress in 1984 to expand America's capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

Through its grants, fellowships, library services, research projects, and various public education activities, the Institute seeks to:

- increase available knowledge about ways to limit and resolve international conflicts and create environments leading to peaceful situations;
- disseminate this knowledge to diplomats, political leaders, and others involved in peacemaking efforts;
- increase public discussion of international peace and conflict resolution; and
- support educational programs and the development of resource materials for students and the general public.

Co-sponsored by:

- | | |
|--|---|
| • Lyndon Baines Johnson Library | • Austin Metropolitan Ministries |
| • Austin Council on Foreign Affairs | • Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary |
| • The University of Texas at Austin | • Concordia Lutheran College |
| • Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs | • Episcopal Theological Seminary of the Southwest |
| • Graduate School of Library and Information Science | • Huston-Tillotson College |
| • General Libraries | • National Conference of Christians and Jews |
| • Institute of Latin American Studies | • St. Edward's University |
| • Center for Middle East Studies | • Texas Conference of Churches |
| • Center for Asian Studies | |
| • Center for Soviet and East European Studies | |
| • Texas Library Association | |

Increasing Knowledge and Information About Peace

Sources of Support Available from the Institute of Peace . . .

Monday, November 13

9:00 - 10:30 A.M. **Library and Information Services Workshop**

- applying for library and information services support from the Institute's Jeannette Rankin Library Program--suggestions for writing grant proposals
- national trends affecting access to materials in the peace, conflict resolution, and security fields
- distribution of a *Checklist of Titles on International Peace, Security, and Conflict Resolution in Austin Area Libraries*, with more than 1000 entries. (Five complimentary copies for each library, college, university, and organization represented.)
- explanation of guides to the Library of Congress Subject Headings and Classification Schedules
- future program development in Texas—Where do we go from here?

Location: Bass Lecture Hall, LBJ School of Public Affairs. Call 512-471-3821 to reserve a place.

10:30 - 12:00 noon **Research and Education Grants Workshop: Support for Scholars, Educators, Civic Organizations, and Curriculum Specialists in Texas**

- applying for support from the Institute—suggestions for writing grant proposals
- national trends affecting grantmaking and philanthropic support in the peace, conflict resolution, and security fields
- explanation of the Institute's Solicited Grants program

Location: Bass Lecture Hall, LBJ School of Public Affairs. Call 512-471-4962, ext. 248, to reserve a place.

Are We Heading for a More Peaceful World?

Public Discussions on . . .

Monday, November 13

12:00 - 2:00 P.M.

Religion: A Source of Peace and a Source of Conflict

Presenters:

David Little, Senior Scholar and Director, Working Group on Religion, Ideology, and Peace, United States Institute of Peace; Professor of Religious Studies, University of Virginia

John Gilligan, Director, International Institute for Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame; former Director, Agency for International Development; former Governor of Ohio

Discussants:

Dr. John Stotts, President, Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary

Dr. Joe Lee, Tom Slick Professor of World Peace, LBJ School of Public Affairs; Professor of Modern History, University College Cork, Ireland

Reverend Sidney Lovett, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace

Summation:

Professor Elspeth Rostow, LBJ School of Public Affairs; Vice-Chairman, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace

Location:

St. Edward's University, Maloney Room, Main Building (Advance purchase of \$9 luncheon ticket required, call 512-448-8411)

4:00 - 5:00 P.M.

Peace in the Middle East: Problems, Prospects, and Potential -- a public lecture

Samuel W. Lewis, President, United States Institute of Peace; U.S. Ambassador to Israel 1977-1985

Location:

Bass Lecture Hall, LBJ School of Public Affairs

Tuesday, November 14

9:00 - 11:45 A.M.

Resolving Regional Conflicts: A Role for U.S.-Soviet Cooperation?

- Is U.S.-Soviet cooperation in limiting Third World conflicts a short-term coincidence or a long-term prospect?
- Superpower cooperation or unilateral diplomacy -- What's best for the regional powers involved?
- Hammering out settlements -- Do Americans and Soviets have different models?
- What about the Brezhnev Doctrine? The Reagan Doctrine?
- Are some conflicts better suited for multilateral diplomacy?

Presenters:

Mark Katz, Peace Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

Jiri Valenta, Director of Soviet and Eastern European Affairs, University of Miami

Discussants:

Jorge Caceres-Prendes, Visiting Scholar, Institute of Latin American Studies; faculty member, University of Costa Rica

Nayan Chanda, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Robert K. German, Visiting Professor, LBJ School of Public Affairs; former senior Foreign Service Officer

Kenneth Jensen, Director of Research & Studies, United States Institute of Peace

Samuel W. Lewis, President, United States Institute of Peace; former U.S. Ambassador to Israel

Jagat Mehta, Visiting Professor, LBJ School of Public Affairs; former Foreign Secretary of India

Sidney Weintraub, Dean Rusk Professor of International Affairs, LBJ School of Public Affairs

Location:

Bass Lecture Hall, LBJ School of Public Affairs

TO: LL President/National Security Chr.; DPM

LWV-Texas

May 1989

FROM: Louise Cummins, LWV-TX Program Vice President

LLP Mailing; DPM

II.B.l.d.

National Security

CAMPAIGN FOR A SAFER WORLD

At the national level, the League is working with an informal coalition of arms control groups which has targeted Texas as one of seven key states for a grassroots lobbying effort during the 101st Congress. The coalition includes the national offices of the American Association of University Women, Common Cause, Physicians for Social Responsibility, SANE/FREEZE: Campaign for Global Security, United Campuses against Nuclear War (UCAM), Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND), Union of Concerned Scientists, Professionals Coalition for Nuclear Arms Control, Federation of American Scientists, Committee for National Security, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Council for a Livable World, American Medical Student Association, NETWORK, and a number of other national organizations.

The national League has suggested that we attempt to coordinate our lobbying with Texas state and local affiliates of other arms control organizations in the coalition. We requested the assistance of a number of them in preparing the letters, descriptions of which follow, which the state League addressed to Senators Bentsen and Gramm, Speaker Wright, three Texas members of congress with outstanding arms control voting records (Bryant, Leland, and Gonzalez), and Texas members of the House Budget Committee (Leath, Bryant, and Armey) and Armed Services Committee (Leath, Ortiz, and Bustamante).

We encourage you to send similar but not identical letters from your local League to the senators and the member or members of Congress in your League area, and to local newspapers.

Also please publish an article in your local VOTER to encourage your members to write similar individual letters. A large number of similar letters to local newspapers will result in the publication of at least several of them on different dates and will encourage more readers to get involved and write to their legislators.

Letters Mailed by the State League

To Senator Lloyd Bentsen (U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510):

We thank you for your support for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and a number of other important national security measures.

National security is one of the three top-priority national concerns of the League of Women Voters. After years of study of national security issues, throw-weight and all, the League has reached a nation-wide consensus that we can enhance national security only by reaching further verifiable and mutual arms reduction agreements--nuclear, conventional, chemical, and biological--along the lines of the INF Treaty ratified last year and the yet-to-be-completed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

We believe the course of the arms race over the past thirty years makes it very clear that its continuation can only make both the U.S. and the Soviet Union constantly less secure. Any increases or modernization by either super-power of offensive weapons has been and will continue to be matched promptly by the other power. Thus both nations become targets of more weapons or more-threatening weapons than before.

Effective national security action will require a bipartisan consensus which recognizes both the need to enhance national security and that the only possible means to achieve that goal is through further verifiable arms reduction agreements. Any partisan effort would be either voted down in the Congress or vetoed when it reaches the White House.

Please support, and try to persuade your colleagues of both parties to support, such a bipartisan consensus to facilitate early completion of START by reaffirming the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty, establishing interim restraints on further deployments of strategic weapons, eliminating funding for the MX rail-garrison system, and significantly reducing funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

In addition to enhancing our military security directly, these preliminary actions and the early completion of START would relieve severe budgetary pressures, reduce the federal deficit, and help restore a strong and competitive economy, without which we could not long sustain our military security.

To Senator Phil Gramm

Same, except first paragraph reads: We thank you for your support for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

To Speaker Jim Wright (House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515):

Same, except the first paragraph reads: We thank you for your strong leadership in the 100th Congress for responsible arms control measures and in support of Peace initiatives in Central America.

To Members of Congress John Bryant, Mickey Leland, and Henry B. Gonzalez:

Same, except first paragraph reads: We thank you for your outstanding support in the 100th Congress for many important arms control measures.

And for Bryant, the next-to-last paragraph starts: Please support, and try to persuade your colleagues of both parties and especially those on the Budget Committee to support, such a bipartisan consensus...

To Members of Congress Marvin Leath (both Budget and Armed Services committees), Dick K. Armey (Budget Committee), and Solomon P. Ortiz and Albert G. Bustamante (Armed Services Committee):

Same as for Bryant, above, except the first paragraph is omitted and the next-to-last paragraph refers to the appropriate committee or committees.

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MAY 1 1989

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League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

May 1, 1989

The Honorable Lloyd Bentsen
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Bentsen:

We thank you for your support for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and a number of other important national security measures.

National security is one of the three top-priority national concerns of the League of Women Voters. After years of study of national security issues, throw-weight and all, the League reached a nation-wide consensus that we can enhance national security only by reaching further verifiable and mutual arms reduction agreements -- nuclear, conventional, chemical, and biological -- along the lines of the INF Treaty ratified last year and the yet to be completed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

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In addition to directly enhancing our military security, these preliminary actions and the early completion of START would relieve severe budgetary pressures, reduce the federal deficit, and help restore a strong and competitive economy, without which we could not long sustain our military security.

Sincerely,

Diane Sheridan
President



League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

May 1, 1989

The Honorable Phil Gramm
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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May 1, 1989

The Honorable Jim Wright
Speaker
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Speaker Wright:

We thank you for your strong leadership in the 100th Congress for responsible arms control measures and in support of peace initiatives in Central America.

National security is one of the three top-priority national concerns of the League of Women Voters. After years of study of national security issues, throw-weight and all, the League reached a nation-wide consensus that we can enhance national security only by reaching further verifiable and mutual arms reduction agreements -- nuclear, conventional, chemical, and biological -- along the lines of the INF Treaty ratified last year and the yet to be completed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

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Diane Sheridan
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May 1, 1989

The Honorable Mickey Leland
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Leland:

We thank you for your outstanding support in the 100th Congress for many important arms control measures.

National security is one of the three top-priority national concerns of the League of Women Voters. After years of study of national security issues, throw-weight and all, the League reached a nation-wide consensus that we can enhance national security only by reaching further verifiable and mutual arms reduction agreements -- nuclear, conventional, chemical, and biological -- along the lines of the INF Treaty ratified last year and the yet to be completed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

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May 1, 1989

The Honorable John Bryant
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Bryant:

We thank you for your outstanding support in the 100th Congress for many important arms control measures.

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
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May 1, 1989

The Honorable Henry B. Gonzalez
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Gonzalez:

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
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May 1, 1989

The Honorable Marvin Leath
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Leath:

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May 1, 1989

The Honorable Dick K. Arney
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Arney:

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May 1, 1989

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Ortiz:

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Sincerely,

Diane Sheridan
President



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1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

May 1, 1989

The Honorable Albert G. Bustamante
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Bustamante:

National security is one of the three top-priority national concerns of the League of Women Voters. After years of study of national security issues, throw-weight and all, the League reached a nationwide consensus that we can enhance national security only by reaching further verifiable and mutual arms reduction agreements -- nuclear, conventional, chemical, and biological -- along the lines of the INF Treaty ratified last year and the yet to be completed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

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Sincerely,

Diane Sheridan
President

Someday, when we're both rich and famous,
we'll look back on all this and laugh.



Save
tell Louise
assigns NS to
someone.

Baynton

635108©PPT, Inc.



League of Women Voters
Education Fund

So

Memorandum

1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-1965

May 13, 1988

TO: The National Security Leadership Network

FROM: Sherry Rockey, Senior Program Analyst, LWVEF

You are receiving the second in a series of mailings from the League of Women Voters Education Fund sent periodically in 1988 to League members who have shown a keen interest in conducting citizen education on national security issues.

These mailings are part of the LWVEF effort to develop League members as national security resources in their own communities. The information you will find here will assist you in designing innovative and effective citizen education projects, tapping existing resources, keeping current on the issues and learning about other League projects on national security issues.

Enclosed in this mailing are the following:

1) Report on the National Security Leadership Training Workshop--This report announces the results on a workshop held in Baltimore, MD as follow-up to the June, 1987 "Redefining National Security" conference. Participants were pass-through grant project managers from the Mid-Atlantic states. The workshop proved to be a useful opportunity to share ideas and learn from each other's experiences.

*A similar workshop will be conducted at the League national convention in Denver in June. Be sure to check your agenda for time and location.

2) Pass-Through Grant Project Samples--To give you a better idea of the projects other Leagues are conducting with their National Security Leadership pass-through grant funds, a small sample of materials produced under this project is enclosed. Unfortunately, there is not space to include all of the many innovative and exciting ideas Leagues across the country have developed.

Here you will find: a brochure promoting a television series which focuses on the broad definitions of national security; a brochure on a slide presentation, particularly effective in localizing national security issues; an educational article distributed widely in New

Jersey as substantive information or for reprint by local Leagues; and a newsletter focusing on training and citizen education techniques.

3) "Solutions for Survival: 1988"--League members have realized the effectiveness of video presentations in educational programs, but often don't know where to find good national security videos. Enclosed is the latest catalogue from the Educational Film and Video Project which offers a wide variety of videos on global issues that would add to a citizen education activity or a League meeting.

4) Access Package--Access is a non-profit clearinghouse of information on national security issues. Many League members, as well as the national League office, has found access services and publications to be valuable tools. Enclosed is a brief description of the wide range of Access services, their publications list and two of their recent briefing papers.

Special Report

National Security Leadership Workshop*

On March 11, 1988 the LWVEF sponsored a gathering of national security pass-through grant project managers from the mid-Atlantic region. The group spent a day in Baltimore, MD sharing the successes and obstacles of their individual projects and searching for solutions to common problems. The purpose of this report is to inform League members interested in citizen education on national security issues about the results of the workshop discussions. Some of the ideas developed at the workshop may be useful to keep in mind when designing your next citizen education project.

The most valuable outcome of the day was the opportunity to learn from each other's experiences, generating new ideas for projects, resources and citizen education techniques. An example of the citizen education ideas discussed at the meeting is the appeal of developing pre-packaged programs, such as a video-tape and accompanying discussion guide to be presented to other organizations. Such projects are easy-to-use, have a long-life and can be conducted by a variety of people with minimal training.

Two of the largest obstacles addressed by the workshop participants in conducting their projects were getting media attention for their projects and preserving the unbiased, educational nature of the project when working in coalition with other groups. It was agreed that an on-going courtship of press contacts is a must, as well as a project designed with a "media hook," or a unique component that would make the project newsworthy.

The project managers found that when working with other organizations, either in coalition or as an audience, it is necessary to make the educational goals of the project clear from the start. It is vital that all actors in a citizen education project understand that the issues will be presented in an objective manner, allowing participants to arrive at their own conclusions.

In order to put forth their citizen education experiences in a way that would be useful for both their own future projects and to other Leagues developing projects, the workshop participants developed two lists: The Project Development Process and Criteria for Successful Citizen Education. The following list describes the steps that the workshop participants found to be most logical when conducting a citizen education project.

The Project Development Process

- 1) Group brainstorming/idea generation--Obviously, the first step is to develop the basic project concept.

2) Establish project goals and objectives--Make clear what it is that you hope to accomplish in this project and how.

3) Program Development--Select a target audience, determine what resources are available, when the project will be implemented and who will do the work.

4) Strategy--Decide the best approaches for marketing the project, producing and distributing the materials, and reviewing and adapting the project progress.

5) Project implementation

6) Follow-up and evaluate goal--Measure whether the stated goals were met, and develop activities that can use the momentum built from doing the project.

The group stressed that projects are often launched without adequate time devoted to strategy. A citizen education project implemented on an ad hoc basis is less likely to meet its educational goals than one in which careful consideration has been given to exactly what steps are necessary to achieve success.

The following list of criteria developed at the workshop is not comprehensive, but should be seen as a partial list of the components that contribute to successful projects.

Criteria for Successful Citizen Education

- o Clearly established goals
- o Identify audience
- o Select issues and format with target audience in mind
- o Identify potential problems and address early
- o Carefully choose what groups to coalesce with
- o Build in ripple-effect
- o Design project to ensure a marketing hook
- o Establish educational guidelines
- o Establish suitable time-line
- o Be sure volunteers are well-trained
- o Utilize resources, financial and non-financial
- o Design an evaluation and on-going review process
- o Develop follow-up projects


If you will be attending the League of Women Voters National Convention in June and wish to participate in a similar discussion on the techniques of doing citizen education on national security issues, check your schedule for the "National Security Leadership Training" workshop.

*The National Security Leadership Workshop was funded by the James C. Penney Foundation, Inc.

REDEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY

A Public Television
Film Series and
Discussion Guide

"Everything has changed except our modes of thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe" — Albert Einstein.



Redefining National Security is a film series designed to focus the interest of Montanans on the arms race, arms control, and the competing political philosophies that govern these subjects.

Each of these six films is followed by a televised discussion panel. The panelists stress the importance of decisions on these issues not being left to the scientists, technologists, military strategists, or political leaders alone. We all share in this most important debate.

A FREE discussion guide addressing the issue of "Redefining National Security" is available from your local League of Women Voters or for study in cooperating libraries.

Redefinition means a review, an examination, a learning of the facts, and a screening of the arguments. The knowledge you gain from this series may be the most important in your life for it deals with more than just survival. Join in redefining our national security with your family, friends, and neighbors.

These programs are scheduled to be aired over KUSM from 2:00-3:00 p.m., and seen on KUED cable from 3:30-4:30 p.m. Please check your local listings.

April 2, 1988
STAR WARS

April 9, 1988
THE EDGE OF HISTORY

April 16, 1988
**WHAT ABOUT
THE RUSSIANS**

April 23, 1988
**WOMEN FOR AMERICA,
FOR THE WORLD**

April 30, 1988
IN THE NUCLEAR SHADOW

May 7, 1988
THE LAST EPIDEMIC

This project is sponsored by the League of Women Voters of Montana and the Office of International Education at Montana State University and is funded in part by the Montana Committee for the Humanities, Montana State University, and the League of Women Voters Education Fund.

POST

a new focus ON NATIONAL SECURITY

A thought-provoking slide presentation
aimed at broadening public understanding of
National Security
and how it relates to
Flint and Genesee County residents.

Where:

Hyatt Regency
Fort Worth Suite

When:

Tuesday, April 26, 1988
5:30 p.m. - 6:30 p.m.

Citizens Education Project
Funded by League of Women Voters Education Fund
Provided courtesy of
THE FLINT AREA LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS

MAR 30 1988

7209

The Flint Area League of Women Voters received a grant from the National LWV Education Fund for a Citizen Education Project on National Security to translate this abstract, technical topic into understandable language. The program, "A New Focus on National Security", is now available for community use.

The goals of the program are:

- To broaden understanding of national security to include provisions of basic human needs, international cooperation and arms control.
- To show how national budget expenditures affect the lives and security of people in the Genesee County area.
- To suggest alternatives and actions for people to become involved in promoting their vision of national security.

This program includes an educational sound-slide presentation followed by a time for questions. A brochure listing various organizations where one can access additional information or become involved will be distributed. Two presentations are available - either a 30 or 45 minute version.

For more information or to arrange having this program presented at your organization's meeting, contact one of the following:

- Ann Kraft, 767-1040
- Ruth Brown, 742-1916
- Carol Mattoon, 234-3191 or 257-3632



LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS



THINKING ABOUT NATIONAL SECURITY*

This article is one of a series. It is our hope that it will help you to examine these important issues and how they relate to national security. We hope that these articles will encourage you to participate in the discussion and debate that is so critical in evaluating public policy.

GETTING TO YES WITHOUT GOING TO WAR

or

What is the Best Way for People to Deal with Their Differences?

"Like it or not, you are a negotiator," Roger Fisher and William Ury point out in their international best seller **Getting to YES**. "Negotiation is a fact of life." Indeed, "more and more occasions require negotiation; conflict is a growth industry." Consequently, "whether in business, government, or the family, people reach most decisions through negotiation."

"Although negotiation takes place every day," as Fisher and Ury point out, "it is not easy to do well." What their book outlines in simple and persuasive language is a method of **principled negotiation** which employs no tricks or posturing but shows you how to obtain what you are entitled to and still be decent. This is a method which "can be used by US diplomats in arms control talks with the USSR, by Wall Street lawyers...in anti-trust cases, and by couples deciding everything." In fact, they conclude, that the method can be successfully employed on any level from the domestic to international. Does it really work?

There is plenty of proof in the book itself, where the authors cite examples of satisfactorily resolved conflicts from disagreements between husband and wife about how to build a house to disputes between Israel and Egypt (Camp David). A demonstration of this type of negotiation, if not of its easy success, has most recently been headline news with the December 1987 award of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica for his leadership in promoting conflict resolution among the five Central American nations. Whether his peace plan will finally succeed or fail remains to be seen, but the enormous potential of the method has been universally recognized. That recognition has been confirmed by the fact that the Nicaraguan government has invited Roger Fisher to be an advisor in the talks between the government and the contras as mandated by the Arias Peace Plan.

The basic outline of this method is:

1. Separate people from the problem.
2. Focus on interests, not problems.
3. Invent options for mutual gain.
4. Insist upon using objective criteria.
5. Negotiate successfully with opponents who are more powerful, refuse to play by the rules, or resort to dirty tricks.

*Funded with a grant from the League of Women Voters Education Fund and written by members of the Leagues of Women Voters of South Orange and Maplewood.

How some of the components of this method were used in the Central American negotiations can be seen by examining some elements of the Peace Accord.

Focus on interests, not positions

Nicaragua's **position** was that it would never talk face to face with the contra leadership. At the urging of President Arias and Cardinal Obando y Bravo, it yielded that **position** in favor of direct negotiation. This success was achieved only after much time and effort on the part of the negotiators who **invented options for mutual gain**. They found ways that the leadership could "save face," and the individual countries were guaranteed their sovereignty. As death tolls mounted, economies worsened and disease and malnutrition spread, the single over-riding **interest** became to end the conflict. Although the situation changes from day to day, so far the five countries involved, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, have continued to meet because of their mutual interests.

Invent options for mutual gain

A look at the many peace formulas developed over the years in Central America demonstrates how many options have been invented along the way. When one has not worked out, as with some of the Contadora Proposals, another has replaced it. It is easy for all parties to comply with the Peace Accord because the latest plan provides a series of gradual steps for implementing it. Overall compliance is far behind schedule. Yet the agreed-on-calendar of implementation shows some progress which encourages more.

Insist on using objective criteria

The Peace Accord calls for National Reconciliation Commissions in each country, made up of representatives of opposing forces, to oversee amnesty, cease-fire, and democratization procedures. The Foreign Ministers and Presidents of all five countries are to meet periodically to evaluate compliance, and an International Verification and Follow-up Commission is to be part of the agreement.

Negotiate successfully with opponents who are more powerful

Recognition of the roles that the United States and the Soviet Union play in the region is the first step in dealing with the effect of their interests on the negotiations.

Whether the above steps taken together will actually result in a Central American peace is of course still to be determined. **But surely these conflict resolution techniques are more likely than guns to produce the peace that both the region and its neighbors so desperately need.**

The more people know about **principled negotiation**, the more there is a chance that this method can be used to resolve conflict in Central America and elsewhere. In this short article, we can just highlight the principles described in Getting to YES. This readable little book describes the process in depth. To read it, is to find out how to use its techniques on all levels of negotiations; in our daily lives, in our towns and cities, and for the security of our nation and the global community.

For further information contact the League of Women Voters of New Jersey at 1-800-792-VOTE.

CITIZEN EDUCATION IDEA EXCHANGE

League of Women Voters of Greater Lafayette
Post Office Box 2085
West Lafayette, IN 47906

No. 2, January 1988

REACHING OUT TO NEW SEGMENTS OF YOUR COMMUNITY

When you talk about national security issues, do you ever have the feeling that you're talking to yourself? Or just to a few like-minded friends? Or at best to a few other like-minded groups in your community?

To be effective in citizen education, you have to talk to people who don't already agree with you, who may not be in the habit of thinking about national security issues, or who may not be used to looking at those issues from more than one point of view. You have to reach out into your community to arouse interest, to offer new ideas, and to stimulate dialogue.

Assess Your Community

A good way to get started is with the League's time-honored commandment to "Know Your Community." Take a little time to think about your community and its citizens. What people are you reaching with your current activities? What others would you like to reach?

Think about the various groups that you might target for citizen education activities: Young adults, retirees, high school students, factory workers, business people, teachers, homemakers, church members, minority and ethnic groups, and others.

Think about where you might find these people. Chances are that most of them don't show up at League meetings, even when you issue an open invitation to the community to attend. To reach these people, you are going to have to take your message to them, in their own organizations, schools, churches, and shopping malls. As a start, target one or two of these groups and think about where and how you might be able to encourage discussion of national security issues.

Educate Yourself First

You don't have to be an expert on arms control, or Third World development, or U.S.-Soviet relations, to do citizen education. You do need to be aware of key issues, to follow current international events as a concerned citizen, and to know where to find more information on a specific topic when you need it.

If you feel you need to educate yourself first, as an individual, or a committee, or a local League, then do so. But try to avoid getting caught up in self-education as an end in itself. Reach out to pass on your new information and ideas to others.

REACHING OUT TO NEW SEGMENTS OF YOUR COMMUNITY (Continued)

Remember that preparing to educate someone else is one of the most powerful motivators for learning. It creates a reason and a need for you to learn. If you choose topics that you care about, you can gain great personal satisfaction from expanding your own knowledge and then sharing your new insights with others.

Listen for the Concerns of Other Groups

The best-prepared and most well-intentioned program will fall flat if it doesn't relate to the needs and interests of the group you are addressing. If you're going to meet people on their own turf, you have to meet them on their own terms as well. You have to address those aspects of national security that relate to their concerns.

It's important to learn what issues various groups in your community care about and what they want to talk about. As you develop an understanding of their concerns, you will discover the ways in which your interests intersect. You may be able to develop joint activities, based on shared interests, that will give you a chance to work together. In these activities, try to cultivate the skill of listening and to develop a sensitivity to the differences as well as the similarities between groups in your community.

Explore New Opportunities for Citizen Education

You may be able to plan shared educational activities with other organizations -- or offer League-designed educational programs to other groups -- or use local newspapers, radio, or television to reach directly into people's homes. Everything you try will not necessarily be successful but, if you persevere, you will discover to your satisfaction that you are finding ways to have an impact in your community.

Reaching out to new segments of your community means taking the initiative to try something different, leaving the security of tradition, and exploring some new opportunities. The goal is to create situations where others in your community are encouraged to discuss and develop and refine their own ideas about national security.

**INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL PEACE
TO BE HELD IN DALLAS ON AUGUST 8-12**

An international women's conference on "Global Peace...from Vision to Reality" will be held on August 8-12 in Dallas, TX, according to an announcement received from Peacemakers, Inc.

The conference is open to anyone anywhere in the world who cares about peace and wants to become skilled in peacemaking. Planners of the conference assert that peacemaking can be learned and peacemaking can be taught.

Information about the conference is available from Peacemakers, Inc., 100 Crescent Court, Suite 270, Dallas, TX 75201, Phone: (214) 871-8448.

LEARNING TO WORK EFFECTIVELY WITH THE MEDIA

Do you get good coverage for League activities through your local media? Or are you frustrated by lack of media attention to League events and issues?

Editorial decisions by newspapers, magazines, radio, and TV stations about what to cover are based on many factors. If you understand how these decisions are made, you can learn to work more effectively with your local news media.

In planning for citizen education, effective use of the media is an important consideration. The media may be an avenue to invite people to educational events, a means of reporting on events to others who did not attend, or a source of direct education through articles, radio programs, and TV shows. The media give you a chance to reach out to citizens in their own homes.

Analyze the Media That Serve Your Community

Start by listing the newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations that serve your community. Think about the geographic area they cover and the audience they reach. Note whether news is national, regional, or local; what topics the editorials address; what kinds of features are used.

Analyzing the media options available in your area will help you target those most likely to take notice of your activities. Items that are selected for publication or broadcast will be those that have broad appeal to the typical readers or viewers. Make special note of any media that encourage community involvement, such as a cable TV station that provides opportunities for local programming by community groups.

Make Personal Contacts

Take time to get to know the key media people in your community. Learn who is responsible for various kinds of decisions, sections of the newspaper, or segments of radio and TV programming.

A newspaper, depending on size and organization, may have a publisher, executive editor, editorial page editor, managing editor, news editor, and assignment editor, among others. A radio or TV station may have a manager, program director, news director, or public affairs director. Reporters may be assigned specific stories or given a general area of responsibility. Knowing how the system works will enable you approach the right person.

Ask Yourself: Is It News, Opinion, or Feature?

To get coverage on the news page of the local paper or on the radio/TV news, an event must be truly newsworthy. It must be of interest to a large number of people outside your own organization.

The editorial page, or the broadcast editorial on a radio or TV station, is the place for opinions. You may be able to contribute letters to the editor, or even a guest editorial, or ask for a meeting with the editorial board to request an editorial be written on a particular topic.

LEARNING TO WORK EFFECTIVELY WITH THE MEDIA (Continued)

Feature stories, used both in newspapers and radio/TV broadcasting, offer a look in greater depth at a person or an event or a topic that has human interest qualities or some unusual characteristics.

The right person to approach about newspaper, radio or TV coverage may depend on whether your item is news, opinion, or feature.

Be Clear and Concise in Your Approach

Reporters, editors, and producer/directors are busy people. They are more likely to respond favorably to a clearly written press release, a brief query as to whether a particular item is of interest, or a concise presentation of an educational proposal. Ask if there are written guidelines for submission of news items. Find out about restrictions on length for letters to the editor or guest editorials. Inquire as to whom and how feature ideas should be proposed.

Your responsibility is to provide to the media information that is accurate, clear, concise, and of interest to your community. As you earn a reputation for meeting these standards, relations with the media will prosper and you may even find the League sought out as a source for information on other topics of community interest.

MEETING-READY MATERIALS ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD

A videotape used by many Leagues during the 1985 national study of U.S. relations with developing countries is now available for purchase. "The Third World Challenge to U.S. Policy" is a 20-minute videotape with scenes in developing countries interspersed with expert commentary on different approaches to foreign aid and relations with the Third World. The videotape is accompanied by a discussion guide with reproducible fact sheets, discussion questions, and additional sources.

Also available is a 12-page publication on "America in the Third World: Collision or Cooperation?", used as a reference by many Leagues during the 1985 national study. In addition, the League has published a more recent 16-page booklet on "A Time for Choosing: The Role of Foreign Aid in U.S. Policy." The videotape and 20 copies of each of the two publications also can be purchased as a "Meeting Package."

A flyer describing the materials and listing the prices for the specific items is available from the Publication Sales office of the League of Women Voters, 1730 M Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036, Phone: (202) 429-1965.

As you consider ways to stimulate the national security dialogue in your community, you may find it worthwhile to invest in one or two videotapes that can be used in a variety of ways. You can use a videotape as a discussion-starter for meetings of many small groups, or as a lead-in for a panel of experts at a larger meeting. You may be able to arrange to lend the videotape to high school or college teachers for classroom use or to make it available through public libraries. You might find that a local cable TV channel would play the videotape on the air.

WHAT INDIANA LEAGUES ARE DOING: IDEAS THAT WORK

LWV of Hammond-Highland-Munster

The national security committee hosted a workshop about citizen education on national security in October and invited representatives of the LWV of Porter County to attend. The workshop was followed by three unit meetings in Hammond-Highland-Munster in November to discuss ideas for League involvement in citizen education on national security issues. The Hammond-Highland-Munster committee is planning to network with the national security committee of the Porter County League and is interested in networking with other League groups in northwest Indiana and south Chicago.

LWV of Greater Lafayette

The League arranged for the videotape on "Beyond the Hotline" from the Crisis Control Discussion Kit to be shown over the local cable TV channel. The videotape was aired six times during December.

LWV of Muncie-Delaware County

Last year the League sponsored a series of six lectures for the community on "Alternative Perspectives on Peace," with a variety of well-known speakers. The lectures were held in varied locations to attract more people, and publicity was offered through the local newspaper, the League newsletter, flyers, and word of mouth. Attendance was excellent. In a survey of those attending, "someone told me about it" was cited most frequently as the source of information.

LWV of Cass County

Last year two members used materials from the Crisis Control Discussion Kit to prepare a League meeting on "Beyond the Hotline." They invited members of the local branch of the American Association of University Women to join them for the meeting.

SYMPOSIUM ON APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT
TO BE HELD AT PURDUE UNIVERSITY ON MARCH 17-19

The Afro-American Studies Research Center at Purdue University will present a symposium on "Appropriate Technology for Development" in West Lafayette on March 17-19.

The symposium is designed for community organizations, scholars and students interested in developing technological packages aimed at improving the quality of life by alleviating world hunger, poverty, illiteracy, and disease. Participants will utilize case studies of development efforts in Africa, the Caribbean, and African-American communities in the United States to seek a better understanding of the gap between the development of technological packages and their effective dissemination to achieve desired results.

Information is available from Afro-American Studies Research Center, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907, Phone: (317) 494-5680.

This publication has been funded with a grant
from the League of Women Voters Education Fund.

Comments, ideas, and other communications
should be addressed to the editor:

Joan J. Lohmann

Phone: [REDACTED]

If you know others who would like to be on the mailing list, send us their
names. If necessary, duplicate additional copies of this form.

Please add the following name to the mailing list for the Citizen Education
Idea Exchange:

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Local League or other organizational affiliation _____

League of Women Voters
of Greater Lafayette

[REDACTED]

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A Safe and Sustainable World



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FOR THE WORLD**

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<i>A</i> lternatives to the Nuclear Arms Race..	3
<i>B</i> ringing Peace to Central America.....	6
<i>C</i> itizen Diplomacy.....	9
<i>D</i> efending The Environment.....	12



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Winner!
1986 OSCAR®
Best Short
Documentary
and
14 Other Awards

Alternatives to the Nuclear Arms Race

PRODUCED BY: *Vivienne Verdon-Roe*
 1986. High School & Adult. 28 min.

Among those Featured:

Joanne Woodward, Actress
 Mary Dent Crisp, Nat'l Republican Co-Chair (1980)
 Patricia Schroeder, U.S. Representative
 Ellen Goodman, Syndicated Columnist
 Vera Kistiakowsky, Physics Professor, MIT
 Dorothy Ridings, Former Pres., League of Wom. Voters

Twenty-two prominent American women call for an end to the arms race and a new vision of security. With common sense and compassion they propose a change in our national priorities to recognize human needs.

These women -- including scientists, educators, trade union leaders, politicians, psychiatrists, and arms control experts -- encourage us all to take an active part in ensuring a future for the world.



"The film moved me to tears. Its message is an inspiration to us all." — Dr. Benjamin Spock

"...an overwhelming feeling of hope is an unexpected byproduct." — Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

"Impassioned. Eloquent. Four stars!****" — Detroit Free Press

SALE	Film	3/4	VHS-Beta	RENT	FILM	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$239	\$75	\$45		\$50	\$45	\$35

PRODUCED BY *Ian Thiermann & S.F. Physicians for Soc'l Responsibility*
 1986 High School & Adult 28 min.

AWARDS: Nat'l Educ. Film Fest. — Second Place
 American Film Fest. — Finalist

A critical look at the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative, featuring leading supporters and critics of the Star Wars Defense system. In a fast moving, visually exciting and informative presentation, the film explores the key questions about the Star Wars plan in sensible, clear language:

- Would a Star Wars defense make us more secure or less secure?
- Is a perfect defense against nuclear missiles possible?
- Are there arms control alternatives to Star Wars?

"***Highly Recommended. Editor's Choice" — Amer. Assoc. For Advan. of Science

"A good introduction to the problems and complexities of Star Wars."
 — Nancy Neumann, Nat'l Pres., League of Women Voters

Includes comments by:

Dr. Gerald Yonas Dpty. Director Strategic Defen.Initv.	Dr. John Holdren Chairman Fed. of Amer. Scien.	Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham Director High Frontier	Ms. Randall Forsberg Director Inst. for Defen. & Disarm.
Caspar Weinberger Secretary of Defense	Dr. Richard Garwin Nat'l. Defense Consultant	Dr. George Keyworth Former Science Advisor to President Carter	H. Jack Geiger, M.D. Nat'l. Pres. PSR

SALE	Film	3/4	VHS-Beta	RENT	FILM	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$239	\$75	\$45		\$50	\$45	\$35

STAR WARS: A SEARCH FOR SECURITY

Narrated by
Ed Begley, Jr.
 of TV's "St. Elsewhere"



1983 OSCAR NOMINEE

In the Nuclear Shadow

WHAT CAN THE CHILDREN TELL US?



Theresa, 13



Marcel, 17



Kweli, 6



Katy, 10

PRODUCED BY Eric Thiermann, Vivienne Verdon-Roe, Ian Thiermann
AWARDS

Academy Award Nominee — Best Short Documentary
S.F.Int'l Film Fest. — Best Educational Documentary
Atlantic Indep. Film Fest. — Best Educational Documentary
Nat. Educat. Film Fest. — Honorable Mention
Sinking Creek Intl. Film Fest. — Cash award

1983 High School & Adult 25 min.

Children of various races and backgrounds openly discuss their responses to the threat of nuclear war. In this deeply moving documentary they express their fear, anger, and feelings of helplessness as well as their hope that the nuclear dilemma can and will be solved.

"I found the film tremendously moving, beautifully put together and sensitively handled ... The film is magnificent" —Dr. Lynn Iglitzen, Exec. Dir. Natl. Council for Social Studies

"Very moving and excellently conceived film. Not heavy handed or maudlin. Speaks for itself. Can see a million uses for it — PTA's, church groups, etc." —Louis Borgenicht, M.D.

SALE	Film	3/4	VHS-Beta	RENT	FILM	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$239	\$75	\$45		\$50	\$45	\$35

A 28 minute video on ending all nuclear explosions for group or public meetings and local TV showings

Produced by
Center for Defense Information

Patriotic and optimistic, 'A Step Away From War' brings you . . .

- ★ The role of nuclear weapons explosions in fueling the arms buildup
- ★ Why a U.S./Soviet Test Ban would avert possible nuclear war
- ★ What YOU can do NOW to end the arms buildup

Admiral Gene La Rocque
Director, Center for Defense Information
Hon. James Leach
Member of Congress (R-Iowa)

Featuring
Dr. Glenn Seaborg
Former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Robert Stuart
Chairman Emeritus, National Can Company

PUT THIS IMPORTANT FILM TO WORK IN YOUR COMMUNITY:

- ★ Arrange its showing on local TV stations
- ★ Screen it for church, civic and business groups . . . at schools, and for city and state officials.
- ★ Recruit new members for your organization

SALE	3/4	VHS-Beta	Rent	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$35		\$45	\$35

PAUL NEWMAN

in A STEP AWAY FROM WAR



PRODUCED BY: Eric Thiermann; **EDITED BY** Ian Thiermann

1981 High School & Adult 28 min. with Study Guide

THE LAST EPIDEMIC conveys in plain language the effects of one or more nuclear weapons on a civilian population, while using visuals which actually show the effects of a nuclear explosion. It describes the drastic damage to the environment and the long range devastation to the planet. It stands alone as the most effective evidence available on the effects of nuclear explosions and is backed up by statements from internationally recognized authorities from both the scientific and medical community.

THE LAST EPIDEMIC is being used internationally by individuals and organizations who are concerned enough about themselves and their environment to help educate the public to the necessity for stopping and reversing the nuclear arms race.

"Overwhelming" — San Francisco Chronicle

"Harrowing" — The Washington Post

"Devastating" — Video Review

"It may be the most important program you will see this year-or any year" — San Jose Mercury

SALE	Film	3/4	VHS-Beta	RENT	FILM	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$239	\$75	\$45		\$50	\$45	\$35



THE LAST EPIDEMIC

PREPARING FOR PEACE ECONOMIC CONVERSION MEANS JOB INSURANCE



PRODUCED BY: Ian Thiermann, Eric Thiermann, and
The San Diego Economic Conversion
Conference

1985 High School & Adult 28 min.

The fear of losing jobs is one of the reasons for support of large military contracts. In San Diego the reduction of military contracts threatens one out of every four jobs. This problem also faces many other communities in the United States.

At a recent conference in San Diego, representatives of labor, management, and the community discuss how to save jobs when military contracts are cut back. This is a lively and exciting analysis and also includes comments by recognized economists, Professors Seymour Melman and Lloyd Dumas. Includes Teaching Packet with Transcript.

SALE	Film	3/4	VHS-Beta	RENT	FILM	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$239	\$75	\$45		\$50	\$45	\$35

PRODUCED BY: Eric Thiermann, Ian Thiermann, Vivienne Verdon-Roe
AWARDS: Athens Intn'l Film Fest. — Golden Athena Award, Educ. Cat.
Nat. Educ. Film Fest. — First Place, Conflict Studies
Vermont Intn'l Peace Festival — Award of Merit
Sinking Creek Intn'l Film Fest. — Cash Award

1984 High School & Adult 28 min. with Study Guide

Twelve distinguished men and women* including Admiral Noel Gayler, former Commander of the Pacific fleet, stress the crucial need for cooperation in international affairs, both in arms control talks and in citizen diplomacy. The viewers become aware they have the power and responsibility to affect change by active participation in the democratic process.

This inspiring film combines creative dialogue for stopping the nuclear arms race together with stirring visual images. It is an excellent basis for a thoughtful discussion on the prevention of nuclear war.


*Craig Schindler, J.D., PhD.; Richard Gardiner, M.D.; Admiral Noel Gayler; Victor Sidel, M.D.; Gary Lapid, M.D.; Alexander Sakarov; Harold Sandler, M.D.; William Colby, LLB; Jerome Frank, M.D., PhD; Sidney Drell, PhD.; Helen Caldicott, M.D.

"THE EDGE OF HISTORY is a worthy successor to THE LAST EPIDEMIC. Given its topic it is probably one of today's most important films and if shown widely enough may help change the course of human history. — Roger Walsh, psychiatrist & author

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

The Stanford Symposium
on the
Prevention of Nuclear War

THE
EDGE
OF
HISTORY



"We have an image
of our
collective death;
we have an image
of our
collective evolution.
We must choose."
—Craig Schindler

Natl. Educational Film Festival—First Place: Conflict Studies

WHAT ABOUT THE RUSSIANS?

PRODUCED BY: Eric Thiermann, Ian Thiermann, Vivienne Verdon-Roe

AWARDS: Nat'l Educ. Assn. Film Fest. — Honorable Mention
Shown 6 times in U.S. House of Representatives
Selected by Museum of Modern Art in nuclear film series

1984 High School & Adult 28 min. with Study Guide

- Are the Russians ahead in the nuclear arms race?
- Can we trust the Russians to honor a nuclear weapons treaty?
- How can we end the arms race and maintain our national security?

"This film should be seen by every American...."

— Dr. Owen Chamberlain, Nobel Laureate in Physics

"One of the most important educational films on how to ensure our national security"

— Bill Perry, Jr. former Director Public Relations, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory



Robert McNamara
Former Defense Secy.



George Kennan
Former USSR Ambass.



William Colby
Former Dir. CIA



John Marshall Lee
Vice-Adm. U.S. Navy (Ret.)

SALE	Film	3/4	VHS-Beta	RENT	FILM	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$239	\$75	\$45		\$50	\$45	\$35

PRODUCED BY: The Beyond War Foundation

1986 High School & Adult

Engage yourself and others in a stimulating exploration of the ideas and principles involved in ending war. Order one or both of these new interactive videos.


Building A World Beyond War

AN INTRODUCTORY PRESENTATION (45 min.)

- The obsolescence of war
- Resolution of conflict
- Beginning a national dialogue
- The role of the individual

THE PROCESS OF CHANGE (54 min.)

- Ensuring survival
- Building agreement
- Involving people



SALE VHS-Beta \$35 each

Reliability and Risk

PRODUCED BY: Johnathan Schwartz for Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility

1987 High School & Adult 34 min.

AWARD: Association for Multi-Image in New England
— Gold Medal for Best Documentary

Produced by an organization of concerned computer professionals, this documentary explores our increasing dependance upon computers to make crucial military decisions. The unreliability inherent in complex systems is examined and chilling examples of typical failures are chronicled, failures which someday could lead to an accidental nuclear war.

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35


Life On Earth Perhaps

PRODUCED BY: Oliver Postgate

1985 6th Grade through Adult 29 min.

At times whimsical, at times terrifyingly blunt, this film looks at the unthinkable — Nuclear War — from the point of view of ordinary citizens.

Cleverly put together mixing animated and documentary footage, this British production confronts the history of war, follows events up to the present time, and concludes with stunning clarity how we as citizens must speak up and demand that our leaders end the nuclear arms race.



SEE ALSO:

The Nuclear Winter..... Pg. 13
Dark Circle..... Pg. 14
A Thousand Cranes..... Pg. 14
Films on the "Backpage".....Pg.15

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

Bringing Peace to Central America

Voices of The Voiceless

PRODUCED BY: *Mark Melchiorre*

1983 *High School & Adult* 60 minutes.

AWARD: *Houston Int'nl Film Festival — Gold Award*

Narrated by Mike Farrell (of TV's *M*A*S*H*), *Voices of the Voiceless* tells the story of the over a half a million El Salvadoran refugees who live in the United States as refugees, many illegally. The war which has driven them here and their struggle to survive amidst poverty and fear of deportation is chronicled in this moving documentary.

The film's title is a reference to the late Archbishop Oscar Romero who, until his assassination, was an outspoken leader of the poor in El Salvador — a voice of those silenced by fear of torture and death. Filmed in El Salvador and Los Angeles's refugee community, *Voices of the Voiceless* is a moving portrait of an essential yet largely unacknowledged truth — the victims of the current war are here among us.

Living in constant fear of the U.S. Government, they are eyewitnesses to the brutally repressive campaigns of a regime that with U.S. support has murdered over 44,000 of its citizens and driven over a million more into refugee camps. This is their story.



SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

Destination Nicaragua

PRODUCED BY: *Barbara Trent and David Kaspar.*

1986 *High School & Adult* 33 & 58 min.

AWARDS: *Phila. Int'nl Film Fest. — Best Documentary*
Houston Int'nl Film Fest. — Silver Award
Suffolk County Film Fest. — Merit Award

Narrated by Tyne Daly (of "Cagney and Lacy") with music by Jorge Strunz, Charlie Haden, Phil Ochs and Arlo Guthrie, this acclaimed film is about the experiences of average Americans who embark on an extraordinary journey out of conscience and an intense desire to understand Nicaragua and the impact of U.S. Foreign policy on their citizens.

"A sobering yet encouraging documentary ... persuasive in its view that the U.S. support of the contras is misguided and threatens the Nicaraguan's fundamental right of self-determination while threatening to drag us into another Vietnam." — Kevin Thomas, *Los Angeles Times*

"It is neither for the revolution nor against the revolution. It is simply a mirror of our revolution ... If I were God, I'd put this film in every corner of the United States." — Omar Cabezas, author of *Fire From the Mountain*.

"Convincingly puts the lie to ... Nicaragua being a 'Soviet beachhead.' — John Powers, *L.A. Weekly*



58 min. version	SALE	Film	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	Film	3/4	VHS-Beta
		\$725	\$75	\$55		\$100	\$45	\$35
33 min. version	SALE	Film	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	Film	3/4	VHS-Beta
		\$360	\$75	\$55		\$60	\$45	\$35

Nicaragua For the First Time



PRODUCED BY: Cineaccion

1985 High School & Adult 58 min. & 28 min.

Nicaragua For the First Time examines the Nicaraguan election process in detail by interviewing international observers, electoral experts, all party candidates, and people from many sectors of the population — including many who boycotted the election. The film contradicts the widely disseminated assumptions that the election was controlled by a totalitarian regime, and that the results were an undemocratic “sham.” In the final count, the Sandanistas gained 65% of the assembly, while their opposition received 35% of the vote. The film challenges the myth that this was not a free and democratic election and gives answers to the crucial questions about the elections in Nicaragua.

58 min. Version

SALE	3/4	VHS/Beta	RENT
	\$125	\$95	\$45

28 min. Version

SALE	3/4	VHS/Beta	RENT
	\$75	\$45	\$35

PRODUCED BY: Gail Dolgin and Ron Shilling

1986 High School & Adult 27 min.

An evocative portrait of Nicaragua as seen through the eyes of U.S. teenagers. Perfect for classroom use it speaks directly to a teenage and young adult audience. Students identify with the thoughts and feelings expressed by their peers who spent two weeks touring Nicaragua. The film also includes maps and a short summary of recent history.

I wanted to go down there to see for myself ... All I'd ever heard about Nicaragua in the news was that they were communists, and nothing about really the way they lived.” — Regina Segura, Age 18, Tour Participant

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

Face to Face

Teenagers talk about Nicaragua



IN THE SHADOW OF WAR

Narrated by Glenda Jackson



PRODUCED BY: Wolf Tirado and Jackie Reiter

1985 High School & Adult 28 min.

IN THE SHADOW OF WAR documents the lives and work of those who, at great personal risk, are working to bring a better life to the ordinary people of Nicaragua. It highlights the role of the church and shows how Christians, conscious of the danger yet stirred by the challenge, have come together with the Sandinista government in their commitment to serve the poor.

This moving film documents four development projects in which ordinary people are struggling for a better future. It focuses on a resettlement project for internal refugees, a village in the war-torn north, a midwives training program and an agricultural co-op set up after the land reform. In interviews with the people involved, their problems, achievements and aspirations are discussed in the context of economic crisis and counter-revolutionary violence. This video is a witness to their courage and faith.

“In the Shadow of War shows the dramatic moments — at once joyous and painful — of the birth of a people. The new Nicaragua.” —Father Ernesto Cardenal

“In depth ... moving ... an important look at third world self-help projects. A must for those interested in political science and world affairs.” — Jeff Wharton, Board of Directors, United Teachers of Los Angeles

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

Faces of War

PRODUCED BY: *Nick Allen & Gil Friend*

1985 *High School & Adult* 22 min.

Hosted by **Mike Farrell** (of TV's M*A*S*H)

Faces of War is a powerful program on the agony — and the hope — of Central America. It features emotional, personal interviews with Americans working in El Salvador and Nicaragua, as well as with Wall Street attorney Bill Ford, brother of one of the American missionaries killed by Salvadoran soldiers.

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35



Until It Is Safe To Return



PRODUCED BY: *Luin Goldring, Wendy Kohli, and Leanne Hozie*

1985 *High School & Adult* 46 min.

Until It Is Safe To Return is a moving account of how a woman and her child, fleeing from El Salvador, found Sanctuary in Ithaca, New York. Esperanza, the refugee, and local religious and community members tell how they came to be involved in sanctuary and what the sanctuary movement has meant to them. Connecting the personal with the political, this video production weaves the story of Esperanza together with the actions of several religious groups in Ithaca, including: the Society of Friends, the First Baptist Church and the New Jewish Agenda.

Until It Is Safe To Return documents the commitment of public officials, including the Mayor, as Ithaca became the fifth city in the United States to declare itself a Sanctuary for refugees from Central America. The film presents the human side of this movement, showing how it can be a powerful means for persuading those in power to adopt a more just policy in Central America.

Comprehensive enough to be used as an organizing tool for broad audiences, such as religious groups, community organizations, and peace groups, the film is also valuable as an educational tool in high school and college classes dealing with the role of private citizens and foreign policy.

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

PRODUCED BY: *Gegory Rutchik and Robert Vaaler for PML.*


1986 *High School & Adult* 30 min.

Neighbors to Nicaragua tells the story of Project Minnesota/Leon, a sister-state program between Minnesota and the Department (State) of Leon in Nicaragua. Originally set up by church congregations in the Minneapolis area, PML involves people from all walks of life in the day to day life of their counterparts in the sister-state.

An uplifting tribute to a success story — highly recommended for viewing by church audiences and all groups who are concerned and looking for ways to get involved.

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

Neighbors to Nicaragua - The Story of Project Minnesota/Leon



Citizen Diplomacy and Responsibility

A Soviet School Day Styles in Soviet Education



PRODUCED BY: *Shirley Ward & US-USSR Youth Exchange Program*

1984 Grades 9-12 18 min.

A **Soviet School Day** is a closeup look at the many facets of Soviet Education and the children who participate in it.

To hear a Soviet English class discussing Shakespeare or *Catcher In The Rye* is a subtle revelation that Soviet children are not much different from their American counterparts. The film is accompanied by a discussion guide, discussion questions, homework assignments, and evaluation forms for students and teachers.

"Through ... correspondence between my students and those in the USSR there should be a small but very positive step toward international understanding."

— Vic Ulmer, Teacher, Fremont High School, Saratoga, CA

"I appreciated the positive attitude and my students appreciated the frankness and sincerity of the Russian children in the video. After the lesson, the students became more trustful, more positive. ...They (the Soviet students) don't seem so different from us."

— Karen Johnson, Teacher, Palo Alto Unified School District, CA

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$100	\$75		\$45	\$35

PRODUCED BY: *Michael Killigrew and Tony Shepherd*

1985 High School & Adult 30 min.

Fifteen teenagers from Sierra Mountain High School, Grass Valley, California videotape a message of hope for peace and mutual understanding to an equal number of Soviet students in this documentary of **Direct Connection**, the US-USSR Youth Communication Initiative.

This initiative, now being adopted by schools all over the United States and the Soviet Union, is strongly supported by the California Association of Student Councils, the National Association of Student Councils, the National Association of Secondary School Principals, and the National Association of Elementary School Principals.

This moving and powerful US-Soviet students' video exchange was broadcast on national television in both countries. It shows the Soviet students' response and is a revelation both to the Soviet students and the American students who see and hear the Soviet response.

Direct Connection



"An idea whose time has come" —Dr. Carl Sagan

"This will educate children and will ease their anxiety by feeling that they are doing something positive." — Dr. Benjamin Spock

"It provides a meaningful opportunity for our young people to explore and experience their right of free expression, and the vital role of the citizenry of our democracy in public policy making." —Bill Honig, California State Superintendent of Public Instruction

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

When The People Lead

A Journey to the Soviet Union



PRODUCED BY: Sharon Tennison

1986 High School & Adult 37 min.

Twenty-three Americans — doctors, lawyers, a city planner, fire-fighters, school teachers, nurses, businessmen and women — visit the Soviet Union to meet Soviet citizens face-to-face and gain a first-hand understanding of modern-day Soviet life.

As they travel freely without guides to Moscow, Leningrad, and the Georgian countryside, they encounter Soviets in subways, schools, a Baptist Church, on the street, and in formal meetings. Raising tough questions, their discussions are frank, intense, and often deeply personal. Challenges many of our assumptions about the Soviet people.

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

PRODUCED BY: Marlow Boyer

1985 Grades 6—12, Adult 28 min. (Color slide to video transfer)

Shown at U.N. Women's Conference in Nairobi; Social Studies Assoc. Conference; International Mayors' Conference.

This is the story of Seattle citizens who decide to talk and visit with the citizens of their "sister" city, Tashkent, which is in the Soviet Union.

It is the story of People To People, captured through the eyes of a young photographer, as the pilgrimage proceeds across the seas to Moscow, Leningrad, Samarkand, and eventually to Tashkent.

It is the true story of a pilgrimage for peace that can be duplicated and emulated by citizens in any city in the world. A story of reaching out to the common humanity within us all.

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

People To People



What Soviet Children Are Saying About Nuclear War



PRODUCED BY: International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War (Nobel Prize winners)

AWARD: Vermont World Peace Film Festival — Certificate of Appreciation

1983 Grades 1—12, Adult 22 min.

- How aware are Soviet children of nuclear war?
- Where do they get their information?

A group of American psychiatrists led by Eric Chivian, M.D. and John Mack, M.D. visited two Soviet Pioneer camps, similar to our Boy Scout camps, and interviewed Soviet girls and boys ages 10 to 15. The unrehearsed answers of these children are highly informative, refreshing, and thought-provoking. A transcript, student and teacher evaluation forms, student assignment questions, and discussion guide are included.

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

PRODUCED BY: *The Beyond War Foundation*

1984 High School & Adult 21 min.

AWARDS: *American Film Festival — Finalist*
Freedoms Foundation Award Winner

No Frames. No Boundaries.

This 21-minute film draws its theme from the perspective of astronaut Russell Schweickart as he stepped into space during the Apollo 9 flight.

The film explores the "frames" of reference and artificial man-made "boundaries" that exist between nations and the current spending of \$500 billion each year for armaments to defend them. Also shown is the global groundswell of grassroots and community action by people working for a world beyond war.

"No Frames. No Boundaries." is designed to stimulate viewers to see the imperative nature of the nuclear threat, to understand the personal implications, and to begin to talk about what is needed from each of us in responding to this critical issue.

"When you go around the earth in an hour and a half you begin to recognize that your identity is with that whole thing. And that makes a change.

You look down and you can't imagine how many borders and boundaries you cross again and again and again. From where you see it, the earth is a whole...and it is so beautiful.

*There are no frames.
There are no boundaries."*

RUSSELL SCHWEICKART
Apollo 9 astronaut

SALE	Film	VHS-Beta	RENT	Film
	\$175	\$35		\$50

PRODUCED BY: *The Beyond War Foundation*

1984 High School & Adult 60 min.

Moscow and San Francisco are linked via satellites for the first time in history before live audiences for the Beyond War Award Ceremony honoring the International Physicians For Social Responsibility represented by Dr. Evgueni Chazov and Dr. Bernard Lown.

Inspiring speeches along with outstanding performances featuring musician Paul Winter accompanied by the S.F. Boys' Choir and the Russian Children's Choir 9000 miles apart in the Gosteleradio studios.

BEYOND WAR SPACEBRIDGE

Moscow — San Francisco
Award Ceremony



Sale VHS-Beta \$35

PRODUCED BY: *Original Face Video*

1984 & 1987 Nine - One Hour Programs

A unique series that bridges the gap between personal awakening and political empowerment. The series begins with the topic of personal mortality, then expands to consider the global perspective of "How Then Shall We Live?" through the eyes of some of the leading thinkers and activists of our time. These programs are available individually or as an integrated series. Write or call for a free informative brochure. The Programs:

- #1 & 2 Stephen Levine — Impermanence and personal mortality.
- #3 & 4 Ram Dass — Personal relationship, conscious social action and inner peace.
- #5 Helen Caldicott — Political and personal dimensions of the work to prevent nuclear war.
- #6 Daniel Ellsberg — The hidden agenda behind America's quest for nuclear supremacy.
- #7 Ram Dass & Daniel Ellsberg — A dialogue on inter-relationships of spiritual and political paths toward peace.
- #8 Patricia Ellsberg et al — The Bomb as Teacher; the planetary crisis as catalyst for a new way of Being.
- #9 Ram Dass — Bringing love, compassion and wisdom into political decision making.

"I never imagined that teachings could be transmitted so luminously ... this series is truly a gift for us all" — Joanna Macy, PhD., author of Despair and Personal Power in the Nuclear Age.
"...brings an unrivaled degree of thoughtfulness and compassion to some of the most important issues of our time" — Roger Walsh, M.D., Ph.D., author of Staying Alive

Sale	3/4	VHS/Beta	Rental	3/4	VHS/Beta
Each	\$80	\$50	Each	\$45	\$35
Series	\$720	\$450	Series	\$325	\$250

How Then Shall We Live?

A Nine Part Series on Consciousness,
Politics, and Human Survival



Daniel Ellsberg and Ram Dass

Defending the Environment

EARTH FIRST! The Struggle For The Australian Rainforest

PRODUCED BY: *Jeni Kendell and John Seed*

1986 High School & Adult 58 min.

AWARD: *The Columbus Int'l Film Festival*
— *Bronze Plaque Award*

It is difficult to conceive that in one lifetime man can destroy that which took nature millions of years to evolve. That as each few seconds pass, 50 acres of the world's richest biological resource is stripped from the Earth.

Earth First highlights the plight of our oldest living link with the past, the majestic rainforests. Set in Australia, the program looks at a 70 square kilometer stand of Rainforest, which is all that remains from an age when Australia was the center of a mighty supercontinent called Gondwanaland, covered by a magnificent emerald rainforest. It is also the story of people who care, who will go to the most extraordinary lengths to save these rainforests. The story of everyday people who stirred the conscience of a nation and set an example for the rest of the world.

Earth First is a remarkable film for the dramatic portrayal it presents of a human struggle against that which is loosely called 'growth and progress,' and a stunning pictorial of the rainforests as the film takes you from the remote southern wilds of Tasmania to the Daintree wet tropics of Northern Queensland. An important film on one of our century's most important topics.

"From the first frame 'Earth First' is a riveting documentary of Australian rainforests and the threats they face. It is one of the best wilderness films ever made."

— Greg Buckman, Wilderness News



SALE VHS / Beta
\$39.95

Dark Circle



PRODUCED AND DIRECTED BY:

Chris Beaver, Judy Irving, and Ruth Landy
1982 High School & Adult 82 min.

AWARDS: Academy Awards - Certificate of Special Merit
U.S. Film & Video Festival — Grand Prize
American Film Festival — Blue Ribbon
Houston Int'l Film Festival — Gold Award
Audubon Film Festival — First Prize, Global Issues
Brussels Peace Film Festival — Grand Prize
Shown Nationally on WTBS - Turner Broadcasting

Profound, compelling, at times ironically humorous, **DARK CIRCLE** explores the little-known underside of the nuclear age - that "dark circle" which links nuclear power with the defense industry. Four years in the making, it was shot on location at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant in Colorado, California's Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, and the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

DARK CIRCLE interweaves dramatic personal stories of American victims of the arms race with rare, recently declassified footage of the secret world where the hydrogen bomb is manufactured, tested and sold.

Among the dramatic sequences in the film:

- the explosion and meltdown of unshielded American Nuclear Reactors in a series of government tests in the desert;
- Atomic Test Code-Named "Priscilla," in which 700 pigs dressed in military uniforms were exposed to the blast, heat, and radiation of an atomic bomb;
- an inside look at the annual and very private "Arms Convention" held in Washington, DC where arms makers sell the latest weaponry to military men in a boat-show atmosphere.

*****"It is a tribute to the power of the material, and to the relentless digging of the filmmakers, that the movie is completely riveting." — Roger Ebert, *Chicago Sun-Times*

"What distinguishes **Dark Circle** from other anti-nuclear documentaries is both its warmth, the way it personalizes the stories it tells, and its activist message ... **Dark Circle** leaves you with the desire to act." — Charles Sugnet, *The Nation*

"The best of the recent films on the Atomic Age." — Valerie Ellis, *In These Times*

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

A Thousand Cranes

Narrated by Joanne Woodward



An Artemis Wildlife Foundation Production

"A fascinating wildlife story, and more. A THOUSAND CRANES symbolizes our global choice between survival and extinction in the nuclear age."

— Russell Peterson, President Emeritus, Nat'l Audubon Society

Cine Gold Eagle Award 1987

National primetime telecasts in the USA, USSR, and Britain

Screened at the Smithsonian Institution and the United Nations

A THOUSAND CRANES tells a remarkable true-life story. Americans and Soviets work together to save from extinction the rare and beautiful Siberian crane, a bird which throughout the ages has symbolized happiness and life itself. Combining the fragile beauty of Russian wilderness, the human richness of a Soviet village, and the drama of an international wildlife adventure, A THOUSAND CRANES is a story of cooperation and friendship in a divided world, a story of inspiration and hope.

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

Age 12 thru Adult
57 Min.

SPECIAL NOTE FOR THIS FILM ONLY:
Schools, Libraries, and Institutions, please contact Wombat Films (New York)

Chernobyl: can it happen here?

A Question of Power



WRITTEN & DIRECTED BY: David L. Brown

PRODUCED BY: David L. Brown, Jane Kinzler, and Tom Anderson.

1986 High School & Adult 60 min.

AWARDS: San Fran. Int'l Film Festival -honorable mention
Peace Image Festival- Grand Prize, Nuc. Disarm.
Humboldt Film Festival - Cash Award
Phila. Int'l Film Festival- honorable mention
Houston Int'l Film & Video Festival - Gold Award
Columbus Int'l Film Fest. - Bronze Plaque
Chicago Int'l Film Fest. - Certificate of Merit
Int'l Film & TV Fest. of NY - Finalist

"A Question of Power is one of the best and most definitive media histories of the antinuclear movement ... It should be seen by everyone who cares about the Earth, about our legacy to the future and about effective techniques of social change." — John Gofman, M. D., Ph.D. Prof. Emeritus of Medical Physics, U.C. Berkeley

"A Question of Power is the best documentary on nuclear power and citizen activism that I have seen. It is a paean to the power of true American democratic action." — Philip Tymon, Executive Director, Nuclear Information and Resource Service

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

PRODUCED BY: Chris Hall Productions, London

1985 High School and Adult 35 min.

AWARDS: Grand Prix Winner

National Audio-Visual Festival of Sweden, Gold Medal

World-renowned philosopher, scientist, humanitarian and author Peter Russell presents an empowering and optimistic vision of humanity's potential.

This dynamic and captivating program is being used by U.S. diplomats, English and Swedish television, and multinational corporations in management development programs. It has earned the praise of educators in the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom and Scandinavia.

"Very impressive ... mind meeting mind." — Ram Dass

"An exciting presentation that challenges our assumptions about the future and offers new insights into our role on the planet." — Marilyn Furgeson

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	\$75	\$45		\$45	\$35

The Global Brain

Based on Peter Russell's best-selling book



The NUCLEAR WINTER: Changing Our Way of Thinking

PRODUCED BY: National Resources Defense Council, Features Dr. Carl Sagan

1985 High School & Adult 58 min.

The most important study of our time by leading scientists reveals that the use of a small fraction of the world's nuclear arsenal would have such devastating climatic consequences that civilization as we know it would be destroyed and the human species would possibly become extinct. Internationally renowned scientist, Dr. Carl Sagan discusses the results of the research into the global consequences of nuclear war, illustrating his talk with extensive visuals.

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$95	\$45		\$45	\$35

THE NUCLEAR WINTER: A Growing Global Concern

PRODUCED BY: Center on Consequences of Nuclear War,

1985 High School & Adult 20 min.

A video mini-documentary including a six minute segment incorporating computer graphics and the latest scientific information on the consequences of nuclear war. Designed for TV news, workshops, and classrooms as an appropriate introduction to speakers on the subject.

SALE	3/4	VHS Beta	RENT	3/4	VHS-Beta
	\$75	\$35		\$45	\$25

After Nuclear War...



The Cold
and the Dark
of Nuclear Winter

Our Backpage

Films on Our Backpage are those which didn't fit into our regular category pages for one reason or another, but nevertheless are important programs on Alternative Security or related subjects.

CHOICES FOR THE FUTURE — Produced by the Windstar Foundation. — John Denver hosts this inspiring new look at options for a peaceful, sustainable future. Featured are perspectives offered by Ted Turner, Ram Dass, Astronaut Rusty Schweickart, Jean-Michel Cousteau, Robert Muller, Dr. Peter Bourne and others. From the first annual Choices for the Future Symposium held at Snowmass, Colorado in 1986.

GODS OF METAL — Produced by Maryknoll Films — Academy Award Nominee, 1983. Analyzes the arms race from a Christian Perspective, showing its effects and what individuals and groups are doing to halt the arms build-up. *"Highly professional... packs a surprising amount into a short film,"* — The Progressive

GROWING UP NUCLEAR — Produced by Marilyn V. De Angelis for WLVI-TV. — Shot on location in Hiroshima, Japan, pays particular attention to the stories of children and families who survived the atomic bombing. Includes an unforgettable animation of how the explosion looked by a man who, as a small boy, was within blocks of the fireball.

WEAPONS IN SPACE — Produced by Union of Concerned Scientists — Features Dr. Carl Sagan, Admiral Noel Gayler and others in a thoughtful analysis of the feasibility and consequences of space-based defenses. Excellent animation of proposed space-based weapons.

A CALL FOR PEACE — Produced by Steve Rauh — Narration by Harry Belafonte. Based on a speech by Congressman Ronald V. Dellums. *"Do we (the American People) wish to live or do we want to die? ... Ponder the message of this film and choose to act. Choose to live."* — Alice Walker, author The Color Purple.

THE BIOLOGY OF NUCLEAR WAR — Produced by Carolina Biological Supply Co. — Stresses scientific understanding of the overall societal and ecological devastation following nuclear war. Suitable for science, social studies, or history classes. Slide show (79 slides, cassette Tape and Teacher's manual).

THE NEED FOR CHRISTIAN PEACEMAKING — Produced by Alan Nelson and Eric Thiermann — Fr. George Zabelka, the chaplain for the men who dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki describes his conversion to peacemaking. *"Father George Zabelka's conversion and personal testimony put the bite into the argument against nuclear madness."* — Br. David Steindl-Rast.

FAITH, WAR, AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE — Produced by Eric Thiermann and the Sacramento Religious Community for Peace. — *"The film has the value of confronting us with the hard facts that must be faced, and then leading us not to despair but to the need to act."* — Robert Macafee Brown, Author and Theologian.

MACMICHAEL ON NICARAGUA — Produced by Ian Thiermann — David MacMichael spent two years on assignment with the CIA, trying to uncover evidence of Sandinista involvement with rebels in El Salvador. His conclusion, that US policy in the region is misguided and disastrous to US best interests, was rejected. This film, excerpted from his talks and illustrated by scenes from Nicaragua, is his report of a three month tour of Nicaragua he undertook studying the election process there.

BUSTER & ME — Produced by Christina Metcalf for KRON-TV. — This Emmy Award-winning children's program addresses the feelings of children about nuclear war and brings them into the open. Its message is that they are not alone and leaves them with a feeling of hope and encouragement.

TIME	SALE			RENT		
	FILM	3/4	1/2	FILM	3/4	1/2
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28	X	75	45	X	X	35
28	X	75	45	X	X	35
28	X	75	45	X	45	35
SLIDE SHOW (79 SLIDES) SALE: \$45						
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28	295	75	45	50	45	35
28	X	75	45	X	X	35
28	X	75	45	X	X	35

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The Educational Film & Video Project (EFVP) was founded in 1983 by Ian Thiermann and Vivienne Verdon-Roe to produce and distribute high-quality, low-cost film and video programs on issues of national and global importance. We are the primary national non-profit source for programs on the nuclear arms race and global security issues, distributing over 55 programs, including 9 of our own productions. Our programs are among the most widely used and critically acclaimed on these vital issues. Our low prices reflect our desire to see these programs get the widest possible use. We also provide other services to help institutions and community groups make the most effective use of these programs.

THE TV ACCESS PROJECT

Our TV Access Project helps organizations throughout the country arrange broadcasts of our programs on commercial, public and cable TV. Local broadcasts of these films is an excellent way to assure that the message of our "Solutions For Survival" programs reaches the widest possible audience. Broadcasts can also increase a group's support and visibility.

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The Women For America Project provides organizations with empowerment and fundraising training and materials using the film "Women For America, For The World". The producer, Vivienne Verdon-Roe is also available for special presentations to colleges and community groups. Call (415) 654-6312 for details.

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OSCAR FOR PEACE

Edited by Michael Porter. 1987. High School & Adult. 32 Min.

An inspiring story of how one person can succeed in making a difference. A presentation by Oscar-winning producer Vivienne Verdon-Roe at John Denver's "Choices for the Future" Conference. Using her own story, Vivienne encourages people to get involved. Features clips from 2 of her films, and her dramatic Academy Awards acceptance speech. The perfect followup to *Women — For America, For the World*.

"She has an inescapable sense of dedication, the persuasive power of a full orchestra, and an unforgettable name."
-- San Francisco Examiner

"Vivienne Verdon-Roe is a major catalyst in the American citizen's movement to secure the future. She is a masterful communicator, speaking with power and grace."

— Gary Lapid, M.D., Past President,
Physicians for Social Responsibility, Stanford, CA

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VHS/Beta ...	\$45	\$35
3/4"	\$75	\$45

RETURN TO AGUACAYO

Produced by Celeste Greco. 1987. High School and Adult. 16 Min.

Return to Aguacayo is a dramatic account of 450 displaced Salvadorans who attempt to return to their homes and farming cooperative in the Guazapa region of El Salvador, after having been forced to leave by the army. The unique footage was acquired by a member of a North American religious delegation which went to El Salvador in July, 1986, in hopes of protecting the displaced from attacks by the Armed Forces on their journey home.

The determination of the Salvadorans to return to their land, despite the destruction of their homes and the threat from the army, is a stirring example of unusual courage and a rare glimpse at the personal toll of the continuing war in El Salvador.

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VHS/Beta ...	\$35	\$25
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DEALING WITH FEELINGS ABOUT NUCLEAR ISSUES

A Training Tape and Handbook for Teachers and Parents

Produced by The Thursday Night Group, in association with the L.A. School District.
1987. Elementary through Adult. 43 Min. (2 Programs)

Educators have observed that children often have deep and powerful emotions about nuclear issues, but avoid expressing them. Experience has shown that once these feelings are expressed and accepted, students are more eager to share their views, assimilate new information, and become involved in seeking solutions to these critical issues.

Dealing With Feelings... is a proven method to use with children in grades K through 12. This unique workshop, videotape, and handbooks enable teachers and parents to deal effectively with the emotions generated by nuclear issues.

"We use it to prepare teachers to use our Nuclear Age Issues curriculum. The methodology has broad application to any controversial or emotionally charged issue."

-- Jackie Goldberg,
Board of Education, L.A.

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THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND

Produced by The Search for Common Ground. *High School and Adult. 3 Programs.*

Featuring nationally and internationally known experts, these unique tapes demonstrate how people holding polar opposite views on national security and other issues can find "common ground", leading to creative new solutions to critical global problems.

Program 1 **Common Ground Approach to Conflict Resolution** (40 Min. - 2 parts)

Moderator William Ury (author of the best-selling Getting to Yes) demonstrates the common ground approach to conflict resolution, following a carefully woven sequence of steps which can lead to new ways of approaching emotionally charged issues. The first 15 minute segment gives an overview of the technique, as Ury works with 5 pair of nationally known figures with widely divergent views on national security issues (includes Asst. Secty of State Elliot Abrams, former U.S. Senator Dick Clark, former ambassador Jonathan Dean). The second 25 minute segment focuses in depth on an interchange between CIA critic Morton Halperin and former CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline.

Program 2 **Preventing the Final Mistake** (15 Min.)

Dramatically portrays the threat of accidental or unintentional nuclear war and shows how the common ground approach can be extended to a specific national security issue -- crisis control. Describes how liberals and conservatives, Americans and Soviets can agree on specific measures to reduce this threat. Features President Reagan, Senator Sam Nunn, William Ury, Ellen Meyer, and CBS News' Charlie Rose.

Program 3 **A U.S. - Soviet Spacebridge: Chernobyl and Three Mile Island** (30 Min.)

A "Spacebridge", or interactive satellite video event, linked leading Soviet and American scientists in 10 cities for an unprecedented public discussion of the nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. The interchange clearly demonstrates the potential for working with the Soviets to solve mutual problems. Includes Dr. Robert Gale, the U.S. cancer specialist who treated Chernobyl victims, and Yevgeny Velikhov, Gorbachev's top science adviser, plus rare Soviet footage inside the damaged Chernobyl reactor. Hosted by Hedrick Smith, Pulitzer Prize-winning former New York Times Moscow Bureau Chief.

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PUBLICATIONS

March 1988

ACCESS Resource Brief: the one-sheet *Resource Brief* summarizes a timely issue like the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and lists sources of information, pro and con. Single copies free; multiple copies \$.25 each.

- "Nuclear Testing," Vol. I, No. 1, November 1986 (updated December 1987).
- "UN Peacekeeping," Vol. I, No. 2, February 1987 (updated June 1987).
- "Interpreting and Reinterpreting the 1972 ABM Treaty," Vol. I, No. 3, April 1987.
- "Military Spending: Economic Balloon or Ballast?" Vol. I, No. 4, September 1987.
- "Europe After INF: The Search for Conventional Wisdom," Vol. I, No. 5, Dec. 1987.
- "The INF Treaty Ratification Debate," Vol. II, No. 1, March 1988.

ACCESS Security Spectrum: the four-page *Security Spectrum* gives an overview of the major positions on a controversial subject like contra aid, and suggests readings and resources from the various perspectives. Single copies free; multiple copies \$.50 each.

- "The Strategic Defense Initiative: Where Do You Stand?," Vol. I, No. 1, February 1987 (updated December 1987).
- "US Assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras," Vol. I, No. 2, May 1987.
- "On Treaties and Cheating (and Cheating on Treaties)," Vol. I, No. 3, October 1987.
- "US-Soviet Relations," Vol. II, No. 1, forthcoming April 1988.

The ACCESS Resource Guide: An International Directory of Information on War, Peace, and Security, a comprehensive handbook on who knows what about international security and peace, to be published in the spring of 1988 by Ballinger Publishing Company, a division of Harper & Row. Free for ACCESS Associates; expected list price, \$15.

Rating the Resources: Congressional Staff Evaluate Information on National Security Issues (April 1988), a report on ACCESS's first-ever study of the information needs and resources of Congressional staffers.

Search for Security: A Guide to Grantmaking in International Security and the Prevention of Nuclear War (Washington, DC: The Forum Institute, July 1985). ACCESS is the sole distributor of this one-of-a-kind study of funding for international security projects. Sale priced at \$30 a copy; discounts available for ACCESS Associates.

ACCESS is a non-profit, non-advocacy clearinghouse of information on international security and peace issues. In addition to the publications listed above, ACCESS offers an Inquiry Service which connects people with questions to the best people with answers about issues like arms control, regional conflicts, and military spending.

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RESOURCE BRIEF

EUROPE AFTER INF: The Search for Conventional Wisdom

The signing of the INF Treaty has provoked renewed concern over the relationship between the non-nuclear forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and those of the Warsaw Pact. In public debates the issues are most often depicted in terms of raw numbers of troops and materiel; yet specialists agree that the questions are much broader. Three overlapping areas attract the most attention: 1) the military *strategies* ('doctrines') of the two sides; 2) the *forces* now deployed; and 3) the prospects for *enhancing defense* or achieving *arms control*.

Strategies

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact claim to be defensive alliances with no plans to launch attacks. The alliances differ markedly in the ways they plan to execute their defenses and the role they see for nuclear weapons in the event of a war. (Even after the INF treaty is implemented, several thousands of nuclear weapons will remain in the European theater on ships, planes, and very short-range ground launchers.)

NATO's basic strategy, Flexible Response, was adopted in 1967. Under this strategy, a Warsaw Pact attack would be met by a 'forward defense' of conventional forces, in an effort to stop the attackers as close to the West German border as possible. Should this effort fail, nuclear options may be selectively implemented, ultimately including strategic nuclear strikes by the US against the Soviet Union. Major constraints on NATO strategy include: (a) the need for *forward defense* due to NATO's relatively shallow and limited territory; (b) the desire to appear to be a *defensive alliance* unprepared to launch offensive attacks; (c) the political *difficulty of deploying permanent barricades*, minefields, etc., along West Germany's eastern border, due to the political sensitivity of Germany's division; and (d) the political *limits on military spending* in democracies.

The Warsaw Pact is often described as having a defensive strategy that is executed by offensive means. In the event of war, it is widely believed that the Soviets would seek to overrun Western Europe and eject American

forces from the continent in the early days of a war, before the US can decide to release nuclear weapons or NATO can reinforce its conventional forces. This strategy of taking the battle to the attacker's territory is thought by many to have developed as a reaction to the Soviet's devastating experience in World War II. The Warsaw Pact apparently plans, if feasible, to achieve its goals with non-nuclear forces -- through rapid attacks by massed, armored forces, such as tanks -- in hopes of avoiding the nuclear destruction of the Soviet Union.

Deployments

Comparisons between the forces of the two sides are tricky. Many crucial aspects of the balance of forces are not readily quantifiable, including quality of equipment, mobilization and resupply time, troop morale and training, quality of military leadership, reliability of allies, geographic obstacles, and communications capability. Behind these factors lie military strategies and practices, as well as political contexts, which must all be figured in.

Even the quantifiable aspects of the force relationship are open to interpretation. For instance, ratios of numbers of main battle tanks of the Warsaw Pact and NATO vary between 1:1 and 8:1. The wide range of published force ratios reflect different assumptions about *who* is expected to fight and *when* they are expected to fight. Experts disagree over whether to include the forces of France and Spain in NATO counts, since their forces are not part of the alliance's integrated command structure, and whether to count fully the forces of possibly unreliable Soviet allies in Warsaw Pact totals. In the same vein, the tallies change sharply according to the amount of mobilization that is expected to take place before hostilities erupt and the time allowed for reinforcement afterwards.

Defense Improvements/Disarmament

Few people are altogether satisfied with the current state of NATO defenses. Some analysts, of varying political persuasions, call for US troop reductions in Europe. Many more promote incremental improvements in the ability of existing

forces to fight; such measures could include increasing ammunition stockpiles in Europe, enhancing US airlift and sealift capabilities, and placing barriers along the West German border. Other specialists call for a more far-reaching overhaul of NATO strategies, forces, and weapons systems, either (a) with the goal of bolstering NATO defenses against a hostile Warsaw Pact by increasing NATO's capacity to stop Pact forces before they can reach the battlefield or (b) with the hope of implementing 'non-provocative defense' plans, in which forces are structurally incapable of attack but offer robust defense.

A new NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiating forum on conventional arms is expected to get underway in 1988, in some way linked with the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Earlier this year the CSCE spawned the final Document of the Stockholm Conference on

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe; this agreement provided for inspections and advance announcements of military maneuvers throughout Europe. The new talks will cover all of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, unlike the prior and more limited Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, which covered only central Europe. Earlier this year, both the Warsaw Pact and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called attention to the existence of "asymmetries" on both sides in the East-West military balance in Europe and expressed interest in redressing these through negotiated reductions. For many years NATO has stressed the need for asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces -- particularly as regards tanks, in which the Warsaw Pact has a large numerical lead. Less often discussed are tactical aircraft and naval forces, where the NATO countries have the advantage.

Sources of Information on Conventional Forces

Official US and NATO Sources

- US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Public Information..... 202-647-8714
Official information on conventional arms negotiations
 US Department of Defense, Public Correspondence 202-697-5737
Official information, including the annual Soviet Military Power, on US and Soviet forces and plans
 NATO Review (magazine)

Non-Governmental Sources

- Atlantic Council of the United States--Karen Meinhart 202-347-9353
Home to NATO's Washington, DC information office and a source of bipartisan studies on Western security issues
 Brookings Institution--Joshua Epstein 202-797-6010
Epstein, an expert on conventional forces and the defense budget, supports conventional force improvements
 Center for Defense Information--Steven Kosiak, Col. Samuel Gardiner..... 202-862-0700
Facts, figures, and analysis on conventional forces, policies, and arms control; finds NATO sufficiently strong
 Center for Strategic and International Studies--Michael Moodie..... 202-887-0200
Study on how to improve NATO defenses, headed by former US Ambassador to NATO David Abshire
 Committee on the Present Danger--David Trachtenberg..... 202-628-2409
Facts, analysis, and public opinion polls; sees a menacing Soviet advantage in Europe
 Council for a Livable World--Jerome Grossman 617-542-2282
Report by George Perkovich on "Defending Europe Without Nuclear Weapons"; finds NATO sufficiently strong
 Defense Budget Project--Dr. Gordon Adams..... 202-546-9737
Information on defense burden-sharing and on conventional forces in NATO, particularly budgetary issues
 Heritage Foundation--Dr. Kim Holmes..... 202-546-4400
Five-part series underway on "The Conventional Arms Balance"; finds a "threatening Soviet lead"
 Hudson Institute--Dr. James Blaker, Dr. Jeffrey Record 703-824-2048
Promotes strengthening NATO defenses, particularly European forces
 Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies--Alan Bloomgarden 617-734-4216
Facts and analyses on conventional forces and arms control; promotes non-provocative defense in Europe
 Institute for East-West Security Studies--Keith Wind..... 212-557-2570
Information on East-West security issues and confidence-building measures
 Union of Concerned Scientists--Amb. Jonathan Dean 202-332-0900
Dean, the former US chief delegate to the MBFR talks, authored the book Watershed in Europe

Readings

- The Military Balance, 1987-1988, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987.*
The most widely used, non-classified source of information on conventional and nuclear forces, worldwide.
 John M. Collins, *US-Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985*, NY: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985.
Trends in the balance; more detail on US and Soviet forces than The Military Balance, although less data on allied forces
 "Conventional Forces in Europe," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1987.
Articles by Dieter Senghaas, Rep. Les Aspin, and Leon V. Sigal

For Further Information . . . on conventional forces and other international security and peace issues, call the **ACCESS Inquiry Service** at (202) 328-2323 or write: ACCESS, 1755 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Suite 501, Washington, DC 20036.

This issue of *Resource Brief* is intended to provide a selective guide to sources of information on the conventional forces in Europe, representing a range of viewpoints and perspectives. ACCESS does not endorse the positions of any of the sources listed. Please feel free to reproduce, quote, or otherwise use *Resource Brief* material, citing ACCESS.



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- ✓ **Briefing papers** on hot topics in security debates. The one-sheet *Resource Brief* (10+/year) gives an overview of issues like nuclear testing and lists sources of information, pro and con. The four-page *Security Spectrum* (4+/year) summarizes the major positions for controversial subjects like contra aid, as well as reference to readings from various perspectives.
- ✓ **A speaker referral service.** We have contacts with more than 1,000 speakers from a range of perspectives, and can direct callers to the organizations which place speakers.

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What kinds of questions does ACCESS answer?

Query: "I'm making a speech on nuclear testing. Have there been any studies done of the amount of money that would be saved or lost with the passage of a comprehensive test ban?"

Response: *Referral to the Council on Economic Priorities, which is doing an economic impact study of a test ban.*

Query: "I'm writing an article on the local impacts of military spending. Is the proposed 1987 military budget of \$311.6 billion the largest in history?"

Response: *The proposed budget is the largest military budget in history. Source: Department of Defense, Plans & Systems Office. Provided a list of sources of information on local impacts of military spending, representing a range of views.*

Query: "We are organizing a city-wide Central America Awareness Day. Where can we get current information on upcoming legislation on US aid to the contras?"

Response: *Referral to the Central America Legislative Hotline of the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy. Sent a copy of the ACCESS Security Spectrum on US policy towards Nicaragua, which lists sources of information on aid to the contras from various points of view.*

Query: "What is the status of limitations on conventional arms sales and transfers?"

Response: *Provided a brief overview of the status of US-Soviet negotiations on conventional arms transfers, with reference to written summaries of these negotiations. Referral to several experts in conventional arms control for further information.*

Query: "We are organizing a local debate on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Where can we find speakers who support SDI?"

Response: *Referral to the speakers bureaus of the US Department of Defense and of High Frontier, a private organization that promotes the Strategic Defense Initiative.*



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SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Background. The December 1987 meeting in Washington between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was widely hailed as marking a transition to a new era of superpower relations. From an American perspective, the key change in the political equation since 1985 has been the meteoric rise of Gorbachev to leadership and the ambitious reform program upon which he has embarked. His brief tenure of office has already witnessed a transformation in the style and perhaps the substance of Soviet foreign policy. Although the American public reaction to Gorbachev has been overwhelmingly positive, deeply-rooted suspicion of Soviet intentions persists. The contending American reactions to the Gorbachev reforms -- and whether they constitute a danger or opportunity for the West -- are a microcosm of the broader, often bitterly polarized, US domestic debate about relations with the Soviet Union.

The US-Soviet relationship has been the dominant factor shaping international politics since the end of World War II. While history has known other great power rivalries, the Soviet-American engagement has unique, seemingly paradoxical qualities. The two sides have never met in conflict and neither covets the territory or resources of the other. The relationship is at once competitive and cooperative, but there are inherent limits to each. While the contending ideologies and interests of the superpowers stimulate competition, the reality of nuclear weapons leaves no alternative to war-avoidance. For this reason, the cyclical swings in US-Soviet relations since 1945 have been between the poles of cold war and detente.

Each superpower views the other through the prism of its own historical experience. For the Soviet Union, this historical legacy is one marked by early US attempts at intervention (as evidenced in the 1918 landing of a US military contingent at Archangel in support of anti-Bolshevik forces) and diplomatic isolation (through non-recognition until 1933). From the Soviet historical perspective, following World War II the United States sought to deny the USSR legitimate security guarantees in Eastern Europe

and to encircle it with a hostile alliance system (e.g., NATO in Europe). Having thus instigated the Cold War, the US attempted to block the USSR out of strategic areas (as in the Middle East) and later to harass Soviet Third World allies (notably Cuba and North Vietnam). Only when Washington recognized the futility of its "negotiation from strength" strategy did serious arms control negotiations (SALT) become possible. The 1970s detente foundered on the unrealistic American expectation that detente could negate the then emerging class struggle in the Third World (e.g., Angola, Ethiopia). In Soviet eyes, the historical record clearly demonstrates that an improvement in US-Soviet relations can only be achieved on the basis of Washington's full acceptance of Soviet political and military parity with the US.

US perceptions of the Soviet Union have been shaped largely by the USSR's revolutionary origins -- and their perceived implications. Fears during the 1920s and early 1930s that Moscow would use the Comintern (the Moscow-led world Communist movement) to export its revolution abroad led to a strategy of diplomatic isolation. Following World War II, the installation of pro-Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe was viewed as a breach of the self-determination pledges of the 1945 Yalta agreement and lent credence in the West to the image of the USSR as a revolutionary state carrying out the imperatives of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In response to this challenge, the United States adopted a "containment" strategy which emphasized the creation of multiple alliance systems around the USSR's periphery as a deterrent to further expansionism. The 1970s detente, which arose from the superpowers' recognition of their shared interests (e.g., arms control), collapsed in the face of Soviet expansion (as in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan) at US expense. From a US perspective, the advent of Gorbachev marks the possible shift toward a more pragmatic, less ideological Soviet foreign policy. American policy-makers view Soviet actions on Afghanistan, where Moscow has pledged early withdrawal, as a key litmus test of these changes.

KEY DATES IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS

- **Nov. 1917:** US refuses to recognize new Soviet government established by Bolshevik revolution.
- **Aug. 1918:** US and British forces land at Archangel to aid anti-Soviet resistance in Civil War, during World War I.
- **July 1920:** US lifts trade embargo on USSR.
- **Nov. 1933:** US recognizes Soviet Government.
- **Oct. 1941:** Lend-Lease agreement signed; program provides some \$10 billion in US military and economic aid to USSR through 1945.
- **Feb. 1945:** Yalta Conference; Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill agree to joint authority for Germany after Nazi surrender and free elections in liberated countries.
- **1945-1948:** Establishment of pro-Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe.
- **1947:** Truman Doctrine pledges US aid to countries threatened by Soviet expansion; Marshall Plan offers US aid to rebuild Europe.
- **1948-1949:** US airlift to West Berlin to relieve Soviet blockade; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established in April 1949.
- **June 1950:** Soviet-supported North Korean invasion of South Korea; war leads to rapid NATO military build-up; truce signed, July 1953.
- **Sep. 1959:** Eisenhower and Khrushchev meet at Camp David.
- **Aug. 1961:** East Germans build fortified wall dividing Berlin.
- **Oct. 1962:** Cuban Missile Crisis; Soviets withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba following threat of US intervention.
- **1969-1979:** Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); talks culminate in SALT I agreement (May 1972), limiting offensive and defensive forces, and SALT II (August 1979), limiting offensive arms; SALT II is never ratified by US.
- **Jan. 1975:** USSR rejects 1972 US-Soviet Trade agreement following passage of Jackson-Vanik amendment stipulating free emigration.
- **July-Aug. 1975:** Helsinki Final Act of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed by Ford, Brezhnev, and 33 other leaders.
- **1975-1978:** Soviets support interventions by Cuba in Angola (1975) and Ethiopia (1977), and by Vietnam in Cambodia (1978).
- **Dec. 1979:** Soviets invade Afghanistan.
- **1982-1983:** US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva; talks suspended in December 1983 following Soviet walkout.
- **March 1983:** President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative.
- **Sep. 1983:** Korean Airlines flight 007 shot down over Soviet territory.
- **Nov. 1985:** START and INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) talks resume in Geneva; Reagan-Gorbachev summit, Geneva.
- **Oct. 1986:** Reagan-Gorbachev meet, Reykjavik.
- **Dec. 1987:** Reagan and Gorbachev sign INF agreement at Washington summit.

Foreground. A turn toward improved US-Soviet relations came in March 1985 when the newly-appointed Gorbachev accepted an invitation from Reagan for a superpower summit and when negotiations, suspended after a 1983 Soviet walk-out, resumed on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). The Geneva summit meeting in November 1985 yielded few tangible results, but provided the first chance since the Carter-Brezhnev summit of August 1979 for the two countries' top leaders to meet and survey the bilateral relationship. The two-day, follow-on meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986 focussed chiefly on arms control, although the US side sought to broaden the agenda to include regional conflicts. At the Reykjavik meeting far-reaching arms control measures, including a proposal for deep-cuts in the two sides' strategic nuclear arsenals, were broached, but agreement foundered on US opposition to Soviet demands for limits on SDI research and testing.

Continuing differences over SDI, however, did not preclude progress on INF. The treaty eliminating this entire class of nuclear missiles was signed by Reagan and Gorbachev at their subsequent meeting in Washington in December 1987. While in Washington, the Soviet leader, in his meetings with both government officials and prominent private individuals, was pressed on a number of contentious issues -- notably, Moscow's restrictions on Jewish emigration and the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. In angrily rejecting these charges, Gorbachev argued that the United States was in no moral position to lecture the USSR on human rights violations, given what he saw as economic injustice in the US, and asserted that US military support to the Afghan Mujaheddin was a major factor hindering the Afghan peace process. Meanwhile, the Senate is expected to approve the INF Treaty by April or May 1988, in an unexpectedly calm debate.

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At issue. In the US debate about Soviet-American relations, differing answers to key questions suggest radically divergent policy prescriptions. The basic issues include these: what are the fundamental sources of US-Soviet competition? Does the new Soviet leadership pose a danger or an opportunity for the West? Are negotiations with the USSR in the US interest and do they offer a means of favorably affecting Soviet behavior? Can the United States trust the Soviet Union to abide by agreements? Should the US administration seek to link progress in one policy area (e.g. arms control) with that in another (e.g. regional conflicts)?

The positions summarized here, and reviewed by specialists across the political spectrum, establish general orientations and do not correlate precisely with the policy viewpoints of

Position One

The Soviet Union, despite the avowed "new thinking" in Moscow, remains a committed revolutionary power. True to its Marxist-Leninist ideology, the USSR is an organically expansionist state which will use any available means -- from disinformation to direct military intervention (as in Afghanistan) -- to undermine Western interests. Just as Soviet violations of the Yalta agreements in Eastern Europe led to the onset of the Cold War, so too did Soviet activism in the Third World lead to the demise of detente. Negotiations with the Soviet Union are futile because, as the historical record indicates, the USSR has never honored its treaty commitments. The prerequisite for a changed relationship with the Soviet Union is nothing short of a fundamental transformation in the nature of the Soviet state itself.

New Soviet Leadership. Many in the West, including perhaps President Reagan, have been taken in by Gorbachev's rhetorical posturing; the basic elements of Soviet policy -- both foreign and domestic -- remain unchanged. Gorbachev's pursuit of better US-Soviet relations is a short-term, tactical move to give the USSR a breathing spell, something the Soviets have tried in the past, before entering a new phase of radical activism.

Linkage. The US should link progress between policy areas. We should not reward the Soviets with improved trade or other relations until they eliminate restrictions on emigration and the press, and otherwise stop the ruthless oppression of their own people. This approach would either force the Soviet Union to adopt

multiple worthwhile changes or, more likely, effectively kill the chances for any negotiated agreement. [**Variation:** The US should insist on rigid, all-or-nothing linkage (e.g., linking arms control to human rights).]

Arms Control. The US should discard the unratified SALT II limits on strategic forces and abrogate the ABM treaty to permit SDI testing. The US should reject the INF treaty, since it would allow the USSR to derive enormous political utility from its superior conventional forces in Europe and further the Soviet effort to weaken the ties between the US and its NATO allies and to denuclearize Europe.

Economic Relations. The US should have minimal economic contact with the Soviet Union and, to the extent possible, attempt to isolate and exclude the USSR from the international economic system. Technology transfers from the West should be rigidly controlled to prevent the "leakage" of potentially sensitive military technologies into the USSR. The US, by denying the USSR economic credits and Most-Favored Nation status, should do nothing to alleviate Soviet economic difficulties.

Regional Conflicts. Soviet intervention -- either direct (as in Afghanistan) or indirect (via local surrogates in Angola and Nicaragua) -- is the primary precipitant of regional conflicts. [**Variation:** The Soviets opportunistically exploit and exacerbate existing Third World conflicts.] All-out support should be given to anti-Communist insurgency movements through the Reagan Doctrine; the aim should be to "roll back" established Soviet positions in the Third World.

Position Two

The Soviet Union, while utilizing Marxist-Leninist ideology to rationalize and legitimate its policies, acts in the international arena as essentially a conservative great power. It is revisionist, but not revolutionary. The USSR relies more on opportunism than risk-taking to improve its position vis-a-vis the United States. Historical and ideological factors, however, have led to an expansive Soviet conception of national security interests. One reflection of this attitude is the drive to secure control, as in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, over adjacent border areas -- moves which while characterized as defensive appear offensive to others. The failure of detente in the 1970s stemmed in large part from Soviet activism in the Third World, which in turn undermined US domestic support for improved relations in other policy areas.

New Soviet Leadership. The US should be receptive to new Soviet diplomatic initiatives and favorably respond to them to the extent that they may serve US interests. American actions, while hopefully influencing the USSR's international behavior, will have little bearing on Soviet internal development.

Linkage. The US should seek an across-the-board improvement in the bilateral relationship, while underscoring that linkage is a political reality to the extent that tensions in one policy area will invariably affect others. The US should surely pressure the Soviets to improve their abhorrent human rights record. However, although linkage is desirable, this preference should not doctrinally stand in the way of

individuals or organizations. For a fuller picture, contact the sources listed on the next page, or call the ACCESS Inquiry Service at (202) 785-6630.

specific agreements, if they are in the US interest.

Arms Control. Having advanced the "zero option" on INF, the United States must now follow through on treaty ratification. Any further progress in European nuclear arms control, however, should be linked to specific measures to deal with Soviet conventional superiority. A START agreement on strategic forces should also be negotiated to guard against circumvention of the INF reductions.

Economic Relations. Whereas there are shared superpower interests in arms control, an asymmetry exists in the economic sphere: the Soviet Union needs Western credits and technology transfers to facilitate internal economic development. While expanded economic ties benefit Western producers, an attempt should be made to employ them as a policy instrument to moderate Soviet foreign policy behavior.

Regional Conflicts. The Reagan Doctrine of support for anti-Communist insurgencies should be continued in order to pressure pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World to make concessions, both on their relations with the Soviet bloc and on their internal political organization.

The ACCESS Inquiry Service helps connect people with questions to people with answers about arms control, regional conflicts, military spending, and other international security and peace issues. Call (202) 785-6630.

Position Three

With the advent of a multipolar international economic system, the Soviet-American relationship, while vital because of the continuing superpower nuclear stalemate, is steadily losing its centrality in international relations. Gorbachev's advocacy of "reconstruction" (perestroika) to modernize the Soviet economy stems from the recognition that economic power, as demonstrated by Japan, will be the future key to international status. Within this context, the Cold War is an historical vestige that stemmed primarily from mutual misperceptions and the tendency to cast specific differences of interest (as over the status of Germany after World War II) in universal ideological terms. Similarly, the failure of detente during the 1970s arose from both sides' determined pursuit of unilateral advantage vis-a-vis the other.

New Soviet Leadership. The US should be receptive to the positive new tone of Soviet diplomacy and not dismiss Gorbachev's proposals over regional issues and arms control as mere propaganda. Positive foreign policy developments may strengthen Gorbachev's hand within the Soviet ruling oligarchy and thereby facilitate further domestic reform.

Linkage. The problem with comprehensive linkage is that, by insisting on too much, it yields nothing. The US should eschew across-the-board linkage in favor of a more measured approach: arms control should be linked to arms control, regional issues to regional issues. This means not ignoring human rights issues but recognizing that the Soviet human rights record has been

best when East-West tensions have been least.

Arms Control. The INF treaty is an important political symbol, but given the continued presence of thousands of nuclear weapons within the European theater, it is of only limited military significance. The superpowers should work toward deep cuts in their strategic nuclear arsenals with US willingness to make major concessions on SDI (such as adherence to a "narrow" interpretation of the ABM treaty) to win Soviet acceptance.

Economic Relations. Expanded economic ties, made possible by a less restrictive technology transfer policy, are in the US interest as the USSR can readily turn to Western Europe or Japan as alternative suppliers of high technology and economic credits. The further integration of the Soviet Union into the global economy should create tangible inducements for moderate Soviet foreign policy behavior, especially in light of the Soviets' growing recognition of their own economic weaknesses.

Regional Conflicts. Conflict and instability in the Third World stems primarily from indigenous sources and should be viewed less as a military issue than one of socio-economic development. American support for authoritarian regimes facing popular resistance generates opportunities for Soviet activism. The US should halt the Reagan Doctrine's program of aid to anti-Communist insurgencies (with the possible exception of the Afghan Mujaheddin) and support regional peace initiatives (such as the Central American peace process).

Prospects

The Washington summit adjourned with the two leaders agreeing to meet in Moscow sometime in mid-1988. That summit will focus on a strategic arms treaty (START) reducing the superpowers' nuclear arsenals by as much as fifty percent. In the meantime, Washington prepared for INF Treaty ratification. Conservative critics of Reagan Administration policy made clear that while their immediate target was the INF agreement, the larger objective was to derail negotiations on START and retard movement toward a more comprehensive Soviet-American accommodation; liberals sought to strengthen the Senate's role in making treaties. For its part, the Soviet Union, aware that Congressional budget constraints may lead to a rigidly circumscribed SDI program, has adopted a more flexible attitude on the issue.

The March 1988 meeting of NATO leaders in Brussels provided Reagan an opportunity to consult with US allies prior to the Moscow

summit. West European governments were surprised and shocked by some of the sweeping disarmament proposals (including one to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles) that were broached by the superpowers at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986. Despite some concerns about START and prospective Soviet-American negotiations on conventional forces, the United States' major European allies -- Great Britain, France, and West Germany -- have expressed their political support for the INF treaty and have welcomed the improvement in US-Soviet relations. In general, the Europeans have adopted an extremely positive attitude toward Gorbachev and his program of domestic reform. They believe that the West should do what it can, whether marginal or not, to support this process. In their view, the failure of *glasnost* and *perestroika* will result in the return to more repressive Soviet internal policies and continued economic stagnation; this, in turn, might lead to a more dangerous and unpredictable USSR in the international arena.

Organizations with Information on Soviet-American Relations

Analysis Stressing Dangers

1. *Committee on the Present Danger*, 905 16th St. NW, #207, Wash. DC 20006, 202-628-2409.
2. *Heritage Foundation*, 214 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Wash. DC 20002, 202-546-4400.
3. *Hudson Institute*, 4401 Ford Ave., Alexandria, VA 22302, 703-824-2048.
4. *US Department of State*, Public Information, Wash. DC 20520, 202-647-6575.

Analysis Stressing Opportunities

1. *American Committee on US-Soviet Relations*, 109 11th St. SE, Wash. DC 20003, 202-546-1700.
2. *American Friends Service Committee*, 1501 Cherry Street, Phila. PA 19102, 215-241-7188.
3. *Committee for National Security*, 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW, #301, Wash. DC 20009, 202-745-2450.
4. *Global Outlook*, 405 Lytton Ave., Palo Alto, CA 94301, 415-321-3828.
5. *Institute for East-West Security Studies*, 360 Lexington Ave., NY, NY 10017, 212-557-2570.
6. *Institute for Soviet-American Relations*, 1608 New Hampshire Ave NW, Wash DC 20009, 202-387-3034.

Mixed Views

1. *Atlantic Council of the US*, 1616 H St. NW, Wash. DC 20006, 202-347-9353.
2. *Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown Univ.*, Box 1948, Providence, RI 02912, 401-863-3465.
3. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 1800 K St. NW, Wash. DC 20006, 202-887-0200.
4. *Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies*, 955 L'Enfant Plaza SW, #7400, Wash. DC 20560, 202-287-3105.
5. *RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior*, 1700 Main St., Santa Monica, CA 90406-2138, 213-393-0411.

Exchanges and Private Initiatives

1. *Organization for American-Soviet Exchanges*, 1302 R St. NW, Wash. DC 20009, 202-332-1145.
2. *Citizen Exchange Council*, 18 E. 41st St., NY, NY 10017, 212-889-7960.
3. *Citizen Diplomacy Inc.*, 9421 SW 61st Ave., Gainesville, FL 32608, 904-376-0341.
4. *International Research and Exchanges Board*, 126 Alexander St., Princeton, NJ 08540, 609-683-9500.

Human Rights and Soviet Jewry

1. *Helsinki Watch*, 36 W. 44th St., NY, NY 10036, 212-840-9460.
2. *National Conference on Soviet Jewry*, 10 E. 40th St., #907, NY, NY 10016, 212-679-6122.
3. *Human Rights Internet*, c/o Harvard University Law School, Pound Hall, Rm. 401, Cambridge, MA 02138, 617-495-9924.

Trade

1. *US/USSR Trade & Economic Council*, 805 3rd Ave., NY, NY 10022, 212-644-4550.

NOTE: Some groups listed may not officially endorse any position but employ analysts who represent perspectives not readily found elsewhere.

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For further information . . .

on Soviet-American relations and other international security and peace issues contact the **ACCESS Inquiry Service** at (202) 785-6630 or write **ACCESS: A Security Information Service**, 1730 M St. NW, Suite 605, Washington, DC 20036. ACCESS, a non-profit, non-advocacy information clearinghouse, does not endorse any of the positions presented herein. Please feel free to reproduce, quote, or otherwise use *Security Spectrum* material, citing ACCESS. For related information, see issues of *ACCESS Security Spectrum* and *Resource Brief* on particular aspects of US-Soviet relations, including the Strategic Defense Initiative, conventional forces in Europe, and the INF Treaty.

TO: LL Presidents; S.U. Chairs; DPM

FROM: Debbie Stine

5

LWV-Texas

January 1988

LL Pres. Mailing; DPM

National Security

INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S PEACE CONFERENCE

Peacemakers, Inc. is sponsoring "Global Peace. . .from Vision to Reality," an international women's conference in Dallas on August 8, 1988. The Dallas League is an honorary cosponsor. Conference planners hope that at least two women from every country in the world will be present at the conference.

Women are invited to submit their expressions about peace in writing, art, and music. Women's groups in this country are also encouraged to sponsor one or two women from a Third World country. The conference will be nonpolitical, not sponsored by any government.

According to Vivian Castleberry, president of Peacemakers, "Women have always either been assigned or have assumed the responsibility for being peacemakers in the private world. It has always been the men who declare wars, it has always been the men who sit down at the peace tables, it has always been the men who decided on the peace treaties. It is time that women took the responsibility for promoting public peacemaking."

If you are interested in more information regarding the conference, you can contact Peacemakers at:

Peacemakers, Inc.

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TO: LL Presidents; S.U. Chairs; DPM

FROM: Debbie Stine

LWV-Texas

August 1987

LL Pres. Mailing; DPM

National Security

LWVUS SEEKS OUR HELP WITH ACTION ALERT ON CONTRA AID

An Action Alert from LWVUS regarding contra aid has been sent to state and local League presidents. Your League should respond as soon as possible with letters to your U.S. representative(s) and to Senators Bentsen and Gramm.

Since the Action Alert was sent by LWVUS, a number of surprise moves have been made by the administration. I thought I'd review what has happened in the past few weeks to help you in responding to the Action Alert.

8/4/87 Secretary of State George Schultz rejects a call by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega for bilateral U.S.-Nicaraguan negotiations, arguing that the issues should be settled by countries in that region.

8/5/87 The White House unveils a peace plan for Central America, largely drafted by House Speaker Jim Wright (D-TX). The plan calls for the following:

1. An immediate cease fire subject to verification by the Organization of American States (OAS). The U.S. would stop arming the contras and Nicaragua would stop receiving Soviet-bloc military aid. Both the contras and the Sandinistas receive "humanitarian aid." Concurrently, Nicaragua would drop its emergency law that suspended political rights. An election timetable would be set within 60 days;
2. Nations in the region would negotiate pulling excess foreign military personnel out of Nicaragua, and the U.S. would suspend its military maneuvers in Honduras once the cease-fire was in place;
3. A "plan of national reconciliation," including amnesty for former combatants and equal right to participation in the political process, would be adopted by the Nicaraguan government;
4. The U.S. would lift its economic embargo on Nicaragua;
5. Talks would begin immediately and be completed by Sept. 30. If progress is blocked by the contras, U.S. aid would be cut off.

8/6/87 President Ortega states that refusal by the U.S. to negotiate directly with Nicaragua makes Reagan's peace plan "a publicity stunt." Schultz responds that the Central American countries themselves should decide what is right for Central America.

8/7/87 The presidents of five Central American countries sign a comprehensive regional peace plan detailing steps toward a cease-fire, democratic elections, and an end to outside military assistance. Speaker Wright urges the administration to support the Central American presidents' peace plan, declaring: "I cannot conceive of the United States being in a position of upsetting this timetable or doing anything but rejoicing and cooperating." Contra leaders state that they are willing to negotiate a cease-fire "in situ" (in place) with the Nicaraguan government.

8/8/87 President Reagan says the United States will be "as helpful as possible" in working for peace in Central America, but he stops short of endorsing the peace plan: "The United States will be as helpful as possible consistent with our interests and the interests of the Nicaraguan resistance who have already stated their readiness to take part in genuine negotiations for peace and democracy in Nicaragua."

8/13- Top white house officials send mixed signals about plans for 16/87 fresh military assistance to the contras. Chief of Staff Howard Baker on "Face the Nation" says an aid request is "virtually certain" after Sept. 30 (when present funding ends) if there is no peace agreement; however, National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci says on "Meet the Press" that no decision had been made. The White House has promised Speaker Wright that it would refrain from submitting a new contra funding request to Congress until after the end of the current budget year.

As you can see, the events regarding contra aid are changing every day, but the League's position does not change. We are generally supportive of the peace initiative. We still believe that military assistance to the contras, including nonlethal aid, is not an appropriate means to promote U.S. interests in Central America.

I'll close with some basic facts on Nicaragua taken from the Corpus Christi Caller-Times of August 16, 1987.

Population:	3.3 million (July 1986)
Size:	50,193 sq. mi. (size of Iowa); 50% forest
Annual per capita income:	\$960
Ethnic groups:	69% mestizo (mixed Indian and European), 17% white, 9% black, and 5% Indian
Army troops:	Sandinista Popular Army: 100,000 men & women Contra rebels: 8,000 to 18,000

You might want to put portions of the Action Alert or some of the above information in your local VOTER so that members can respond to the Action Alert as individuals. Please feel free to contact me if you should need any help with your response. As I stated earlier, these events change every day, and who knows what tomorrow will bring!

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President Reagan's statement that the United States will be "as helpful as possible" in working for peace in Central America, but he stops short of endorsing the peace plan.

The statement of the United States that it will be "as helpful as possible" in working for peace in Central America, but he stops short of endorsing the peace plan.

TO: LL Presidents, S.U. Chairs, DPM

FROM: Debbie Stine
[REDACTED]

LWV-Texas

July 1987

LL Pres. Mailing; DPM

II. B. I. d.

National Security

REDEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY

How can we help people understand that national security issues encompass much more than nuclear weapons, and that citizens can have some influence on national security policy? The LWVUS conference "Redefining National Security" was designed to teach participants how to get more people to focus on issues related to national security, broadly defined, and to motivate these League members to become involved in the national security debate. Three of the seventy participants in this national League training conference were from Texas: Mary Alice Pisani and Debbie Stine from the state board and Jean Myers-Hunt of LWV-Dallas. The conference was highly successful in achieving its goals, and panel discussions, workshops, and exchange among participants provided many valuable ideas and techniques.

A discussion of "Bridging the Gap Between the Public and the Experts" covered the role of the media in shaping public views; how the "experts" dictate public debate; the relationship between education and national security; public attitudes toward national security; and the difference between how the public and the "experts" view the issues. Tony Wagner from the Public Agenda Foundation said that surveys have shown that the public and the "experts" think in different time frames: the public thinks in terms of long-term consequences for their children and grandchildren, while the "experts" only consider the next five years. He said that the public wants and needs a clearer view of policy options in a values context, and that real dialogue on the issues occurs best in small discussion groups where facts can be presented in the context of policy alternatives.

Workshop sessions focused on defining the challenges of educating citizens on national security issues. The major challenges identified were these:

1. Broaden the outreach of the League's education efforts and promote critical thinking skills within the larger segment of the community;
2. Develop more creative citizen education tools and present viewpoints in a clear intelligible manner;
3. Discover non-confrontational, non-polarizing ways to present issues and promote dialogue;
4. Achieve broader press coverage;
5. Overcome stereotypical thinking;
6. Dispel disinformation;
7. Personalize national security issues;
8. Distinguish between advocacy and education;
9. Set achievable goals and create reasonable expectations;
10. Break through public apathy and establish the value of political empowerment and the ability to affect power structures.

Dick Clark, former U.S. Senator from Iowa, spoke on "The Future of the East-West Conflict." In Clark's view, Gorbachev may offer our best hope for peace in a long time, and our last chance to avoid a dangerous, accelerated arms race. Clark said that the U.S. needs to test Gorbachev's sincerity seriously by initiating several years of hard bargaining to try to end the arms race. Following Clark's speech, the Academy Award-winning film "Women--For America,

-over-

For the World" was shown. It is a powerful statement of individual women's concern for national and world security, featuring Joanne Woodward, Dot Ridings, Geraldine Ferraro and many others. If you get the chance, be sure to see it.

Other workshops covered the topics "Third World Challenges," "The Conflict in Central America," "Networking" and "Working with the Schools." The first two workshops underscored the complexity of the U.S. relationship with various parts of the Third World. One speaker expressed the view that the conservative renaissance in the U.S. has been due in part to our loss of status in the world, and that "Star Wars" is an attempt to reestablish American dominance. A discussion on the schools covered ideas from around the nation for school curricula designed to teach students to think about national security in new ways and to learn to resolve conflict peacefully. The networking workshop focused on how we can increase our power and education efforts through networking.

A panel discussion on "Reaching Out" was designed to teach us ways to educate more people about national security issues. Suggestions offered were to tap into community organizations with captive audiences; design programs with local "angles"; use non-technical language; display personal conviction about the issues; and learn to use the media effectively. The goal of reaching out is to encourage people to think more critically about national security by challenging their assumptions in an indirect way.

One speaker made the point that every generation until the present has had the certainty that others will follow. Another said that half of the U.S. population now thinks there is a greater than 50% chance of war in the next 10 years. The devastating consequences of a nuclear war have been detailed in recent scientific studies. Enormous amounts of world resources are being absorbed in preparation for war, resources which could be spent on preventing starvation and hunger and education the world's children. Many people are deeply troubled about the kind of world their children will inherit, but do not participate in the discussion of national security policy for a variety of reasons: complexity, fear, and feelings of impotence. The challenge is to teach more people that they can influence decisions on national security and that in the interest of world peace, they must begin to do so. If the decisions are left solely to the "experts," we can expect to continue the psychologically-numbing status quo and risk the extinction of human life on earth. "Redefining National Security" offered a variety of ways to meet the challenge. Many of them need to be tried on our fellow Texans.

A summary of the conference will be in an LWVUS mailing to be sent later this summer. The LWV-Texas board will discuss at its September meeting how to implement what we have learned.

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League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

October 30, 1987

The Honorable Lloyd Bentsen
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Bentsen:

On behalf of the members of the League of Women Voters of Texas, I would like to thank you for your recent votes supporting the Levin/Nunn ABM Treaty, Bumpers/Chafee Salt II, and Kerry/Chafee/Simon ASAT Testing arms control amendments. As you stated in your letter of September 22, 1987, these arms control amendments can work to reduce the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The League was, however, disappointed in your vote on the Johnston/Proxmire/Evans SDI funding amendment, which would have reduced funding for Strategic Defense Initiative in the Senate to \$3.7 billion, last year's congressional level (\$3.5 billion) plus inflation. Since the Senate vote to table this amendment was tied, your vote on this issue would certainly have made a difference in this important issue.


The League of Women Voters of Texas appreciates and applauds your continuing efforts on arms control.

Sincerely,

Diane B. Sheridan

Diane B. Sheridan
President

DBS:jl



League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

October 30, 1987

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The Honorable Jim Wright
Speaker of the House
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Wright:

On behalf of the members of the League of Women Voters of Texas, I would like to thank you for your strong stand against President Reagan's attempt to obtain further aid for the Nicaraguan "contra" rebels. We agree that seeking \$270 million in contra aid defeats the peace-making process in Nicaragua.

Thank you again for your stand on this issue.

Sincerely,

Diane Sheridan
President

Sent to Senators Bentsen and Gramm



League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

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September 15, 1987

The Honorable Lloyd Bentsen, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Bentsen,

The League of Women Voters of Texas believes that arms control is a vital part of U.S. national security policy. Administration threats to existing arms control agreements require decisive Senate support of arms control this year.

The League urges your support of the following arms control amendments:

Levin/Nunn ABM Treaty Amendment - requires the U.S. to abide by Article V of the ABM Treaty, which prohibits the development and testing of land-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems;

Bumpers/Chafee/Leahy/Heinz SALT II Amendment - provides that no funds be spent for weapons that exceed the central numerical sublimits of the SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviets continue to abide by these limits;

Johnston/Proxmire/Evans SDI Funding Amendment - reduces funding for Strategic Defense Initiative in the Senate to \$3.7 billion, which is last year's level (\$3.5 billion) plus allowance for inflation;

Kerry/Chafee/Simon ASAT Testing Amendment - extends the U.S.-Soviet moratorium on testing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons against targets in space for another year.

The League believes that now is a critical time for U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control. The arms control framework that has existed for nearly two decades is under full-scale assault. Congress must act decisively this year to preserve the vital restraints on nuclear weapons necessary to maintain our national security and reduce the danger of nuclear war. President Eisenhower represented the League's position well when he stated:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending

The Honorable Lloyd Bentsen, Jr.

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September 15, 1987

the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. . . . This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

The League of Women Voters of Texas wants you to support these arms control agreements so that we can all live in a safer world.

Sincerely,

Diane Sheridan

Diane Sheridan
President

Debbie Stine

Debbie Stine
National Security Director

Arms Control Action Alert Response Form -- August 1987

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Please help us gauge the level of response to this Action Alert by completing and mailing this form.

☒ We wrote _____ or called _____ Senators Gramm
Bentsen

_____ We asked _____ people to call their Senators.

_____ We wrote a letter to the editor of _____

name Diane Sheridan League Epas

address 1212 Guadalupe #107
Austin TX 78701



CRISIS IN ARMS CONTROL

In recent moves that threaten to unleash a major arms race and increase the threat of nuclear war, the Administration has acted to abandon existing arms-control agreements:

- The central provisions of the unratified but mutually observed SALT II Treaty were abrogated by the United States in November 1986.
- The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which arms-control supporters consider the bedrock of arms control, has been dramatically reinterpreted by this Administration.
- Rapid expansion of the Star Wars program, or Strategic Defense Initiative, threatens to provoke an entirely new competition in space weapons and a redoubling of the offensive nuclear arms race on earth.

But there is hope in Congress. In the coming weeks, the House and Senate will vote on legislation to cut spending on the Star Wars program and to reaffirm the ABM and SALT II treaties. The strength of these congressional efforts will depend on vocal public support.

Members of Congress need to hear from YOU.

HERE'S HOW YOU CAN HELP:

- **Mail the attached postcards TODAY.** Remember to write your name and address on the postcards so that your senators will know you are a constituent. Votes are expected to be very close in the Senate, and passage of crucial arms-control legislation will depend on citizen support.

- Follow up the postcards with letters to your senators and representative. Personal letters are an effective way to increase the impact of your message.
- Join the League's Campaign for a Safer World activist network and receive updates on arms-control legislation. Send your name and address to the Arms Control Desk at the League's address below.
- Call the national office for the latest information on League-supported legislation. Weekdays, contact Kathy Shulman, coordinator of Grassroots Lobbying, at (202) 429-1965. Weekends, call the League ActionLine at (202) 296-0218.

League of Women Voters
of the United States
1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036



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The Honorable _____
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510



14¢
stamp

The Honorable _____
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

CRISIS IN ARMS CONTROL

Now is a critical time
for U.S.-Soviet nuclear
arms control.

The arms-control framework
that has existed for nearly two
decades is under full-scale
assault. An unrestrained arms
race in both offensive and
defensive strategic weapons
lies on the horizon . . .

League of Women Voters
of the United States



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TAKE ACTION

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which bans the development, testing and deployment of antimissile systems, was signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in 1972. The treaty prevents a destabilizing and dangerous arms competition in both defensive and offensive weapons, as each side would race to develop nuclear forces to penetrate or overwhelm the defenses of the other. For over a decade, the treaty has brought fundamental stability to U.S.-Soviet competition and made it possible to set limits on offensive nuclear weapons.

In 1985 the Administration announced its new interpretation of the treaty under which work would be permitted on ABM systems based on exotic technologies. The Administration argued that testing and development of the Star Wars program could therefore continue without restraint. This sudden reinterpretation is wrong, and in the words of Senator Sam Nunn (D GA), it is based on a "complete and total misrepresentation" of the treaty ratification record.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Members of both houses of Congress are currently developing legislation to preserve the ABM Treaty.

Urge your members of Congress to support legislation to reaffirm the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

"The ABM Treaty is of vital importance to peace on this planet."

Senator

Robert Stafford (R VT)

"We will have Star Wars or arms control. We can't have both."

Former Secretary of Defense

Clark Clifford

"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.... This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron."

President

Dwight D. Eisenhower

STAR WARS

The Star Wars program, or Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), was originally promoted in 1983 as a program to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." This utopian goal has since been resoundingly rejected by the American scientific community. Members of the prestigious National Academy of Sciences who work in the physical or mathematical sciences relevant to SDI were surveyed in 1986. By a margin of more than 36-to-1, these prominent American scientists believe that SDI could not destroy enough missiles to defend our population if the Soviets tried to overwhelm the SDI.

Criticism by arms-control supporters and the scientific community prompted Congress to sharply limit the growth of the SDI program last year. Undaunted, the Administration has requested \$5.9 billion for SDI for FY '88, a huge 67% increase over last year's \$3.5 billion. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger has urged that a decision be made within the next two years to commit the United States to deploying SDI. The major reason for this rush toward deployment is the desire to lock in the SDI program so that, in Attorney General Edwin Meese's words, "it will not be tampered with by future Administrations."

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Representative Bennett (D FL) will offer legislation in the House to reduce SDI funding below last year's level.

Leadership for the effort to cut SDI funding in the Senate will be provided by Senators Johnston (D LA) and Proxmire (D WI).

Urge your members of Congress to support legislation to cut SDI funding BELOW last year's level of \$3.5 billion.

THE SALT II AGREEMENT

The SALT II treaty, which sets numerical limits on the development of strategic nuclear weapons, was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1979. Although formal ratification broke down after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both sides publicly pledged to uphold a "no undercut" policy. Each nation agreed to comply with the treaty's central limits on offensive weapons as long as the other maintained similar restraint.

After six years of mutual adherence to these limits, the Reagan administration purposefully violated the agreement after the November 1986 elections by deploying the nation's 131st B-52 bomber armed with nuclear cruise missiles. Now the United States is continuing to expand its missile forces in violation of the limits.

"Without SALT...the entire structure of offensive arms limitations laid out over a period of 15 to 20 years by four presidents—Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter—will be destroyed."

Former Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

HR 347 This bipartisan bill sponsored by Representative Dicks (D WA) would deny funding for the deployment of nuclear weapons in excess of the SALT II numerical limits, as long as the Soviet Union observes those limits.

S 415 Senators Bumpers (D AR), Chafee (R RI), Heinz (R PA) and Leahy (D VT) have introduced a similar bill in the Senate to preserve the SALT II numerical limits.

Urge your members of Congress to support HR 347 in the House and S 415 in the Senate.

If you have already received a copy of this mailing, please share this one with a concerned friend.

Dear Senator _____:

The future of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control is in your hands. Congress must act decisively this year to preserve the vital restraints on nuclear weapons necessary to maintain our national security and reduce the danger of nuclear war.

As a concerned citizen and member of the League of Women Voters, I urge you to support legislative efforts to:

- Restore the U.S. to compliance with the SALT II limits on strategic nuclear weapons, as long as the USSR observes those limits.
- Reaffirm the traditional interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
- Reduce SDI funding below last year's level of \$3.5 billion.

Sincerely yours,

Dear Senator _____:

The future of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control is in your hands. Congress must act decisively this year to preserve the vital restraints on nuclear weapons necessary to maintain our national security and reduce the danger of nuclear war.

As a concerned citizen and member of the League of Women Voters, I urge you to support legislative efforts to:

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- Reaffirm the traditional interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
- Reduce SDI funding below last year's level of \$3.5 billion.

Sincerely yours,

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To: BSh, LCU, MAP, Jan Wilbur
From: Debbie Stine

December 16, 1987

EB
SD (CA)

National Security Grant Update

First, I just got the vouchers from national today. I will forward them on to Myrtle. I had already sent her my first reimbursement request, and the attached layout shows how I am keeping track of the budget. A letter attached indicates that Alice Hughey is leaving LNWUS to take a position at a national church organization (Luthern I think).

I haven't heard anything from Houston yet. I will send them a copy of the LNJ paper and attach a note indicating they might look at the author as a possible speaker (James Galbraith), or Hoyt Purvis (also LNJ) who had directed a project analyzing U.S. policy & the third world in a similar way (see back of paper). I will also tell them of our pre-board deadline. I would like to get final approval by the board and then send info to local leagues and other in the Feb. mailing. I would like to have enough info for the January mailing, but I'm not sure how Houston is getting along. I will check with them on their status once I get back.

As I told Louise, I am somewhat concerned that Houston understand the focus of the grant well enough to work with the speakers. She suggested that I write a short statement which she would send to Houston. This statement is shown below:

The Texas Economy & the Third World

The purpose of this workshop is to train community leaders in national security issues and citizen education techniques. Speakers will speak on the economic aspects of United States policy toward the third world. The focus of the discussion should be on the implications for Texas. How does this policy affect the economy of Texas? What is the role of energy and trade? What is the relationship between Texas and the Middle East or Central America? The remainder of the workshop will focus on training these leaders to effectively communicate this message to the public.

One example I am using to aid in understanding the focus is U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. How does the reflagging of ships in the gulf and the use of U.S. military forces to guard tankers affect the economy of Texas? Mary Alice suggested that we might look at the relationship of agriculture (which would tie in neatly with the national study).

I have worked with a friend (using a computer) designing a possible mailout. I know we asked Houston to do this, but we started fooling around and we couldn't stop. I have included a copy. See what you think. If we can't afford to typeset, this might be a possible alternative. I might be able to find some better software if is needed. I don't have a dot matrix printer, so I don't have any of my own.

The second half of the workshop is coming along fine. A discussion format will be used. I hope the speakers will be willing to sit in on these discussions as resource people. Some idea of how I think the sessions should go is given in the attached tapes. The speakers, I believe, are speaking for too long but if we focus our discussions we should be able to get the same information across in a shorter period of time.

I'll take the first one on Defining the Challenges. Participants will be requested to ask their neighbors and coworkers several questions. (I need to work on these) During the discussion, participants will be requested to define the difficulties they have in communicating these issues to the public.

Mary Alice will take the next workshop on Communicating a positive message. This workshop will focus on methods of communicating a possibly negative message in a positive way. For example, rather than talking about U.S. involvement in Central America as a military action communicate it as how much money is being sent to the contras compared to the budget of a city, state, or some aspect of the national budget. I thought Modelle might have picked up some info on this topic at the pr workshop she went to.

Jan Wilbur has agreed to take the third workshop on Networking and Coalition building. Now that we know the problems in communicating a message, and how to communicate it in a positive way, we will work with the participants in developing an audience for their message. What groups can we work with in communicating our message? What type of groups would be interested in hearing the message?

The second half should conclude with an evaluation of the workshop. Participants will be requested to develop a goal of how they will use the information learned in this workshop.

I hope to gain some information when I got to Austin for the board meeting. I plan to go early and try to contact some of the professors at LBJ to find some good papers on this topic. I will also be going to the Peace group conf on Sat. Diane, my attendance at this will be pretty flexible. The only session that I feel I really need to go to is the llam workshop. Otherwise, I plan to work my attendance around the board meeting commitments. Information I pick up here should be helpful in the last two workshops.

Finally, I have selected about 5 possible pubs for our workbook. None is exactly what I want. I'm hoping one of our speakers might have some suggestions once they are selected. I'm also waiting to see how our budget comes out on location and speaker expense. We have only \$100 planned for speaker expense; however, we do have \$200 for coordinators travel. I thought at the time that we would have to visit Houston twice--before and during the WS. However, now I think that one trip will be enough. Therefore, we could possibly move some funds from the coordinators budget to speaker's budget.

Well that's the plan so far. What do you think? Any suggestions would be greatly appreciated. I am planning to get most of my planning done between now and the board meeting. Classes don't start until Jan. 13, so I will actually be at home for almost two continuous weeks! This (in my mind) is a remarkable opportunity. I am attending a TWC workshop on First response (to a haz. material spill that is) on Jan. 12 and 13 in San Antonio, so I will be gone 1/11-1/13. Otherwise, I will be back home Dec. 27 (unless I break my leg skiing of course!).

Merry Christmas!

Sent to all TX reps except Jim Wright
and Senators Bentsen and Gramm



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League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

September 9, 1987

The Honorable Jack Brooks
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Brooks:

The League of Women Voters of Texas urges you to oppose any aid to the Nicaraguan contras--whether military or nonlethal--in any amount, via any legislative vehicle. The League believes that the United States should seek diplomatic rather than military solutions to the conflicts in Central America.

As you are aware, five of the Central American countries recently signed a comprehensive peace plan which detailed steps toward a cease-fire, democratic elections, and an end to outside military assistance. Speaker of the House Jim Wright, who recently unveiled the Reagan-Wright peace plan, urged the administration to support the Central American presidents' peace plan instead. "I cannot conceive of the United States being in a position of upsetting this timetable or doing anything but rejoicing and cooperating," the Speaker declared.

The League agrees with Speaker Wright. We believe that contra aid is a policy which undermines the ongoing regional negotiating process, contributes to the increasing militarization of the region, and jeopardizes our standing and relations with the people and governments of the region. It is in the interest of the United States to promote peace and regional security through diplomatic and peaceful means. The legitimate interests of our country are best served by addressing the long-term social and economic needs of the region and by vigorously supporting and reinforcing the ongoing process of regional dispute settlement.

Please oppose any aid to the Nicaraguan contras for, as columnist Sandy Grady stated in the Corpus Christi Caller-Times on August 16, 1987, "After making war for six years, why not gamble 90 days on peace?"

Sincerely,

Diane Sheridan

Diane Sheridan
President

Debbie Stine

Debbie Stine
National Security Director



League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

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September 9, 1987

The Honorable Jim Wright
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Speaker Wright:

The League of Women Voters of Texas urges your continued opposition to any aid to the Nicaraguan contras--whether military or nonlethal--in any amount, via any legislative vehicle. The League agrees with you that the United States should seek diplomatic rather than military solutions to the conflicts in Central America.

As you are aware, five of the Central American countries recently signed a comprehensive peace plan which detailed steps toward a cease-fire, democratic elections, and an end to outside military assistance. We urge you to continue your support of the Central American presidents' peace plan, and oppose any attempts by the White House to request funding for the Nicaraguan contras.

We believe that contra aid is a policy which undermines the ongoing regional negotiating process, contributes to the increasing militarization of the region, and jeopardizes our standing and relations with the people and governments of the region. It is in the interest of the United States to promote peace and regional security through diplomatic and peaceful means. The legitimate interests of our country are best served by addressing the long-term social and economic needs of the region and by vigorously supporting and reinforcing the ongoing process of regional dispute settlement.

Please oppose any aid to the Nicaraguan contras for, as columnist Sandy Grady stated in the Corpus Christi Caller-Times on August 16, 1987, "After making war for six years, why not gamble 90 days on peace?"

Sincerely,

Diane Sheridan

Diane Sheridan
President

Debbie Stine

Debbie Stine
National Security Director

Action Alert

For the latest developments on League issues, call Kathy Shulman, Coordinator of Grassroots Lobbying, during business hours at 202-429-1965. On weekends, call Action Line at 202-296-0218 for a recorded update.

This is going on DPM

July 27, 1987

TO: State and Local League Presidents

FROM: Nancy M. Neuman, President and Marilyn Reeves, Advocacy Issues Chair

RE: Contra Aid

The debate once again is heating up in Congress over continuing military aid to the Nicaraguan contras. The Administration is expected to make a fiscal year 1988 appropriations request in the next few weeks for \$130 to \$140 million in aid to be expended over the remaining 18 months of the Reagan presidency. Absent a victory on a free-standing contra aid measure, the Administration will seek a compromise with Congress by lowering the aid dollar figure, attaching aid as an amendment to other legislation, or a combination of the two. A series of votes on contra aid is expected throughout the fall congressional session.

Based on our position on U.S. relations with developing countries, the League of Women Voters strongly believes that U.S. military assistance to the contras, including nonlethal aid, is not an appropriate means to promote U.S. interests in Central America. Contra aid is a policy that undermines the ongoing regional negotiating process, that contributes to the increasing militarization of the region and that jeopardizes our standing and relations with the people and governments of the region.

It is in the interest of the United States to promote peace and regional security in Central America through diplomatic and peaceful means. The legitimate interests of our country are best served by addressing the long-term social and economic needs of the region and by vigorously supporting and reinforcing the ongoing process of regional dispute settlement.

ACTION URGENTLY NEEDED

o Please call or write your senators and representative. Urge them to:

1) Oppose any aid to the contras, in any form -- lethal or nonlethal -- in any amount, in any legislative vehicle.

2) Seek diplomatic rather than military solutions to the conflicts in Central America.



BACKGROUND

Last summer, the U.S. Congress approved \$100 million in military assistance to the Nicaraguan contras for fiscal year (FY) 1987. Enactment of the measure last fall marked the end of a four-year congressional ban on military aid to the contras.

The Iran/Contra affair has unveiled the diversion of Iran arms sales profits to the contras for military use in 1985 and 1986 despite the congressional ban on U.S. military aid. The continuing contra aid debate has achieved heightened visibility this summer through nationally televised congressional hearings into the Iran/Contra affair. The arguments against giving U.S. aid to the contras, however, remain unchanged and compelling.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONTRA AID

- o Additional aid will further escalate the U.S. role in the contra war. The contra's lack of military and political success demonstrates that the heavy U.S. commitment to date, including the \$100 million FY 1987 appropriation, is just the downpayment on hundreds of millions more that will be required in the future, a fact already evident in the \$140 million expected to be sought by the Administration in FY 1988 appropriations.
- o Continued U.S. aid to the contras will further militarize the entire region and undermine efforts at diplomatic solutions, thus setting up conditions that could lead to direct U.S. military intervention. The Administration has consistently set up roadblocks to negotiating a regional peace accord. Renewed U.S. military aid to the contras portends U.S. reliance on a military solution and may well eliminate any chances of a diplomatic solution to the conflict.
- o The contra's human rights record and the fact that nearly all of their military commanders are former officers of the Somoza National Guard are reasons they have so little support among Nicaraguans. The contras have repeatedly committed serious violations of human rights, documented by Amnesty International and other reliable human rights organizations.
- o Diplomatic and economic isolation of Nicaragua, combined with the ongoing U.S.-backed contra war, will almost certainly lead to increased Nicaraguan reliance on the Soviet Union for political, economic and military support.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 1987

Explore Peace in Nicaragua

If President Reagan wanted an honorable and sensible resolution of conflicts in Central America, he would grab for the peace plan put forward by Costa Rica's President, Oscar Arias. Mr. Reagan's own policy of backing the Nicaraguan rebels and driving the Sandinistas out of Nicaragua is at a dead end. The Arias plan, whatever its flaws, has promise and wide support.

Mr. Reagan even felt compelled to issue a statement after his meeting with President Arias yesterday stressing their agreement on "objectives." But that's not enough. If the Arias plan is to get off the ground, the postponed Central American leaders' meeting to discuss it must be rescheduled. That means Washington must put its full weight behind the initiative. Otherwise, after Mr. Reagan's years of lip service to negotiations, suspicions will rightly linger about his sincerity.

Mr. Arias proposes cease-fires and regional elections, the restoration of civil liberties and the beginning of talks between governments and their "unarmed internal opposition." Nicaragua would "democratize" and the United States would stop aid to the contras.

Outwardly, the differences boil down to timing. Mr. Arias wants Washington to stop aid to the contras at the same time the Sandinistas commit themselves to democratization. President Reagan insists on continuing to arm the rebels until Nicaraguan freedoms have been established. To Mr. Reagan, helping the contras is the best way to insure democratization. To Mr. Arias, the rebels are no solution; they are the problem, giving the Sandinistas cause

for foreign sympathy and a pretext for repression.

Behind the jockeying lies Mr. Reagan's deeper reluctance for any kind of compromise that leaves the Sandinistas in power. That reluctance has doomed past peace initiatives from even being explored. There is no evidence even now that he has changed his mind.

Yet there are stirrings that encourage the plan's supporters. The Administration, has been rocked by the Iran-contra affair; future aid for the contras is chancy. Pragmatists have gained in a White House staff led by Howard Baker.

Additionally, the Soviet Union has sharply cut oil shipments to Nicaragua. The difference will probably be made up by Mexico and Venezuela, giving them leverage. Since Nicaragua is nearly broke, it has an incentive for compromise, providing — and this is the catch — that Mr. Reagan is willing to end aid to the contras.

The Sandinistas have long said they are ready to ban foreign bases and accept policing of frontiers. But they adamantly rule out direct dealings with the contras and have long refused to accept an election process that jeopardized their power.

Much as Nicaragua's neighbors fear the Sandinistas, they are at least equally repelled by the contras. Mr. Reagan has so far refused to acknowledge this unpalatable truth, putting all his chips on the contras, an increasingly bad bet. If he wants to rescue his barren Central American policy, he'd better begin soon, by breathing life into the only plausible peace plan around.

Otherwise, Americans are bound to conclude that his real aim is not to explore peace but to pass an undeclared war on to his successor.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

Congress is expected to consider the question of continued U.S. aid to the contras in mid-September, but action is needed now to let your voice be heard in this important debate.

- 1) Write your senators and representative. Urge them to vote against continued U.S. aid to the contras in any form and to seek a diplomatic solution to conflict in the region.
 - 2) Send a League delegation to your members of Congress's district offices with the message: no more contra aid. Congress is in recess and members may be in their districts from August 8 to September 8.
 - 3) Set up League telephone networks to be activated two days before the first vote in mid-September. Call in your views to Washington and keep those phones ringing throughout the two days before the vote.
 - 4) Prepare for additional votes. The first contra aid vote may be on a free-standing measure. Additional votes are possible if the contra aid measure is defeated as a free-standing bill. An amendment could be offered to the continuing resolution (the omnibus spending bill), thus warranting additional votes.
 - 5) Use methods appropriate to your community to mobilize opposition to contra aid.
-

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in the S.O.*

DEC 12 1986

League of Women Voters of Ohio
[REDACTED]

December 1986

To: Local League Presidents
From: Jean Hutzler, Citizen Education Committee, LWVOEF
Re: Availability of videotapes for possible program use

The LWVO Education Fund has two videotapes which were originally distributed by the LWVUS Education Fund that can be loaned to you and might be useful in planning a program, a project on a related topic or a discussion group.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE--DEBATE VIDEO: Available in VHS format this SDI Debate Video features Senators Kerry (D-MA) and Wallop (R-WY) in a November 1985 LWVEF-sponsored debate. The Senators discuss various issues surrounding the Strategic Defense Initiative, including: cost, feasibility, effectiveness, arms control implications and possible Soviet responses. An illustrated discussion guide accompanies the SDI videotape. (42 minutes)

THE THIRD WORLD CHALLENGE TO U.S. POLICY: Available in VHS and Beta format this videotape focuses on strategic and economic approaches to United States Relations with developing countries. This video provides some basic definitions of terms, such as what a developing country is, and highlights some specific issues, including increased U.S. reliance on security assistance and the problems of Third World debt. A discussion guide accompanies the video. The video presentation is an ideal companion of the LWVUS Education Fund monograph, "America in the Third World: Collision or Cooperation?" (Pub #533, \$1.00 for League members, \$1.25 for the public). This publication is available from national and provides more specific information about U.S. interests in developing countries and the U.S. foreign aid program. (20 minutes)

TO ORDER: Contact the League of Women Voters of Ohio
Education Fund
[REDACTED]

The only charge involved is postage and handling for each order. Local League is responsible for returning the tape to the LWVOEF.



League of Women Voters
of the United States

JUL 28 1986

Memorandum

1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-1965

July 1986

TO: Local and State League Presidents and DPM Subscribers

FROM: Rosalind J. McGee, Communications Chair

ABOUT THIS MAILING:

--June/July 1986 issue of the National Voter; file copy for LWV presidents and DPM subscribers.

--Agenda for Security (Pub. #817, \$1.00 (75¢ for members)). Like the earlier edition, this new brochure offers a brief introduction to current national security issues and related debate questions. Its purpose is to provide voters and candidates with balanced information from which to make informed choices. Agenda for Security can be used as a predebate briefing tool for candidates, moderators and panelists, as well as an educational tool for students and other citizens. Leagues sponsoring Agenda for Security congressional debates will be using the brochure for their projects. Other Leagues are also encouraged to make the most of this valuable resource during the 1986 election season.

--"National Security in the Nuclear Age" proposal and booklist. These materials were sent to League presidents in May 1986, but we were unable to send them to DPM subscribers at that time due to insufficient quantities. This mailing includes these materials for DPM subscribers only. The national office is distributing the "National Security in the Nuclear Age" proposal and booklist for public libraries in response to many comments from Leagues concerning the lack of materials on national security topics on the local level. We have reviewed the proposal and booklist with care and believe that they could prove helpful in strengthening public understanding of these issues. We encourage you to copy and circulate the proposal/booklist and to consider how best to promote it to your community's librarians. The proposal's author, Ernest B. Dane, welcomes suggestions or comments. Contact him at 4 Jefferson Run Road, Great Falls, VA 22066.

--Compact for African Development. Jointly produced by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Overseas Development Council, this publication is being sent to League presidents only. Presidents should refer to the separate memo in this mailing for more information.

NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

JUL 28 1986

PUBLIC LIBRARY PROPOSAL & BOOKLIST

It is proposed that every public library in the United States establish a balanced up-to-date collection of books and other informational materials on national security in the nuclear age. Libraries are further encouraged to take as many as possible of the following steps to facilitate access to the collection and to stimulate public interest in these matters:

- a) Provide a free handout bibliography showing the books' shelf location details.
- b) Install a "National Security in the Nuclear Age" bulletin board for the bibliography, current news clip copies and book reviews of key collection items and new books.
- c) Present periodic exhibits of all or some groups of the collection's books; or, if possible, establish a dedicated subject bookshelf for the collection.
- d) Use library posters to draw public attention to the national security collection and exhibits of its books.
- e) Cooperate with local sponsors of public discussion groups or debates on current national security issues such as new strategic weapons, the Strategic Defense Initiative, arms control verification and defense reform.

OBJECTIVE : Strengthen public education in this crucial area by making readily available and promoting citizen interest in the new data sources and recent writings on national security, nuclear weapons and arms control issues; in effect, make the public library system notably more significant as an informational outreach force concerning national security and nuclear policy matters.

RATIONALE : The need for clearer public understanding of these questions now seems self evident. To meet this need many of our best qualified writers have been working recently to improve our grasp of virtually all aspects of the subject, but so far the impact of their thinking has fallen well short of what the situation requires. However, making such writings more accessible to everyone could contribute to an important broadening of public knowledge and reduce the potential peril that underlies ignorance of these matters.

SPECIFIC RATIONALE FOR A DEDICATED SUBJECT SHELF : Grouping the books together on a single identified shelf seems certain to attract a higher level of public attention and stimulate more interest than can be expected if the same books are assigned to separate positions on a library's shelves.

IMPLEMENTATION : The thrust of implementation should be local, especially concerning the selection of books and book funding. However, a useful role can also be played by a central office acting as catalyst and source of current information on this evolving topic.

(a) Requirements : First, a commitment of broad support and cooperation from professional librarians, the American Library Association and at least some of the state library associations seems essential. Second, the backing of a significant foundation or other organization appears desirable to provide a base for further refinement of this concept and for its transformation into a reality. Third, financial and staffing constraints in the library systems of many communities seem likely to require a modest contribution of book purchasing funds and volunteer help from local non-library sources.

(b) Progress to date : Extensive support for this proposal is developing. It has been endorsed by the American Library Association's Social Responsibilities Round Table and its Peace Information Exchange Task Force, and more than 1000 copies of the proposal's booklist have been picked up by librarians attending the ALA's 1985 and 1986 conferences.

In addition, the League of Women Voters of the United States is providing national level support by distributing the proposal and its booklists to its 1227 state and local chapters. A summary of the proposal is also now available on-line through ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center) and the complete proposal/booklist can be obtained by mail from ERIC. The ERIC data base call-up number is ED261923.

BOOKS FOR LIBRARIES TO CONSIDER : See attached list. It is divided into sections as follows: a) Short Books for a Quick Grasp of the Issues; b) Primary Books for Broadest Understanding; c) Reaching for Solutions; d) Political, Strategic, Environmental and Arms Control Analysis; e) Nuclear War: Control and Planning; f) The Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"); g) Defense Reform and Defense Budget Questions; h) Moral, Medical and Psychological Assessments; and i) Nuclear Weapons Data and Annual Publications. Key books in each section are indicated by asterisk. List book prices shown in parentheses are for the least expensive edition currently available. Some of the soft cover books are also available in hard cover editions at the higher prices shown in brackets. Total pages and ISBN numbers follow prices. A secondary booklist arranged alphabetically by author is also attached to facilitate checking these titles against existing library catalogs.

BOOK SELECTION CRITERIA : The listed books have been selected on the basis of the stature and reputation of their authors and of the works themselves as judged by a broad spectrum of reputable reviewers, other writers and professionals in the national security, nuclear policy, arms control and space warfare areas. The designation of some as key books is based on these same criteria with lower cost also considered as a factor.

RECOMMENDED CONGRESSIONAL READING : In September, 1985, the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, published a major new study, Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies . Its Appendix L, "References on Strategic Nuclear Policy", includes 20 of the important works on the attached list. Each of these books is marked by double asterisk.

PROJECT COST PER LIBRARY : The purchase of all 56 books on the attached list could total \$545 per library, while the 37 key asterisk-marked books total \$318. However, some of these books are already in the general collections of many libraries. It follows that the cost of obtaining a selection of other listed books could be substantially less than these totals. Note also that a small basic collection of the key books from section (a) (list cost: \$12.35) plus a few other moderately priced choices from other sections would total as little as \$50 to \$60.

INCLUDING COPIES OF KEY MAGAZINE ARTICLES : The impact of the proposed collection or dedicated bookshelf could be reinforced by including copies of (or by listing) pertinent recent magazine articles such as Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Thomas Power's piece "What is it About?" published in the January '84 issue of Atlantic Monthly . Scientific American has also contributed a very informative set of recent lead articles on nuclear policy and military matters, and Foreign Affairs , Foreign Policy , Commentary , International Security and others regularly publish pieces of current importance.

COLLEGE AND SECONDARY SCHOOL LIBRARIES : While this proposal is focused on the 15,000 public libraries in the United States, its objectives would be well served by establishing similar collections, handout bibliographies, bulletin boards, and temporary exhibits or dedicated subject shelves in university, college and secondary school libraries.

PROPOSAL AND BOOKLIST COPYRIGHT : All libraries, librarians and other persons interested in this proposal and its booklists are freely encouraged to copy and otherwise use them in any non-commercial context that will contribute to the proposal's implementation. No permission from or contact with the author is necessary, but information on independant promotional actions will be welcomed.

Updated as of 5/1/86
(Initially proposed 6/84)

Proposal and booklist developed by:

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Great Falls, Va. 22066
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NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

BOOKLIST

A. SHORT BOOKS FOR QUICK GRASP OF THE ISSUES

- * Nuclear Illusion and Reality : Lord Solly Zuckerman; Vintage - 1982
(\$2.95) [\$10.95] (154 pages) (ISBN 0-394-71363-X)
- * Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace : Leon Wieseltier; Holt, Rinehart & Winston - 1983
(\$2.95) [\$7.95] (109 pages) (ISBN 0-03-064029-6)
- * Thinking About the Next War : Thomas Powers; Mentor - 1982
(\$2.95) (172 pages) (ISBN 0-451-62246-4)
- * Up in Arms: A Common Cause Guide to Nuclear Arms Policy : Sandra Sedacca;
Common Cause - 1984
(\$3.50) (130 pages) (ISBN 0-914389-01-7)
- Arms Control: Verification and Compliance : Michael Krepon;
Foreign Policy Association/Headline Series - 1984
(\$3.00) (64 pages) (ISBN 0-87124-093-9)
- We Must Defend America: A New Strategy for National Survival : Daniel Graham;
High Frontier; Regnery Gateway/Conservative Press - 1983
(\$2.95) (114 pages)

B. PRIMARY BOOKS FOR BROADEST UNDERSTANDING

- * The Nuclear Question: The United States & Nuclear Weapons 1946-1976 :
Michael Mandelbaum; Cambridge University - 1979 **
(\$9.95) (277 pages) (ISBN 0-521-29614-5)
- * The Nuclear Crisis Reader : Gwyn Prins, ed; Vintage - 1984
(\$6.95) (251 pages) (ISBN 0-394-72768-1)
- * The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy : Lawrence Freedman; St. Martin's - 1981 **
(\$10.95) (473 pages) (ISBN 0-312-27270-7)
- * The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age :
George Kennan; Pantheon - 1983 **
(\$4.95) (264 pages) (ISBN 0-394-71318-4)
- * Living With Nuclear Weapons : Harvard Nuclear Study Group;
Harvard University/Bantam - 1983 **
(\$3.95) [\$12.95] (268 pages) (ISBN 0-553-23739-X)
- Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture : Aspen Institute;
Barry Blechman, ed; Ballinger - 1982 **
(\$14.95) (308 pages) (ISBN 0-88410-910-0)

C. REACHING FOR SOLUTIONS

- * Weapons and Hope : Freeman Dyson; Harper & Row - 1984 ** (See also note ***)
(\$6.95) [\$17.95] (340 pages) (ISBN 0-06-039039-5)
- * Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War :
Graham Allison, Albert Carnesale, Joseph Nye, eds; W.W. Norton - 1985 **
(\$6.95) [\$14.95] (282 pages) (ISBN 0-393-30329-2)
- * Preventing War in the Nuclear Age : Dietrich Fischer;
Rowman & Allenheld - 1984
(\$9.95) (236 pages) (ISBN 0-8476-7343-X)
- * Beyond the Hotline: How We Can Prevent the Crisis that Might Bring On
a Nuclear War : William Ury; Houghton Mifflin - 1985 **
(\$14.95) (187 pages) (ISBN 0-395-36671-2)
- Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War : Ralph White, ed;
New York University - 1986
(\$20.00) [\$38.00] (591 pages) (ISBN 0-8147-9204-9)

D. POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ARMS CONTROL ANALYSIS

- * Present History: On Nuclear War, Detente, and Other Controversies :
Theodore Draper; Random House - 1983
(\$9.95) [\$19.95] (407 pages) (ISBN 0-394-72371-6)
- * The Age of Vulnerability: Threats to the Nuclear Stalemate : Michael Nacht;
Brookings - 1985 **
(\$9.95) (209 pages) (ISBN 0-8157-5963-0)
- * Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning : Colin Gray;
Foreign Policy Research Institute - 1984 **
(\$5.95) (130 pages) (ISBN 0-910191-07-7)
- * The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy : Robert Jervis;
Cornell University - 1984 **
(\$9.95) [\$19.95] (203 pages) (ISBN 0-8014-1715-5)
- * Arms Control and the Arms Race: Readings from Scientific American :
Scientific American; W.H. Freeman - 1985
(\$14.95) (229 pages) (ISBN 0-7167-1729-8)
- The Verification Challenge: Problems and Promise of Strategic Nuclear Arms
Control Verification : Richard Scribner, Theodore Ralston, William Metz;
American Association for the Advancement of Science; Birkhauser - 1985
(\$20.95) (249 pages) (ISBN 0-8176-3308-1)
- Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S-Soviet Relations :
Ralph White; Free Press - 1984 **
(\$20.00) (374 pages) (ISBN 0-02-933760-7)
- Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control and the Future : Edward Haley, David Keithly,
Jack Merritt, eds; Westview - 1985
(\$15.95) (372 pages) (ISBN 0-8133-0170-X)
- Nuclear Winter: The Evidence and the Risks : Owen Green, Ian Percival,
Irene Ridge; Polity Press - 1985
(\$9.95) (216 pages) (ISBN 0-7456-0177-4)
- The Cold and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War : Paul Erhlich,
Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy, Walter Orr Roberts; W.W. Norton - 1984
(\$7.95) [\$12.95] (229 pages) (ISBN 0-393-30241-5)
- * Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms
Control : Strobe Talbott; Alfred A. Knopf/Vintage - 1984/85
(\$7.95) [\$17.95] (380 pages) (ISBN 0-394-74009-2)
- * The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military : Andrew Cockburn; Random House - 1983
(\$4.95) [\$16.95] (533 pages) (ISBN 0-394-72379-1)
- * The New Nuclear Nations: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1985 :
Leonard Spector; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;
Vintage - 1985
(\$5.95) (367 pages) (ISBN 0-394-74189-7)

E. NUCLEAR WAR: CONTROL AND PLANNING

- * The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces : Paul Bracken;
Yale University - 1983 **
(\$7.95) [\$19.95] (252 pages) (ISBN 0-300-03398-2)
 - * Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat : Bruce Blair;
Brookings - 1985 **
(\$12.95) (341 pages) (ISBN 0-8157-0981-1)
 - * The Button: The Pentagon's Strategic Command and Control System :
Daniel Ford; Simon & Schuster - 1985 **
(\$16.95) (270 pages) (ISBN 0-671-50068-6)
- (Section E continued next page)

SIOP: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War : Peter Pringle, William Arkin;
W.W. Norton - 1983

(\$7.95) [\$16.95] (287 pages) (ISBN 0-393-01798-2)

Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.- Soviet Relations : Keith Payne;

Westview - 1984 **

(\$23.50) (239 pages) (ISBN 0-86531-903-0)

F. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ("STAR WARS")

* Ballistic Missile Defense : Ashton Carter, David Schwartz, eds;
Brookings - 1984 **

(\$13.95) (455 pages) (ISBN 0-8157-1311-8)

* Strategic Defenses: Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies; Anti-Satellite Weapons, Counterweapons, and Arms control : Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress: Princeton University - 1986 (See note **)

(\$12.50) (471 pages) (ISBN 0-691-02252-6)

* Strategic Defense: "Star Wars" in Perspective : Keith Payne;
Hamilton Press 1986

(\$9.95) [\$20.95] (280 pages) (ISBN 0-8191-5110-6)

* The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political, and Arms Control Assessment : Sydney Drell, Philip Farley, David Holloway;
Center for International Security and Arms Control; Ballinger - 1985 **

(\$12.95) (153 pages) (ISBN 0-88730-064-2)

Assessing Strategic Defense: Six Roundtable Discussions : Bruce Weinrod, ed;
Heritage Foundation - 1985

(\$8.00) (170 pages) (ISSN 0272-1155)

Daedalus: Weapons in Space, Vol. I: Concepts and Technologies :

Herbert York, et al; American Academy of Arts and Sciences - 1985

(\$5.00) (192 pages) (ISSN 0011-5266) (Spring Issue)

Daedalus: Weapons in Space, Vol. II: Implications for Security :

Abram Chayes, et al; American Academy of Arts and Sciences - 1985

(\$5.00) (200 pages) (ISSN 0011-5266) (Summer Issue)

A Defense That Defends: Blocking Nuclear Attack : Daniel Graham,
Gregory Fossedal; Devin-Adair - 1983 **

(\$17.95) (158 pages) (ISBN 0-8159-5317-8)

American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapons Systems and Arms Control : Colin Gray; Abt Books/University Press - 1982

(\$9.25) [\$28.00] (128 pages) (ISBN 0-8191-4077-5)

The Fallacy of Star Wars : Union of Concerned Scientists; Vintage - 1984 **
(\$4.95) (293 pages) (ISBN 0-394-72894-7)

G. DEFENSE REFORM AND DEFENSE BUDGET QUESTIONS

* National Defense : James Fallows; Vintage - 1981
(\$4.95) (204 pages) (ISBN 0-394-75306-2)

* Defense Dollars and Sense: A Common Cause Guide to the Defense Budget Process : Mark Rovner; Common Cause - 1983
(\$4.50) (90 pages) (ISBN 0-914389-00-9)

Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends : Jeffrey Record;
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis; Pergamon-Brassey's - 1984
(\$11.95) (113 pages) (ISBN 0-08-031618-2)

The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform :
Edward Luttwak; Institute for Contemporary Studies;
Simon & Schuster - 1984
(\$17.95) (333 pages) (ISBN 0-671-52432-1)

H. MORAL, MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS

- * Indefensible Weapons: The Political & Psychological Case Against Nuclearism : Robert Jay Lifton, Richard Falk; Basic - 1982
(\$6.95) (301 pages) (ISBN 0-465-03237-0)
- * Facing the Threat of Nuclear Weapons : Sidney Drell, Andrei Sakharov; University of Washington - 1983
(\$5.95) (120 pages) (ISBN 0-295-96083-3)
- * Last Aid: The Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War : Eric Chivian, Susanna Chivian, Robert Jay Lifton, John Mack, eds; W.H. Freeman - 1982
(\$9.95) (338 pages) (ISBN 0-7167-1435-3)

I. NUCLEAR WEAPONS DATA AND ANNUAL PUBLICATIONS

- * Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol.1: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities : Natural Resources Defense Council; Thomas Cochran, William Arkin, Milton Hoenig; Ballinger - 1984
(\$19.95) [\$38.00] (340 pages) (ISBN 0-88410-173-8)
- * Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age : Kosta Tsipis; Simon & Schuster - 1983
(\$8.95) [\$16.95] (342 pages) (ISBN 0-671-43912-X)
- * World Military and Social Expenditures - 1985 : Ruth Leger Sivard; World Priorities - 1985
(\$5.00) (52 pages) (ISBN 0-918281-01-6)
- * Soviet Military Power 1986 : U.S. Department of Defense; GPO - 1986
(\$7.00) (156 pages)


* Key books indicated by asterisk.

List updated 5/1/86

** Also listed in Appendix L, "References on Strategic Nuclear Policy", of Strategic Defenses: Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies ; Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress (See Section F. above)

*** 1984 National Book Critics Circle Award

Booklist developed by and copies of complete proposal available from:

Ernest B. Dane


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Ernest B. Dane

NATIONAL SECURITY/NUCLEAR AGE BOOKLIST (by author, alphabetically)

- Allison, Graham et al, eds; Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War ; W.W. Norton - 1985
- Blair, Bruce: Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat ; Brookings - 1985
- Blechman, Barry, ed: Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture ; Aspen Institute; Ballinger - 1982
- Bracken, Paul: The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces ; Yale University - 1983
- Carter, Ashton & Schwartz, D.: Ballistic Missile Defense ; Brookings - 1984
- Chayes, Abram, et al: Daedalus: Weapons in Space, Vol. II: Implications for Security : American Academy of Arts and Sciences - 1985 (Summer)
- Chivian, Eric et al: Last Aid: The Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War ; W.H. Freeman - 1982
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- Draper, Theodore: Present History: On Nuclear War, Detente, and Other Controversies ; Random House - 1983
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- Erhlich, Paul et al: The Cold and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War ; W.W. Norton - 1984
- Fallows, James: National Defense ; Vintage - 1981
- Fischer, Dietrich: Preventing War in the Nuclear Age ; Rowman & Allenheld - 1984
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- Graham, Daniel: We Must Defend America: A New Strategy for National Survival ; High Frontier; Regnery Gateway/Conservative Press - 1983

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- Lifton, Robert Jay & Falk, R.: Indefensible Weapons ; Basic - 1982
- Luttwak, Edward: The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform ; Institute for Contemporary Studies; Simon & Schuster - 1984
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- Payne, Keith: Strategic Defense: "Star Wars" in Perspective ; Hamilton Press 1986
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
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W.H.Freeman - 1985
- Scribner, Richard et al: The Verification Challenge: Problems and Promise
of Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Verification ; American Association
for the Advancement of Science; Birkhauser - 1985
- Sedacca, Sandra: Up in Arms: A Common Cause Guide to Nuclear Arms Policy ;
Common Cause - 1984
- Sivard, Ruth Leger: World Military and Social Expenditures - 1985 ;
World Priorities - 1985
- Spector, Leonard: The New Nuclear Nations: The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons 1985 ; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Vintage-1985
- Talbott, Strobe: Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate
in Nuclear Arms Control ; Alfred A. Knopf - 1984
- Tsipis, Kosta: Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age ;
Simon & Schuster - 1983
- Union of Concerned Scientists: The Fallacy of Star Wars ; Vintage - 1984
- Ury, William: Beyond the Hotline: How We Can Prevent the Crisis that Might
Bring On Nuclear War ; Houghton Mifflin - 1985
- Weinrod, Bruce, ed: Assessing Strategic Defense: Six Roundtable Discussions ;
Heritage Foundation - 1985
- White, Ralph, ed: Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War ;
New York University - 1986
- White, Ralph: Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of
U.S.- Soviet Relations ; Free Press - 1984
- Wieseltier, Leon: Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace ; Holt, Rinehart & Winston - 1983
- York, Herbert, et al: Daedalus: Weapons in Space, Vol. I: Concepts and
Technologies ; American Academy of Arts and Sciences - 1985 (Spring)
- Zuckerman, Solly: Nuclear Illusion and Reality ; Vintage - 1982

List Updated 5/1/86

Booklist developed by and copies of complete proposal available from:

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Ernest B. Dane

Ernest B. Dane
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Great Falls, VA 22066



How
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LWVUS
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League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

October 7, 1986

The Honorable Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Bentsen,

The League of Women Voters of Texas commends your recent votes on the bills that would freeze funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative at last year's level.

We believe the League's position supporting legislation that advocates continued arms control programs, and opposing the proliferation of costly and competitive defensive nuclear weapon systems, is in the best interest of our national security.

Please continue your efforts to prevent additional funding of "Star Wars" and other legislation allowing development of weapons that would exceed the SALT II numerical limits.

Sincerely,

Lois Carpenter

Lois Carpenter
President

Carol Flatten

Carol Flatten
National Security Associate Dir.

ca

Sent to Sen. Bentsen; Reps Bryant, Brooks, Pickle, Leland, Gonzales,
Bustamante, Chapman, Leath, Wright, de la Garza, Frost and Ortiz

JUL 28 1986

NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE : SHORT BOOKLIST

This list of ten books is derived from a proposal to establish a balanced up-to-date collection of books and articles on this subject in every library in the United States. The proposal stresses the need for librarians to encourage popular interest in these matters. Extensive support for the proposal is developing. It has been endorsed by the American Library Association's Social Responsibilities Round Table and its Peace Information Exchange Task Force. In May 1986 the League of Women Voters of the United States gave the proposal and its booklist new national level backing by distributing copies to the leaders of its 1200 state and local chapters. (Cost of the ten books: \$50.50)

Nuclear Illusion and Reality : Lord Solly Zuckerman; Vintage - 1982
(\$2.95) (154 pages) (ISBN 0-394-71363-X)

Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace : Leon Wieseltier; Holt, Rinehart & Winston - 1983
(\$2.95) [\$7.95] (109 pages) (ISBN 0-03-064029-6)

Thinking About the Next War : Thomas Powers; Mentor - 1982
(\$2.95) (172 pages) (ISBN 0-451-62246-4)

Weapons and Hope : Freeman Dyson; Harper & Row - 1984 * (Also note **)
(\$6.95) [\$17.95] (340 pages) (ISBN 0-06-039039-5)

Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War :
Graham Allison, Albert Carnesale, Joseph Nye, eds; W.W. Norton - 1985 *
(\$6.95) [\$14.95] (282 pages) (ISBN 0-393-30329-2)

Preventing War in the Nuclear Age : Dietrich Fischer;
Rowman & Allenheld - 1984
(\$9.95) (236 pages) (ISBN 0-8476-7343-X)

The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age :
George Kennan; Pantheon - 1983 *
(\$4.95) (264 pages) (ISBN 0-394-71318-4)

Strategic Defense: "Star Wars" in Perspective : Keith Payne;
Hamilton Press 1986
(\$9.95) [\$20.95] (280 pages) (ISBN 0-8191-5110-6)

The Fallacy of Star Wars : Union of Concerned Scientists; Vintage - 1984 *
(\$4.95) (293 pages) (ISBN 0-394-72894-7)

National Defense : James Fallows; Vintage - 1981
(\$4.95) (204 pages) (ISBN 0-394-75306-2)

* Also listed in Appendix L, "References on Strategic Nuclear Policy", of
Strategic Defenses: Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies ; Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress; Princeton University - 1986


** 1984 National Book Critics Circle Award

Booklist developed by and copies of complete proposal/booklist available from:

Booklist Updated 5/1/86

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League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

October 8, 1986

The Honorable Ronald D. Coleman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Coleman,

The League of Women Voters of Texas commends your recent vote on the bill that would freeze funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative at last year's level.

We believe the League's position supporting legislation that advocates continued arms control programs, and opposing the proliferation of costly and competitive defensive nuclear weapon systems, is in the best interest of our national security.

Please continue your efforts to prevent additional funding of "Star Wars" and other legislation allowing development of weapons that would exceed the SALT II numerical limits.

Sincerely,

Lois Carpenter

Lois Carpenter
President

Carol Flatten

Carol Flatten
National Security Associate Dir.

ca

Sent to Reps Coleman, Stenholm and Andrews



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League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

October 8, 1986

The Honorable Phil Gramm
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Gramm,

The League of Women Voters of Texas hopes that in the future you will reconsider your recent votes in favor of increased funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative.

We believe the League's position supporting legislation that advocates continued arms control programs, and opposing the proliferation of costly and competitive defensive nuclear weapon systems, is in the best interest of our national security.

We hope that in the future you will consider opposing expansion of "Star Wars," which we believe is a wasteful program, especially in light of budget cuts in other military and domestic programs.

Sincerely,

Lois Carpenter

Lois Carpenter
President

Carol Flatten

Carol Flatten
National Security Associate Dir.

ca

Sent to Sen. Gramm; Reps Wilson, Bartlett, Hall,
Barton, Archer, Fields, Boulter, Sweeney, Combest,
Loeffler, Delay and Arney

To: Jo Ann
Diene
Lois

SEP 26 1986

From: Carol Flatten

Re: Action Alert

I think I covered everything
required in the alert. Please
edit as you please

letter #1

To: Sen. Benson, Reps - Bryant, Brooks, Pickle,
Island, Longley, Bustamonte, Chapman, Keith
Wright, de la Garza, Frost + Ortega
willis)

" delete "s" on vote[s] in #1 on the following:

Coleman, Stenholm, Andrews

16

Dear _____

The League of Women Voters of Texas commends your recent vote[s] on the ~~the~~ bills that would freeze ~~strategic~~ ^{funding for Strategic} Defense Initiative at last year's level.

We believe the League's position of supporting legislation that advocates continued arms control programs, and opposing proliferation of costly and competitive defensive nuclear weapon systems is in the best interest of our national security.

Please continue your efforts to prevent ~~further funding~~ ^{additional funding} of "Star Wars" and other legislation that would allow development of weapons that would exceed the SALT II numerical limits.

Sincerely

Letter #2

To: Sen. Gramm, Reps. Wilson, Bartlett, Hall,
Barton Archer, Fields, Boulton, Sweeney,
Conquest, Leffler, Delany, & Armay

Dear

1

The League of Women Voters of Texas
hopes that in the future you will
reconsider ~~you will reconsider~~ your
recent votes in favor of increased
spending on the "Star Wars" program

2 the same

3 We hope that in the future
you will consider ^{opposing expansion of} ~~a vote for~~
~~expanding~~ "Star Wars," ^{which we believe is a} ~~unnecessary and~~
~~wasteful~~ ^{program, especially} in light of
budget cuts in other military and
domestic programs.

Sincerely

Action Alert

SEP 8 1986

For the latest developments on League issues, call Jennifer Vasiloff, Coordinator of Grassroots Lobbying, during business hours at 202-429-1965. On weekends, call Spotmaster at 202-296-0218 for a recorded update.

This is going on DPM.

August 29, 1986

TO: State and Local League Presidents, LAS Subscribers and League Members interested in arms control

FROM: Nancy M. Neuman, President

RE: 1986 Congressional Action on Arms Control

In the League's campaign for a safer world, recent congressional victories on arms control amendments to the Fiscal Year 1987 defense authorization bill send a strong message that we, as concerned citizens, are not prepared to abandon arms control for a costly and ill-advised defensive weapons system and unlimited competition in offensive nuclear weapons. State and local League action is needed NOW to capitalize on these gains.

This Action Alert provides information for immediate, targeted Senate action to further reduce Star Wars funding as well as for a broader effort throughout the fall to reinforce recent House victories on all League-supported arms control amendments to the defense authorization bill. Please see also the sample arms control letter to the editor and the voting chart describing how your members of congress voted on arms control so far this year.

1986 VOTES ON LEAGUE SUPPORTED AMENDMENTS TO THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

In the House of Representatives:

Bennett Amendment to freeze SDI funding at last year's level, plus inflation; League supported passed 239-176, August 12, 1986

In the Senate:

Johnston/Evans Amendment to cap SDI funding at 3 percent real growth; League supported, defeated 50-49 August 5, 1986

Brown/Coughlin Amendment
to extend the U.S.-Soviet
Anti-Satellite weapons (ASAT)
test moratorium through Fiscal
Year 1987; League supported,
passed 222-197, August 13, 1986

voted to resume ASAT
testing

Dicks/Aspin/Fascell Amendment
to restrict funds for weapons
that exceed the SALT II
numerical limits, unless the
President certifies that the
Soviets are not abiding by
these limits; League supported,
passed 225-186, August 12, 1986

voted to include
non-binding language urging
the President to abide by the
the SALT II limits

The difference between the House and Senate positions on these three
issues will now be negotiated in conference committee.

Senate Action on Defense Appropriations

The Senate Appropriations Committee is scheduled to vote on the Fiscal
Year 1987 defense appropriations bill on September 16. The Senate
authorized \$3.95 billion in funding for the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), a 30 percent increase over last year's level.
Defense appropriations determines the actual amount of money spent on
individual programs. This amount can be no higher than the authorized
level but it can be lower. Following the defeat of the Johnston/Evans
Amendment to the defense authorization bill, Senators Bennett Johnston
(D LA) and William Proxmire (D WI) are renewing their effort to cap SDI
funding in the Senate at 3 percent real growth by offering a similar
amendment to the defense appropriations bill in the Senate
Appropriations Committee.

Along with the recent House approval of a freeze on SDI spending,
passage of the Johnston/Proxmire Amendment could virtually halt the
expansion of the SDI this year. Fifteen of the 29 Senators on the
Senate Appropriations Committee voted for the 3 percent real growth cap
on the defense authorization bill. These 15 Senators include:
Senators Mark Hatfield (R OR, Chair), Bennett Johnston (D LA), William
Proxmire (D WI), Daniel Inouye (D HI), Lawton Chiles (D FL), Quentin
Burdick (D ND), Patrick Leahy (D VT), Jim Sasser (D TN), Dale Bumpers
(D AR), Frank Lautenberg (D NJ), Tom Harkin (D IA), Dennis DeConcini (D
AZ), Lowell Weicker (R CT), Mark Andrews (R ND), and Arlen Specter (R
PA).

Urgent Action Needed

State and local Leagues with Senators on the Appropriations Committee
should write or call your Senators by September 16.

- 1.) Thank those Senators listed above who voted for the 3 percent real

growth cap on SDI funding on the defense authorization bill and urge them to continue to hold the line on Star Wars spending by voting for the Johnston/Proxmire Amendment to the defense appropriations bill; and

- 2.) Urge Senators who did not vote to contain SDI funding to reconsider. Tell them that the 30 percent increase in SDI funding authorized by the Senate in August is unnecessary and wasteful, especially in light of budget cuts in other military and domestic programs.

FOLLOWING UP ON HOUSE VICTORIES

This year's victories on League-supported arms control amendments to the defense authorization bill provide a unique opportunity to reinforce and encourage the House of Representatives' dramatic challenge to Administration policy on arms control. Throughout September and October, state and local Leagues should take every opportunity to thank those Members of Congress who voted for League positions on the key votes outlined above.

LEAGUE ACTION NEEDED

- 1.) Write your Representatives and ask others to write expressing thanks or disappointment in how your representative voted on the three League supported amendments to the defense authorization bill. Consult the enclosed vote chart to check how your representative voted.
- 2.) Adapt as appropriate, then send the enclosed sample letter to the editor to the newspapers in your area. Action this fall to publicize how your representative voted on these amendments will help hold them accountable in anticipation of next years vote on these issues.
- 3.) Detach and return the Action Alert Response Form so that we can better gauge the effectiveness of this call to action in our on-going campaign for a safer world.

Thank you for your help.

ARMS CONTROL ACTION ALERT RESPONSE FORM

Please return to: Arms Control Desk
League of Women Voters of the United States
1730 M Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20036

I wrote or called Representative _____.

I wrote a letter to the editor.

Name _____ League _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____ Phone () _____

CQ House Votes

300. HR 4428. Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1987. Bennett, D-Fla., amendment to decrease from \$3.4 billion to \$2.85 billion the amount authorized for research on the strategic defense initiative, or "star wars." Adopted 239-176: R 33-142; D 206-34 (ND 154-8, SD 52-26), Aug. 12, 1986. (Story, p. 1869)

302. HR 4428. Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1987. Dicks, D-Wash., amendment to prohibit the use of funds to deploy any weapons inconsistent with certain limits contained in the SALT II arms control treaty, provided the Soviet Union continues to observe those limits. Adopted 225-186: R 19-154; D 206-32 (ND 155-6, SD 51-26), Aug. 12, 1986. (Story, p. 1869)

309. HR 4428. Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1987. Brown, D-Calif., amendment to bar tests against an object in space of the anti-satellite (ASAT) missile provided the Soviet Union abstains from testing its own version of the weapon. Adopted 222-197: R 28-148; D 194-49 (ND 153-10, SD 41-39), Aug. 13, 1986. A "nay" was a vote supporting the president's position. (Story, p. 1869)

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Congressional Quarterly

Note: The League position = Y on
all three amendments

KEY		300	302	309
Y	Voted for (yea).			
#	Paired for.			
+	Announced for.			
N	Voted against (nay).			
X	Paired against.			
-	Announced against.			
P	Voted "present."			
C	Voted "present" to avoid possible conflict of interest.			
?	Did not vote or otherwise make a position known.			
Democrats Republicans				
		300	302	309
ALABAMA				
1 Callahan	N N N			
2 Dickinson	N N N			
3 Nichols	N N N			
4 Beville	N N N			
5 Flippo	? ? ?			
6 Erdreich	N Y N			
7 Shelby	N N N			
ALASKA				
Al Young	N N N			
ARIZONA				
1 McCain	N N N			
2 Udall	Y Y Y			
3 Stump	N N N			
4 Rudd	N N N			
5 Kolbe	N N N			
ARKANSAS				
1 Alexander	Y Y Y			
2 Robinson	N N N			
3 Hammerschmidt	N N N			
4 Anthony	Y Y Y			
CALIFORNIA				
1 Bosco	Y Y Y			
2 Chappie	N N N			
3 Matsui	Y Y Y			
4 Fazio	Y Y Y			
5 Burton	? ? ?			
6 Boxer	Y Y Y			
7 Miller	Y Y Y			
8 Dellums	Y Y Y			
9 Stark	Y Y ?			
10 Edwards	Y Y Y			
11 Lantos	Y Y Y			
12 Zschau	N N Y			
13 Mineta	Y Y Y			
14 Shumway	N N N			
15 Coelho	Y Y Y			
16 Panetta	Y Y Y			
17 Pashayan	N N N			
18 Lehman	Y Y Y			
19 Lagomarsino	N N N			
20 Thomas	N N N			
21 Fiedler	N N N			
22 Moorhead	N N N			
23 Beilenson	Y Y Y			
24 Waxman	Y Y Y			
25 Roybal	Y Y Y			
26 Berman	Y Y Y			
27 Levine	Y Y Y			
28 Dixon	? ? Y			
29 Hawkins	Y Y Y			
30 Martinez	Y Y Y			
31 Dymally	Y Y Y			
32 Anderson	Y Y Y			
33 Dreier	N N N			
34 Torres	Y ? Y			
35 Lewis	X X N			
36 Brown	Y Y Y			
37 McCandless	N N N			
38 Dornan	N N N			
39 Donnemeyer	N N N			
40 Badham	N N N			
41 Lowery	N N N			
42 Lungren	N N N			
43 Packard		N N N		
44 Bates		Y Y Y		
45 Hunter		N N N		
COLORADO				
1 Schroeder	Y Y Y			
2 Wirth	Y Y Y			
3 Strang	N N N			
4 Brown	Y N N			
5 Kramer	N N N			
6 Schaefer	N N N			
CONNECTICUT				
1 Kennelly	Y Y Y			
2 Gejdenson	Y Y Y			
3 Morrison	# # #			
4 McKinney	Y ? Y			
5 Rowland	N N N			
6 Johnson	N Y Y			
DELAWARE				
Al Carper	Y Y Y			
FLORIDA				
1 Hutto	N N N			
2 Fuqua	N Y N			
3 Bennett	Y Y Y			
4 Chappell	N Y N			
5 McCollum	N N N			
6 Mackay	Y Y Y			
7 Gibbons	Y Y Y			
8 Young	N N N			
9 Bilukis	N N N			
10 Ireland	N N N			
11 Nelson	N N N			
12 Lewis	N N N			
13 Mack	N N N			
14 Mico	Y Y Y			
15 Shaw	N N N			
16 Smith	Y Y Y			
17 Lehman	Y Y Y			
18 Pepper	Y Y Y			
19 Fawell	Y Y Y			
GEORGIA				
1 Thomas	N N N			
2 Hatcher	Y N N			
3 Ray	Y N N			
4 Swindall	N N N			
5 Fowler	? ? ?			
6 Gingrich	N ? N			
7 Darden	N N N			
8 Rowland	Y N N			
9 Jenkins	? ? N			
10 Barnard	N N N			
HAWAII				
1 Vacancy				
2 Akaka	Y Y Y			
IDAHO				
1 Craig	N N N			
2 Stollings	Y Y Y			
ILLINOIS				
1 Hayes	Y Y Y			
2 Savage	Y Y ?			
3 Russo	Y Y Y			
4 Vacancy				
5 Lipinski	N Y N			
6 Hyde	N N N			
7 Collins	Y Y Y			
8 Rostenkowski	Y Y Y			
9 Yates	Y # Y			
10 Porter	Y N Y			
11 Annunzio	Y Y Y			
12 Crane	N N N			
13 Fawell	Y N N			
14 Grotberg	? ? ?			
15 Madigan	N N N			
16 Martin	N N N			
17 Evans	Y Y Y			
18 Michel	N N N			
19 Bruce	Y Y Y			
20 Durbin	Y Y Y			
21 Price	Y Y Y			
22 Gray	N Y Y			
INDIANA				
1 Visclosky	Y Y Y			
2 Sharp	Y Y ?			
3 Hiler	N N N			
4 Coats	N N N			
5 Hillis	? ? ?			

ND - Northern Democrats SD - Southern Democrats

* Corresponding to Congressional Record Votes

300 302 309	300 302 309	300 302 309	300 302 309
6 Burton N N N	7 Stangeland N N N	NORTH CAROLINA	TENNESSEE
7 Myers N N N	8 Oberstar Y Y Y	1 Jones Y Y Y	1 Oullen N N N
8 McCloskey Y Y Y	MISSISSIPPI	2 Valentine Y N N	2 Duncan N N N
9 Hamilton Y Y Y	1 Whitten Y Y Y	3 Whitely Y Y Y	3 Lloyd N N N
10 Jacobs Y Y Y	2 Franklin N N N	4 Cobey N N N	4 Cooper Y Y Y
IOWA	3 Montgomery N N N	5 Neal Y Y Y	5 Boner Y Y Y
1 Leach Y Y Y	4 Dowdy Y Y Y	6 Cable Y N N	6 Gordon Y Y Y
2 Tauke Y Y Y	5 Lott N N N	7 Rose Y Y Y	7 Sundquist N N N
3 Evans Y N Y	MISSOURI	8 Helmer Y Y Y	8 Jones Y Y Y
4 Smith Y Y Y	1 Clay Y Y Y	9 McMillan Y N N	9 Ford Y Y Y
5 Lightfoot N N N	2 Young Y Y Y	10 Vacancy N N N	TEXAS
6 Bedell Y Y Y	3 Gephardt Y Y Y	11 Hendon N N N	1 Chapman Y Y N
KANSAS	4 Skelton N N N	NORTH DAKOTA	2 Wilson N N N
1 Roberts Y N N	5 Wheat Y Y Y	Al Dorgan Y Y Y	3 Bartlett N N N
2 Slattery Y Y Y	6 Coleman N N N	OHIO	4 Hall R N N N
3 Meyers Y N Y	7 Taylor N N N	1 Luken Y Y Y	5 Bryant Y Y Y
4 Glickman Y Y Y	8 Emerson N N N	2 Gradison N N Y	6 Barton N N N
5 Whittaker N N N	9 Volkmer Y Y Y	3 Hall Y Y Y	7 Archer N N N
KENTUCKY	MONTANA	4 Osley N N N	8 Fields N N N
1 Hubbard Y N N	1 Williams Y Y Y	5 Latta N N N	9 Brooks Y Y Y
2 Notcher Y Y Y	2 Marlenee Y N N	6 McEwen N N N	10 Pickle N N Y
3 Mazzoli Y N Y	NEBRASKA	7 DeWine N N N	11 Leath Y Y N
4 Snyder N N N	1 Bereuter Y N N	8 Kindness N N N	12 Wright Y Y N
5 Rogers N N N	2 Daub N N N	9 Raptur Y Y Y	13 Boulter N N N
6 Hopkins N N N	3 Smith Y N N	10 Miller N N N	14 Sweeney N N N
7 Perkins Y Y Y	NEVADA	11 Eckart Y Y Y	15 de la Garza Y Y N
LOUISIANA	1 Reid N Y Y	12 Kasch N N N	16 Coleman N Y N
1 Livingston N N N	2 Vucanovich N N N	13 Pease Y Y Y	17 Stenholm Y N N
2 Boggs Y Y Y	NEW HAMPSHIRE	14 Seiberling Y Y Y	18 Ieland Y Y Y
3 Touzin N N N	1 Smith N N N	15 Wylie N N N	19 Combest N N N
4 Roemer N N N	2 Gregg N N N	16 Regula Y N Y	20 Gonzalez Y Y Y
5 Huckabee N Y N	NEW JERSEY	17 Traficant Y Y Y	21 Loeffler N N N
6 Moore Y Y Y	1 Florio Y Y Y	18 Applegate Y Y Y	22 DeLoay N N N
7 Breous Y Y Y	2 Hughes Y Y Y	19 Feighon Y Y Y	23 Bustamante Y Y Y
8 Long Y Y Y	3 Howard Y Y Y	20 Oaker Y Y Y	24 Frost Y Y N
MAINE	4 Smith N N N	21 Stokes Y Y Y	25 Andrews N Y N
1 McKernan Y Y Y	5 Roukema Y N Y	OKLAHOMA	26 Armer N N N
2 Snowe Y Y Y	6 Dwyer Y Y Y	1 Jones Y Y Y	27 Ortiz Y Y N
MARYLAND	7 Rinaldo N N N	2 Symar Y Y Y	UTAH
1 Dyson Y N N	8 Roe Y Y Y	3 Watkins Y Y Y	1 Hansen N N N
2 Bentley N N N	9 Torricelli Y Y Y	4 McCurdy Y Y Y	2 Monson N N N
3 Mikulski Y Y Y	10 Rodino Y Y Y	5 Edwards N N N	3 Nielson N N N
4 Holt N N N	11 Gallo N N N	6 English Y Y N	VERMONT
5 Hoyer Y Y Y	12 Courter N N N	OREGON	Al Jeffords Y Y Y
6 Byron Y N N	13 Saxton N N N	1 AuCom Y Y Y	VIRGINIA
7 Mitchell Y Y Y	14 Guarini Y Y Y	2 Smith, R. Y N N	1 Bateman N N N
8 Barnes Y Y Y	NEW MEXICO	3 Wyden Y Y Y	2 Whitehurst N N N
MASSACHUSETTS	1 Lujan N N N	4 Weaver Y Y Y	3 Bliley N N N
1 Cante Y Y Y	2 Skeen N N N	5 Smith, D. N N N	4 Sinky N N N
2 Boland Y Y Y	3 Richardson N Y Y	PENNSYLVANIA	5 Daniel N N N
3 Early Y Y Y	NEW YORK	1 Foglietta Y Y Y	6 Olin Y Y Y
4 Frank Y Y Y	1 Carney N N N	2 Gray Y Y Y	7 Slaughter N N N
5 Atkins Y Y Y	2 Downey Y Y Y	3 Barski Y Y Y	8 Parris N N N
6 Mavroules Y Y Y	3 Mrozek Y Y Y	4 Kolter Y Y Y	9 Boucher Y Y Y
7 Markey Y Y Y	4 Lent N N N	5 Schulze N N N	10 Wolf N N N
8 O'Neill Y Y Y	5 McGrath Y N N	6 Tatro Y Y Y	WASHINGTON
9 Moakley Y Y Y	6 Waldon Y Y Y	7 Edgar Y Y Y	1 Miller N N Y
10 Studds Y Y Y	7 Ackerman Y Y Y	8 Kostmayer Y Y Y	2 Swift Y Y Y
11 Donnelly Y Y N	8 Scheuer Y Y Y	9 Shuster N N N	3 Bonker Y Y Y
MICHIGAN	9 Manton Y Y Y	10 McDade N Y N	4 Morrison N N N
1 Conyers Y Y Y	10 Schumer Y Y Y	11 Karjorski Y Y Y	5 Foley Y Y Y
2 Purcell Y Y Y	11 Towns Y Y Y	12 Murtha N N N	6 Dicks Y Y Y
3 Wolpe Y Y Y	12 Owens Y Y Y	13 Caughlin Y Y Y	7 Lowry Y Y Y
4 Silander N N N	13 Solarz Y Y Y	14 Coyne Y Y Y	8 Chandler Y N Y
5 Henry Y Y N	14 Malinari N N N	15 Ritter N N N	WEST VIRGINIA
6 Carr Y Y Y	15 Green Y Y Y	16 Walker N N N	1 Mollohan Y N N
7 Kildee Y Y Y	16 Rangel Y Y Y	17 Galka N N N	2 Stoggers Y Y Y
8 Troxler Y Y Y	17 Weiss Y Y Y	18 Walgren Y Y Y	3 Wise Y Y Y
9 Vander Jagt N N N	18 Garcia Y Y Y	19 Goodling N N N	4 Rahall Y Y Y
10 Schuette N N N	19 Braggi Y Y Y	20 Gaydos N Y Y	WISCONSIN
11 Davis N Y N	20 DiGuardi N N N	21 Ridge Y N Y	1 Aspin Y Y Y
12 Bonior Y Y Y	21 Fish Y Y Y	22 Murphy Y Y Y	2 Kostenmeier Y Y Y
13 Crockett Y Y Y	22 Gilman N N N	23 Clinger N Y Y	3 Gunderson Y N Y
14 Hertel Y Y Y	23 Stratton N N N	RHODE ISLAND	4 Klecko Y Y Y
15 Ford Y Y Y	24 Solomon N N N	1 St German Y Y Y	5 Moody Y Y Y
16 Dingell Y Y Y	25 Boehlert N Y Y	2 Schneider Y Y Y	6 Petri Y N N
17 Levin Y Y Y	26 Martin N N N	SOUTH CAROLINA	7 Obey Y Y Y
18 Broomfield N N N	27 Markey N N N	1 Harriott N N N	8 Roth N N N
MINNESOTA	28 McHugh Y Y Y	2 Spence N N N	9 Sassenbrenner N N N
1 Pansy Y Y Y	29 Herion Y Y Y	3 Derrick Y Y Y	WYOMING
2 Weber N N N	30 Eckart N N N	4 Campbell X X X	Al Cheney N N N
3 Franzel Y Y Y	31 Kemp N N N	5 Spratt Y Y Y	
4 Vento Y Y Y	32 LaFalce Y Y Y	6 Tallon Y N N	
5 Salbo Y Y Y	33 Nowak Y Y Y	SOUTH DAKOTA	
6 Silorski Y Y Y	34 Lundine Y Y Y	Al Daschle Y Y Y	

Southern states - Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Miss., N.C., Okla., S.C., Tenn., Texas, Va.

* The Congressional Record vote number is different from the CQ vote number because the Record includes quorum calls in its tally. CQ does not publish quorum call votes.

CQ Senate Votes 176 - 181

Corresponding to Congressional Record Votes 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181

176	176	176	KEY
ALABAMA Denton Y Heflin Y	IOWA Grassley N Harkin N	NEW HAMPSHIRE Humphrey Y Rudman Y	Y Voted for (yea). # Paired for. + Announced for. N Voted against (nay). X Paired against. - Announced against. P Voted "present." C Voted "present" to avoid possible conflict of interest. ? Did not vote or otherwise make a position known.
ALASKA Murkowski Y Stevens Y	KANSAS Dole Y Kassebaum N	NEW JERSEY Bradley N Lautenberg N	Democrats Republicans
ARIZONA Goldwater Y DeConcini N	KENTUCKY Ford N McConnell Y	NEW MEXICO Domenici Y Bingaman Y	
ARKANSAS Bumpers N Pryor N	LOUISIANA Johnston N Long N	NEW YORK D'Amato Y Moynihan N	
CALIFORNIA Wilson Y Cranston N	MAINE Cohen Y Mitchell N	NORTH CAROLINA Brayhill Y Helms Y	
COLORADO Armstrong Y Hart N	MARYLAND Mathias N Sarbanes N	NORTH DAKOTA Andrews N Burdick N	
CONNECTICUT Weicker N Dodd N	MASSACHUSETTS Kennedy N Kerry N	OHIO Glenn Y Metzenbaum N	
DELAWARE Roth Y Biden N	MICHIGAN Levin N Riegle N	OKLAHOMA Nickles Y Boren N	TEXAS Gramm Y Bentsen N
FLORIDA Hawkins + Chiles N	MINNESOTA Boschwitz Y Durenberger Y	OREGON Hatfield N Packwood N	UTAH Garn Y Hatch Y
GEORGIA Mattingly Y Nunn Y	MISSISSIPPI Cochran Y Stennis Y	PENNSYLVANIA Heinz Y Specter N	VERMONT Stafford N Leahy N
HAWAII Inouye N Matsunaga N	MISSOURI Danforth Y Eagleton N	RHODE ISLAND Chafee N Pell N	VIRGINIA Trible Y Warner Y
IDAHO McClure Y Symms Y	MONTANA Baucus N Melcher N	SOUTH CAROLINA Thurmond Y Hollings Y	WASHINGTON Evans N Gorton Y
ILLINOIS Simon N Dixon N	NEBRASKA Exon Y Zorinsky Y	SOUTH DAKOTA Abdnor Y Pressler Y	WEST VIRGINIA Byrd Y Ricketteller N
INDIANA Lugar Y Quayle Y	NEVADA Hecht Y Laxalt Y	TEXAS Gore N Sasser N	WISCONSIN Kasten Y Proxmire N
			WYOMING Simpson Y Wallop Y

ND Northern Democrats SD Southern Democrats (Southern states: Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Miss., N.C., Okla., S.C., Tenn., Texas, Va.)

176. S 2638. Department of Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1987. Warner, R-Va., motion to table (kill) the Johnston, D-La., amendment to provide a limit of \$3.24 billion for research and development on the strategic defense initiative, or "star wars" program. President Reagan had requested \$5.3 billion. Motion agreed to 50-49: R 41-11; D 9-38 (ND 5-28, SD 4-10). Aug. 5, 1986. A "yea" was a vote supporting the president's position. (Story, p. 1787)

Reprinted with permission from the Congressional Quarterly.

Note: The League position = N on the Warner motion to table amendment

SAMPLE LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Congress, at long last, appears to be recognizing that a policy to abandon existing arms control restraints while engaging in a massive arms build-up is not in our national security. In August, the House of Representatives issued a major challenge to the Administration on arms control policy. This challenge should be met with public support and encouragement.

In the face of strong Administration opposition, the House voted to support the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by freezing funds for the President's "Star Wars" program and by extending the U.S.-Soviet moratorium on Anti-Satellite weapons testing for another year. The House also voted to restrict funds for offensive nuclear weapons that exceed the SALT II numerical limits unless the President certifies that the Soviets have exceeded those limits.

The League of Women Voters commends the House of Representatives for their strong support of arms control this year and applauds Representative (your member) for his/her vote(s) in support of this effort.

Action Alert

APR 7 1986

For the latest developments on League issues, call Jennifer Vasiloff, Coordinator of Grassroots Lobbying, during business hours at 202-429-1965. On weekends, call Spotmaster at 202-296-0218 for a recorded update.

This is going on DPM.

March 28, 1986

TO: State and Local League Presidents

FROM: Dorothy S. Ridings, President and Julia A. Holmes,
Legislative Action Chair

RE: The Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars)

ACTION URGENTLY NEEDED

The full House of Representatives is expected to vote on the Fiscal Year (FY) 1987 defense authorization bill in late April or early May. Representatives Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA) and Victor Fazio (D-CA) will offer a League-supported amendment to freeze funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) at last year's level of \$2.8 billion. Over the course of the defense budget process this year, the League will also support further efforts to freeze or reduce funding for the SDI. State and local League action in support of the Mavroules/Fazio SDI Amendment is needed now. Contact your Members of Congress as soon as possible.

The League is opposed to the direction and intent of the President's "Star Wars" program. We believe that, if it proceeds as currently planned, the SDI will result in enormous waste and a costly and dangerous acceleration of the arms race. Passage of the Mavroules/Fazio SDI Amendment is an important first step in this year's effort to stop the rapid expansion of the SDI.

BACKGROUND

The SDI was introduced in Congress in 1984 as a consolidation and acceleration of on-going research programs in technologies aimed at defense against ballistic missiles. The stated purpose of the SDI was to explore the feasibility of deploying a nationwide space-based and space-directed anti-ballistic missile weapons system capable of rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Known as the "Star Wars" program, SDI has enjoyed priority support from the President and his Administration.

In the last two years, the SDI has received unprecedented funding increases. SDI programs are spread throughout the Defense Department

(DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE). The large majority of these programs are within the Defense Department's budget, but this year a large increase in the budget request for the SDI programs within the Department of Energy (DOE) has called attention to the fact that the SDI is not solely a non-nuclear program as the President has advertised. The requested increase in DOE programs is primarily for nuclear-powered directed energy weapons, including the X-ray laser. Last December, an underground nuclear test was conducted to test the X-ray laser. In the last two years, funding for "Star Wars" has tripled, and this year's requested increase amounts to a 78 percent increase over that level.

STAR WARS BUDGET

	<u>DOD Budget</u>	<u>DOE Budget</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>% increase</u>
*FY 1987	\$4.8 Billion	\$603 Million	\$5.4 Billion	78%
FY 1986	\$2.8 Billion	\$282 Million	\$3.1 Billion	91%
FY 1985	\$1.4 Billion	\$202 Million	\$1.6 Billion	44%
FY 1984	\$990 Million	\$118 Million	\$1.1 Billion	----

*Requested but not yet approved

The purpose of the SDI is directly opposed to the intent and understandings embodied in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. In December, 1983, following adoption of our Arms Control position, the League's national board took a position in support of the ABM Treaty and opposed to the SDI. Since that time, League members have been working to educate the public and lobby members of Congress to limit SDI funding to pre-SDI research levels.

At a time of pressing national concern about the federal deficit, the "Star Wars" program must be subject to the same scrutiny and congressional restraint as the rest of the budget. In the last two years, the SDI has become an obstacle, not an inducement, to serious arms control negotiations. There is no national mandate for this program. There is no need to rush SDI research. Indeed, eminent scientists and defense specialists have testified before Congress that it is counterproductive to throw money at the SDI. Contrary to original promises, Administration spokesmen have repeatedly admitted that the SDI will not make nuclear weapons obsolete. This year, many of those same spokesmen are saying that it is designed to "enhance deterrence." The shifting rationales for the SDI defy logic.

For additional information, see the March 1986 edition of the LWV Prospectus and the April edition of Report From The Hill. Also, you may order free copies of the National Voter reprint, Space Age Defense.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

- 1) Write or call your Representative as soon as possible. Urge him/her to support the Mavroules/Fazio Amendment to the FY 1987 defense authorization bill to freeze funding for the SDI at last year's level of \$2.8 billion. Tell your Member that the budget constraints affecting all other federal programs must also apply to the SDI. The SDI undermines arms control and threatens to accelerate the arms race. A vote in support of the Mavroules/Fazio SDI Amendment will apply much needed brakes to this costly, ill-defined, and ill-advised program.
- 2) Contact your local newspaper. Alert them to the upcoming vote on the defense authorization bill. Send them your version of the attached sample Letter-to-the-Editor.

ARMS CONTROL ACTION ALERT RESPONSE FORM

Please return to: Arms Control Desk
League of Women Voters of the United States
1730 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

_____ We wrote or called Representative _____.

_____ We wrote a letter to the editor.

_____ We met with our Representative

Please send me _____ copies of the National Voter
reprint, Space Age Defense

Name _____ League _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____ Phone () _____

SAMPLE LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Most Americans oppose President Reagan's budget priorities, according to a Washington Post-ABC News national poll. The majority of Americans favor cuts in the Defense Department, and nearly two-thirds oppose cuts in social programs, the survey states.

In spite of this, the Defense Department has requested \$4.8 billion for the Strategic Defense Initiative or "Star Wars." In the past two years, SDI appropriations have tripled. This year's request is a 75-percent increase over last year. Former Defense Secretary James A. Schlesinger has criticized the Administration's unprecedented funding requests for the SDI, pointing out that, "Few research programs can profitably expand at a rate in excess of 30 to 35 percent."

A program that could bankrupt our defensive resources and intensify the arms race--still leaving millions of us vulnerable to nuclear attack--should not be pursued.

Within the next month, the U.S. House of Representatives will vote on the SDI. A Congress devoted to deficit reduction must not allow the SDI program any special privileges. The SDI must be subject to the same scrutiny and congressional restraint as the rest of the budget.

We propose that the House freeze Defense Department funding for the SDI at last year's appropriation of \$2.8 billion. Quantum increases for the SDI are not only dangerous but counterproductive. Star Wars is a risk we simply can't afford.

TO: LL Presidents; S.U. Chairs

FROM: Modelle Brudner, Pub. Relations Dir., LWV-T
[REDACTED]

LWV-Texas
April 1986
Council Pres. Packet
II. 8. 1. d.
National Security

"WOMEN--FOR AMERICA, FOR THE WORLD"

Word of this television program has just come to us from LWVUS. We encourage you to publicize it in your May local League VOTER or to inform your members about it in some other way.

The Better World Society, an international citizen action organization founded by Ted Turner, is sponsoring a series of television programs advocating an end to the nuclear arms race.

Dorothy Ridings appears in the first film, "Women--for America, For the World," which will air on Monday, May 19, at 10:30 p.m. on WTBS. This will probably be at 9:30 p.m. C.S.T. If you receive CNN on cable, chances are good you also receive WTBS, Atlanta.

Produced by Academy Award Nominee Vivienne Verdon-Roe, the show also features Betty Bumpers of Peace Links; former member of Congress Shirley Chisholm; Rep. Pat Schroeder; former Republican National Committee co-chair Mary Dent Crisp and actress Joanne Woodward, among others. A promotional brochure says that "together, the voices of these women present a moving call to action."

Further information on "Women--For America, For the World," is available from the Better World Society, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

Future programs on arms control will air on June 2 and June 18. However, LWVUS has not previewed these documentaries, and therefore is not in a position to recommend them.

#



League of Women Voters
Education Fund

FEB 24 1986

Memorandum

1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-1965

February 14, 1986

AGENDA FOR SECURITY - 1986

GRANTS AVAILABLE FOR CONGRESSIONAL AND SENATORIAL CANDIDATE DEBATES

To: Presidents of State and Local Leagues and ILO's

FROM: Margaret Davis, Agenda for Security Project chair
Cynthia Hill and Marlene Cohn, Election Services and
Litigation Staff

RE: Submission of proposals for state and local League participation
in Agenda for Security Project debates

DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF PROPOSALS - March 17, 1986 POSTMARK

We want to share with you the good news that a major grant from the W. Alton Jones Foundation of Charlottesville, VA and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation of Chicago, IL will make it possible for the LWVEF to assist selected state and local Leagues in producing senatorial and congressional candidates debates for the 1986 elections.

This memo provides detailed information to guide Leagues in the preparation and submission of proposals to support their applications for participation in the project. Those Leagues whose proposals are accepted will receive funding, training, technical assistance and promotional materials from the LWVEF. Each participating League will be asked to send two representatives to a training conference in Washington, DC on April 21 and 22. We ask that each proposal include a feasible plan and budget for producing, promoting and broadcasting a debate between candidates for the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives in 1986, that Leagues agree to devote a major portion of the debate (i.e. at least half) to issues of national security, and that proposals be postmarked no later than March 17, 1986.



Contributions to the Fund are deductible for income-tax purposes.

Any questions or requests for further information should be addressed to Marlene Cohn, Senior Election Services Specialist, at the LWVEF national office (202-429-1965).

Project Overview

The purpose of the project is to promote the discussion of global and national security issues by candidates for the U.S. Congress in the context of the 1986 elections. A specific objective is to ensure that candidates for national office address the issue of the threat of nuclear war. It is our expectation that the Agenda for Security debates will increase public understanding of such issues and will help citizens make election decisions based on the knowledge of the candidates' positions on issues vital to our nation's survival.

These goals will be accomplished through the production of congressional and senatorial candidate debates and related citizen education efforts that present informative and effective discussion of these issues.

Pass-Through Grants

Grants will be awarded in two parts:

- (1) Planning grants - Grants will be awarded to Leagues for up to 20 senatorial debates, in amounts up to \$500 each, and for up to 65 congressional debates, in amounts up to \$300 each;
- (2) Production grants - Once the LWVEF has received the participating Leagues that candidates have agreed to debate and debate plans will be implemented, Leagues will receive additional funding. Grants will be awarded for approximately 15 senatorial debates in a range from \$1,000 to \$9,500, with an average grant of \$4,500; and for approximately 50 congressional debates in a range of \$200 to \$2,500, with an average grant of \$1,200.

Grant amounts will be determined on the basis of budgets that Leagues submit with their proposals. If additional funds are available, Leagues will be notified in sufficient time to apply for them.

Which Leagues Can Apply

Grants will be awarded to state and local Leagues to produce congressional and senatorial candidate debates that either:

- (1) are entirely devoted to global and national security issues,

or

- (2) devote a major portion of debate content (defined as more than half the time allotted for the debate, or more than half the questions addressed in the debate) to global and national security issues.

In either case, the issue of the threat of nuclear war must be included in the debate content. Other security issues include such topics as arms control, strategic nuclear policy, defense spending and U.S. - Soviet relations, as well as U.S. commitments abroad, international trade, foreign aid, regional conflicts (e.g. the Middle East and Central America) and the role of international organizations. Leagues will be supplied with suggested questions on these issues and a guide for using the questions. Leagues in states with fall primaries may apply for funding for a primary election, if that is determined to be the best way to provide meaningful information to voters.

Leagues are encouraged to cooperate in the planning and production of debates and related activities. This is especially appropriate where there is more than one League in a congressional district or in metropolitan areas where several congressional districts are served by the same broadcast media. In such cases, one League (this may be a local League, an ILO or a state League) should be designated to coordinate and supervise the project, and that League should be the contact with the LWVEF. The League that takes the lead role in planning and producing the debate should submit the proposal.

Senatorial debates should be conducted by state Leagues, unless the state League Board specifically delegates this responsibility to another League level. State Leagues should be kept informed about any proposals for congressional debates submitted by local Leagues in that state.

If Leagues are co-sponsoring a debate with a college or university, a non-profit, nonpartisan community organization or another suitable partner, this should be indicated in the proposal, and the League must retain responsibility for expenditure of funds awarded through the LWVEF.

Leagues may also include in their proposals such citizen education activities as forums, discussion sessions or distribution of materials (written or video) provided that they are related to the debate and focus on national security issues. All activities conducted with grant funds must be educational in nature and present more than one point of view.

Preparing a Proposal

We realize that Leagues will be preparing their proposals within a tight time frame, and we are not expecting lengthy, polished or detailed proposals. It will be helpful if proposals include all the

information requested and are concise and legible. We know that most Leagues are just beginning their debate planning process, and will be making modifications as they receive project training, technical assistance and materials. We would like to get a general idea of what the plans are, and we do expect that Leagues will give serious thought to the purposes of their debates and the criteria they will use to determine which candidates can participate. LWVEF staff will be available, by phone, to assist Leagues in planning their projects and preparing their proposals.

All proposals should include the following information:

1. Name, address and telephone number of League office (if appropriate), League president, and project director (if selected) or contact person.
2. Congressional district(s) or senatorial seat for which debates are planned and names and political parties of all candidates known to be running for that office. Indicate incumbents. Include an assessment of the political and foreign policy significance of the race.
3. Your League's criteria for selection of participants in the debate (unless all candidates for office are to be included) -- see attached guidelines (Please call Marlene Cohn at the LWVEF national office if you have any questions about this requirement).
4. Description of planned debate(s) and plans for broadcast and/or plans for securing a large audience for the debate(s). (Details, such as site, format, moderator or panel, questions to be used, etc. may be submitted after the training conference in April, but preliminary plans should be included.) Include information on how nuclear war and other national security issues will be addressed.
5. Description of any other activities planned to coordinate with debate(s), whether or not funding for such activities is requested through the Agenda for Security Project.
6. Description of plans for promoting the debate(s).
7. Budget, accounting for all funds required, including funds acquired or expected from sources other than the Agenda for Security Project. The budget should account for both the planning grant and the production grant (suggested budget line items are attached).
8. Plans for evaluation and/or follow-up.

The proposal and all supporting documents, including a budget, should be submitted to the Election Services and Litigation staff,

3 -
LWVEF, 1730 M Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036 -- postmarked no later than March 17, 1986 in order to be considered.

Leagues will be notified of their selection as soon as possible; all selected Leagues will have been notified by April 11, 1986.

Criteria for Awarding Pass-Through Grants

The LWVEF board and staff will apply the following criteria for the selection of proposals:

- (1) Fulfillment of project goal - content related to national security and threat of nuclear war.
- (2) Quality of planned debate(s) - feasibility, potential for attracting a large audience through broadcasting, appropriateness and innovation in format, setting, etc.
- (3) Political situation - closeness of race, foreign policy significance.
- (4) Other planned activities related to the debate(s) - forums, distribution of materials, discussions -designed to increase public understanding of issues related to national security and the nuclear threat, or to increase awareness of and audience for the debate(s).
- (5) Plans for promoting the debate(s) and related activities.
- (6) Appropriateness and completeness of budget
- (7) Plans for evaluation and/or follow-up.
- (8) Geographical distribution and representation of different kinds of communities.

Past experience with debates or with the Agenda for Security project will not be a factor in the selection of proposals.

Other Information

A project manager and administrative assistant, working under the direction of the Election Services and Litigation staff of the LWVEF, will coordinate the Agenda for Security Project and provide technical assistance by phone and site visits. Each state and local project should name a project director and a working committee (the project director may receive a stipend, usually no more than 10 percent of the project budget; a paid project director should not be a member of the current board of the supervising League).

The project director and one other representative of the participating League will be expected to attend a two-day training conference in Washington DC on April 21 and 22. All expenses will be paid by the LWVEF and do not have to be included in project budgets. The conference will include training and workshops on conducting and promoting debates, negotiating with candidates and broadcasters, selecting and implementing a debate format, addressing issues of national security and nuclear war, etc. An important feature of the conference will be the ability to learn from the experience of other Leagues, from the Presidential Debates staff and from special consultants in broadcasting.

The Presidential Debates staff is planning a nationally televised election special event in October 1986, highlighting the major issues of the 1986 senatorial and congressional elections, using clips from Agenda for Security sponsored debates. Leagues sponsoring debates for selected important races will be asked to coordinate the timing and production of their debates so that selected footage will be available for this program. Further information will be presented at the training conference.

The board and staff of the LWVEF is very pleased that we can again offer Leagues financial and technical assistance to conduct these important forums for providing information to voters. We are looking forward to receiving your proposals and to working with you.

Other Information

A project manager and administrative assistant, working under the direction of the Election Systems and Litigation staff of the LWVEF, will coordinate the Agenda for Security Project and provide technical assistance by phone and site visits. Each state and local project should name a regional director, who will be a working committee member of the project. Attention may receive a stipend, depending on the amount of the project budget; a full project director should not be a member of the national board of the sponsoring League.

GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING CRITERIA
FOR THE
SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS IN CANDIDATE DEBATES

It is essential for Leagues that are sponsoring debates to establish criteria for determining the eligibility of candidates to participate in the debates. Leagues should select criteria that will allow them to conduct a nonpartisan debate to meet the goal of providing information to as many citizens as possible so that voters may make a meaningful electoral choice.

League boards should adopt criteria before they invite any candidates to take part in the debate. The criteria will become part of League policy, at least for that election year, and should not be the subject of negotiations with candidates.

Criteria can range from general and simple to specific and detailed. For example, a League may announce that it will only invite candidates nominated by the two major parties, or it may require a candidate to provide evidence of a specific level of public support in order to qualify. It is always advisable to have the criteria checked over by an attorney.

Whatever criteria are used, they should be clear, perceived as fair, and publicly announced well in advance of the debate. A basic guideline is that a particular League should be able to demonstrate, if challenged, that it used a reasonable set of criteria to reach a reasonable decision in an objective manner. When the criteria are made public, they can be accompanied by an explanation of how they are related to the League's goals and objectives for the debate.

Criteria that have often been used by state Leagues include:

- (1) Constitutional eligibility - the candidate must meet the requirements of the state constitution and/or the Constitution of the United States;
- (2) Ballot access - the candidate must meet all requirements to be on the ballot according to state election laws;
- (3) Evidence that a formal campaign is being waged (for major office only) - presence of headquarters, campaign staff, issuance of position papers, campaign appearances, etc.;
- (4) Evidence of significant voter interest and support such as:
 - o nomination by major party,
 - o receipt of certain percentage (usually 10-15 percent) of support in one or more statewide nonpartisan public opinion polls (or a level of support at least equal to that of a major party candidate),
 - o evidence of a significant level of financial support, and receipt of contributions from a significant number of contributors.

Worksheet - Proposal Budgets

Sample Budget

Direct Costs

Personnel

Project Manager
Secretary/Clerical
Bookkeeping
Consultants (media, legal, site selection, public relations, survey research)
(Benefits)

Administrative

Telephone
Bank Charges
Duplicating (Printing - Programs)
Postage
Rent and Utilities
Travel (Staff, Consultants, Moderators and Panelists)

Supplies and Equipment

Typewriter rental
Office supplies

In Kind Contributions

Attorney
LWV Board Member
Volunteer time
Consultants

On Site Expenses

TV Monitors
Podia/ Tables
Security
Transcripts
Tape recording
League Identification
Directional signs

Publicity

Advertising
Design/Logo

Volunteers' Expenses

Parking
Mileage
Child care
Travel and meals

Indirect Costs

Overhead (office space, equipment and services used for project and not specifically charged)



League of Women Voters
Education Fund

FEB 5 1986

Memorandum

1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-1965

January 21, 1986

TO: Local and State League Presidents

FROM: Deborah Goldman, LWVEF Debates Staff

RE: Videocassettes and discussion manual available of SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) Debate

Videocassette copies (along with a discussion guide) of the November 17, 1985 LWVEF debate on the Strategic Defense Initiative featuring Sen. John Kerry (D MA) and Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R WY) are now available from the LWVEF. Order one of two versions: the full 60-minute debate or an edited 42-minute version. The videocassettes are available on a 3-week loan basis for a small postage and handling charge of \$5.00. The tape and discussion guide may be purchased for \$50 (\$30 members).

Now is an ideal time to convene a League or community meeting on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Use the order form below to order your video copy -- a perfect starting point for the discussion on the SDI. Please be sure to indicate the format and length you want -- and return the tape to the LWVEF Debates Office within 3 weeks. Send the order form and check (made out to the League of Women Voters) to the LWVEF, c/o Debates, 1730 M St., NW, Washington, DC 20036. Be sure to specify the actual date needed and allow 10 days for delivery.

SDI Debate Order Form

Date: _____

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

League _____ Phone # _____

Format:	<input type="checkbox"/> 1/2" VHS	Length:	<input type="checkbox"/> 60-minute
(check one)	<input type="checkbox"/> 1/2" Beta	(check one)	<input type="checkbox"/> 42-minute

Date needed: _____

How will you use the tape? _____

Enclosed check or Money Order:

\$5 for 3-week loan, \$50 purchase (\$30 members) _____ Total Enclosed



Contributions to the Fund are deductible for income-tax purposes.



League of Women Voters
Education Fund

FEB 17 1986

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MB

FYI

Memorandum

1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-1965

January 21, 1986

JAN 24 1986

TO: Local and State League Presidents

FROM: Deborah Goldman, LWVEF Debates Staff

RE: Videocassettes and discussion manual available of SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) Debate

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SDI Debate Order Form

Date: _____

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____

Zip _____

League _____

Phone # _____

Format:

☐ 1/2" VHS

Length:

☐ 60-minute

(check one)

☐ 1/2" Beta

(check one)

☐ 42-minute

Date needed: _____


How will you use the tape? _____

Enclosed check or Money Order:

\$5 for 3-week loan, \$50 purchase (\$30 members)

Total Enclosed _____

Contributions to the Fund are deductible for income-tax purposes.



MEMORANDUM

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS

1212 Guadalupe, No. 109 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel 512/472-1100

MAR 4 1986

Feb. 28, 1986

To: S.O., MB, DS, RR, and CF

From: Lois

Re: Enclosed LWVUS memo on Agenda for Security congressional debates

This is ridiculous! This memo came today, and by the time you receive it, it will only be two weeks until the postmark deadline time for proposals for these debates!

Two years ago when national provided similar grants, we were working on a senatorial debate which was ultimately unsuccessful, that is, it didn't happen. We elected not to try the Security tactic because we thought the Texas candidates and media would not want to spend so much time on that one issue.

This year there is no senatorial race, thus no congressional race of state-wide interest. Therefore, I suggest that we keep hands off again this year, leaving it to the local Leagues to jump in and work on these debates among U.S. House candidates.

If any of you want to get involved or push your LLs to do so, please go ahead. My plate is looking rather full and I'll bow out. Now why do I think some of you would feel the same way ???

With the oil industry and the Texas economy in their current dismal state, I seriously wonder if this kind of debate could get off the ground in any congressional district in Texas. Granted, the oil industry has a lot to do with national security. . .



League of Women Voters
Education Fund

MAR 4 1986

Memorandum

1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-1965

FEB 28 1986

February 14, 1986

AGENDA FOR SECURITY - 1986

GRANTS AVAILABLE FOR CONGRESSIONAL AND SENATORIAL CANDIDATE DEBATES

To: Presidents of State and Local Leagues and ILO's

FROM: Margaret Davis, Agenda for Security Project chair
Cynthia Hill and Marlene Cohn, Election Services and
Litigation Staff

RE: Submission of proposals for state and local League participation
in Agenda for Security Project debates

DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF PROPOSALS - March 17, 1986 POSTMARK

We want to share with you the good news that a major grant from the W. Alton Jones Foundation of Charlottesville, VA and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation of Chicago, IL will make it possible for the LWVEF to assist selected state and local Leagues in producing senatorial and congressional candidates debates for the 1986 elections.

This memo provides detailed information to guide Leagues in the preparation and submission of proposals to support their applications for participation in the project. Those Leagues whose proposals are accepted will receive funding, training, technical assistance and promotional materials from the LWVEF. Each participating League will be asked to send two representatives to a training conference in Washington, DC on April 21 and 22. We ask that each proposal include a feasible plan and budget for producing, promoting and broadcasting a debate between candidates for the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives in 1986, that Leagues agree to devote a major portion of the debate (i.e. at least half) to issues of national security, and that proposals be postmarked no later than March 17, 1986.



Contributions to the Fund are deductible for income-tax purposes.

Any questions or requests for further information should be addressed to Marlene Cohn, Senior Election Services Specialist, at the LWVEF national office (202-429-1965).

Project Overview

The purpose of the project is to promote the discussion of global and national security issues by candidates for the U.S. Congress in the context of the 1986 elections. A specific objective is to ensure that candidates for national office address the issue of the threat of nuclear war. It is our expectation that the Agenda for Security debates will increase public understanding of such issues and will help citizens make election decisions based on the knowledge of the candidates' positions on issues vital to our nation's survival.

These goals will be accomplished through the production of congressional and senatorial candidate debates and related citizen education efforts that present informative and effective discussion of these issues.

Pass-Through Grants

Grants will be awarded in two parts:

- (1) Planning grants - Grants will be awarded to Leagues for up to 20 senatorial debates, in amounts up to \$500 each, and for up to 65 congressional debates, in amounts up to \$300 each;
- (2) Production grants - Once the LWVEF has received the participating Leagues that candidates have agreed to debate and debate plans will be implemented, Leagues will receive additional funding. Grants will be awarded for approximately 15 senatorial debates in a range from \$1,000 to \$9,500, with an average grant of \$4,500; and for approximately 50 congressional debates in a range of \$200 to \$2,500, with an average grant of \$1,200.

Grant amounts will be determined on the basis of budgets that Leagues submit with their proposals. If additional funds are available, Leagues will be notified in sufficient time to apply for them.

Which Leagues Can Apply

Grants will be awarded to state and local Leagues to produce congressional and senatorial candidate debates that either:

- (1) are entirely devoted to global and national security issues,

or

- (2) devote a major portion of debate content (defined as more than half the time allotted for the debate, or more than half the questions addressed in the debate) to global and national security issues.

In either case, the issue of the threat of nuclear war must be included in the debate content. Other security issues include such topics as arms control, strategic nuclear policy, defense spending and U.S. - Soviet relations, as well as U.S. commitments abroad, international trade, foreign aid, regional conflicts (e.g. the Middle East and Central America) and the role of international organizations. Leagues will be supplied with suggested questions on these issues and a guide for using the questions. Leagues in states with fall primaries may apply for funding for a primary election, if that is determined to be the best way to provide meaningful information to voters.

Leagues are encouraged to cooperate in the planning and production of debates and related activities. This is especially appropriate where there is more than one League in a congressional district or in metropolitan areas where several congressional districts are served by the same broadcast media. In such cases, one League (this may be a local League, an ILO or a state League) should be designated to coordinate and supervise the project, and that League should be the contact with the LWVEF. The League that takes the lead role in planning and producing the debate should submit the proposal.

Senatorial debates should be conducted by state Leagues, unless the state League Board specifically delegates this responsibility to another League level. State Leagues should be kept informed about any proposals for congressional debates submitted by local Leagues in that state.

If Leagues are co-sponsoring a debate with a college or university, a non-profit, nonpartisan community organization or another suitable partner, this should be indicated in the proposal, and the League must retain responsibility for expenditure of funds awarded through the LWVEF.

Leagues may also include in their proposals such citizen education activities as forums, discussion sessions or distribution of materials (written or video) provided that they are related to the debate and focus on national security issues. All activities conducted with grant funds must be educational in nature and present more than one point of view.

Preparing a Proposal

We realize that Leagues will be preparing their proposals within a tight time frame, and we are not expecting lengthy, polished or detailed proposals. It will be helpful if proposals include all the

information requested and are concise and legible. We know that most Leagues are just beginning their debate planning process, and will be making modifications as they receive project training, technical assistance and materials. We would like to get a general idea of what the plans are, and we do expect that Leagues will give serious thought to the purposes of their debates and the criteria they will use to determine which candidates can participate. LWVEF staff will be available, by phone, to assist Leagues in planning their projects and preparing their proposals.

All proposals should include the following information:

1. Name, address and telephone number of League office (if appropriate), League president, and project director (if selected) or contact person.
2. Congressional district(s) or senatorial seat for which debates are planned and names and political parties of all candidates known to be running for that office. Indicate incumbents. Include an assessment of the political and foreign policy significance of the race.
3. Your League's criteria for selection of participants in the debate (unless all candidates for office are to be included) -- see attached guidelines (Please call Marlene Cohn at the LWVEF national office if you have any questions about this requirement).
4. Description of planned debate(s) and plans for broadcast and/or plans for securing a large audience for the debate(s). (Details, such as site, format, moderator or panel, questions to be used, etc. may be submitted after the training conference in April, but preliminary plans should be included.) Include information on how nuclear war and other national security issues will be addressed.
5. Description of any other activities planned to coordinate with debate(s), whether or not funding for such activities is requested through the Agenda for Security Project.
6. Description of plans for promoting the debate(s).
7. Budget, accounting for all funds required, including funds acquired or expected from sources other than the Agenda for Security Project. The budget should account for both the planning grant and the production grant (suggested budget line items are attached).
8. Plans for evaluation and/or follow-up.

The proposal and all supporting documents, including a budget, should be submitted to the Election Services and Litigation staff,

LWVEF, 1730 M Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036 -- postmarked no later than March 17, 1986 in order to be considered.

Leagues will be notified of their selection as soon as possible; all selected Leagues will have been notified by April 11, 1986.

Criteria for Awarding Pass-Through Grants

The LWVEF board and staff will apply the following criteria for the selection of proposals:

- (1) Fulfillment of project goal - content related to national security and threat of nuclear war.
- (2) Quality of planned debate(s) - feasibility, potential for attracting a large audience through broadcasting, appropriateness and innovation in format, setting, etc.
- (3) Political situation - closeness of race, foreign policy significance.
- (4) Other planned activities related to the debate(s) - forums, distribution of materials, discussions -designed to increase public understanding of issues related to national security and the nuclear threat, or to increase awareness of and audience for the debate(s).
- (5) Plans for promoting the debate(s) and related activities.
- (6) Appropriateness and completeness of budget
- (7) Plans for evaluation and/or follow-up.
- (8) Geographical distribution and representation of different kinds of communities.

Past experience with debates or with the Agenda for Security project will not be a factor in the selection of proposals.

Other Information

A project manager and administrative assistant, working under the direction of the Election Services and Litigation staff of the LWVEF, will coordinate the Agenda for Security Project and provide technical assistance by phone and site visits. Each state and local project should name a project director and a working committee (the project director may receive a stipend, usually no more than 10 percent of the project budget; a paid project director should not be a member of the current board of the supervising League).

The project director and one other representative of the participating League will be expected to attend a two-day training conference in Washington DC on April 21 and 22. All expenses will be paid by the LWVEF and do not have to be included in project budgets. The conference will include training and workshops on conducting and promoting debates, negotiating with candidates and broadcasters, selecting and implementing a debate format, addressing issues of national security and nuclear war, etc. An important feature of the conference will be the ability to learn from the experience of other Leagues, from the Presidential Debates staff and from special consultants in broadcasting.

The Presidential Debates staff is planning a nationally televised election special event in October 1986, highlighting the major issues of the 1986 senatorial and congressional elections, using clips from Agenda for Security sponsored debates. Leagues sponsoring debates for selected important races will be asked to coordinate the timing and production of their debates so that selected footage will be available for this program. Further information will be presented at the training conference.

The board and staff of the LWVEF is very pleased that we can again offer Leagues financial and technical assistance to conduct these important forums for providing information to voters. We are looking forward to receiving your proposals and to working with you.

Other Information

A project manager and administrative assistant, working under the direction of the Liaison Service and subject to the approval of the LWVEF, will coordinate the Agenda for Security project and provide technical assistance by phone and site visits. Each state and local project should name a project director and a project manager. The project director may receive a stipend, based on the time 10 percent of the project budget; a paid project director should not be a member of the current board of the sponsoring League.

GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING CRITERIA
FOR THE
SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS IN CANDIDATE DEBATES

It is essential for Leagues that are sponsoring debates to establish criteria for determining the eligibility of candidates to participate in the debates. Leagues should select criteria that will allow them to conduct a nonpartisan debate to meet the goal of providing information to as many citizens as possible so that voters may make a meaningful electoral choice.

League boards should adopt criteria before they invite any candidates to take part in the debate. The criteria will become part of League policy, at least for that election year, and should not be the subject of negotiations with candidates.

Criteria can range from general and simple to specific and detailed. For example, a League may announce that it will only invite candidates nominated by the two major parties, or it may require a candidate to provide evidence of a specific level of public support in order to qualify. It is always advisable to have the criteria checked over by an attorney.

Whatever criteria are used, they should be clear, perceived as fair, and publicly announced well in advance of the debate. A basic guideline is that a particular League should be able to demonstrate, if challenged, that it used a reasonable set of criteria to reach a reasonable decision in an objective manner. When the criteria are made public, they can be accompanied by an explanation of how they are related to the League's goals and objectives for the debate.

Criteria that have often been used by state Leagues include:

- (1) Constitutional eligibility - the candidate must meet the requirements of the state constitution and/or the Constitution of the United States;
- (2) Ballot access - the candidate must meet all requirements to be on the ballot according to state election laws;
- (3) Evidence that a formal campaign is being waged (for major office only) - presence of headquarters, campaign staff, issuance of position papers, campaign appearances, etc.;
- (4) Evidence of significant voter interest and support such as:
 - o nomination by major party,
 - o receipt of certain percentage (usually 10-15 percent) of support in one or more statewide nonpartisan public opinion polls (or a level of support at least equal to that of a major party candidate),
 - o evidence of a significant level of financial support, and receipt of contributions from a significant number of contributors.

Worksheet - Proposal Budgets

Sample Budget

Direct Costs

Personnel

Project Manager
Secretary/Clerical
Bookkeeping
Consultants (media, legal, site selection, public relations, survey research)
(Benefits)

Administrative

Telephone
Bank Charges
Duplicating (Printing - Programs)
Postage
Rent and Utilities
Travel (Staff, Consultants, Moderators and Panelists)

Supplies and Equipment

Typewriter rental
Office supplies

In Kind Contributions

Attorney
LWV Board Member
Volunteer time
Consultants

On Site Expenses

TV Monitors
Podia/ Tables
Security
Transcripts
Tape recording
League Identification
Directional signs

Publicity

Advertising
Design/Logo

Volunteers' Expenses

Parking
Mileage
Child care
Travel and meals

Indirect Costs

Overhead (office space, equipment and services used for project and not specifically charged)



CF
LKa
DS
SO
JV(LWVUS)

League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

September 3, 1985

Bartea

The Honorable Phil Gramm
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

+ TX MC's report Brooks
de la Garza
Gonzalez
Island

Dear Senator Gramm,

The League of Women Voters of Texas hopes that you will join us in working to prevent a new and dangerous acceleration of the nuclear arms race. Very shortly appropriations sub-committees will begin to consider the FY'86 defense budget. It is urgent that Strategic Defense Initiative funds be reduced.

The League has studied the U.S. defense program and has taken the position of strongly opposing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). We have found the program is costly, would be destabilizing, and is in definite opposition to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In addition, it undermines arms control and runs the risk of accelerating the arms race.

The League urges you to work for freezing of funds for SDI at last year's level. The funding projections for SDI far exceed the cost of previous military requests, and the costs for nationwide ABM defenses are projected to be in the tens-of-billions of dollars in the next ten years.

The League is not opposed to research consistent with the ABM treaty; however, the SDI is more than a research program. The SDI is geared toward development and deployment of ABM systems. These engineering demonstrations will lead to violations of the ABM Treaty and more importantly to a vastly accelerated arms race.

Sincerely,

Lois Carpenter

Lois Carpenter
President

LC/cha



CF
L6
DS
SO
JV(LNVUS)

League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #107 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

September 2, 1985

The Honorable Jack Brooks, *de la Garza, Gonzalez, Leland*
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Brooks:

Thank you for your support of the amendments for cutting funds on the Strategic Defense Initiative. The League of Women Voters is committed to stopping the "Star Wars" program.

The fight against Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) must be targeted to cutting funding during the appropriations process. Your continued support and your influence on the rest of the Texas delegation and other Members of Congress is crucial during the September committee meetings and later on the floor.

The League strongly opposes the SDI because we believe that it is an extremely costly, destabilizing program; that it is in opposition to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; and that it undermines arms control and increases the risk of accelerating the arms race.

Research has shown that funding projections for SDI far exceed the cost of previous military requests and that the costs for nationwide ABM defenses are projected to be in the tens-of-billions of dollars in the next ten years. The SDI is not just a research program, but an engineering demonstration project that will lead to violations of the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the SDI program could end our policy of arms control and begin an arms race in offensive and defensive weapons.

We will appreciate your continued efforts to oppose SDI by your voting to cut funds in the full sessions.

Sincerely,

Lois Carpenter

Lois Carpenter
President

LC/cha

This letter to: Brooks, de la Garza, Helms + Gonzalez

Thank you for your support of the amendments for cutting funds on the Strategic Defense Initiative. The LWR is committed to stopping the "Star Wars" program.

The fight against Strategic Defense Initiative must be targeted to cutting ^{funding} ~~money~~ during the appropriations process. Your continued support and your influence on the rest of the Texas ~~Delegation~~ and other ^Mmembers of Congress is crucial during the September committee meetings and later on the floor.

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Research has shown that funding projections for SDI far exceed the cost of previous military requests and that the costs for nationwide ABM defenses are projected to be in the tens-of-billions of dollars in the next ten years. The SDI is not just a research program, but an engineering demonstration project that will lead to violations of the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the SDI program could end our policy of arms

control and begin an arms race in offensive and defensive weapons.

We will appreciate your continued efforts to oppose Strategic Defense Initiative by your voting to cut funds in the full session.

To all Texas m.c. except the 4 listed for the other letter.

The LUV of Texas hopes that you will join us in working to prevent a new and dangerous acceleration of the nuclear arms race. Very shortly Appropriation sub-committees will begin to consider the fiscal year '86 defense budget. It is urgent that Strategic Defense Initiative funds be reduced.

The League has studied the U.S. defense program and has taken the position of strongly opposing the Strategic Defense Initiative. We have found the program is costly, would be destabilizing and is in definite opposition to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In addition, it undermines arms control and runs the risk of accelerating the arms race.

The League urges you to work for freezing of funds for SDI at last year's level. The funding projections for SDI far exceed the cost of previous military requests, and the costs for nationwide ABM defenses are projected to be in the tens-of-billions of dollars in the next ten years.

The League is not opposed to research consistent with the ABM Treaty; however, the SDI is more than a research program. The SDI is geared toward development

and deployment of ABM systems. These engineering demonstrations will lead to violations of the ABM Treaty and more importantly to a vastly accelerated arms race.

AUG 1 1985

SAMPLE OP-ED PIECE FOR USE BY LOCAL AND STATE LEAGUES

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced his plan to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." He called on the United States to embark on an effort to deploy a space-based "security shield" that would protect us all from the horrors of Armageddon.

Who among us would not embrace such a dream? But pursuing such a dream entails enormous costs -- both in terms of money and security. The time to take a long hard look at the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) -- dubbed "Star Wars" by the media -- is now, before the program and its consequences are irrevocably set in motion.

What would the SDI program mean?

- In terms of costs, it would mean \$3.7 billion this year. This staggering amount would only be a down payment on the hundreds of billion of dollars the system could eventually devour.

- In terms of arms control, it would mean the loss of the most significant treaty now in existence -- the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. For years this treaty, which prohibits wide-spread defensive systems, has prevented both sides from erroneously concluding that a nuclear war would be survivable. A nationwide ballistic missile defense system would totally abrogate the ABM Treaty. Even the field testing of some of the system's components -- planned for the near future under the SDI -- would violate the treaty.

- In terms of the arms race, it would mean an unprecedented build-up of Soviet offensive missiles. Commitment now to a ballistic missile defense will provoke the Soviets into a massive acceleration of their offensive weapons program in order to overwhelm any defensive system of ours.

• In terms of peace and stability, it would mean a long period of the ever-looming danger of a preemptive first strike by the Soviets. The USSR could very well decide to attack us first before our "shield" became operative -- and before we could be in a position to attack them without fear of retaliation. Attempts to build a ballistic missile defense system could actually put us in far greater peril than our present state of mutual deterrence.

But if we could build a protective shield, would it not be worth it to proceed, despite all these costs and dangers? The answer might be yes, if we would all be safe. But not even the SDI's major proponents believe that.

Even the most optimistic SDI supporters concede that a perfect defense is impossible. In a massive attack with a system that was 95% effective, enough nuclear warheads could still penetrate a defensive shield to destroy all the major cities in the United States. Millions would be killed, and millions more would face a slow death from radiation, perhaps in an uninhabitable land, chilled and darkened by a nuclear winter.

In addition, although an SDI system could eventually mean some degree of protection against ICBMs, a space-based missile defense would still leave us vulnerable to the horror of the nuclear weapons that could be delivered by cruise missiles, submarine-launched missiles or terrorists' bombs.

A program that could bankrupt our defensive resources and intensify the arms race -- and still leave millions of us vulnerable to a nuclear attack -- should not be pursued. Tell our Members of Congress to hold funding for a ballistic missile defense at the pure research level -- with no funds for an expanded "Star Wars" program with its emphasis on development and eventual deployment. Funding at the research only level will ensure our protection against a Soviet technological breakthrough without the attendant dangers of the President's SDI plan.

#

AUG 1 1985

SDI AMENDMENTS TO THE FY'86 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

HOUSE - On June 20, the House approved \$2.5 billion in spending authority for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The following three categories indicate how members of the House voted on SDI amendments to the FY'86 defense authorization bill relative to the League's position.

For the League Position: The following members voted for either the Mavroules/Hertel Amendment or the Dellums Amendment or both. The Mavroules/Hertel Amendment was rejected by a vote of 155-268; the Dellums Amendment was defeated 102-320.

ARIZONA - Udall; ARKANSAS - Anthony; CALIFORNIA - Matsui, Fazio, Burton, Boxer, Miller, Dellums, Stark, Edwards D., Lantos, Mineta, Coelho, Panetta, Lehman, Beilenson, Waxman, Roybal, Berman, Levine, Dixon, Hawkins, Martinez, Dymally, Anderson, Torres, Brown G., Bates; COLORADO - Schroeder, Wirth; CONNECTICUT - Kennelly, Gejdenson, Morrison, McKinney; FLORIDA - MacKay, Gibbons, Mica, Smith, Lehman; HAWAII - Akaka; ILLINOIS - Hayes, Savage, Russo, Collins, Yates, Annunzio, Evans, Bruce, Durbin; INDIANA - McClosky, Jacobs; IOWA - Leach, Bedell; KANSAS - Glickman; KENTUCKY - Perkins; MARYLAND - Mikulski, Mitchell, Barnes; MASSACHUSETTS - Conte, Early, Frank, Atkins, Mavroules, Markey, Moakley, Studds; MICHIGAN - Conyers, Wolpe, Carr, Kildee, Traxler, Bonior, Crockett, Hertel, Ford, Dingell, Levin; MINNESOTA - Penny, Vento, Sabo, Sikorski, Oberstar; MISSOURI - Clay, Young, Wheat, Volkmer; MONTANA - Williams; NEW JERSEY - Florio, Howard, Dwyer, Torricelli, Rodino, Guarini; NEW YORK - Downey, Mrazek, Addabbo, Ackerman, Scheuer, Manton, Schumer, Owens, Solarz, Rangel, Weiss, Garcia, McHugh, LaFalce, Nowak, Lundine; NORTH CAROLINA - Jones, Rose; NORTH DAKOTA - Dorgan; OHIO - Hall, Kaptur, Eckart, Pease, Seiberling, Traficant, Applegate, Feighan, Oakar, Stokes; OKLAHOMA - Synar, Watkins; OREGON - AuCoin, Wyden, Weaver; PENNSYLVANIA - Foglietta, Gray, Borski, Kolter, Yatron, Edgar, Kostmayer, Coyne, Walgren, Murphy; RHODE ISLAND - St. Germain, Schneider; TENNESSEE - Cooper, Ford; TEXAS - Brooks, de la Garza, Leland, Gonzalez; VIRGINIA - Boucher; WASHINGTON - Swift, Bonker, Foley, Lowry; WEST VIRGINIA - Staggers, Wise, Rahall; WISCONSIN - Kastenmeier, Kleczka, Moody, Obey.

Possible Swing Votes: The following members did not vote for League-supported amendments but voted for the Armed Services Committee level (\$2.5 billion) or lower (the Dicks Amendment at \$2.1 billion; Rejected 195-221). These members also voted against amendments to increase SDI funding above the Armed Services Committee recommendation.

ALABAMA - Dickinson; ARKANSAS - Alexander; CALIFORNIA - Bosco; COLORADO - Brown; CONNECTICUT - Johnson; DELAWARE - Carper; FLORIDA - Fuqua, Bennett, Pepper, Fascell; GEORGIA - Thomas, Hatcher, Ray, Fowler, Darden, Rowland, Jenkins; HAWAII - Heftel; IDAHO - Stallings; ILLINOIS - Porter; INDIANA - Visclosky, Sharp, Hamilton; IOWA - Tauke, Smith; KANSAS - Roberts, Slattery, Meyers; KENTUCKY - Hubbard, Natcher, Mazzoli; LOUISIANA - Boggs, Roemer, Huckaby, Long; MAINE - McKernan, Snowe; MARYLAND - Hoyer, Byron; MASSACHUSETTS - Boland, Donnelly; MICHIGAN - Pursell, Henry, Davis; MINNESOTA - Frenzel; MISSISSIPPI - Whitten, Dowdy; MISSOURI - Gephardt, Skelton; NEBRASKA - Bereuter, Smith; NEW JERSEY - Hughes, Roukema, Roe; NEW MEXICO - Lujan, Richardson; NEW YORK - Green, Biaggi, Fish; NORTH CAROLINA - Valentine, Whitley, Neal, Coble, Hefner, Broyhill; OHIO - Regula; OKLAHOMA - Jones, McCurdy, English; OREGON - Smith R.; PENNSYLVANIA - Kanjorski, Murtha, Coughlin, Ridge; SOUTH CAROLINA - Derrick, Spratt, Tallon; TENNESSEE - Boner, Gordon, Jones; TEXAS - Bryant, Pickle, Wright, Coleman, Bustamante, Frost, Andrews, Ortiz; VIRGINIA - Sisisky, Olin; WASHINGTON - Dicks; WEST VIRGINIA - Mollohan; WISCONSIN - Aspin, Gunderson, Petri, Roth.

SDI AMENDMENT VOTES - CONTINUED

Note: Members who were absent or not voting on all of the SDI amendments include: Rostenkowski (IL), Towns (NY), Luken (OH), Gaydos (PA), Daschle (SD), Jeffords (VT). Speaker of the House O'Neill: not voting.

For the Administration's Position: Members of the House who are not included in the above lists voted for the amendments to increase SDI funding above the level adopted by the House (\$2.5 billion).

* * * * *

SENATE - On June 4, the Senate approved \$3 billion in spending authority for the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Senate rejected the League-supported Kerry Amendment by a vote of 21-78, as well as a less restrictive amendment offered by Senators Bumpers and Proxmire to cut SDI funding to \$1.89 billion. The Bumpers/Proxmire Amendment was defeated by a vote of 38-57. The two votes listed below indicate either very strong opposition (on the Kerry Amendment) or moderately strong opposition to the SDI (on the Bumpers/Proxmire Amendment). Senators not included in these lists supported funding levels above \$2.5 billion.

For the League Position: Senators who voted for the Kerry Amendment to freeze funding for the SDI at \$1.4 billion and eliminate funding for demonstration projects include:

Bumpers (AR), Pryor (AR), Cranston (CA), Hart (CO), Weiker (CT), Inouye (HI), Matsunaga (HI), Simon (IL), Harkin (IA), Sarbanes (MD), Kennedy (MA), Kerry (MA), Riegle (MI), Eagleton (MO), Melcher (MT), Burdick (ND), Metzenbaum (OH), Hatfield (OR), Pell (RI), Leahy (VT), Proxmire (WI).

Moderately Strong Opposition to the SDI: Senators who voted for the Bumpers/Proxmire Amendment but against the Kerry Amendment include:

DeConcini (AZ), Dodd (CT), Biden (DE), Chiles (FL), Grassley (IA), Kassenbaum (KS), Ford (KY), Johnston (LA), Mitchell (ME), Mathias (MD), Levin (MI), Baucus (MT), Lautenberg (NJ), Moynihan (NY), Chafee (RI), Gore (TN), Sasser (TN), Rockefeller (WV).

Possible Swing Votes: Over the next two to three months, the League will be developing a list of Senators who may be considered possible swing votes on the SDI in the future. Close questioning of Senators who voted for the Bumpers/Proxmire Amendment but against the Kerry Amendment and especially of Senators not included in either of these lists will help produce the list of possible swing votes. Please forward any information you receive at the state or local level to the Arms Control Desk at the national League office.

AUG 1 1985

Space-Age Defense *Pipe Dream or Protection?*

Space-Age Defense

Pipe Dream or Protection?

Ever since that speech, a debate has raged over whether the President's defense plan, dubbed "Star Wars" by the press, will ensure national security or simply escalate the arms race. But in spite of the long and heated list of reservations raised by skeptics, the President remains firm in his support for a space defense program. He believes that protection from nuclear attack, that space-based missiles may be possible. He believes that the technology exists to build a defense system that can intercept and destroy incoming missiles. He believes that the United States must lead in this new era of space warfare. He believes that the United States must lead in this new era of space warfare. He believes that the United States must lead in this new era of space warfare.

For citizens who want to know more about the current debate in space defense, here is a list of the Administration's major claims in support of the Strategic Defense Initiative — each followed by a counterargument, forcefully presented by the League of Women Voters. Several very different perspectives on the issue of national security and arms control are offered. The League of Women Voters stands for the SDI.

**League of Women Voters of the United States
Reprinted from the *National VOTER*, Spring 1985**

Space-Age Defense

Pipe Dream or Protection?

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan unveiled a dream to the American people. "It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive, ..." said Reagan. "I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." What the President was proposing, in the midst of frigid East-West relations, was an about-face in prevailing arms-control strategies and a radically different perspective on providing for the common defense.

Ever since that speech, a debate has raged over whether the President's defense plan, dubbed "Star Wars" by the press, will enhance national security or simply escalate the arms race. But in spite of the long and growing list of reservations raised by skeptics, the President remains firm in his support for a space defense program and in his belief that protection from Soviet ballistic (i.e., space-flying) missiles may be possible. Pentagon officials, scientists and military strategists already are working to make the President's dream become a reality.

Under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) — the Administration's official name for the new ballistic missile defense program — the United States will explore a variety of technologies designed to protect the country from Soviet missile attack. Possible futuristic weapons include directed-energy (lasers and particle beams) and kinetic-energy

weapons (explosive nonnuclear warheads or nonnuclear missiles that destroy through the force of impact at a very high speed). These weapons theoretically would be capable of intercepting and destroying enemy missiles during their boost phase (the first three to five minutes of flight) and destroying warheads at all points along their flight path. Such a layered defense system, supporters say, will provide the effectiveness necessary for an adequate defense.

On the surface, these proposals sound enticing, but in reality the President's Strategic Defense Initiative remains a plan plagued with unanswerable questions. Military strategists fear that the SDI will upset the knowledge that nuclear war is not winnable and that creation of a less-than-perfect defense might actually increase the risk of war. Arms-control advocates, including the League of Women Voters, believe that the SDI will lead to *more*, not less, nuclear competition and will nullify the most important arms-control agreement in recent history, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. And many scientists challenge the technological feasibility of ever designing a perfect system.

For citizens who want to know more about the current defense-in-space debate, here is a list of the Administration's major claims in support of the Strategic Defense Initiative — each followed by a counterargument forcefully presented by the League. This exercise in polemics reveals very different perspectives on the issue of national security and underscores the League's stand that the SDI is a dangerous proposition.

CLAIM:

The SDI will stabilize the current arms race.

The President maintains that by building defenses against missile attack, the SDI creates an opportunity "for reducing tensions and for introducing greater stability into the strategic nuclear calculus on both sides." And as former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, physicist Robert Jastrow and arms-control expert Max M. Kampelman argue in a February 1985 *New York Times Magazine* article, "Such a transition, first of the United States and eventually of the Soviet Union, into a genuinely defensive posture, with neither side posing a first-strike threat to the other, would not only be stabilizing but would also be most helpful to the pursuit of more far-reaching arms-control agreements."

NOT TRUE.

Neither developing nor deploying a ballistic missile defense system is a step toward greater stability. If the United States attempts to build a defense against Soviet attack while retaining its own missile force, the Soviets would undoubtedly view the situation as a U.S. move towards first-strike readiness. In other words, U.S. ability to attack the Soviet Union and protect itself against retaliation would heighten Soviet fears of a U.S. first strike. Such fear might, in turn, lead to a preemptive attack by the Soviets.

As national security experts McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith point out in a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "As long as it [the SDI] continues, it will darken the prospect for significant improvement in the currently frigid rela-

tions between Moscow and Washington. It will thus sharpen the very anxieties the President wants to reduce."

CLAIM:

The SDI will render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

The President maintains that by building a ballistic missile defense system, nuclear weapons will be rendered impotent and obsolete. Mr. Reagan has confidence that the same scientific minds that put astronauts on the moon and a shuttle in outer space will conquer the formidable task of creating a foolproof missile defense. Even if the system is not 100-percent effective, supporters argue that it would complicate Soviet attack and make them see the folly of a continued arms build-up.

NOT TRUE.

The SDI will do little to render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. Most experts agree that the Soviets simply will build more offensive weapons and a range of other countermeasures to overpower and outwit the missile defense system.

As for the original claim that a perfect defense is feasible, many Pentagon officials and members of the scientific community admit that a partial defense against Soviet missiles is perhaps the very best the SDI can provide. Even the program's chief, Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, has stated that "a perfect defense is not a realistic thing." Arms control experts also question the survivability—and thus the effectiveness

ASATs: Not-so-distant relations

Mastering the language and purpose of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative is a challenge for both novices and experts. Now add another element to the space-weapons equation, antisatellite weapons (ASATs), and multiply the confusion. The fundamental difference between the two programs is this: SDI technology would shoot down incoming enemy missiles; ASATs are designed to destroy enemy satellites. Now consider these major Administration claims about ASATs — and the League's counterarguments

CLAIM:

The SDI and ASAT programs are two unrelated weapons-development systems.

The United States and the Soviet Union have ASAT programs apart from their antiballistic missile efforts. The Soviets currently have in place an ASAT weapon that is launched into a position alongside its target, which it then showers with deadly shrapnel. In January 1978, the United States resurrected its ASAT program and began testing a new, highly sophisticated system, the Miniature Homing Vehicle, in January 1984. This weapon is carried aboard an F-15 aircraft and destroys its target by slamming into it at a very high speed. The U.S. ASAT needs more testing before it is operational.

NOT TRUE.

While ASAT technology has proceeded on a separate track from SDI research, the two have crossed paths over the years. Early U.S. antiballistic missiles were tested as ASATs, and today antisatellite technology is being applied to basic SDI programs, perhaps as a means of avoiding certain

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty restrictions.

CLAIM:

The United States has to catch up with the Soviet ASAT program.

Many Administration officials argue that ASAT testing must move ahead in order to get the Miniature Homing Vehicle system off the ground and the United States out in front in the ASAT competition.

NOT TRUE.

Currently, Soviet ASATs pose little threat to U.S. satellites, which orbit at very high altitudes. If the ASAT competition heats up and the Russians develop a superior system, the United States could find its entire satellite force in danger. Also, knocking out an enemy's early warning and communications satellites — systems designed to let leaders know what is going on in a time of crisis — would promote instability, not understanding.

CLAIM:

ASAT development can proceed without threatening U.S./Soviet arms control treaties.

ASATs are not directly restricted by the ABM Treaty, and Administration officials stand firm by this fact.

NOT TRUE.

As previously stated, developments in the ASAT field that can be applied to ballistic missile defense do jeopardize the ABM Treaty.

The Soviets declared a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing in 1983. The President, because of verification questions and other concerns, did not follow suit. Before the Miniature Homing Vehicle is perfected, the United States must move ahead with ASAT arms control.

— of an elaborate space-based detection and missile-delivery system that would be very vulnerable to enemy attack.

It is important to remember, too, that weapons being developed under the SDI are designed to intercept Soviet *strategic* missiles. The program does not address defense against missiles delivered by Soviet aircraft and submarines and low-flying cruise missiles.

CLAIM:

A partial defense of the homeland is better than no defense.

While the President and other Administration officials are reluctant to renege on the promise of 100-percent protection, they are now facing the reality that a partial system might be all they can get. Still, they remain committed to developing a ballistic missile defense system, partial or otherwise. Lieutenant General Abrahamson has stated that the ability to destroy even some Soviet missiles would save countless U.S. lives.

NOT TRUE.

Accepting the concept of a leaky defense umbrella also means accepting the fact that, at a minimum, tens of thousands of people will die in a nuclear attack. As McGeorge Bundy and his fellow experts caution, "Even a 95-percent kill rate would be insufficient to save either society from disintegration in the event of a general nuclear war."

The installation of a partial defense also sends the destabilizing signal that the United States might plan to use the

SDI not as a foolproof shield against the full Soviet arsenal but as a means of shooting down a Soviet missile force already severely incapacitated by a U.S. first strike.

Finally, a partial defense most likely would be used as protection for U.S. missile sites, not for U.S. citizens, as outlined by the President in his March 1983 speech.

CLAIM:

The SDI is a progressive idea whose time has come.

According to President Reagan, the SDI is a "vision of the future which offers hope." The plan rests on a solid history of ballistic missile defense research, but its real potential depends on projected technological advances in the coming years. With a once unimaginable defensive weapon now possible, SDI supporters say it is time to phase out the traditional concept of deterrence based on the immoral threat of "mutual assured destruction" and phase in this new perspective on arms control.

NOT TRUE.

Striving for an effective ballistic missile defense is not a new phenomenon for either the United States or the Soviet Union. Since the early 1950s, each superpower has worked steadily to improve its antiballistic missile program, and in the 1960s the United States' Nike-Zeus defense system was set for deployment. Plans for moving ahead with Nike-Zeus were cancelled when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972.

What led the two nations to this agreement only 13 short years ago was the wisdom of limiting defense weaponry. Both countries acknowledged the enormous power of offensive nuclear weapons and the fact that if national ABM systems were not severely limited, a costly defensive and offensive arms race would follow. New weapons technology has not—and can not—change the basic premise accepted by the superpowers in 1972. Competition will continue. The question is whether both sides will agree to limit the race or expand it to include defensive weapons.

CLAIM:

The United States can proceed with SDI research, development, testing and deployment without abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.

The 1972 ABM Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union bans the deployment of nationwide systems used to defend against strategic ballistic missile attack. Specifically, the treaty allows research and some development of space-based, sea-based, air-based and mobile land-based ABM systems but bans their full-scale deployment. Administration officials repeatedly have stated that the SDI is just a research program and, as such, does not violate the ABM accord.

NOT TRUE.

The ABM Treaty is regarded as the foundation of current arms control and has

made possible subsequent agreements on offensive weapons. As conceived, the SDI calls for the deployment of a nationwide ABM system, which, if carried out, would result in complete rejection of the ABM Treaty. And as research and development continue over the next few years towards that goal, the testing of components of ballistic missile defense—for example, the “Talon Gold” laser tracking program, whose components are scheduled to be tested in space in the early 1990s—also will result in ABM Treaty violations. Current Soviet and U.S. antisatellite weapons advances (see box), which most admit are precursors to the development of ballistic missile defenses, also threaten the spirit, if not the letter, of the ABM agreement.

It is not possible to proceed along the SDI path that the Administration has outlined and spend the kind of money that has been requested without the United States—or possibly the Soviet Union—deciding to abrogate the ABM treaty.

CLAIM:

An antiballistic missile system is more important than an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The Administration views ballistic missile defense as an alternative to more traditional methods of deterrence and as a complement to unreliable arms control. Seeing the SDI as a means of achieving “mutual assured survival” instead of “mutual assured destruction,” the Administration may, in the long run, seek to alter the ABM Treaty so that components of ballistic missile defenses and a missile defense system itself can be tested and deployed. Many in the

Administration charge that the Soviets already have violated the ABM accord and that it is thus of questionable value.

NOT TRUE.

By placing a cap on the development of defensive weapons, the ABM Treaty opened the door to the significant limits on offensive nuclear arsenals (missiles) that were achieved in the SALT I and SALT II negotiations and closed off a potentially dangerous defensive buildup. The importance of this cornerstone of U.S.-Soviet arms control is best expressed by McGeorge Bundy and his fellow SDI opponents: "The ABM Treaty, in short, reflected a common understanding of exactly the kinds of danger with which Star Wars now confronts the world. To lose the treaty in pursuit of the Star Wars mirage would be an act of folly."

CLAIM:

The SDI is an effective bargaining chip in the current Geneva arms talks.

The Administration firmly maintains that both the threat of the SDI and Soviet paranoia over U.S. development of a ballistic missile defense system of this scale helped bring Soviet negotiators back to the bargaining table. Now that they are back, the Administration stresses that the threat of the SDI will help to convince the Soviets to make sizeable cuts in their strategic and medium-range nuclear stockpiles.

NOT TRUE.

Perhaps the threat of the SDI did contribute to the resumption of arms negotiations—but the issue is what will ensure that they will continue. As of the VOTER's mid-March press date, the Administration had made it clear that it has no intention of bargaining the SDI away at the Geneva talks. In a February 12 interview with the *New York Times*, President Reagan stated that he will not give up SDI research in U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations. The Soviets, in turn, had remained adamant that there will be no progress on offensive weapons unless there is agreement on defensive weapons. The American public should be considering — and rejecting — the SDI on its merits alone.

CLAIM:

The SDI is a good buy.

"Isn't it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war?" asks the President. If the protection of Americans and of all citizens is the ultimate goal of the SDI, surely it is worth the cost. After all, say supporters, how can anyone put a price on such a just and morally right task.

NOT TRUE.

The SDI is not a good investment for the simple reason that it is not a good idea. The SDI was originally presented to Congress as a five-year research and development program with a \$26-billion budget. Congress approved \$1.4 billion in SDI expenditures for fiscal year (FY)

1985, and the Administration is now asking for \$3.7 billion for FY 1986 and projecting a \$4.9 billion request for the following year. Recent estimates put the total figures for research and development at \$70 billion over a ten-year period and for deployment of a nation-

wide system in the hundreds of billions. Such costs are astronomical and unprecedented, even by Pentagon standards, and many military, scientific and national security experts argue that this kind of spending could hinder rather than advance the cause of arms control.

The League vs. space weapons

In December 1983, the national board of the League of Women Voters announced a new position on arms control—a position that readied the League for important action in the area of space-weapons development. Since that important announcement, the League has become a respected, and very vocal, advocate of stopping both SDI and ASAT advances in their tracks.

At each step of the FY 1985 defense budget cycle, the League pushed for legislation that would place restrictions on the testing of antisatellite weapons and undercut the President's SDI budget request.

The League scored its first victory in May 1984 when, during debate on the Department of Defense authorization bill, the House of Representatives passed the League-supported Brown-Coughlin amendment, which called for a mutual moratorium on the testing of ASATs against objects in space, so long as the Soviets observed their existing moratorium. This legislation sent a clear message to congressional decision makers that the arms-control community was prepared for action, and calls by League members in key local districts contributed significantly to the amendment's wide margin of victory.

In spite of the League's diligent efforts to see Brown-Coughlin through the final days of the budget process, Congress negotiated away the amendment in defense authorization conference. All was not lost, however. Arms-control advocates ultimately walked away with a five-month moratorium on ASAT testing against an object in space and only three allowable tests in FY 1985. This March 1, 1985 deadline has since passed, and the League is working to have Congress reinstitute the ASAT testing moratorium.

On the Strategic Defense Initiative front, in 1984 the League worked to limit SDI funding to levels consistent with the ABM Treaty and to draw the line against expensive SDI research and testing. The FY 1984 appropriations for programs eventually included under the SDI was \$991 million; the Administration requested \$1.78 billion for FY 1985. In its lobbying on Capitol Hill and at the grass-roots level, the League pushed for a cap on SDI funding for FY 1985 at the FY 1984 level plus inflation, or approximately \$1 billion—a \$680-million cut in the Administration's request. Thanks to the League and other arms-control groups, Congress cut FY 1985 SDI funding to \$1.4 billion. And this year the League is urging Congress once again to cut the Administration's SDI request to pre-SDI levels plus inflation, or approximately \$1.1 billion.

The League is not opposed to research in ballistic missile technologies consistent with the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty. Funding at and below the \$1-billion level has kept the United States ten years ahead of the Soviets in this field. The League will work to convince the public and Congress that to go beyond pre-SDI funding levels and rationales will be both extremely costly and dangerous.

CLAIM:

The SDI has won the confidence of America's allies.

In her February 20 address to the U.S. Congress, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared her support for the President's "decision to pursue research into defense against ballistic nuclear missiles — the Strategic Defense Initiative." West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl also has expressed tentative support. In his March 1983 address and frequently since, President Reagan has repeated his commitment to the security of the NATO allies and, to quell NATO uneasiness, has said that the SDI program will be carried out in consultation with U.S. friends abroad.

NOT TRUE.

Prime Minister Thatcher did declare her support for SDI research and her hope that British scientists be included; however, according to the *Washington Post*, Thatcher negotiated an agreement with the President late last year that no antiballistic missile system would be deployed without further U.S.-Soviet talks, signaling her concerns about the plan. French, West German and other allied countries also have raised a list of SDI reservations. They question whether it's technologically possible for Europe to be protected by the SDI umbrella and whether a partial defense of the United States will be extended to the NATO allies. They also wonder whether reliance on a ballistic missile defense will shake up the deterrence balance—to Europe's disadvantage. And NATO leaders worry that a serious Soviet commitment to ballistic missile defense technology could

render the less sophisticated and considerably smaller NATO nuclear arsenals impotent and obsolete.

CLAIM:

The SDI will make America safer.


For more than 30 years the American people have been held hostage by the threat of "mutual assured destruction." The SDI eliminates this threat by assuring citizens that they will be protected and by putting into place the technology to do so.

NOT TRUE.

Lulling citizens into a false sense of security with less-than-perfect defense system against nuclear missiles hardly seems an improvement. More importantly, if the SDI is allowed to escalate the arms race and further deteriorate U.S.-Soviet relations, no one will be any safer.

Will the Strategic Defensive Initiative make America safer? This question and the claims and counterarguments raised in this article surely will resurface in the months ahead as SDI supporters and opponents debate the issue from their very different points of view. The budget battle continues on Capitol Hill and the future of space weapons may be uncertain, but one thing is not. The League of Women Voters will be up front in the fight for arms control and against the development of this new breed of destabilizing weapon. ■

Researched and written by Debra Duff, Managing Editor.



Action Alert

AUG 1 1985

SPOTMASTER: For the latest development on League issues, call Spotmaster (202) 296-0218 from 5 p.m. on Friday to 5 p.m. on Monday (EDT).

This is going on DPM
July 24, 1985

TO: State and Local League Presidents
FROM: Dorothy S. Ridings, President and Julia A. Holmes, Legislative Action Chair
RE: The Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars")

State and local League action is needed this summer and fall to prevent a new and dangerous acceleration of the nuclear arms race. Members of Congress must be persuaded to stop the President's "Star Wars" program NOW. This Action Alert contains the material you will need to effectively lobby your Senators and Representatives to significantly reduce funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This includes:

- Up-to-date information on the substance and timing of the issue in Congress
- State and local League action needed
- A sample op-ed piece
- A targeted voting record of SDI votes in Congress so far this year
- A reprint of the Spring VOTER article on Space-Age Defense

ACTION ON THE DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL

The fight against "Star Wars" now focuses on cutting money during the appropriations process. The deadline for congressional enactment of the defense appropriations bill is October 1, though that deadline has slipped in years past. The House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees are expected to begin consideration of the FY'86 defense appropriations bill in late July. In September, amendments to reduce SDI funding will be offered in the full committees. Floor action is also expected late in September. State and local League lobbying over the August congressional recess (August 3 - September 4) and continuing into the fall is especially important to gain significant funding restrictions this year.

THE LEAGUE'S POSITION AND MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

The League strongly opposes the Strategic Defense Initiative. We believe that it is an extremely costly, destabilizing program that is on a collision course with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, undermines arms control, and runs the serious risk of vastly accelerating the arms race.

In March, 1983, President Reagan signalled a major change in the United States' strategic posture and approach to arms control when he called on the nation's scientists to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." In 1984, the Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed "Star Wars" by the press, was introduced in Congress as a five-year, \$26 billion research and development program to explore the feasibility of developing a nationwide, multi-layered space-based and space-directed ballistic missile defense system. Up-dated estimates on the cost and time span for the SDI are closer to ten years and \$70 billion.

The League is not opposed to research consistent with the ABM Treaty. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have been conducting such research since the 1950's. Some research is necessary to assure effective U.S. participation in future treaty negotiations governing the development of new ABM technologies and to protect U.S. interests in the event of a Soviet break with the treaty. Research for these purposes was more than adequately funded at levels between \$500 million and \$1 billion for ten years prior to the introduction of the SDI. These research programs along with new programs have been consolidated and greatly accelerated under the SDI. This year the League has joined with 61 other national organizations to urge Congress to oppose the Strategic Defense Initiative by:

- 1) eliminating all funding for SDI demonstration projects that will result in violations of the ABM Treaty, and
- 2) freezing funds for the SDI at last year's level (\$1.4 billion) or lower.

Your Members of Congress need to hear this message throughout the defense appropriations process. Emphasize these two points by focussing on the following arguments.

The Strategic Defense Initiative Undermines Arms Control

In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The ABM Treaty was designed to prevent an arms race in ballistic missile defenses and, consequently, to provide a strategic framework within which arms control and reduction of offensive weapons might be achieved. The leaders of both countries recognized the dangers and costs involved in a spiraling and uncontrollable nuclear arms race with improvements in ballistic missile defenses constantly fueling the perceived need for more powerful and accurate offensive missiles to penetrate and overwhelm them. The ABM Treaty has been the cornerstone of subsequent arms control agreements in offensive weapons. Yet in 1983, President Reagan signaled a major departure from this fundamental agreement by launching a crash program, the Strategic Defense Initiative, to explore the feasibility of deploying nationwide ballistic missile defenses.

Administration officials claim that the SDI is not a threat to the ABM Treaty because it is "just a research program." To regard the SDI as just a research program is a serious error. The SDI is geared toward development and eventual deployment of ABM systems. The major SDI funding increases are designed for engineering demonstration projects -- demonstrations that will lead to violations and possible abrogation of the ABM Treaty before any deployment decision can be made in the early to mid-1990's. The ABM Treaty not only limits the deployment of ABM systems, but also prohibits field testing of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems, or components of such systems.

The Administration is attempting to exploit "gray areas" of the ABM Treaty by claiming that SDI demonstration projects scheduled for field tests in the late 1980's and early '90's will not violate the treaty because these demonstrations, or "experiments," will be conducted against anti-satellite interceptors and not ballistic missiles; or they will be tested at power levels below those required for ABM weapons; or because the experimental devices will be limited in their capacity. This approach to arms control compliance is simply wrong. Playing technical word-games in an attempt to get around the purpose and provisions of the treaty undermines arms control. Our nation's security would be much better served by an arms control policy designed to clarify technical ambiguities and strengthen the ABM Treaty.

Paul Warnke, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, called the Administration's approach to ABM Treaty compliance on the SDI "a total fraud." According to Warnke, "this is the kind of reasoning that would bring the total arms control business into disrepute." Recent U.S. charges of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty challenge this same kind of reasoning on the part of the Soviets. Certainly the United States cannot hold the Soviet Union to a stricter standard of treaty compliance than that by which we are willing to abide. At best, the President's "Star Wars" program undermines the ABM Treaty and the future of arms control; at worst, it signals the end of arms control and the beginning of a vastly accelerated U.S.-Soviet arms race in offensive and defensive weapons.

The Strategic Defense Initiative is Extremely Costly

Pentagon funding projections for the SDI are unprecedented and exceed the cost of any previous military research and development program. In 1983, prior to the introduction of the SDI, research in ballistic missile defense technologies was funded at \$991 million. Since the introduction of the SDI in 1984, funding requests for ABM research have doubled yearly.

This year the Administration's FY'86 request for the SDI is \$3.7 billion. Funding projections for the SDI over the next ten years are in the tens of billions of dollars. Costs for actual deployment of nationwide ABM defenses are estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars. These costs are, and will be, in addition to the hundreds of billions of dollars already required for strategic offensive and conventional systems. The time to stop the program is now. Spending on nationwide defenses, in addition to offensive systems, will result in an uncontrollable acceleration in U.S. military spending - spending that will inevitably eat into needed domestic programs. As the billions of dollars presently being requested for the SDI begin to develop a private sector constituency, this program will become more and more difficult to stop. The time to act is now.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE FY'86 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

After rejecting several floor amendments to reduce and restrict the SDI during floor consideration of the defense authorization bill in June, both houses adopted the Armed Services Committees' recommendations, \$2.5 billion in the House and \$3 billion in the Senate. The House/Senate defense authorization conference committee then split the difference between the two houses at \$2.75 billion in budget authority for the SDI in FY'86. The upcoming defense appropriations may be significantly less than, but may not exceed, the funding ceiling (\$2.75 billion) established in the authorization bill.

During floor consideration of the defense authorization bill, a variety of amendments were offered to either reduce and restrict funding for the SDI or, in the House, to increase funding above the Armed Services Committee level. These amendments provide the first measure of a member's stand on the issue.

The League endorsed the Mavroules/Hertel Amendment in the House and the Kerry Amendment in the Senate. Both of these amendments would have frozen spending for the SDI at least year's appropriation of \$1.4 billion and eliminated all funding for field demonstration projects that will lead to violations of the ABM Treaty. The League also endorsed the Dellums Amendment in the House that would have further reduced SDI funding and deleted funding for demonstrations and other major experiments. Had they passed, the League-supported amendments would have effectively killed the "Star Wars" proposal while allowing research consistent with the treaty to continue. Other amendments of interest were offered by Dicks (D WA) in the House and Bumpers (D AR) and Proxmire (D WI) in the Senate. These amendments would have reduced the SDI from the committee level and placed some policy restrictions on the program but fell short of killing the program outright.

The League is committed to an on-going effort to stop the SDI. Our next opportunity is during the defense appropriations process this summer and fall.

STATE AND LOCAL LEAGUE ACTION NEEDED

We must persuade a majority of members of Congress to "Stop Star Wars Now." Please take the following actions:

1) Encourage all League members and other interested individuals to write their Members of Congress opposing the Strategic Defense Initiative. An extensive letter writing campaign is needed over the next eight weeks leading up to the defense appropriations vote in late September. All Members of Congress should be contacted. Please refer to the enclosed voting records to see how your Members of Congress voted in the authorization process so that you can target your letter. Members of Congress who voted for the League position (the Dellums and/or Mavroules Amendments in the House and the Kerry Amendment in the Senate) should be thanked by League members and encouraged to continue to vote for funding cuts and policy restrictions for the SDI program. Do not ignore the importance of thank you letters; particularly at this early stage in our lobbying efforts it is important to encourage our congressional leaders. Members of Congress who did not support the League position should be urged to reconsider and vote against "Star Wars" in the appropriations process.

Particular attention should be paid to Members of Congress who are listed on the attached voting record as "possible swing votes." In the House, the "possible swing votes" are Representatives who voted for the Armed Services Committee level (\$2.5 billion) or lower (the Dicks Amendment at \$2.1 billion). Although these House swings did not vote for the League endorsed amendments (\$954 million and \$1.4 billion), they also did not support amendments that would have raised the funding level for "Star Wars" even higher (\$2.9 billion and \$3.7 billion). In the Senate, we are relying on your help in persuading the Senators who did not support the League endorsed Kerry Amendment to reconsider and support the lowest possible funding level during the appropriations debate.

- 2) Meet with your Members of Congress over the August recess (August 3 - September 4) to lobby him/her to oppose "Star Wars." (See May-June Report from the Hill Supplement for VOTER Editors, page 2, for tips on how to obtain a meeting with your Member of Congress or call the LWVUS Grassroots Lobbying Desk for advice.)
- 3) Encourage the press in your area to editorialize against the SDI program. TV citizen speak-outs and radio call-in shows -- in addition to newspapers -- are opportunities for League members to get the word out. Provide the editorial board of your local newspaper with a copy of the VOTER reprint on "Star Wars," included in this packet, and ask them to editorialize against this costly, destabilizing, and dangerous program. Submit your version of the enclosed press statement as a letter to the editor or guest opinion editorial or write your own using the information in this Action Alert. Do not send the identical letter to more than one paper in your city and send it under the name of the League member with the highest title possible. This will increase its chances of being printed. Most papers require that you include your phone number on the letter, not because they will print it, but so they can call you with any questions. Another consideration in submitting your guest editorial or letter to the editor is timing. Ideally, you should submit your editorial or letter to the editor by the first week of September so that it will run either during the August recess when members are at home or before the votes in September.
- 4) Coordinate your lobbying efforts with the chapters of other national organizations that oppose SDI. The national anti-SDI coalition that the League works with includes such national membership organizations as Physicians for Social Responsibility, Union of Concerned Scientists, SANE, and Common Cause. In addition, many local church, peace and justice, and freeze groups may be potential allies in your lobbying efforts. the Coordinator of Grassroots Lobbying at the national office will be able to provide you with local anti-SDI contact names for many congressional districts. As always, many voices are more influential than just one.
- 5) Send for additional free copies of the enclosed VOTER article for distribution in your community. Since all League members have already received the article in the Spring 1985 VOTER, we do not recommend sending it to League members again in your local VOTER mailings. However, it is useful to distribute the VOTER reprint to members of the press, other interested organizations and individuals in your community, and Members of Congress. If you need less than 10 copies, you may reprint the copies locally, as an exception to usual League policy. For quantities of more than 10, please contact the Arms Control Desk at the national office. We would be happy to send you extra copies of the reprint.

Thank you for all you are doing in this important campaign.

"STAR WARS" ACTION ALERT RESPONSE FORM

Please return to: Arms Control Desk, League of Women Voters of the United States
1730 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

- ☐ We wrote to Representative _____.
- ☐ We wrote to Senator _____ and _____.
- ☐ We wrote a letter to the editor _____.
- ☐ We contacted other local arms control groups in our
community _____.
- ☐ We met with our Member(s) of Congress _____.
- ☐ Other _____.

Please send me _____ free copies of the VOTER reprint "Space Age Defense - Pipe Dream
or Protections?" for distribution in my community.

We are interested in working with other anti-SDI organizations. Please send us the
names of any local organizations or contacts you know of. _____

Name _____

Address _____

City, State _____

Zip _____

Phone () _____

Congressional District _____

TO: National Security Chairs/LL Pres.; DPM
FROM: Carol Flatten, National Program Coord. for
LWV-Texas
[REDACTED]

LWV-Texas
September 1985
LL Pres. Mailing; DPM
II. B. 1. d.
National Security

RE: Videotape distribution for The Third World Challenge to U.S. Policy

Please refer to the avocado green memo sent in mid-August to LL presidents and state unit chairs regarding the videotape. This memo lists the contact persons for each region listed in the August memo. LWV-Dallas and Houston have each received their own tapes because they have more than 400 members.

WEST TEXAS

Ana Rios
[REDACTED]

NORTHWEST

Clyde Mitchell
[REDACTED]

NORTH CENTRAL I

Linda Cozzen
[REDACTED]

NORTH CENTRAL II

Susan Chen
[REDACTED]

CENTRAL

LWV-Austin Area
[REDACTED]

NORTHEAST

Sue Barham
[REDACTED]

SOUTH TEXAS

Cathy Liu Scott
[REDACTED]

SOUTHEAST I

Carol Flatten
[REDACTED]

SOUTHEAST II

Melba Buss
[REDACTED]

* * * * *

TO: LL Pres. & state unit chairs; NOT ON DPM
 FROM: Carol Flatten, National Program Coordinator
 for LWV-Texas
 Lois Carpenter, Pres., LWV-T
 RE: Fall plans for study of U.S. Relations with the Developing
 Nations, especially videotape distribution

LWV-Texas
 August 16, 1985
 Special LL Pres. Mailing

Local League presidents have already received a copy of the Leaders Guide: Evaluating U.S. Relations with Developing Countries. Local presidents, as well as national DPM subscribers will soon receive the publication for member study, America and the Third World: Collision or Cooperation? A short time later, state unit chairs will receive from LWVUS one copy of each of the above publications.

Just this week we received a lengthy memo from LWVUS explaining their distribution plans for the 15-min. videotape, The Third World Challenge to U.S. Policy. Local League presidents (but not state unit chairs) will be receiving a summary of this memo. Basically, it is up to each state to decide upon a distribution system for the videotapes within its state. The really good news is that LWVUS will be sending us approximately one tape (1/2 inch VHS format) for every four Leagues, plus one tape for each League with over 400 members--a total of 11 of the 1/2 inch tapes. In addition, we will receive one 3/4 inch copy suitable for use on most institutional video machines (libraries, schools, commercial TV) and for providing a good copy from which a reproduction could be made.

We want to make the tapes available to the state units as well, so they are included in our proposed distribution plan. Dallas and Houston will each receive their own tape. For the other nine tapes, we propose to divide the state into regions with one League in each region serving as a clearinghouse for that tape. Other Leagues in the same region will make arrangements to use the tape through the clearinghouse League. Obviously, it would help if each League could finish its tape showings in a week or so and ship it to the next League. When we receive the tapes from LWVUS, we will ship the 1/2 inch tapes to Dallas, Houston, and clearinghouse Leagues immediately.

We will retain the 3/4 inch version in our office awaiting any requests for its use on a first-come-first-served basis. (We will pay the postage to ship it to you; you pay to send it back.) If a League or state unit thinks that short-term use of either tape is not sufficient and wishes to purchase a copy, we can make arrangements to have the 3/4 inch tape copied at an approximate cost of \$30 plus shipping for a 1/2 inch tape; \$45 plus shipping for a 3/4 inch tape. Just let us know as soon as you can.

Here are the regions that we propose, with the clearinghouse Leagues listed first with an asterisk:

<u>West Texas</u>	<u>Northwest</u>	<u>North Central I</u>	<u>North Central II</u>	<u>Central</u>
*Lubbock	*Denton	*Tarrant County	*Richardson	*Austin
El Paso	Amarillo	Abilene	Arlington	Kerrville
Midland	Gainesville	Burleson St. Unit	Irving	San Marcos
Odessa	Wichita Falls	Gleburne St. Unit	Plano	Waco
		Wise Co. St. Unit		
<u>Northeast</u>	<u>South Texas</u>	<u>Southeast I</u>	<u>Southeast II</u>	
*Tyler	*San Antonio	*Beaumont	*Bay Area	
Marshall/Harr. Co.	Corpus Christi	Brazos Co.	Baytown	
Sherman	Edinburg/McAllen	Montgomery Co.	Galveston	
Bowie Co. S.U.	Victoria	Orange Area	Pearland	
Cherokee Co. S.U.			Pasadena S.U.	
Gregg Co. S.U.				

- more -

Here is where we need your help and cooperation. Will each designated clearinghouse League please confirm with the state office by Tuesday, Sept. 3 that you can function in this capacity. The sooner you let us know, the sooner you will receive the tape. We suggest you appoint a chair or coordinator for this short-term job and advise us of this person's name, address, and phone number. Then in the Sept. 6 mailing from the state office, we can advise all Leagues and state units of the confirmed clearinghouse Leagues and their contact person.

Once the clearinghouse Leagues are confirmed, will local Leagues and state units please notify their clearinghouse contact by Sept. 20 of their first and second choices of time periods within which they want the tape. Then the clearinghouse Leagues can set up a shipping schedule and confirm or adjust the desired times.

For shipping the tapes, we advise that padded envelopes (available at office supply stores) be used and that the tapes be shipped via priority (first class) mail. For starters at least, it might work well for the League doing the shipping to pay the postage. It may be worked out that the tape can just be sent from one League to the next within a region. However, if several shipments must be made back and forth to the clearinghouse League, you will have to work out fair postage payments within your region. The clearinghouse League should not have to absorb repeated shipping costs.

We hope these arrangements will be satisfactory. We are excited about this new learning tool and hope you will all try it.

We want to make the tape available to all state units as well as to those who are interested in our proposed clearinghouse plan. We will send the tape to each clearinghouse League for the other Leagues to use. We propose to divide the states into regions with one League in each region acting as a clearinghouse for that region. Our Leagues in the same region will not be responsible for the tape through the clearinghouse League. Obviously, it would help if each League could finish its tape shipping by Sept. 20. We will ship the tape to the clearinghouse League in each region. We will send the tape to each clearinghouse League immediately.

We will retain the 3 1/2 inch videotape in our office awaiting any requests for the tape on a first-come-first-served basis. We will pay the postage to ship the tape to you by air mail if needed. If a League or state office thinks that short-term use of the tape is not sufficient and wishes to purchase a copy, we can make arrangements to have the 3 1/2 inch tape copied at an approximate cost of \$10 plus shipping and a 10 inch copy. \$25 plus shipping for a 1 1/2 inch copy. Let us know as soon as you can.

Here are the regions that we propose, with the clearinghouse Leagues listed below with an asterisk:

Northwest Alaska Idaho Montana Oregon Washington Wyoming	North Central Iowa Kansas Minnesota Missouri Nebraska North Dakota South Dakota	Central Arkansas Louisiana Mississippi Alabama Georgia Florida Tennessee Kentucky West Virginia	South Central Texas Oklahoma New Mexico Colorado Arizona California	South Alabama Florida Georgia Louisiana Mississippi Tennessee West Virginia	East Delaware Maryland Virginia North Carolina South Carolina Georgia Florida Alabama Mississippi Louisiana Tennessee Kentucky West Virginia
--	--	--	---	--	---

TO: LL Pres. & state unit chairs; NOT ON DPM
FROM: Carol Flatten, National Program Coordinator
for LWV-Texas
Lois Carpenter, Pres., LWV-T

LWV-Texas
August 16, 1985
Special LL Pres. Mailing

RE: Fall plans for study of U.S. Relations with the Developing Nations, especially videotape distribution

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Midland	Gainesville	Burleson St. Unit	Irving	San Marcos
Odessa	Wichita Falls	Gleburne St. Unit	Plano	Waco
		Wise Co. St. Unit		
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Cherokee Co. S.U.			Pasadena S.U.	
Gregg Co. S.U.				

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* * * * *

To be completed by local Leagues. Please return after using the video. Mail to:
League of Women Voters Education Fund
1730 M Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036

EVALUATION FORM FOR LWVEF VIDEO: "THE THIRD WORLD CHALLENGE TO U.S. POLICY"

FROM: _____ (name)
LWV of _____
_____ (address)
_____ (zip code)

I. Please rate content of the video on a scale of 1 to 5.

	Excellent		Average		Poor
	1	2	3	4	5
A. Overall quality	1	2	3	4	5
B. As an introduction to the topic	1	2	3	4	5
C. As a balanced treatment of the subject	1	2	3	4	5
D. In conveying information on the issue	1	2	3	4	5
E. As a means to provoke discussion	1	2	3	4	5

Please add any other comments on the content of the video:

II. Distribution and utility

- A. How did your League use the video (small group discussion, statewide meeting, community program, cable TV, other?)
- B. Was the video a good learning tool in your educational activities?
- C. Was the video the appropriate length for your purposes?
- D. Were the other LWVEF informational materials (publication and discussion manual) helpful as background, in follow-up, or in answering questions?
- E. What distribution system was used? How well did it work?

Please note on the back any additional comments that you would like us to have in evaluating this project. Your comments will help us improve future activities of this kind.

To be completed by local Leagues. Please return after using the video. Mail to:
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	1	2	3	4	5
A. Overall quality	1	2	3	4	5
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rides
400 tapes

each gets
about 1 tape

some 4 lbs
2 1/2 tapes


over 100 tapes

also 1 - 3/4" tape

we get 11 - 1/2" VHS tapes
2 1/4"

also ch. for postage
we get \$33

Workbook
Twentieth Convention
Apr11 1985



1. Abilene
2. Amarillo
3. Arlington
4. Austin Area
5. Bay Area
6. Baytown
7. Beaumont
8. Brazos County
9. Corpus Christi
10. Dallas
11. Denton
12. Edinburg/McAllen
13. El Paso
14. Gainesville
15. Galveston
16. Houston
17. Irving
18. Kerrville
19. Lubbock
20. Marshall/Harrison Co.
21. Midland
22. Montgomery Co.
23. Odessa
24. Orange Area
25. Pearland Area
26. Plano
27. Richardson
28. San Antonio Area
29. San Marcos
30. Sherman
31. Tarrant County
32. Tyler
33. Victoria
34. Waco Area
35. Wichita Falls
- A. Bowie County State Unit
- B. Burleson Area State Unit
- C. Cherokee County State Unit
- D. Cleburne State Unit
- E. Gregg County State Unit
- F. Pasadena State Unit
- G. Wise County State Unit

one League in ea. region

Denton
Lbk.
Tenn. Co.
Richardson
Taylor
Austin
San An

Betty
Betsy
Bmt.
Bay Area
Dah
Don

Biennial Reports (cont.)

PUBLIC RELATIONS BIENNIAL REPORTS

PUBLIC RELATIONS VICE PRESIDENT

We kept Texas informed about the League of Women Voters of Texas these last two years by press releases about our many and varied activities, by encouraging local Leagues and state units to increase their public relations efforts through the media and through their interaction with other groups via their Speakers' Bureau and membership in coalitions, by promoting our many excellent publications, and by cultivation of our present and prospective contributors. Through our Texas VOTER we continue to communicate directly with our members and other subscribers about League activity at the state level.

Lavora Arizaga

TEXAS VOTER

The Texas VOTER is one means of communication among the state board and all the members of the League in Texas. Four issues are published each calendar year. A Facts and Issues on Child Support Enforcement was printed as an insert in the July, 1983 VOTER. An extra issue of the newsletter, without the VOTER masthead, was published in 1984 as a way of bringing information about Women's Legislative Days to every Texas League member.

Sondra Ferstl

VOTERS SERVICE

The League of Women Voters of Texas Education Fund published three Voters Guides during this biennium:--for the constitutional amendments November, 1983;--for the primary election, May, 1984; and, for the general election of November, 1984. Guides were distributed to local Leagues and state units in printed form or as veloxes or negatives for use with local Voters Guides.

The Voters Service director has been available for consultation with local Leagues on their Voters Guides, candidates meetings, voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. She represented LWV-T in Texas Women for the 80's, a voter registration and participation project designed to increase the participation of women in the governmental process.

Rowena Rodgers

PUBLICATIONS

During this biennium we have published three Facts and Issues (Redistricting, Intestacy, and Family Violence); four advocacy papers (Redistricting, The Texas Judiciary, Hazardous Waste, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children); and a special report entitled Independent observations on Ocean Incineration. Before convention we expect a new



MEMORANDUM

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS

1212 Guadalupe, No. 109 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel 512/472-1100

Aug. 9, 1985

Dear Carol,

(Flatten)

cc: Diane

AUG 14 1985

I'm so pleased you agreed to tackle the national program items for us. They sent one copy only of the Leader's Guide for "Evaluating U.S. Relations with Developing Countries." I have xeroxed copies of the first two pages and the consensus form in the back of it for Diane and me. The entire Guide is enclosed for you. You may want to put a brief memo in the Sept. or Oct. mailing to local Leagues encouraging its use, explaining about the videotape, or whatever. At the present, we have heard nothing more about the videotape.

Diane says you are working on drafting a letter to our Texas MC's in response to the Action Alert on SDI. Of course I would like to see a copy of it, but if you have it ready while I am on vacation (Aug. 16-29), I will feel quite comfortable with Diane okaying it. I realize she will be gone part of the same time I will be gone, but there is no big hurry with this. In the current mailing she and I both are encouraging the LLs to respond to the alert.

Thanks again for your help.

Lois

Joann - It occurred to me that perhaps the SO should have a copy of the consensus form & the first 2 pages of the Leader's Guide. I have no idea if the video will be sent here or to the S.O. At least we should be able to tell the LL's about it in the Sept. 6 mailing & if it has come here, I can bring it to Austin the 30th of Aug. or when I come for board meeting. Also note p. 2 of Guide - contents and committee. Consensus form does not look like fun! Lois

Leader's Guide

League of Women Voters of the United States 1730 M Street, NW Washington, DC 20036
Pub. #554, \$1.00

EVALUATING U.S. RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

LEADER'S GUIDE

The second half of the 1984-86 National Security Study, adopted by delegates to Convention '84, calls on members to "evaluate U.S. economic and military aid to developing countries and its relationship to our international economic and political interests." The scope of this study, as outlined in the convention workbook, includes "an examination of U.S. commitments to developing countries, the criteria for evaluating economic and military aid, and the role of U.S.-Soviet relations in influencing U.S. policies in developing countries. The National Security Committee (members listed on the reverse side) considered both the motion and the scope in drafting consensus questions that were subsequently adopted by the national board. The questions appear on the official consensus form (yellow) attached to this Leader's Guide. The postmark deadline for returning consensus forms is January 15, 1986, for consideration at the March 1986 meeting of the national board. (This schedule was announced in September 1984.)

To help you spend your time efficiently, this Leader's Guide (Pub. #554, \$1.00) contains several meeting-ready sections. All state and local League presidents and DPM subscribers will receive a background publication entitled America in the Third World: Collision or Cooperation? (Pub. #553, \$1.00 for members). And, the LWVEF will make available through state Leagues copies of a video presentation. The 15-minute video can serve as an introduction to a unit meeting or a special community program. Additional copies of the publication can be ordered from the LWVUS (include 50 cents handling per order); all orders must be prepaid. The video presentation will be provided free of charge on a limited basis and will be available in late August. Information on distribution will be forthcoming.

This is not going on DPM

file 50

We should be hearing something about this soon - Lois

→ This Leader's Guide includes:

- Management tips--some basic Q&As to guide League presidents, study chairs and resource committees.
- Meeting outline--a meeting outline with suggested discussion questions to aid in answering consensus questions, summary LWVUS International Relations statements of position and official consensus report form (yellow).
- An LWVEF information kit--camera-ready material, factsheets, optional activities, a glossary and selected bibliography.

For your information, members of the National Security Committee are:

Joan Rich, Chair

Linda Moscarella

Judy Duffy

Sloane Robbins

Ginny Higgins

Edith Segall, UN Observer

Laureen Andrews and Alice Hughey staff the Committee and can be contacted at the national League office.

TO: LWVUS
1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036

FROM: LWV of _____

State: _____

File #: _____

POSTMARK DEADLINE: January 15, 1986

NATIONAL SECURITY U.S. RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Instructions for Using this Consensus Report Form

If your League participated in a joint consensus meeting with other Leagues, please fill out a separate form for each League.

Please fill out the consensus report form in the blanks indicated.

In those areas that indicate a narrative response use a separate page. Do *not* write on this consensus form. By your using a separate sheet, two teams of tabulators can compile the reports. Identify your League on each attachment in the following way:

FROM: LWV of _____ File # _____

SIGNED: _____

Be sure to mark which question or subquestion you are responding to by labeling with the appropriate number (Consensus I, II, III) and Part (A, B, C, D). It would be helpful to use a separate page for each question, but it is not essential.

How did your board determine member thinking on this consensus report?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> unit meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> questionnaire |
| <input type="checkbox"/> general meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> telephone poll/survey |
| <input type="checkbox"/> bulletin tear-off | <input type="checkbox"/> other, please specify _____ |

Number of members participating in this member agreement process: _____

REMEMBER, this is a report of your League's consensus, not the concerns and opinions of individual members. It is **NOT** appropriate to ask for or to report numbers or percentages of "votes." "Consensus" means member agreement. "No consensus" means your League was unable to agree; "no response" means your League did not discuss.

Please postmark this completed form by **January 15, 1986** to the above address. Mark envelope "National Security Consensus." The national board is under no obligation to consider replies postmarked after January 15, 1986.

LWV of _____

Signed _____ (Portfolio)

I. Past, present and possible U.S. international economic and political interests include those on the list below. Select UP TO FIVE interests that should be PARAMOUNT in determining U.S. policies toward developing countries and UP TO FIVE that should be ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDED in determining U.S. policies toward developing countries. (If you list more than five, we will tabulate only the first five listed.) Additional comments elaborating your choices should be attached and identified.

PARAMOUNT		ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDED
_____	stimulating economic growth	_____
_____	promoting stability	_____
_____	promoting peaceful change	_____
_____	fighting communism	_____
_____	containing the Soviet Union	_____
_____	limiting U.S. involvement abroad	_____
_____	protecting U.S. access to resources and markets	_____
_____	maintaining U.S. preeminence	_____
_____	maintaining U.S. leadership	_____
_____	ensuring self-determination	_____
_____	fostering democratic values	_____
_____	protecting human rights	_____
_____	promoting sound management of global resources	_____
_____	protecting U.S. business interests	_____
_____	reducing the risk of military conflict	_____
_____	supporting allies	_____
_____	improving the quality of life	_____
_____	protecting U.S. territory, institutions and people	_____
_____	Other: _____	_____

No consensus _____ No response _____

II. The United States has a variety of means to promote its economic and political interests in developing countries. Among them are development aid, the Economic Support Fund, military aid and direct military involvement of U.S. forces. The LWVUS has evaluated development aid in previous studies. For the following questions, please indicate YES, NO, NO CONSENSUS or NO RESPONSE on this form and attach narrative responses on a separate, identified sheet.

A. Is the Economic Support Fund (ESF) an appropriate means to promote the paramount U.S. interests you listed in Question I?

☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ NO CONSENSUS ☐ NO RESPONSE

If YES, for what purposes should ESF be used?

If NO, why not?

B. Is military aid an appropriate means to promote the paramount U.S. interests you listed in Question I?

☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ NO CONSENSUS ☐ NO RESPONSE

If YES, for what purposes should military aid be used?

If NO, why not?

C. Is the direct military involvement of U.S. forces an appropriate means to promote the paramount U.S. interests you listed in Question I?

☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ NO CONSENSUS ☐ NO RESPONSE

If YES, for what purposes should direct military involvement of U.S. forces be used?

If NO, why not?

D. Of the following means to promote U.S. economic and political interests in developing countries, is there one or more that is preferable to the others? Do NOT check all four.

☐ Development Aid ☐ Economic Support Fund ☐ Military Aid ☐ Direct military involvement of U.S. forces

WHY?

☐ NO CONSENSUS ☐ NO RESPONSE

III. Please respond to Parts A and B of this question on a separate, identified sheet. We ask that your responses to Part B be in *list form*. Comments may follow.

A. What role, if any, should U.S.-Soviet relations play in influencing U.S. policies toward developing countries?

B. What efforts could reduce U.S.-Soviet competition in developing countries?



League of Women Voters
Education Fund

AUG 19 1985

Memorandum

1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-1965

This is going on DPM

August 1985

TO: Local League Presidents
FROM: Joan Rich, LWVEF Trustee
RE: Developing Countries Video

As noted in Leader's Guide: Evaluating U.S. Relations with Developing Countries (Pub. #532, \$1.00), the LWVEF has produced and will make available through state Leagues copies of a video presentation on U.S. relations with developing countries. The video is entitled The Third World Challenge to U.S. Policy and is an ideal companion to America and the Third World: Collision or Cooperation? (Pub. #553, \$1.00 for members). The video and the publication are excellent references for member discussions, which many local Leagues will convene this fall as part of the National Security study, and for community programs on U.S. Third World relations. (Ideas for the latter are included in a discussion manual that will accompany the video.)

The production, duplication and distribution of the video are made possible through generous financial contributions to the LWVEF by the Rockefeller Foundation, and Pfizer, Inc. The budget for this project allows us to reproduce 400 copies of the videotape and will offset a great deal of the mailing costs. Therefore, we are relying on state Leagues to distribute the video to interested local Leagues, since unfortunately we cannot provide a copy directly to each local League--we wish we could! Of course, we will try to deal with individual concerns, as necessary. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact Deborah Goldman at the national office (202-429-1965).

The Distribution Plan

In mid to late August, the LWVEF will send each state League office a copy or copies of the videotape and a check to cover the approximate cost of the initial mailing of the tapes from the state office to local Leagues. Most of the tapes will be on 1/2 inch VHS format, the most popular brand of home video equipment. State

Leagues that receive multiple copies will also receive at least one 3/4 inch copy, suitable for use on most institutional video machines (libraries, schools, etc.) and for providing a good copy from which a League that decides to do so could reproduce more tapes. (Remember, copyright laws require permission from the author, in this case the LWVEF, before reproducing materials. So do inform us before making any copies.) We have encouraged state League presidents to develop a statewide distribution plan to get the videotape to the local Leagues. Some state offices may choose to contact you directly to find out when your local League could use the video or they may choose to wait until your fall state workshop to determine the best approach. Despite all our best efforts, for some Leagues there may be conflicts in scheduling and constraints on funds for mailing.

This is the first major LWVEF foray into the use of video as an educational tool. We are eager to hear your evaluation of the product and how the distribution system worked. If you meet up with some problems early on, however, please feel free to write me or call Deborah Goldman at the national office. We may be able to help provide some guidance based on what other states have reported.

Overall, we hope that video, as an exciting new way of conveying information via sights and sounds, will become a more common means of communication between national, state and local Leagues. As an initial attempt, we hope that you will give it your best, so that we can make it better and easier in the future.



League of Women Voters
Education Fund

AUG 16 1985

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Memorandum

1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-1965

AUG 12 1985

August, 1985

TO: State League Presidents

FROM: Joan Rich, LWVEF Trustee

RE: Distribution Plan for Developing Countries Video

As noted in the Leader's Guide: Evaluating U.S. Relations with Developing Countries (Pub.#532, \$1.00), the LWVEF has produced and will make available through state Leagues copies of a video presentation on U.S. relations with developing countries. The video is entitled The Third World Challenge to U.S. Policy and is an ideal companion to America and the Third World: Collision or Cooperation? (Pub. #553, \$1.00 for members). The video and the publication are excellent references for member discussions, which many local Leagues will convene this fall as part of the National Security study, and for community programs on U.S.-Third World relations. (Ideas for the latter are included in a discussion manual that will accompany the video.) This memo explains the distribution plan and provides some suggestions as to how you can help us get the video into the hands of interested local Leagues.

The production, duplication and distribution of the video are made possible through generous financial contributions to the LWVEF by the Rockefeller Foundation and Pfizer, Inc. The budget for this project allows us to reproduce 400 copies of the videotape and will offset a great deal of the mailing costs. However, we are relying on your ingenuity and your understanding of the needs of local Leagues in your state to create the most effective distribution plan. Unfortunately, we cannot provide a copy to each local League -- we wish we could!

We realize that this distribution process increases the workload of the state office. We consulted a number of state League offices for their advice on the best distribution approaches and have incorporated many of their suggestions in preparing this memo. Of course, we will try to deal with individual concerns, as necessary. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact Deborah Goldman at the national office (202-429-1965).

Contributions to the Fund are deductible for income-tax purposes.

The distribution plan

In mid to late August, the LWVEF will send each state League office a copy or copies of the videotape and a check to cover the approximate cost of the initial mailing of the tapes from the state office to local Leagues. The number of copies that each state League receives will be based on the following ratio: one videotape for approximately every 4 local Leagues in the state, with an additional copy for each League in your state that has over 400 members. (See the attached state list to determine the number of copies you will be receiving.)

Most of the tapes will be on 1/2 inch VHS format, the most popular brand of home video equipment and the format requested most often in our sampling of state Leagues. Leagues that receive multiple copies will also receive at least one 3/4 inch copy, suitable for use on most institutional video machines (libraries, schools, etc.) and for providing a good copy from which a League that decides to do so could reproduce more tapes. (Remember, copyright laws require permission from the author, in this case the LWVEF, before reproducing materials. So do inform us before making any copies, if you decide to do so.)

We would like to encourage you to begin now to determine what is the best statewide distribution plan for your local Leagues. You may want to send a survey form asking when local Leagues could use the video or wait until your fall state workshop to determine the best approach. Many state Leagues will probably want to appoint someone to plan and coordinate scheduling and distribution. To help you get local League cooperation and to get information about the video out to all Leagues, we will forward a summary of this memo to local League presidents. This way, they will be aware of the plan and can be prepared to respond to your inquiries. Some may approach the state office on their own.

The following are some suggestions for distribution that you might want to consider:

--a chain letter approach. Assign a "route" for each video copy. The state League would mail a copy to the first League on the route with a memo describing the schedule for the entire route, including the dates when each local League can use it. It is then the responsibility of the local League to mail the videotape on to the next stop by the date indicated in the memo. At the end of the route, the state should determine if it wants to have the video returned, in which case it is the responsibility of the last user.

--a regional approach. Set up a number of League regional distribution centers within your state to send out and receive videotape copies for local Leagues within the state assigned

to that region. The state distributes its copies to the regional centers that will then serve as clearinghouses.

--a statewide lending library approach. Establish a central address (the state office, the state National Security chair, a designated board member) from which tapes can be requested on a first come basis and returned after use.

We expect that state Leagues will also develop their own innovative approaches. For some, there will no doubt be conflicts in scheduling and constraints on funds for mailing. This is the first major LWVEF foray into the use of video as an educational tool. We are eager to hear your evaluation of the product and how the distribution system worked. If you meet up with some problems early on, however, please feel free to write me or call Deborah Goldman at the national office. We may be able to help provide some guidance based on what other states have reported.

We hope that video, as an exciting new way of conveying information via sights and sounds, will become a more common means of communication between national, state, and local Leagues. As an initial attempt, we hope that you will give it your best so that we can make it better and easier in the future.



League of Women Voters
of the United States

AUG 16 1985

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Memorandum

1730 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-1965

August 9, 1985

AUG 12 1985

TO: State League Presidents
FROM: Joan Rich, National Security Study Chair
RE: Participation in National Security Consensus by Member-at-Large Units

Once again, we would like to encourage member-at-large (MAL) units to participate in the national security consensus process. As you know, a copy of the Leader's Guide, "Evaluating U.S. Relations with Developing Countries" (Pub. #554), was sent in early July to local, provisional and state Leagues. Attached to the Guide is the official yellow consensus report form, due in the national office with a postmark date of January 15, 1986. A background publication, "America in the Third World: Collision or Cooperation" (Pub. #553), will also be sent the week of August 12 to local, provisional and state Leagues.

The national office does not keep a list of the names and addresses of the chairs of member-at-large units. So that we may send each unit one free set of the above materials, we ask that you send us this mailing information for each MAL unit in your state. (Send to Dorothy Nieweg, Membership and Development Division, LWVUS, 1730 M Street NW, Washington DC 20036.) If you want your member-at-large units to have further materials, please place your order as indicated on page one of the Guide.

Past experience has shown that about half of the member-at-large units take advantage of the opportunity to participate in consensus. We hope that more will do so this time.

Scherel - I did this already. You and Rachel can confer about ordering the background pub for MAL's and MAL unit members. Let Joann know how many to order & where to ship whatever quantity when they come in.

Lois

P.S. We will include MAL units in the distribution plan for the videotapes as well.

"The Third World Challenge to U.S. Policy"
 (Developing Countries Video)
 Statewide Distribution Plan

<u>STATE</u>	<u>Number of videos to be sent by LWVEF</u>
ALABAMA	2
ALASKA	2
ARIZONA	2
ARKANSAS	3
CALIFORNIA	23
COLORADO	6
CONNECTICUT	11
DELAWARE	2
D.C.	1
FLORIDA	7
GEORGIA	6
HAWAII	1
IDAHO	2
ILLINOIS	19
INDIANA	7
IOWA	6
KANSAS	4
KENTUCKY	5
LOUISIANA	4
MAINE	2
MARYLAND	7
MASSACHUSETTS	25
MICHIGAN	10
MINNESOTA	17
MISSISSIPPI	2
MISSOURI	5
MONTANA	3
NEBRASKA	2
NEVADA	1
NEW HAMPSHIRE	3

STATENumber of videos
to be sent by LWVEF

NEW JERSEY	20
NEW MEXICO	2
NEW YORK	26
NORTH CAROLINA	5
NORTH DAKOTA	2
OHIO	16
OKLAHOMA	3
OREGON	6
PENNSYLVANIA	16
PUERTO RICO	1
RHODE ISLAND	3
SOUTH CAROLINA	3
SOUTH DAKOTA	2
TENNESSEE	4
TEXAS	11
UTAH	3
VERMONT	2
VIRGIN ISLANDS	1
VIRGINIA	7
WASHINGTON	6
WEST VIRGINIA	2
WISCONSIN	9
WYOMING	2

TO: LL Pres. & state unit chairs; NOT ON DPM
FROM: Carol Flatten, National Program Coordinator
for LWV-Texas
Lois Carpenter, Pres., LWV-T

LWV-Texas
August 16, 1985
Special LL Pres. Mailing

RE: Fall plans for Study of U.S. Relations with the Developing Nations, especially videotape distribution

Local League presidents have already received a copy of the Leaders Guide: Evaluating U.S. Relations with Developing Countries. Local presidents, as well as national DPM subscribers will soon receive the publication for member study, America and the Third World: Collision or Cooperation? A short time later, state unit chairs will receive from LWVUS one copy of each of the above publications.

Just this week we received a lengthy memo from LWVUS explaining their distribution plans for the 15-min. videotape, The Third World Challenge to U.S. Policy. Local League presidents (but not state unit chairs) will be receiving a summary of this memo. Basically, it is up to each state to decide upon a distribution system for the videotapes within its state. The really good news is that LWVUS will be sending us approximately one tape (1/2 inch VHS format) for every four Leagues, plus one tape for each League with over 400 members--a total of 11 of the 1/2 inch tapes. In addition, we will receive one 3/4 inch copy suitable for use on most institutional video machines (libraries, schools, commercial TV) and for providing a good copy from which a reproduction could be made.

We want to make the tapes available to the state units as well, so they are included in our proposed distribution plan. Dallas and Houston will each receive their own tape. For the other nine tapes, we propose to divide the state into regions with one League in each region serving as a clearinghouse for that tape. Other Leagues in the same region will make arrangements to use the tape through the clearinghouse League. Obviously, it would help if each League could finish its tape showings in a week or so and ship it to the next League. When we receive the tapes from LWVUS, we will ship the 1/2 inch tapes to Dallas, Houston, and clearinghouse Leagues immediately.

We will retain the 3/4 inch version in our office awaiting any requests for its use on a first-come-first-served basis. (We will pay the postage to ship it to you; you pay to send it back.) If a League or state unit thinks that short-term use of either tape is not sufficient and wishes to purchase a copy, we can make arrangements to have the 3/4 inch tape copied at an approximate cost of \$30 plus shipping for a 1/2 inch tape; \$45 plus shipping for a 3/4 inch tape. Just let us know as soon as you can.

Here are the regions that we propose, with the clearinghouse Leagues listed first with an asterisk:

<u>West Texas</u>	<u>Northwest</u>	<u>North Central I</u>	<u>North Central II</u>	<u>Central</u>
*Lubbock	*Denton	*Tarrant County	*Richardson	*Austin
El Paso	Amarillo	Abilene	Arlington	Kerrville
Midland	Gainesville	Burleson St. Unit	Irving	San Marcos
Odessa	Wichita Falls	Cleburne St. Unit	Plano	Waco
		Wise Co. St. Unit		
<u>Northeast</u>	<u>South Texas</u>	<u>Southeast I</u>	<u>Southeast II</u>	
*Tyler	*San Antonio	*Beaumont	*Bay Area	
Marshall/Harr. Co.	Corpus Christi	Brazos Co.	Baytown	
Sherman	Edinburg/McAllen	Montgomery Co.	Galveston	
Bowie Co. S.U.	Victoria	Orange Area	Pearland	
Cherokee Co. S.U.			Pasadena S.U.	
Gregg Co. S.U.				

- more -

Here is where we need your help and cooperation. Will each designated clearinghouse League please confirm with the state office by Tuesday, Sept. 3 that you can function in this capacity. The sooner you let us know, the sooner you will receive the tape. We suggest you appoint a chair or coordinator for this short-term job and advise us of this person's name, address, and phone number. Then in the Sept. 6 mailing from the state office, we can advise all Leagues and state units of the confirmed clearinghouse Leagues and their contact person.

Once the clearinghouse Leagues are confirmed, will local Leagues and state units please notify their clearinghouse contact by Sept. 20 of their first and second choices of time periods within which they want the tape. Then the clearinghouse Leagues can set up a shipping schedule and confirm or adjust the desired times.

For shipping the tapes, we advise that padded envelopes (available at office supply stores) be used and that the tapes be shipped via priority (first class) mail. For starters at least, it might work well for the League doing the shipping to pay the postage. It may be worked out that the tape can just be sent from one League to the next within a region. However, if several shipments must be made back and forth to the clearinghouse League, you will have to work out fair postage payments within your region. The clearinghouse League should not have to absorb repeated shipping costs.

We hope these arrangements will be satisfactory. We are excited about this new learning tool and hope you will all try it.

It is our hope that this tape will be a valuable learning tool for all who use it. We are excited about this new learning tool and hope you will all try it. We are excited about this new learning tool and hope you will all try it.

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Action Alert

SPOTMASTER: For the latest developments on League issues, call SPOTMASTER at (202) 296-0218 from 5 p.m. Friday to 5 p.m. Monday (EDT).

This is going on DPM

MAR 11 1985

March 4, 1985

TO: State and Local League Presidents

FROM: Dorothy S. Ridings, President, and Julia A. Holmes, Legislative Action Chair

RE: Congressional Funding for the MX Missile System

ACTION URGENTLY NEEDED

Critical votes on Fiscal Year (FY) 1985 funding for the MX missile system are expected in both the House and Senate the last two weeks of March. According to the terms of a hard-fought House/Senate leadership compromise last year, \$1.5 billion in funding for the procurement of an additional 21 MX missiles was delayed until after March 1 and before the Easter recess (April 5) this year. The rules of the compromise state that two separate joint resolutions (authorization and appropriations) must pass both houses before the funds can be released. The most recent congressional count indicates that the vote will be very close in both houses. During the regular defense authorization and appropriations process later this year, Congress will also consider the Administration's FY '86 request for an additional \$3.2 billion for 48 MX missiles. A March vote to defeat the 21 missiles requested for FY '85 will set the stage for ultimate congressional rejection of this costly and destabilizing weapons system. The League opposes all funding for the MX missile program.

1. Please call or send telegrams to your Senators and Representatives today. Tell them that the League is opposed to all funding for the MX missile program and urge them to vote against the special Fiscal Year 1985 authorization and appropriations resolutions for the MX missile.
2. Tell your members of Congress that the extraordinary firepower and accuracy of the MX, combined with its vulnerable basing mode, make the MX a "use it or lose it" first-strike weapon that will increase bilateral instability and accelerate the arms race.
3. Every vote counts. All members of Congress will need to hear from the League. In addition, there are some possible swing votes in the House and Senate that need to receive as many calls and telegrams from home state constituents as possible:

House: Kolbe (AZ), Robinson (AR), Fazio (CA), Pepper (FL), Darden (GA), Stallings (ID), Fawell (IL), Grotberg (IL), Bruce (IL), Gray (IL), Visclosky (IN), Lightfoot (IA), Meyers (KS), Perkins (KY), Bentley (MD), Hoyer (MD), Pursell (MI), Henry (MI), Smith (NH), Hughes (NJ), Smith, C. (NJ), DioGuardi (NY), Horton (NY), Valentine (NC), Hefner (NC), Traficant (OH), Watkins (OK), Kanjorski (PA), Clinger (PA), Boner (TN), Gordon (TN), Coleman (TX), Bustamante (TX), Frost (TX), Monson (UT), Miller (WA), Dicks (WA), Mollohan (WV), Aspin (WI).

Senate: Andrews (ND), Grassley (IA), Humphrey (NH), Johnston (LA), Long (LA), Mathias (MD), Packwood (OR), Pressler (SD), Specter (PA), Weicker (CT), Bentsen (TX), Byrd (WV), Chafee (RI), DeConcini (AZ), Kassebaum (KS), Nunn (GA), Rockefeller (WV), Cohen (ME), Evans (WA), Gore (TN), Heinz (PA), McConnell (KY), Stennis (MS).

BACKGROUND -- MISSILE EXPERIMENTAL (MX)

In 1972, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) requested a new, accurate intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could survive a nuclear attack. Supporters of the new missile claimed that it was necessary to close the "window of vulnerability"-- the Soviets' ability to destroy U.S. land-based missiles in a surprise attack. However, an invulnerable and politically acceptable basing mode for the MX could not be found.

In 1983, after the Reagan Administration's "dense pack" MX basing proposal had been rejected by Congress, the President appointed a commission to study the future of the MX. The Scowcroft Commission, unofficially named for its chairman, Brent Scowcroft, concluded that, in effect, no "window of vulnerability" exists if the capabilities of all three legs of the triad are considered, and that an invulnerable basing system for the land-based leg was therefore not essential. The commission endorsed the new Reagan proposal to deploy 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos and recommended that the MX be deployed immediately as work begins on a mobile, single-warhead "Midgetman" missile. The commission also introduced the argument that the MX was needed as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviet Union.

In November 1983, by a narrow nine-vote margin in the House, Congress approved \$2.1 billion for the first 21 MX missiles. In 1984, the Administration requested \$3.2 billion for an additional 40 missiles, but the Administration's arguments began to lose their appeal as public opposition grew. Congress cut the Administration's request and, following dramatic floor battles in both the House and Senate, decided to delay the decision to fund future missiles until this year.

In May 1984, following completion of a two-year study on military policy and defense spending, the League announced its opposition to the deployment of the MX missile system and joined forces with over 100 arms control, civic, environmental, professional, labor, and religious organizations to actively oppose deployment of the MX.

PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE MX

The MX Is Destabilizing. When the 100 MX missiles currently envisioned, each carrying ten warheads, are added to the existing 550 advanced Minuteman III's, with three warheads apiece, there will be more than enough to threaten all 1400 Soviet land-based ICBMs. Since three-fourths of all Soviet warheads are on land-based missiles, such a first strike threat to Soviet forces will greatly increase the Soviet's incentive to launch first in a crisis. In addition, the increased accuracy and firepower of the MX (each warhead being equivalent to 23 Hiroshima bombs), combined with its vulnerable basing in existing Minuteman silos, increase U.S. incentives to strike first in a crisis. According to Les AuCoin (D OR), one of the leading opponents of the MX in the House, "It's fundamentally different from anything supported by previous Presidents, who sought a deterrent: an ICBM basing mode that could survive a nuclear attack and retaliate with overwhelming force. Instead, Reagan, now proposes a vulnerable but devastatingly powerful missile: the long-recognized formula for

provoking, not deterring, nuclear war."

The MX Is Not A "Bargaining Chip." Relying heavily on the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission, the Administration sold the MX to Congress in 1983 primarily as a "bargaining chip" for arms control negotiations. As U.S.-Soviet negotiations resume in Geneva on March 12, the Administration, once again, is launching a major campaign to convince Congress that deployment of the MX is necessary to successful U.S.-Soviet negotiations. However, the Soviets left the negotiating table shortly after Congress approved the MX in 1983. Passage of the MX did not make the Soviets more conciliatory and, indeed, the Administration has never indicated any willingness to trade the MX for Soviet reductions. According to Les AuCoin, "Rather than scaring them into accepting our arms control position, it is scaring them into new and more capable classes of weapons." Right now, rough strategic parity exists between the two countries. Deployment of the MX will accelerate nuclear competition rather than enhance or support arms control. Congress must not allow the long-awaited resumption of U.S.-Soviet negotiations to become a smokescreen for deployment of a weapons system that is not in the national security interests of our country.

ACTION NEEDED NOW

The strength of the Administration's lobbying effort cannot be underestimated. All members of the House and Senate will need to hear from MX opponents. The special authorization and appropriations resolutions for FY '85 funding of the MX may come up within days of your receiving this Action Alert, so please call or send telegrams to your Senators and Representatives as soon as possible.

To call your Senators or Representatives, use the Capitol Hill switchboard number: (202) 224-3121. Or send a telegram to:

Representative _____
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Senator _____
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Western Union toll free number is (800) 325-6000.

The League's voice does make a difference!

MX ALERT: So that we can gauge the level of response to this Action Alert, please fill out this tear-off sheet and return it to: Action Department, League of Women Voters of the United States, 1730 M Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

- ☐ We called Senator/s _____
and Representative/s _____
- ☐ We sent a telegram to Senator/s _____
and Representative/s _____
- ☐ Other response _____
- ☐ We did not respond to this Action Alert.

National Security Study
November 1984

*Mary P.
JA?*
This is not going on DPM

NOV 23 1984

LEADER'S GUIDE

EXAMINING U.S. OPTIONS IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD

This Leader's Guide is designed to assist Leagues in their "examination of the interdependent nature of IR program, including new and innovative ways to promote global security." It contains a suggested meeting outline, meeting-ready exercises, an optional community survey, selected resources, and an optional evaluation questionnaire to be returned by Leagues to the national office by April 30, 1985. While this Leader's Guide will make planning and conducting meetings easier, it also provides suggestions for using a nonmeeting approach to complete the examination. As background, the guide includes information on actual situations in which the LWVUS has applied IR statements of position to specific U.S. government actions, as well as on hypothetical situations that could arise in the future. The optional community survey is intended to help you gauge the level of community awareness of international issues and assess the potential for mobilizing public opinion and influencing public policy on these issues.

While this guide is intended as a meeting-ready tool, leaders should also refer to Impact on Issues (Pub. #386, \$3) and recent issues of Report from the Hill and mini-Report from the Hill in the National VOTER for more extensive discussions of LWVUS international relations positions and action. The new LWVEF publication, Promoting Peace: Agenda for Change (Pub. #542, \$1.25, 75¢ for members) provides background on recent trends and U.S. policy options in trade, development, international organizations, arms control, and military policy and defense spending.

You will note that the following outline for a 90-minute unit or general membership meeting is cross-referenced to the evaluation questionnaire (yellow). This format works best with groups of 20 people or less. If your group is much larger, you may want to break up into several sub-groups. Whether or not you hold a meeting, consider using materials in this Leader's Guide in the following ways:

- Reprint some of the historical examples or hypothetical situations in local bulletins and ask members to send their reactions to the IR chair, president or other League leaders. Reprint other sections of the guide, as appropriate.
- Develop a member survey based on the historical examples and hypothetical situations or the community survey.
- Ask a member to undertake the community survey, report his/her analysis in a bulletin, and invite comments. Ask the publicity chair to write a news story based on the survey for the local newspaper.
- Have the resource committee discuss the evaluation questionnaire and share the results with members.

League of Women Voters of the United States
1730 M Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036

SUGGESTED MEETING OUTLINE

I. Updating LWVUS IR Positions (Addresses Evaluation Questionnaire Part I.A.)10
min.

A. Start with some questions about recent LWVUS actions (see pages 5-6) in order to bring members up to date on LWVUS activities in the international arena. For example: "Did you know that the LWVUS opposes U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO? Do you know why?"

B. Present one or two of the historical examples (see pages 3-4) as a means of explaining current trends and developments affecting IR program issues. Ask participants what they think the LWVUS position was in these cases and why. Do members understand the underlying issues?

II. Interpreting LWVUS IR Positions (Questionnaire Part I.B.,C.)30
min.

Break up into small groups, with each focusing on one hypothetical situation (pages 7 - 9) in order to discuss how the LWVUS might respond. (You do not need to use all four of the examples.) After each small group has reported its responses to the entire group, assess how well your members understand the process of interpreting League positions. Are there any problems?

III. Preparing for the Future (Questionnaire Part II)25
min.

A. Ask participants to discuss elements or factors that promote "global security."

B. Highlight some of the common threads in the League's IR positions (interdependence, importance of developing countries to the United States, avoiding conflict, use of nonmilitary strategies, cooperation, etc.). How do LWVUS positions address issues of global security identified by the group? Are there important issues that the LWVUS positions do not address?

C. Ask participants to discuss any new and innovative proposals in the international relations field (i.e., those that have been suggested in one form or another but not implemented) that might contribute to global security? (See Promoting Peace: Agenda for Change.)

IV. Broadening Perspectives (Questionnaire Part III. A-D)10
min.

If your League has conducted a Community Survey (see attached) summarize these results. Give particular attention to the problems perceived by respondents as most pressing and to respondents' evaluations of the appropriate balance between military and nonmilitary U.S. policy options. If your League did not do the survey, you may want to ask meeting participants to respond to the interview questions.

V. Opportunities for Advocacy (Questionnaire Part IV)15
min.

Review briefly some of the organizations working on international issues (see attached). Emphasize national coalitions the League belongs to and local organizations with whom your League could work to organize events or develop a network. Discuss how inter-organization connections could be improved and how your League could mobilize public opinion on international issues and influence public policy through education and action.

Be sure to keep in mind how these activities could serve your membership, public relations and fund raising goals. For example:

- Expand or target your membership campaign to include local affiliates of other national organizations involved in IR issues. Be sure to highlight the League's special interest in this topic.
- As part of the community survey, consider interviewing important community leaders who also may be potential League members or donors.
- Write an upbeat analysis of your League's IR activities to demonstrate how citizens can tackle current foreign policy issues.

MEETING-READY EXERCISES: HISTORICAL EXAMPLES AND HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS

I. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES IN WHICH THE LWVUS APPLIED IR STATEMENTS OF POSITION TO SPECIFIC U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS.

Application of Development and United Nations Positions

In 1977 the U.S. House of Representatives considered two amendments to the foreign aid bill designed to place "strings" or conditions on U.S. direct (bilateral) and indirect (multilateral) economic aid. The proposed amendments prohibited the use of U.S. funds for the production of certain commodities that compete with U.S. agriculture (palm oil, citrus, sugar) and economic aid to "unfriendly" governments with alleged human rights abuses (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola, Cuba).

U.S. bilateral aid includes Agency for International Development (AID) programs to promote economic growth in developing countries through agriculture, population, health, education and energy projects. Multilateral aid is provided through U.S. contributions to economic and social development activities of the UN specialized agencies and voluntary programs and to the multilateral development banks (World Bank, International Development Association and the regional banks for Latin America, Asia, and Africa).

The LWVUS opposed the amendments because:

- they would have subverted the multilateral aid process by imposing conditions on the nonpolitical lending practices of the multilateral institutions. (The LWVUS development position advocates "reduced tied aid".);
- they violated the charters of the multilateral development banks and therefore would have forced them to refuse to accept vitally important U.S. funds; and
- the commodity restriction would have undermined economic growth in developing countries and the principle of free trade. (The LWVUS supports "a liberal U.S. trade policy" and advocates that U.S. policies "help less-developed countries reach self-sustaining economic growth.");
- Because the LWVUS does not have a specific position on international human rights, the League did not comment on the alleged human rights violations.

Application of Trade Position

In 1979 President Carter submitted legislation to Congress to implement the multilateral trade agreements negotiated under the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1974-1979). These negotiations resulted in reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers to trade. In some cases, the League would have preferred more liberal provisions (e.g., longer time periods for investigation of unfair trade practices) than were proposed in the implementing legislation, and the LWVUS did not have trade positions covering all of the provisions in the implementing legislation (e.g., customs valuation procedures and licensing requirements). However, the League supported the act because, on balance, it represented a "systematic reduction of tariff and nontariff trade barriers and promoted economic development at home and abroad, expanded consumer choice, and further advanced political harmony among nations."

Application of Arms Control Position

In 1984 the Reagan administration requested \$1.78 billion for FY 1985 to fund a new research and development program to explore the technological feasibility of building an effective defense against ballistic missile attack. The program, referred to as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), consolidated and expanded existing research efforts on ballistic missile defense. Although the LWVUS did not oppose basic research designed to provide insurance against Soviet development of ballistic missile defenses, the LWVUS opposed the SDI because: --it threatened to violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which prohibits the development and deployment of nationwide ballistic missile defenses. (The LWVUS supports arms control efforts to inhibit the further development and improvement of weapons and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to regions such as outer space); and --the SDI, if continued, would lead to a costly and destabilizing arms race in outer space.

Application of an LWVUS Domestic Position to an International Situation

In 1980 the Carter administration signed and sent to the Senate for ratification the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1979 after five years of consultation by various working groups. It called for national legislation to ban discrimination, recommended temporary special measures to speed equality in fact between men and women and advocated action to modify social and cultural patterns that perpetuate discrimination.

The LWVUS does not have a specific position on the worldwide elimination of discrimination against women; however, the LWVUS supported the Convention after deciding that its objectives coincided with those of LWVUS positions in support of the U.S. Equal Rights Amendment, affirmative action, equal access to jobs and education, and child care. LWVUS President Ruth Hinerfeld noted that this action marked the first occasion in which the LWVUS supported a UN convention based on League positions on domestic policy.

II. SUMMARY OF RECENT LWVUS IR ACTIONS

The LWVUS responds to and initiates contact with members of Congress (MCs) and Administration officials as the need arises or at opportune times in the decision making process. The following outline highlights LWVUS actions taken in the period between January 1983-December 1984. More information about these actions can be found in Report from the Hill and the mini-edition of R/H carried in the National VOTER. You may want to put some of these in your bulletin as background and have your members bring them to the meeting.

United Nations

A. Statements to various congressional committees (April, October and November 1983 and February and April 1984) urging support for U.S. contributions to the multilateral development banks, UN voluntary programs, and the UN and its specialized agencies. Response to efforts to sharply reduce U.S. funding in the FY 1984 and 1985 budgets. Basis for action: "The United States should support the UN and its specialized agencies and should provide financial contributions commensurate with its ability to pay."

B. Letters, testimony and telegrams to the President and Congress (March-May 1984) arguing that the U.S. government should suspend its notice of intent to withdraw from UNESCO and seek ways to achieve U.S. objectives within the organization. Prompted by the President's December 1983 announcement of U.S. intent to withdraw from UNESCO in one year unless substantial changes are made. Basis for action: "The United States should not place conditions on its participation in the UN except in the most extreme cases, such as flagrant violations of the Charter."

C. Telegram to the President (February 1984) urging support for UN Security Council efforts to establish peacekeeping forces in Beirut, Lebanon. Response to renewed Security Council deliberations on the Middle East and to hopeful signs of changing positions by Council members. Basis for action: "UN peacekeeping procedures should be strengthened and employed wherever possible."

D. Press release (April 1984) calling on the Administration to reverse its decision to suspend for two years the World Court's jurisdiction in disputes involving Central America. Basis for action: "World peace must rest in part on a body of international law developed through treaties, covenants, agreements and the judgments of international courts."

Trade

A. Letters and statements to MCs, testimony and articles (April 1983-May 1984) opposing the Fair Practices in Automotive Products Act, the so-called "domestic content" bill, requiring that specific percentages of U.S. parts and labor be used in imported automobiles sold in the United States.

Basis for action: "Implicit in the League's support of expanded trade is opposition to measures that impede trade: restrictive administrative procedures, quotas, Buy American provisions, and similar measures."

B. Memo to the House of Representatives (September 1983) urging reauthorization of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program for FY 1984-85, which was due to expire.

Basis for action: "Trade adjustment assistance should be made easily available to domestic firms and workers injured by import competition."

Development

A. Letter to the Commission on Security and Economic Assistance (August 1983) summarizing the League's positions on foreign assistance. Response to Commission's consideration of options for U.S. aid policy in the 1980's.

Basis for action: "The League believes that development assistance enhances the possibilities for world peace. . . favors programs with a focus on human needs which emphasize cooperative efforts by developed and developing countries and are long-range, adequately financed, effectively coordinated and administered."

B. Testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee (August 1983) in support of the extension of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) permitting duty-free treatment by the U.S. of certain goods produced by developing countries.

Basis for action: "Because of their need for greater access to U.S. and other industrialized countries' markets, the League favors generalized, temporary preferential tariff treatment and certain commodity arrangements for the less developed countries."

Military Policy and Defense Spending

A. Statements and telegrams to Congress and the President (May-October 1984) opposing MX missile funding. The FY 1985 defense authorization and appropriations bills were under consideration.

Basis for action: "The League does not support any modernization of the land leg (of the triad) that would result in weapons systems that are vulnerable or increase incentives to attack first."

Arms Control

A. Action Alert to Leagues, memos and letters to MCs (May-October 1984) opposing funding levels requested by the President for the Strategic Defense Initiative and calling for negotiations to ban anti-satellite weapons. The FY 1985 defense authorization and appropriations bills were under consideration.

Basis for action: "The LWVUS advocates limits on the spread or proliferation of weapons to inhibit transfers of nuclear technology or weapons from one nation to another or to a geographic region such as the seabed or outer space."

B. Participation in a press conference (August 1984) launching a global campaign to end nuclear weapons testing by August 6, 1985, forty years after the bombing of Hiroshima. The press conference was called by the Center for Defense Information.

Basis for action: "The League supports efforts to inhibit the development and improvement of weapons through qualitative limits, including limits on the testing of weapons."

III. HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATIONS OF LWVUS POSITIONS

This exercise is intended to help members understand the process that the national board goes through in interpreting LWVUS positions. (See In League, Pub #275, \$2.00, for the interpretive role of boards.) Some of the choices posed in these situations are extremely difficult; don't feel that you have to arrive at definitive conclusions or that all the examples must be used. Each situation is followed by questions drawing on the relevant LWVUS positions. It will be very helpful to have a copy of the International Relations section of Impact on Issues available during this discussion.

Application of Development and United Nations Positions

Suppose that the 1959 Antarctic Treaty were renegotiated and now awaits U.S. signature and ratification. In the original treaty, the United States, the Soviet Union and 12 other nations agreed to demilitarize the entire continent, outlaw nuclear explosions, protect the environment, pool scientific data and provide for on-site inspections. Developing nations had charged that the treaty was an "exclusive arrangement" that denied them access to the profits from exploitation of the continent and demanded renegotiation. The negotiated changes define the Antarctic region as part of the "common heritage" and provide for a new decision-making structure to govern prospecting and exploitation of the oil and mineral wealth of Antarctica and its continental shelf. The new agreement specifies the type and membership of a governing board that will determine policies and projects to be undertaken by an international corporation, voting procedures and means for financing projects and sharing profits. (See Promoting Peace: Agenda for Change for more on Antarctica.) What should be the LWVUS stance on U.S. signature and ratification of the revised treaty? Consider:

1. In what ways does the new treaty promote LWVUS development goals of economic growth, shared decision making and greater involvement of the private sector?
2. To what extent does the LWVUS need to balance or prioritize its interests in economic development, international cooperation and non-proliferation when considering the merits of the Treaty's revisions?
3. On what basis should the LWVUS judge the specific treaty provisions on voting schemes, representation, financial contributions and profit sharing?
4. Should the potential environmental hazards arising from mineral and oil exploration be a consideration in the LWVUS decision? (See hypothetical situation #3 for questions about applying domestic environmental positions to international situations.)

Application of United Nations Position

Suppose that the United States submitted notice of its intent to withdraw from the UN General Assembly unless substantial changes were made in voting procedures. In announcing its decision, the United States charges that the General Assembly has become politicized and anti-American, that

program budgets are out of control and that the Assembly no longer serves a productive function. The U.S. decision comes after completion of a congressionally mandated State Department report outlining the General Assembly's shortcomings and concluding that continued General Assembly membership no longer serves U.S. interests. The primary change in General Assembly voting practices demanded by the United States is abolition of the one-nation, one-vote principle and establishment of a voting system based on a combination of a nation's population, gross national product and financial contribution to the UN. The developing countries oppose such a change because it would reduce their voting power. What should be the LWVUS stance on the U.S. intent to withdraw and on the voting change demanded by the United States? Consider:

1. Does this announced U.S. intent to withdraw from the General Assembly promote or hinder the LWVUS goal of active and constructive participation in the UN?
2. Do the problems cited by the United States justify League support for the imposition of conditions on continued U.S. membership?
3. Does the LWVUS UN position contain a basis for judging proposed changes to the UN Charter?
4. Could the General Assembly's functions be accomplished by another international organization? If so, could the LWVUS support the work of that organization in place of the UN General Assembly?

Application of an LWVUS Domestic Position to an International Situation

Suppose that Senator Staple, an ardent environmentalist, proposed an amendment to the foreign aid bill stipulating that in order to receive U.S. bilateral economic aid, a country must demonstrate that its industries meet U.S. environmental standards set forth in the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts--the toughest standards of any nation. The measure threatens to tie up the foreign aid bill and aid supporters are worried that it will invite similar restrictions on U.S. contributions to multilateral institutions. What should be the LWVUS stance on this amendment? Consider:

1. Does LWVUS understanding warrant League support of the application of a domestic position promoting the wise management of resources in the public interest to U.S. policies toward other nations?
2. While protecting the environment, would the legislation have negative consequences on developing country growth by requiring potentially costly measures to reduce pollution?
3. How should the LWVUS balance the goals of environmental protection and economic growth in developing countries? If the two positions are viewed as conflicting, how should the LWVUS determine which is more important?
4. Does the legislation promote or hinder the LWVUS goal of shared decision making by development aid donors and recipients?
5. Could the same objectives be accomplished through cooperative efforts by multilateral organizations such as the UN Environment Program or an international conference on environmental quality?

Application of Military Policy and Defense Spending
and Arms Control Positions

Suppose that Congress were asked in 1985 to appropriate funds for new, sophisticated and expensive conventional weapons for NATO defense. The proposal reflects a new strategy of attacking Warsaw Pact forces behind the line of battle in order to delay or stop reinforcements, in contrast to the former emphasis on repelling forces after they have invaded NATO territory. Factors that have led to making this proposal include advances in weapons technology, doubts about NATO's existing ability to wage conventional defense, and growing aversion to NATO's heavy reliance on nuclear weapons for defense. (See also Promoting Peace: Agenda for Change for more background.) What should be the LWVUS stance?

Consider:

1. Does the LWVUS position supporting NATO's conventional defense imply a general goal that must also be examined in light of further considerations such as efficiency and effectiveness, or does it imply a blanket endorsement to all proposals to strengthen conventional defense?
2. In light of the fact that the LWVUS position specifies no particular level of defense spending, is there a basis for judging the cost of these new weapons (e.g., readiness over investment; savings through efficiency; defense spending in relation to other national needs)?
3. Would support of these new weapons further the LWVUS goal of reduced NATO reliance on nuclear weapons?
4. Would support of these weapons help or hinder the LWVUS goal of negotiated reductions in conventional forces in Europe?
5. Would NATO's deployment of such weapons promote or detract from the LWVUS arms control goals of building confidence and promoting stability?

APPENDICES

The following sections comprise the remainder of this Leader's Guide:

Optional Community Survey

Organizations

Selected Resources

Optional Evaluation Questionnaire (yellow)

SELECTED RESOURCES

I. General

Atlas of the United States Foreign Relations. U.S. Department of State. 1983. Stock #S/N 044-000-01973-6. \$5.00. Published by the U.S. Department of State, 1983. Order from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20420. Contains maps and charts illustrating executive branch foreign policy making machinery, international organizational relationships, world economy statistics, trends in trade and investment, and development assistance.

North-South: A Program for Survival. The Brandt Commission, 1980 (MIT Press, 28 Carleton Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, \$4.95); Common Crisis. The Brandt Commission, 1983 (MIT Press, \$5.95). Reports of an independent investigation by a group of international statesmen and leaders into the problems of inequality in the world and the failure of its economic system. The reports make a series of bold recommendations, including a new approach to international finance and ways to deal with the global economic crisis and avert economic collapse.

II. Trade and Development

Agenda 1985. Overseas Development Council (see organizational listing for address). \$12.95. Biannual analysis of U.S.-Third World relations, including recent policy changes and options for the future. Available January 1985. Agenda 1983. \$9.95. Available now.

The Intemperate Zone. Richard E. Feinberg, 1983. (Overseas Development Council, see organizational listing for address). \$6.95 paperback. An analysis of U.S.-Third World relations containing a series of proposals and recommendations for the future.

The Trade Policy Debate. Jeffrey J. Schott, 1984. (Council on U.S. International Trade Policy, Suite 400, 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036.) Free. A trade policy briefing book that outlines 12 arguments for protectionism and examines whether they offer viable and realistic alternatives to the open trade system, concluding that "the consequences of protectionism caution against resorting to such 'quick fix' solutions."

World Development Report 1984. (The World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433.) \$8.00. Annual statistical analysis of development trends, including trade flows, official development assistance levels and private investment. Also contains extensive recommendations and special attention to population issues.

III. International Organizations

A World Without a UN. The Heritage Foundation, 1984 (see organizational listing for address). \$8.00. A compendium of essays examining UN activities in economic development, health, environment, education, world food supply, human rights, disarmament and peacekeeping. Concludes that the "record reveals that in general the world without a UN may be a better world."

U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO. (House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2170 RHOB, Washington, DC 20515.) Free. Hearings before the House Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on International Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs. 98th Congress, 2nd Session. Record of testimony and statements regarding U.S. participation in UNESCO from government officials and organizations representing diverse viewpoints. Limited quantity available.

Issues Before the 39th General Assembly. United Nations Association-USA, 1984. (see organization listing for address). \$10.00. Brief description of pending issues with succinct history of previous actions.

IV. Arms Control and Military Policy

Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982. (Simon and Schuster, 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020). \$5.95. Report by an international group of government officials on ways to break the arms race impasse and find a way to achieve common security. Proposals include nuclear weapons-free zones and strengthening of UN peacekeeping operations, among others.

On the Front Lines. UNA-USA, 1984. (see organizational listing for address). \$4.50. A briefing book for the second annual UNA-USA study of multilateral issues and institutions focusing on UN mechanisms for peacekeeping, including case studies. (Single copy sent to all state and local League presidents in October 1984.)

A Report on the Impact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty. Thomas K. Longstreth and John E. Pike, 1984. (National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, 1346 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 903, Washington, DC 20036). \$3.00. An analysis of current "star wars" programs prepared for the Campaign.

The Security Project, Principal Report. (World Policy Institute, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017). Inquire for price. Principal report of a five to ten year program to reassess current U.S. security policies and offer practical alternatives. Available February 1985.

"Two Paths to Stability in Europe," F.A.S. Public Interest Report, vol. 37, no. 5, May 1984. (Federation of American Scientists, 307 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002). \$2.00. An analysis of proposals for NATO conventional force modernization and alternative defense strategies.

Weapons and Hope. Freeman Dyson, 1984. (Harper and Row Bookstores, 10 E. 53rd Street, New York, NY 10022.) \$17.95. An analysis of the current nuclear impasse that proposes complete nuclear disarmament followed by construction of non-nuclear space defense.

What About the Russians--and Nuclear War? Ground Zero, 1983. (Pocket Books, 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020). \$3.95. An analysis of present Soviet nuclear policy from the perspective of Russian history and culture.

V. Global Resources

Building a Sustainable Society. Lester R. Brown, 1981. (Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036). Also may be available at bookstores. \$6.95 paperback. Outlines the steps to a sustainable society in the areas of population, resources and renewable energy.

Fate of the Earth. Jonathan Schell, 1982. (Avon Books, 959 8th Avenue, New York, NY 10019.) \$2.50. Author argues that full-scale use of nuclear weapons would lead to extinction of humankind.

The Resourceful Earth. Julian Simon and Herman Kahn, 1984. (Basil Blackwell, 432 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016). \$19.95. Challenges the findings of the Global 2000 Report, arguing that the world in 2000 will be "less crowded, less polluted, more stable ecologically, and less vulnerable to resource-supply disruption than the world we live in now."

VI. Journals

Foreign Affairs. Published five times a year by the Council on Foreign Relations. Subscription Department: P.O. Box 2615, Boulder, CO 80321. Annual subscription, \$22.00. Single copies, \$4.95. Recent editions contain articles on "The Nuclear Debate," "Can the Soviet Union Reform?" "The United Nations: The Tarnished Image," "A Monetary System for the Future" (Fall 1984); "Trade and Debt: the Vital Linkage" and "The American Trade Deficit" (Summer 1984); a series of articles on "The Star Wars Debate" and "The Rise, Fall and Future of Detente" (Winter 1983/84).

Foreign Policy. Published quarterly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Subscription Department: P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, New York 11737. Annual subscription, \$17.00. Single copies, \$5.00. Recent editions contain articles on "The Superpowers: Freeze or Flux" (Fall 1984); "The New Soviet Challenge" and "The Old Russian Legacy" (Summer 1984); "Swapping with the Empire" and "Stabilizing Star Wars" (Spring 1984); and "Reagan Through Soviet Eyes" (Fall 1983).

VII. ORGANIZATIONS WITH LEGISLATIVE NEWSLETTERS

Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy. A coalition of 55 national religious, professional, peace, research and social action organizations working for a noninterventionist and demilitarized U.S. foreign policy. Membership: \$20. 712 G Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003.

Consumers for World Trade. A national membership organization representing consumer interests in free trade. Membership: \$20. 1346 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036.

League of Women Voters of the United States. Report from the Hill. Obtain from League Action Service. Subscription: \$12.00/congressional session. \$2.00/single copy.

UNA-USA Washington Office. UNA-USA's office that monitors on a weekly basis congressional and executive branch actions affecting the UN. Subscription to UNA-USA Weekly Report: \$40. 1010 Vermont Avenue, NW, #904, Washington, DC 20005.

World Federalist Association. A national membership association working to promote global solutions to world problems. Current focus is on nuclear weapons disarmament strategies. Membership: \$20. 418 7th Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003.

OPTIONAL COMMUNITY SURVEY

By taking an inventory of local resources that have international connections (Part I) and interviewing selected residents in your community (Part II), your League can gauge the level of community awareness of international issues and assess the potential for education and action-oriented programs. This kind of survey also is an opportunity to make important contacts with community leaders and the media, and to give visibility to help achieve results on U.S. foreign policy. You might consider using the results to:

- meet with the local newspaper editor or television program manager to promote broader coverage of international issues and U.S. foreign policy;
- write a League column or editorial encouraging citizens to see the international connections in your community;
- meet with your member of Congress to stress the importance of foreign policy decisions on your district or state;
- capitalize on local interest in international issues to press for editorial coverage of LWVUS IR program concerns;
- serve on panels, talk shows or as guest speaker at meetings at other organizations to demonstrate the League's interest in international issues and to mobilize public opinion on a foreign policy topic;
- hold a town meeting on international issues.

Preferably, this two-part optional survey should be conducted before any membership or public meetings on the first part of the National Security study. See the Meeting Outline Part IV for suggested ways to use the results of the Evaluation Questionnaire. You may want to tailor the questions to the area in which you live; don't feel that you have to use them all.

Part I: Taking Inventory of Local International Connections

A. List businesses or organizations in your community with international connections (use the Yellow Pages as a resource). Consider: businesses with overseas affiliates; churches with missionaries abroad; commercial importers or exporters; study or exchange programs; defense-related industry or military bases; community groups with cultural, religious or political relationships abroad; immigrant or refugee centers.

B. Take a random sampling of international connections in your community. For example, count the number of foreign cars in the supermarket parking lot; total the number of ethnic restaurants in town; check the proportion of the library budget that goes to purchase books about foreign policy, other cultures or nations; keep track of features, editorials or news items on foreign affairs in the local newspaper during one week; estimate how far people have to travel to make connections for overseas flights; find out whether your members of Congress sit on any foreign affairs-related committees; determine if a world affairs topic has been on the agenda of any civic organization in the last year. Are there major defense contractors in your congressional district?

C. Monitor school activities. What courses or programs are offered in world affairs, foreign languages, English as a second language, Model UN, student exchange programs? At what levels? Number of students participating?

Part II: Interviews

A. Instructions:

Try to set up interviews with at least four people in your community with different backgrounds or professions (exclude League members). For continuity, the same person should conduct all four interviews; your League can do as many sets of four interviews as you wish. Allow about 30 minutes per interview. While face-to-face interviews are preferable, it may be more practical in some cases to use the telephone. The following questions are derived from interview questions contained in U.S. National Security: Facts and Assumptions (LWVEF Pub. #538, \$2.25, \$1.50 for members). Agenda for Security congressional candidate debate brochure (LWVEF Pub. #541, \$2.00, \$.60 for members). The underlined question is the primary one; the follow-up questions help to round out the response. During the interview, jot down key phrases to help you remember what was said and write out answers more fully later.

B. Interview

I am _____, a member of the League of Women Voters of _____. This survey is part of a national League project aimed at finding out more about what people think about foreign affairs and global problems. We want to get your ideas about the issues--ideas that don't necessarily show up in the public opinion polls. This survey isn't a scientific sampling, and while some of the responses may be reported, your name will not be used.

1. What do you consider to be the most pressing international problems facing the United States over the next ten years? What do you think about U.S.-Soviet military competition and the nuclear arms race? dwindling global energy supplies? poverty and social unrest in developing countries? environmental degradation? economic problems?
2. In light of these problems, what do you think the United States should do? Does the United States have interests to protect and promote abroad? If so, which are the most important? Can the United States protect its interest alone, or do we need to develop and maintain alliances and other means of cooperation, such as the United Nations?
3. What do you think should be the function of military power in fulfilling the world role of the United States? What are the uses and limits of nuclear/conventional weapons?
4. What strategies do you think are useful in fulfilling the world role of the United States? In what ways can foreign aid, trade and investment policies and United Nations activities promote U.S. interests in developing countries? Are there ways we can learn more about the Soviet Union and build a more cooperative relationship? How important are these strategies relative to military strength?
5. How important are these international issues to you and to our community?
6. What is your main source of information about foreign and military affairs? What would you be willing to do to learn more about these issues? What kinds of information do you most need and want to learn? Do you belong to any groups that are active in international affairs? Have you ever written your members of Congress or the local newspaper, or called a talk show to express your views on a foreign policy topic?
7. Do you have any other general comments or concerns that you would like to add?

LWVUS
1730 M St., NW
Washington, DC 20036

EXAMINING U.S. OPTIONS IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD

OPTIONAL EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

POSTMARK DEADLINE: April 30, 1985.

LWV of _____ Local League Code # _____
(Local League name) (State)

NAME, POSITION AND ADDRESS OF INDIVIDUAL COMPLETING FORM:

(name) (position)

(street address)

(City, State, zip)

BASIS OF RESPONSE: (Meeting, survey, bulletin tear-off, etc.)

ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF MEMBERS INVOLVED _____ NO. OF MEMBERS IN YOUR
LEAGUE _____

HOW USEFUL WERE THE MATERIALS IN THIS LEADER'S GUIDE? VERY _____
SOMEWHAT _____ NOT USEFUL _____ EXPLAIN: _____

Please record and attach all responses to the following questions on a separate sheet of paper. (You do not need to repeat the questions; simply use the appropriate roman numeral.)

This questionnaire is designed to assess your members' understanding of how the national board interprets positions, to identify similarities and differences between League and community interests, and to determine how League program can be shaped to respond to your interests and needs. While no statement of position will result, we will put together a summary of responses. This summary may be used to develop League program proposals, testimony, field service and technical assistance, as appropriate. You should keep in mind ways to use your own responses for promoting local public relations, fundraising, membership, education and action programs and projects.

The questions are open ended to allow flexibility in responding, but are linked to the subject areas in the meeting outline and the community survey. Try to encourage as broad a range of opinion as possible. Don't feel that you must answer all the questions. The questionnaire is not part of a member agreement process and your local League board does not need to approve or ratify the questionnaire results.

I. Updating and Interpreting LWVUS IR positions

- A. Do your League members have a low, moderate or high degree of understanding of current trends and developments affecting IR program issues? Explain.
- B. What specific problems did your members express in trying to understand the process of interpreting LWVUS positions?

II. Preparing for the Future

- A. How do your members describe or define global security?
- B. Do your members understand the League process of translating philosophical goals (e.g., promoting peace) into specific actions on trade, development, international organizations, arms control and military policy? Explain.
- C. Did your members identify areas in which the LWVUS can take action based on existing positions but hasn't? Are there international issues of interest to your members on which the LWVUS can't take action based on existing positions? Explain.
- D. What specific proposals to promote global security are the most important?

III. Community Survey

- A. Does your community rank low, moderate or high in terms of international connections? Explain your ranking.
- B. What international problems concern residents the most? How do they view the use of military and nonmilitary actions to resolve international problems? How do they view the issue of U.S.-Soviet relations? Describe any significant contradictions in these views.
- C. How would you compare the community's general level of international (See Part I.A.)
- D. What kinds of educational or lobbying activities do you think people in your community would support with time and resources?

IV. Opportunities for Advocacy

What plans does your League have to mobilize public opinion on international issues through education and action?

SEP 24 1984

League of Women Voters of the United States 1730 M Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036 Tel. (202) 429-1965



memorandum

TO: State and Local League Presidents
FROM: Joan Rich, National Security Study Chair
RE: The National Security Study
DATE: 12 September 1984

This is going on DPM.

This memo outlines the calendar (also printed in the August Post Board Summary) and plans for the first year of the National Security study. Since this information was not available when the last PROSPECTUS (vol. 3, #1) was written, we are providing details here. Please share this memo with the person responsible for the National Security study in your League.

CALENDAR

1984

October Substantive publication, Promoting Peace: Agenda for Change distributed to Leagues.
Early No- Leader's Guide containing meeting-ready materials, background information and option-
vember al questionnaire sent to Leagues.

1985

Late Fe- NS Study Committee meets to develop scope and consensus questions for second year
bruary (U.S./Third World).
March Board adopts consensus questions.
April 30 Deadline for return of optional questionnaires.
June Study publication and Leader's Guide distributed to Leagues.

1986

January 15 Deadline for return of consensus forms.
Late Febru- NS Study Committee meets to evaluate consensus reports.
ary
March Board announces statement of position.

SCOPE

During the first year of the study members will "Examine the interdependent nature of International Relations program, including new and innovative ways to promote global security." (In the second year, members will "Evaluate U.S. economic and military aid to developing countries and its relationship to our international economic and political interests.")

The following definitions explain the meaning of significant elements of the first year scope:

Examine--review and discuss, without trying to achieve member agreement.

Interdependent nature--the theme that unites all areas of IR program and demonstrates their interrelatedness.

International Relations program--the five areas of League IR program: trade, development, international organizations, arms control, and military policy and defense spending.

New and innovative--proposals that have been put forth but not implemented.

Global security--a term that describes the interdependence of interests of all nations.

Three components will comprise the "examination" phase.

Information: Leagues will be provided background on trends and developments affecting the five areas of IR program, and background on LWVUS action on IR program. A substantive publication, Promoting Peace: Agenda for Change, and a Leader's Guide will be ready soon (see

more on these below).

Discussion: While no member agreement will be taken during this first part of the study, Leagues should try to hold one discussion meeting--either general or unit--on the examination phase, as a means of stimulating thinking and exchange about the issues and about League action. In order to facilitate this discussion, the Leader's Guide will include meeting-ready exercises (see below).

Feedback mechanism: Leagues will have an opportunity to evaluate member views in a questionnaire (see below).

MATERIALS

Substantive publication: Promoting Peace: Agenda for Change reviews trends and developments affecting international organizations, trade, development and arms policies, including proposals for changes and adjustments. Available mid-October.

Leader's Guide: A resource committee tool containing meeting-ready exercises, background information on League IR program and bibliography. Two meeting-ready exercises will be outlined: community survey and scenarios. The survey is an optional exercise based on informal interviews in the community; it can be used during the meeting as a discussion starter. The survey process was used by participants in the June 1983 National Security conference and is explained in detail in National Security: Facts and Assumptions (Pub. #538, \$1.50). The scenario section will be in two parts: 1) Historical scenarios will describe how the LWVUS interpreted IR positions in specific cases. 2) Hypothetical scenarios will give Leagues an opportunity to discuss how the IR positions could be interpreted. In order to help answer these questions, a selected listing of LWVUS action on IR issues and description of groups that the LWVUS works with on these issues will be included. The bibliography will be annotated. The questionnaire will be attached. Available early November.

Questionnaire: This evaluation tool is intended to stimulate discussion at the local level and provide an opportunity for Leagues to let the LWVUS know their views. The open-ended questions will ask for an evaluation of community awareness of international issues (if a community survey is done) and member understanding of the IR positions and the process of interpreting them. The questionnaire will also give Leagues an opportunity to convey to the LWVUS their members' views on global security. The deadline for responding is April 30, 1985. The responses will be analyzed and reported in some form, yet to be determined. Since this is not a consensus process, no statement of position will result. The analysis will, however, be used by the LWVUS and LWVEF in developing proposals, testimony, field service programs and technical assistance projects, as appropriate.

NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

The members of the National Security Committee are:

Joan Rich, Chair
7500 Devon Court
Atascadero, CA 93422
(805) 466-2499

Linda Moscarella
West Lake Road
Tuxedo Park, NY 10987
(914) 351-2654


Judy Duffy
505 Lake Avenue
Birchwood, MN 55220
(612) 429-7903

Sloane Robbins (as of October 17:)
654 Cypress Way E.
Naples, FL 33942
(813) 597-8600

Ginny Higgins
Route 3, Box 112
Pelham, NH 03076
(603) 635-7025

Edith Segall
Woodlands Road
Harrison, NY 10528
(914) 967-0523

Laureen Andrews and Alice Hughey are staff members of the Committee and can be contacted at the national office.



Copies:
Carpenter
Albers
LAD
S.O.

League of Women Voters of Texas
1212 Guadalupe Suite 109 • Austin, Texas 78701 • Tel. 512/472-1100

August 27, 1984

The Honorable John Tower
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Tower:

The League of Women Voters of Texas is very concerned about the defense appropriations bill due to be debated in the next several weeks. We believe it is imperative that the level of funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative not exceed \$1.1 billion for FY 1985. While this amount would permit on-going research in ballistic missile defense technologies, it would not risk violating provisions of the ABM Treaty.

League members throughout Texas have expressed great fear of a costly and destabilizing arms race in ballistic missile defense systems. Our members have indicated that they believe U.S. national security interests are served, not by programs such as the SDI that threaten to escalate the arms race, but by mutual restraint and negotiations to achieve arms reductions.

The League of Women Voters of Texas urges your thoughtful consideration of this most important foreign policy issue.

Sincerely,

Lois Carpenter

Lois Carpenter
President

LC:jl

Also sent to:
Bentsen
Hightower
Loeffler
Wilson

SDI
Page Three

- o The Strategic Defense Initiative is on a collision course with the ABM Treaty and, if pursued, will lead to violations and eventual abrogation of the treaty;
- o Abrogation of the ABM Treaty will lead to a costly and destabilizing arms race in space weapons;
- o The Strategic Defense Initiative holds out a false hope to the public that an effective defense against nuclear attack can be achieved through technological means and, thereby, undermines efforts to achieve arms control;
- o The \$26 billion proposed for this program over the next five years may be only a down-payment on a program estimated in the hundreds of billions while the technological feasibility of such a system has already been seriously questioned by leading scientists across the nation;
- o Programs for research and development of ballistic missile defense technologies should be limited to providing a hedge against a Soviet break with the treaty and to the pursuit of information needed for potential future treaty negotiations;
- o U.S. national security interests are served, not by programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative that threaten to escalate the arms race, but by mutual restraint and negotiations to achieve arms reductions.

The members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees are listed in the enclosed memorandum to state and local League presidents. Please note the corrected vote on the MX and SDI for the members of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Action Alert

SPOTMASTER: For the latest developments on League issues, call Spotmaster (202) 296-0218 from 5 pm on Friday to 5 pm on Monday (EST)

AUG 20 1984

This is going on DPM

August 14, 1984

TO: State and Local League Presidents
FROM: Dorothy S. Ridings, President, and Julia A. Holmes, Legislative Action Chair
RE: The Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars)

ACTION URGENTLY NEEDED

The House and Senate Appropriations Committees are expected to markup the defense appropriations bill when Congress reconvenes on September 4. Congress must pass a defense appropriations bill by October 1, the beginning of the new fiscal year. Amendments will be offered in committee and, if necessary, on the floor to limit funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Administration's new space weapons research and development program, dubbed "star wars" by the press. The League supports a cap on funding for the SDI at the Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 level, plus inflation, plus 5% real growth, or approximately \$1.1 billion. Capping funding for the SDI will signal a clear rejection of the Administration's program while continuing to permit on-going research in ballistic missile defense technologies, consistent with the provisions of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

The Reagan Administration wants to spend \$26 billion in the next five years on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Administration's FY 1985 request is for \$1.78 billion and that request is expected to be doubled again next year. The SDI is intended to explore the feasibility of developing a nationwide ballistic missile defense, or ABM, system using space-based and space-directed kinetic and directed-energy weapons -- weapons designed to destroy ballistic missiles in various stages of flight.

Imagine if you will, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) ready to be fired from a silo in the Soviet Union. The missile is fired. For the first 3 to 5 minutes it's in its initial thrust stage. Then it leaves the atmosphere in a high arc, separates into a number of different warheads and these warheads reenter the atmosphere aimed at a variety of targets in the United States. Multiply this one ICBM by 1,000 more, many with multiple warheads and all fired at about the same time. The SDI proposes to explore the development of a weapons system that could effectively destroy these nuclear weapons before they reach their targets.

SDI

Page Two

The weapons system envisioned in the SDI involves ground-based and space-based laser and space-based particle beam (or directed-energy) weapons, as well as the more conventional kinetic energy weapons (weapons that destroy something by crashing into them). Presumably space-based weapons would be used to destroy the ICBMs during the initial thrust stage; and if that is not completely successful, the space weapons would try to destroy the multiple warheads in the atmosphere; and if that is not completely successful, the ground-based weapons would try to destroy whatever is left over. After this, if some warheads still get through, the population would have to rely on civil defense shelters. This is the point where the issue of the degree of effectiveness, or survivability rate, of the system begins to be debated. The idea of a perfect defense has already been rejected even by most proponents of the program. In addition, the technology for some of the SDI weapons is very futuristic and development is a long way off. The costs for actually developing such a "multi-layered" system have been estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

The idea of developing ballistic missile defenses is not new. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were moving in this direction in the 1960s when leaders of both nations decided that an arms race in defensive weapons would be too costly and destabilizing. In 1972, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, explicitly prohibiting both nations from developing a nation-wide ballistic missile defense system. The treaty specifically limits the ABM capability of each nation, including permissible research and development activity. Since then, limited but on-going research in ballistic missile defense technologies has been considered necessary to act as a hedge against a Soviet break with the treaty as well as to provide the information necessary to negotiate effective treaties governing these technologies in the future.

In March 1983, President Reagan announced a major departure from the principles and understandings embodied in the treaty by stating his intent to initiate a space weapons program "to render nuclear weapons obsolete." The SDI is the result of that announcement and its purpose flies in the face of the ABM Treaty. If pursued, accelerated research and development programs included in the SDI will, undoubtedly, lead to violations of the ABM Treaty. The technological success of such an effort has already been seriously questioned by leading scientists across the nation. The SDI holds out the false hope that a nuclear war may be survivable or winnable through technological means and undermines efforts to achieve arms control. The ABM Treaty is generally regarded as the most important arms control agreement since the advent of nuclear weapons. U.S. abrogation of the treaty would deliver a crippling blow to the future of arms control. (For additional information on the SDI, see Report From The Hill and the August 1984 edition of Prospectus.)

WHAT YOU SHOULD DO

Congress is in recess from August 11 until September 4. Contact your members at home over the recess and after they return to Washington. Especially be sure to contact members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Tell them that the League is opposed to the direction and intent of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Urge them to support a cap on funding for this program at FY '84 levels, or approximately \$1.1 billion, when they consider the defense appropriations bill. Tell your members that:



League of Women Voters Education Fund 1730 M Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036 Tel (202) 429-1965

memorandum

JAN 9 1984

JA
LA
Marlene
Mason
SOV

TO: State and Local League Presidents

This is not going on DPM.

FROM: Dorothy K. Powers, National Security Study Chair

JAN 4 1984

RE: Enclosed Materials

Will get to Jan 4
copy for JA

You will find in this special mailing several training and education materials on national security issues that we hope you will share with the appropriate state or local League board members. The workshop outline (including several key charts and graphs) and audio cassette program were prepared by the League of Women Voters Education Fund with grants from The Rockefeller Foundation and Exxon Corporation as part of The Nation-wide Citizen Education Project on National Security Issues. This multi-faceted project was established by the LWVEF in June 1982, one month after delegates to the LWVUS national convention adopted a study of national security issues as a program priority in the 1982-84 biennium. The project is designed to parallel the League's national security study, but also to support your broader public education activities. In order to facilitate your community-wide efforts, and in response to requests for such information, Communications Chair Rosalind McGee and I have collaborated on the enclosed memo outlining tips for marketing the audio cassette program, "National Security: Not for Experts Only."

The decision to seek funding for the development of these materials emerged from recommendations made by state League leaders who participated in the June 1983 LWVEF conference on "National Security: Facts and Assumptions." At the conclusion of the two and one-half day conference, the League participants stressed the importance of undertaking public education activities that seek to improve and strengthen citizen understanding of military policy and defense spending issues. Toward that end, participants repeatedly referred to the "citizen framework" that was developed throughout the Conference. The enclosed materials are an attempt to implement that recommendation.

I also want to stress that the League's involvement in education activities related to national security issues is only beginning. The workshop kit and charts, and audio cassette program can be adapted and used during and after the League's National Security study as a refresher course for members, a community-wide program, a school workshop, or as leadership training for other organizations. The possibilities are unlimited.

If you would like more information about these materials or how to use them, please contact International Relations Department staff specialist Deborah Goldman.

Program Description

(audio cassette tape)

LWVEF
1730 M St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

TITLE: "National Security: Not for Experts Only"

LENGTH: 28:54 minutes

MODE: Mono

PRODUCER: League of Women Voters Education Fund

AVAILABILITY: Free to any station

STATION USE RIGHTS: Unlimited

FUNDING: The Rockefeller Foundation, The Exxon Corporation,
The Johnson Foundation

ON-AIR CREDIT: Included in the program

SOURCE: Deborah Goldman, League of Women Voters Education Fund,
1730 M Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036

DESCRIPTION: A lively, concise and balanced presentation of a "citizens' framework" for grappling with the current national security debate. The program blends music with the voices of citizens, administration officials and independent defense analysts in order to demystify issues of U.S. military policy and defense spending. In so doing, the program brings reason and objectivity to this emotionally-charged topic, and offers citizens a guide for participating in national security policy-making. Guest speakers include General Harry Griffith, Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, Professor William Kaufmann, long-time consultant to the Pentagon, and Larry Smith, Executive Director of Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs.

Key Questions Raised in "National Security: Not for Experts Only"

1. What is the nature of national security? How does one evaluate its military and non-military components?
2. What is the United States' role in the world and what interests are vital to the United States around the globe?
3. What is the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship? How important is the alliance system? How should the United States respond to Third World conflicts?
4. What are the uses and limitations of military force in promoting U.S. interests abroad?
5. Which approach is most valuable in evaluating the military force needs of the United States?
 - the "threat" oriented or perception of strength approach?
 - the functionalist approach?
 - the approach that examines the effects of military spending on the economy?

JAN 4 1984

JA
LA
SO ✓
Marken

LWV-Texas
Council 1984

The following resolution was drafted by Texans for a Bilateral Nuclear Weapons Freeze.

LWV-Texas is encouraging voters to present it for adoption at their precinct conventions on May 5.

The resolution has been approved by LWVUS.

"Quick Freeze" Resolution

WHEREAS, There is no cure for nuclear war, only prevention; and

WHEREAS, The use of even a small fraction of the nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union could trigger a nuclear winter which human life on earth might not survive; and

WHEREAS, The massive build-up of nuclear weapons arsenals since 1979 by both the United States and the Soviet Union, especially the deployment of first strike weapons, has led the two nations away from meaningful negotiations to freeze and then reduce nuclear weapons; and

WHEREAS, Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have the national technical means to monitor and verify each other's testing of nuclear explosives underground as well as to monitor and verify each other's flight testing of ballistic missiles (such as the MX, SS-20, Pershing II, SS-X-24, etc.); now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, That the President of the United States should propose to the new leadership of the Soviet Union an immediate, mutual, and verifiable "Quick Freeze" moratorium on the underground testing of nuclear explosives and on the flight testing and deployment of ballistic missiles in order to lessen tensions between the superpowers; and, be it further

RESOLVED, That the President should negotiate with the new leadership of the Soviet Union to produce a bilateral and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to be followed by negotiations to reduce the nuclear weapons arsenals of both superpowers.

4/13/84

TO: Public Relations Chairman/
LL Presidents; DPM

FROM: Lavora Arizaga, Comm. Rel. VP,
LWV-Texas
[REDACTED]

LWV-Texas
January 1984
LL Pres. Mailing; DPM
S.
Public Relations

RE: CITIZEN EDUCATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY

In early January every local League received an audio cassette tape entitled "National Security: Not for Experts Only." With the tape came marketing tips for local Leagues to use to get the program aired as widely as possible. There are two key marketing strategies to keep in mind: 1) establish personal contact with the public radio station in your area, and 2) present a local angle for the program.

The LWVUS-EF has arranged for this national security program to be aired on approximately 250 public radio stations around the country on Tuesday, February 21, 1984 from 3:00 to 3:29 p.m. (EST) and at a later date in early June.

The job of local Leagues with public radio stations is to convince those stations to pick up the program broadcast by national and tape it for broadcast at a later date. As some of you share a public radio station, we are asking the following local Leagues to be responsible for contacting the indicated stations by the end of January or as soon thereafter as possible.

AUSTIN:	KUT(FM)	DALLAS:	KERA(FM)
BEAUMONT:	KVLU(FM)	EL PASO:	KTEP(FM)
COLLEGE STATION:	KAMU(FM)	HOUSTON:	KUHF(FM) or KPFT(FM)
CORPUS CHRISTI:	KKED(FM)		

We don't have a local League in Commerce which has KETR(FM), or in Killeen which has KNCT(FM). Are there any volunteers to contact these stations? KGNC is not a public radio station but might be interested in carrying the program. How about contacting KGNC, Amarillo?

PLEASE let us know who will broadcast the program and when. Make an original and two copies of the report that the national League office asked for. Send the original to national, one copy to the state office, and save one copy for your file.

#

What Can One Person Do?

Be a Freeze Leader.

In 1984, the bilateral Freeze has been thrust into the foreground of issues that surround the presidential and congressional elections. Hart-Mondale jockeying for pre-eminence on the Freeze issue is evidence that it is now etched on the national agenda, a key priority for the new government to deal with.

Texas political precinct meetings, May 5th, are **the** key opportunity to reveal widespread support in Texas for the bilateral Freeze.

You can help. Because you can lead.

- ¶ Introduce the bilateral 'quickFreeze' resolution into your neighborhood precinct meeting.
- ¶ Urge that delegates from your precinct to the District Meeting on May 19th declare their support for the bilateral Freeze.

Mail this card today and receive your precinct 'Freeze Leader' kit.

NAME

ORGANIZATION

ADDRESS

PHONE(S)

CITY/STATE/ZIP

There is no cure for nuclear war. Only prevention. Between now and May 5th, you can take this simple step to help prevent nuclear war: Be a precinct 'Freeze Leader.'

A U.S./Soviet bilateral agreement to Freeze testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons is the **first step** toward reducing the risk of nuclear war and reducing nuclear arsenals.

*Your 20¢ stamp
saves a 38¢
postage fee.*



NO POSTAGE
NECESSARY
IF MAILED
IN THE
UNITED STATES

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL

FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 1193 FT. WORTH, TEXAS

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE

TEXANS FOR A BILATERAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE

Precinct 'Freeze Leader' HQ
600 West 28th Street, Room 106
Austin, Texas 78705



Joann - I was sending the original
to SO because I misread the
above line. I thought this memo had
only gone to Presidents & State Lgs
& ILO's. I thought you would
need to copy & send to locals -
Thank goodness not! Lois

Original to SO
Copies: LC
MB
DS
RR
CF

TEXAS

Precinct Freeze Leader.

**What One Person Can Do
To Prevent Nuclear War
Kit.**

TEXANS^{FOR A}
BILATERAL
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
FREEZE

One person, either by yourself or with your friends, can do something right now that will help prevent nuclear war. That's because we still live in a democracy. Democracy operates on the principle that political power is accessible to the common citizen. Since over 70% of all Americans favor a bilateral nuclear 'freeze,' if each of us will just use the political power accessible to us...
...government will eventually respond by achieving the nuclear 'freeze' we seek.

Sometimes, it's frustrating. The president has closed his ears and the White House is inaccessible to most Americans. Although they're supposed to be accessible, the Halls of Congress are out of reach to most people, too.


But, we hire them and they will listen if we only use the political system properly. Contrary to popular belief, citizen political power doesn't begin at the ballot box. It begins at the neighborhood precinct meeting. In Texas, choosing a presidential nominee begins at the precinct meeting, not at the ballot box. Control of the political parties begins at the precinct meeting. Yes, casting your ballot is very important, but it is not enough.

Texas who advocate a bilateral nuclear weapons 'freeze' are going to the neighborhood precinct meetings, Democratic and Republican, May 5th, to promote the 'freeze' in two ways:

- ¶ introduce the 'Quick Freeze' resolution into party platforms, and
- ¶ elect delegates to the Democratic and Republican conventions who also advocate the 'freeze.'

This kit provides what you will need to gather support in your neighborhood to take this crucial step. Everyone can help prevent nuclear war. Because everyone can attend their precinct meeting. Please, for the sake of all our kids and our grandkids, carry to your precinct meeting May 5th the potent message that the bilateral nuclear weapons 'freeze' is urgent.

Thank you for your good
work on this important project,
and best wishes,


John Henry Faulk

THE 'QUICK FREEZE' MORATORIUM

WHEREAS...

...the only cure for nuclear war is prevention because

...the use of even a small fraction of the nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union would trigger a nuclear winter from which life on earth might never survive, and while

...the massive build-up of nuclear weapons arsenals since 1979 by both the United States and the Soviet Union, especially the deployment of first strike weapons, has led the two nations away from meaningful negotiations to freeze and then to reduce nuclear weapons, and since

...both the United States and the Soviet Union have the national technical means to monitor and verify each other's testing of nuclear explosives underground as well as to monitor and verify each other's flight testing and deployment of ballistic missiles (such as the MX and the Soviet SS-X-24), therefore

BE IT RESOLVED...

...that the president of the United States should immediately propose to the new leadership of the Soviet Union a bilateral, verifiable 'Quick Freeze' moratorium on the underground testing of nuclear explosives and on the flight testing and deployment of ballistic missiles in order to lessen tensions and permit

...the president to negotiate with the new Soviet leadership to produce a bilateral and verifiable comprehensive freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to be followed by negotiations to reduce the nuclear weapons arsenals of both nations.

This resolution adopted by the Convention of Precinct _____ of the _____ Party on _____, 1984 in the County _____ of _____, and the State of Texas.

ATTEST: _____

From the very beginning, the proposal for a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze was intuitively clear and could be easily understood. Written in 1979, the 'Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race' proposed, simply:

"To improve national and international security, the United States and the Soviet Union should stop the nuclear arms race. Specifically, they should adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons. This is an essential, verifiable first step toward lessening the risk of nuclear war and reducing the nuclear arsenals."

The national campaign to achieve the bilateral freeze, which began in March 1981, has been marked by the surges and pauses typical of political campaigning. Citizen actions, each building momentum from past accomplishments, have been followed with Congressional reciprocity...
...and an eventual Congressional stall.

Spring 1982. The freeze proposal swept New England Town Meetings, passing 446 in all. Eight city councils and 5 state legislatures had already passed the resolution.

March 10, 1982. Senators Kennedy and Hatfield responded by introducing the freeze resolution into Congress with 139 original co-sponsors.

June 1982. Two million petition signatures were delivered to the U.S. and Soviet Union missions in New York three days prior to the June 12th disarmament rally where 750,000 citizens called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to 'Freeze the Arms Race.'

August 5, 1982. Congress responded by bringing the freeze resolution to a vote in the House...
...defeating it by only two votes, 204-202.

November 1982. Forty-nine state and local freeze organizations had placed the freeze proposal on the ballot as a referendum, to be voted on by 20 million Americans. Sixty percent favored the freeze in the closest thing to a national referendum in U.S. history.

March 8, 1983. Five thousand Citizen Lobbyists gathered in Washington, DC to urge their representatives to pass the freeze resolution in the House and in the Senate.

May 4, 1983. Congress responded with overwhelming two-to-one passage, on a 278-149 vote. By now, 370 city councils, 71 county councils, 23 state legislatures and more than 150 national organizations had endorsed the freeze proposal.

Then, in November 1983, the Senate tabled the freeze resolution by a vote of 58-40.

Meanwhile, during three years of gradual, incremental increases in Congressional support, an unmitigated nuclear arms race continued. Air- and ground-launched cruise missiles are coming off the assembly line. B-1 bombers and MX missiles are committed to production. Pershing II missiles are deployed in West Germany precipitating an outbreak of public anger and break-off of arms control talks between the U.S. and the Soviets.

A bold, new initiative is needed in 1984, to accomplish three objectives:

- ¶ Emplace a fulcrum with which to lever Congress into real action toward implementing the freeze.
- ¶ Strip away the pretense that verification problems make a freeze unworkable.
- ¶ Test each member of Congress before the 1984 elections to determine which are truly dedicated to achieving the freeze.

Congress amends next year's federal budget, suspending funds for underground testing of nuclear explosives and flight testing and deployment of ballistic missiles* (e.g., the MX and the Soviet SS-X-24), as long as the Soviets halt the same things at the same time.

Q. How does the Congressional 'Quick Freeze' differ from the original proposal in the 'Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race?'

A. The original freeze proposal is comprehensive. It includes all weapons and all activities: testing, production and deployment. In this regard, it is superior to any other arms control proposal. The Congressional



'Quick Freeze' is partial implementation of the comprehensive freeze, seen as the first increments that can be started right away.

Q. Is the Congressional 'Quick Freeze' more verifiable than the comprehensive freeze?

A. All aspects of the comprehensive freeze are verifiable by national technical means, i.e., by satellite, radar, seismic stations and clandestine spy planes. Testing of nuclear explosions underground and flight testing and deployment of ballistic missiles are considered to be more easily verified than other parts, but all are verifiable with or without on-site inspection.¹

Q. How could the U.S. catch the Soviets cheating on the Congressional 'Quick Freeze'?

A. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have been working since the 1950s to develop satellites that can take accurate photographs of objects on the earth's surface. For example, 'Big Bird' here takes shots of objects 10 ft. or so in length, such as cruise missile launchers and vehicles. The KH-11 takes shots of objects 50 ft. or more in length, such as bombers, missiles and submarines. This photograph of the license plate on a car in Moscow can be taken by a high-resolution U.S. Air Force satellite camera.



The question of verification rests at the center of the nuclear weapons debate.

Introduction of the Congressional 'Quick Freeze' is a decisive step toward clarifying the meaningful questions of verification and stripping away the pretense.

Verification of the Congressional 'Quick Freeze' has been worked out in previous arms control negotiations.

Comprehensive Test Ban. Prior to 1981, when Reagan took office, most details had been worked out between the U.S., the U.K. and the Soviet Union to ban all nuclear explosions. Only minor technical questions remain and could be worked out in 30 days, if all parties were serious.⁴

SALT II. In 1979, SALT II was signed calling for a ban on testing and deployment of new ICBMs (with one exception for both, thus, the MX and the Soviet SS-X-24), new fixed ICBM launchers, 'heavy' mobile ICBMs and 'heavy' SLBMs, systems to launch from sea, river or lake beds within each country. All these were agreed to be verifiable by both sides using national technical means.

Thus, since it's been worked out previously, in no sense do problems of verification stand in the way of enactment of the Congressional 'Quick Freeze.'⁵

1. Randall Forsberg, "A Bilateral Nuclear-Weapons Freeze," Scientific American, November 1982.
2. Department of Defense, 1982 Report to Congress.
3. U.S. Department of State, "SALT and American Security: Questions Americans Are Asking," November 1979.
4. Admiral Eugene Carroll, Center for Defense Information, in a talk delivered at Rice Univ., November 14, 1983.
5. Except ASATs, which will be included in the 'Quick Freeze' legislation.

Texans for a Bilateral Nuclear Weapons Freeze is a non-partisan, non-profit organization whose sole purpose is to promote a U.S./Soviet bilateral, verifiable nuclear weapons freeze. The organization provides education and skill development to citizens so that citizens might lobby the government in favor of the bilateral freeze. No professional lobbyists are employed.

Precinct 'Freeze Leader' HQ
600 West 28th Street, Room 106
Austin, Texas 78705

512 477 4871

THE PROJECT:

To raise the bilateral freeze as a critical, indelible issue in the 1984 elections by entering the 'Quick Freeze' proposal into the Democratic and Republican convention process, beginning at the neighborhood precinct level.

THE OBJECTIVES:

- ¶ Educate the public on the 'Quick Freeze' proposal, and
- ¶ Establish a basic local precinct organization for the freeze movement in Texas, for use in upcoming educational and political projects.

THE GOAL:

To identify 'Freeze Leaders' in 500 separate precincts statewide, who will introduce the 'Quick Freeze' resolution into 500 Democratic and 100 Republican precinct meetings.

THE RESOLUTION:

The 'Quick Freeze' resolution, printed on Page 3 of this booklet, calls for, "an immediate, verifiable moratorium on the underground testing of nuclear explosives and on the flight testing and deployment of ballistic missiles (e.g., the MX and the Soviet SS-X-24)."

Such a moratorium could be proposed by the president of the United States in a summit meeting or even with a telephone call.

In the event that the president does not propose the 'Quick Freeze,' the U.S. Congress could press for it by suspending funds for testing and deployment, contingent upon the Soviets abiding by the moratorium.


THE STEPS:

To take advantage of your party's precinct meeting to promote the bilateral freeze, follow the four basic steps described below. There are many ways to implement each step, you needn't do every implementary. As usual, it is most important to taylor implementation of these steps to the unique conditions in your neighborhood.

TWO WEEKS BEFORE - IDENTIFY YOURSELF AS THE PRECINCT 'FREEZE LEADER.'

- ¶ Register with your Regional Coordinator.
- ¶ Study details of your party's rules so that you can take the most advantage of the proceedings.

Get a copy of, "How to become a Texas Delegate to the 1984 Democratic National Convention," or "Rules of the Republican



Party of Texas" from the county office of your party.

- ¶ Contact your precinct chair; discuss the rules guiding the precinct meeting. If the chair is favorable, ask who else in the precinct may be favorable.
- ¶ Agree with the precinct chair on the exact point in the meeting agenda at which you will introduce the 'Quick Freeze' resolution.

DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS - GATHER SUPPORT IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD.

- ¶ Door-to-door canvass. Go first to neighbors you know. Discuss the issue and determine their opinion. Use the Q and A section of this booklet in answering concerns. Remember: whenever polls have been taken in Texas, 7 out of 10 Texans support the bilateral freeze, although most people share concerns about the Soviet government and verification.

Eventually, canvass streets where you don't know people. Reaching out to the 'unconverted' is essential to strengthening support.

- ¶ House Parties. Block parties are fun, we don't do them often enough and they are a great way to raise this issue. Invite someone in the community who's studied the issue and who can answer common concerns about verification, a university professor, clergy, etc.
- ¶ Gather names. Write down the name of every person you speak with and record their level of support. Use the 2-part form that is supplied. Keep one copy in your community, send the second copy to your Regional Coordinator.

ON ELECTION DAY - MOBILIZE SUPPORT

- ¶ Call every known 'Freeze Delegate,' one who has agreed to attend the precinct meeting in support of the bilateral freeze; remind them to attend the meeting that night at 7:15 P.M. In most cases, meetings occur at the polling place.
- ¶ Petition outside the polling place during peak voting hours, record names and circulate freeze literature.

AT THE MEETING - DEMONSTRATE POPULAR SUPPORT

- ¶ Wear 'freeze' buttons, supplied by the Regional Coordinator.
- ¶ Know which 'Freeze Delegates' will be caucusing for each presidential candidate (Democratic).
- ¶ Encourage 'Freeze Delegates' to run for delegate to the County/District Convention. Urge everyone who runs for delegate to declare their support for the 'Quick Freeze.'
- ¶ At the proper time, introduce the resolution.
- ¶ Then, celebrate the completion of a job well done.

Texas Endorsers

The Reverend Dr. Barry Bailey, Minister
Fort Worth

The Reverend Ruth Tiffany Barnhouse, M.D.
Dallas

Willard Barr, The Barr Company
Fort Worth

Karl W. Brown, Mayor Pro Tem
San Marcos

James D. Calaway, Southwest Minerals
Houston

Liz Carpenter
Austin

The Reverend Finis Crutchfield, Bishop
Houston

Dominique De Menil
Houston

Chris Dixie, Attorney
Houston

John Dodds, City Commissioner
Fredericksburg

Ronnie Dugger
Washington, D.C.

Dr. Lloyd J. Dumas, University of Texas
Dallas

Francis 'Sissy' Farenthold
Houston

John Henry Faulk
Austin

Effie and Benjamin Feld
Houston

The Reverend Joseph A. Fiorenza, Bishop
San Angelo

The Reverend Dr. Gaston Foote, Minister
Fort Worth

Thomas Gaubert, Independent American Group
Dallas

Judge Andrew L. Jefferson, Jr.
Houston

Pat Maloney, Attorney
San Antonio

The Reverend John L. Markovsky, Bishop
Houston

George McAlmon, Attorney
El Paso

The Reverend John McCarthy, Bishop
Houston

J. R. Parten, Farmers Oil
Houston

Cactus Pryor
Austin

Ann W. Richards, Texas State Treasurer
Austin

The Reverend Michael J. Sheehan, Bishop
Lubbock

General P. D. Straw, USAF, retired
San Antonio

The Reverend James C. Suggs, Disciples
of Christ in the Southwest

Ed Wendler, Sr., Attorney
Austin



League of Women Voters of the United States 1730 M Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036 Tel. (202) 429-1965

news release

JAN 3 1984

CONTACT: Vicky Harian
Jerry Carton
(202) 429-1965

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1983

LEAGUE ANNOUNCES SUPPORT FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE

In its first foray into the arms control debate, the League of Women Voters of the United States today announced its support for a bilateral, mutually verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, followed by reduction of those weapons.

In a related action, the League announced its deep regret that the INF and START talks have been suspended and will urge the merger and resumption of these negotiations.

These two actions are results of the League's newly determined position in support of arms control measures. The League's 111,000 members across the country participated in the development of this new position which was ratified yesterday by the League's national board of directors.

In announcing the new position, League President Dorothy S. Ridings said, "The League is entering the debate at a critical juncture. World tensions are high, the government's commitment to arms control is being challenged, and citizens are looking for some progress towards arms reductions. The League brings a well-informed, politically active grassroots network to the debate to help citizens translate their concerns into concrete actions."

--MORE--

2-2-2 League Supports Nuclear Weapons Freeze

Other actions resulting from the new position include:

- support for a Comprehensive Test Ban.
- support for negotiations to prohibit deployment of anti-satellite weapons
- opposition to the deployment of space weapons that would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Ridings noted that the League strongly supports both multilateral and bilateral negotiations to achieve agreement in all arms control areas. The League believes that unilateral initiatives are not the most appropriate means to achieve arms control.

An overwhelming majority of local Leagues participated in setting this new position. "We had responses from 76 percent of our 1,197 local Leagues, an indication of their strong interest in finding solutions to the arms race," said Ridings.

Since May 1982, League members throughout the country have been studying arms control issues. They considered a variety of viewpoints in meetings and discussions at the local and state levels and responded to a questionnaire from the national office. Their responses were read, tabulated, and analyzed, and the final position was adopted yesterday by the national board after member agreement on the issues was determined.

Local Leagues are currently studying US military policy and defense spending. The national League will be evaluating the study's results in the spring of 1984.

#

LWV-Texas
Selected LL Presidents
April 17, 1984

TO: Local Leagues unable to attend Council '84 in Corpus Christi.

We missed you and are sorry you were not able to be there.

This is the President's Packet you would have picked up in Corpus. If your League has any state Duplicate Presidents Mailings subscriptions, the April mailing (which would also have been picked up at Council) is being sent today to each subscriber.

Please pay careful attention to the instructions on the enclosed blue cover memo. Thank you.

FROM: Jan Albers, Program VP, LWV-Texas

Also enclosed with this mailing are four copies of a Nuclear Freeze Resolution, a Nuclear Freeze Kit (What One Person Can Do to Prevent Nuclear War Kit) and cards to order additional kits.

At the January board meeting, LWV-T directors discussed ways to focus public attention on our new LWVUS National Security positions. We decided to participate with several other organizations in advocating the adoption of a freeze resolution at the Democratic and Republican precinct meetings to be held at 7:15 p.m. on May 5. The enclosed resolution was drafted by Texans for a Bilateral Nuclear Weapons Freeze and was reviewed by LWVUS for compliance with our positions. The LWV-T, Texas AAUW, and Lone Star Chapter of Sierra Club have all endorsed the resolution. We expect other groups to do so shortly.

If you have a newsletter going out before May 5 please consider including the text of the resolution and urging your members to present it at their precinct conventions. We also would urge you to have copies of the resolution available at League meetings and to work with groups in your community that might be interested in this project.

#



memorandum

This is going on DPM.

December 19, 1983

TO: State and Local League Presidents
FROM: Dorothy K. Powers, National Security Study Chair
RE: The National Security Study

REPORTING ON ARMS CONTROL

Congratulations on a job well done! The first phase of the National Security study has resulted in decisive member agreement on arms control objectives and criteria. We are enclosing a copy of the new position adopted by the national Board on December 8, 1983, and a copy of the press release announcing the League's action. In addition, we are enclosing some "Questions and Answers" for you to use in making your own announcements to League units, local press and community organizations. These sample questions and answers are meant to be an initial guide for you in determining how the new position can be applied. There will be more information on the arms control position, its application and the LWVUS action strategy in the next issue of Report from the Hill and subsequent issues.

The adoption of this position comes at an ominous juncture in the arms control debate. As Dot Ridings noted in the enclosed press release, "world tensions are high, the government's commitment to arms control is being challenged, and citizens are looking for some progress toward arms reductions." That observation is made starker by the recent suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations. There can be no question that the League has taken on a timely and significant issue.

GEARING UP FOR THE FINAL STAGE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSENSUS

The League's study of military policy and defense spending issues remains as topical as the new arms control position. You should take special note of the distinction between these two phases of the study: the first phase concentrates on negotiations; the second phase focuses on U.S. policies that affect the commitments the government makes around the world and the characteristics of the nation's military forces. Several of the sample questions and answers deal with this distinction.

We realize that many of you are under a tight study schedule. For that reason, we are anxious to make the process more efficient for you--and us. For those of you who have not already had units and need extra help, please keep an eye out for a third

class mailing that contains a new workshop outline on military policy and defense spending and an audio cassette program entitled "National Security: Not for Experts Only." These educational and training materials were prepared by the LWVEF for League leaders to use in community outreach programs throughout 1984, but they also can be helpful to your National Security resource committee and units.

Given our recent experience with the arms control portion of the study, we also have developed a few pointers about taking consensus and reporting local League results. Remember, the deadline is March 15 for mailing your completed green report form entitled "National Security Consensus on Military Policy and Defense Spending." As your League enters the final stages of the consensus process locally, we ask you to use the following guidelines for filling out the consensus form:

DO

- o Follow the instructions carefully. A check mark in the appropriate space is needed to communicate that your League has reached consensus on the response to a particular question.
- o Refer to Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader (Pub. #531, \$1.25), Dollars for Defense: Translating Military Policy into Spending Choices (Pub. #534, \$1.25), and Committee Guide II. These League-produced publications are especially helpful if your League would like clarification on the terms and issues raised on the report form. Additional copies may be ordered from the LWVUS.
- o Write your additional comments only in the appropriate space provided after each question or on a separate piece of paper, identified by your League name. Comments are especially welcome if your League determines that more information should be provided to the national board about your members' thinking.
- o If your League does not reach consensus on a particular topic, tell us so in the comments section after each question or write "no consensus" in lieu of a check mark. Only your League board can determine whether a minority opinion or the low number of members participating makes consensus impossible for your League.

DON'T

- o Do not leave it up to the national board to interpret raw data results to decide whether your League has reached consensus. As you know, consensus is not a simple majority vote. Only your League Board can determine the overall sense of the group or whether there is agreement among units in your League. (See "In League," page 37, for pointers on determining member agreement.)
- o Do not try to rewrite the report form. We ask for your cooperation in responding to the questions--as they are written--so that your responses can be equitably figured in with those of other Leagues according to the same criteria. If your League has suggestions for designing future consensus forms, we welcome them and we ask you to write your recommendations on a separate sheet of paper and to send them along, too.

Best of luck!

League of Women Voters of the U.S.
1730 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

ARMS CONTROL STATEMENT OF POSITION

The League of Women Voters believes that arms control measures are essential to reduce the risk of war and increase global stability. Toward that end, the U.S. government should give the highest level of importance to arms control efforts that:

- limit or reduce the quantity of weapons;
- limit proliferation and prohibit first use of nuclear weapons;
- prohibit first use and possession of chemical, biological and radiological weapons; and
- reduce tensions in order to prevent situations in which weapons might be used.

While these objectives should receive the highest level of attention, the U.S. government also should negotiate measures that inhibit the development and improvement of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons that increase incentives to attack first in a period of crisis.

As a long-term goal, the League supports the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons.

The League of Women Voters recognizes that peace in an interdependent world is a product of cooperation among nations and therefore strongly favors multilateral negotiations. Given the potential for worldwide proliferation of nuclear technology, efforts involving all countries are essential to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and to protect commonly held nuclear-weapons-free regions such as the seabed and outer space. Multilateral efforts are appropriate as well to achieve bans on the possession of chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

The League of Women Voters believes, however, that for arms control to be effective, bilateral efforts also are necessary. Bilateral efforts may be especially appropriate in negotiations to limit and reduce quantities of weapons. The League believes that unilateral initiatives are not the most appropriate means to achieve arms control.

The League does not support tying progress in arms control to other issues. The League believes that arms control is too important in and of itself and too crucial to all nations to be linked to other foreign and military policy goals.

Arms Control Criteria

The League of Women Voters believes that arms control measures should be evaluated in terms of the following factors:

Equity: The terms should be mutually beneficial and each nation's security and interests should be adequately protected. Equity does not necessarily require equality in numbers of weapons but may be achieved through a relative balance in total capabilities.

Verifiability: Each party should be able to insure that other parties comply with the terms of the agreement, whether using national technical means (satellites, seismic sensors and electronic monitors) or on-site inspection. The League believes it is extremely important to ensure compliance, recognizing that absolute certainty is unattainable.

Equity and verifiability are critical in efforts to limit and reduce quantities of weapons and to prohibit the possession and spread of nuclear weapons.

Confidence-building: Each party should be assured of the political or military intentions of other parties. Fostering confidence is vital in efforts to prohibit the first use of weapons and to reduce tensions.

Widespread Agreement: All appropriate parties should participate in and approve the results of the negotiating process. However, the League recognizes that, in specific cases, progress can be achieved even though some key parties do not participate.

Environmental Protection: The quality of the earth's environment should be protected from the effects of weapons testing or use. Environmental protection has special significance in negotiations to prohibit the possession of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Continuity: Negotiations should build on past agreements and should be directed toward future negotiations whenever feasible. Innovative thinking and new approaches should, however, be encouraged when appropriate.

Application

Arms Control Objectives

League support of arms control measures includes action on proposals, negotiations and agreements.

The League supports efforts to achieve quantitative limits or reductions that focus on nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems, anti-ballistic missiles, conventional weapons or troop levels.

The League advocates limits on the spread or proliferation of weapons to inhibit transfers of nuclear technology or weapons from one nation to another or to a geographic region such as the seabed or outer space.

The League's pursuit of bans on the possession or use of weapons may apply to existing weapons or to those not yet developed.

The League seeks to reduce tensions through better means of communication, exchange of information or prior notification of military tests and maneuvers in order to avoid the risks of miscalculation or accident. Other League-supported measures to reduce tensions and create a climate of trust among nations include scientific and cultural exchanges, conflict resolution training and strengthening the United Nations.

The League supports efforts to inhibit the development and improvement of weapons through qualitative limits, including limits on the testing of weapons. These constraints may be selective or comprehensive in their application.

League of Women Voters of the United States
1730 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

December 1983

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES'

ARMS CONTROL POSITION

1. Does the LWVUS support the nuclear freeze?

There are many types of nuclear freeze resolutions. The LWV supports a bilateral, mutually verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons followed by reductions in nuclear weapons.

2. What took the League so long to become a nuclear freeze advocate?

This new position adds a new dimension to our long-standing commitment to promote peace in an interdependent world. But before taking on any new position, our members take seriously the need to become informed about the issues.

3. Will you support freeze measures in Congress?

Our members will be working in their communities to get citizens involved in the issues surrounding the freeze. If Congressional measures are considered, we will take action in support of a freeze that meets our objectives.

4. Does the LWVUS support the strategy of The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign?

The LWV supports the campaign goal and many of the campaign's strategies for achieving a freeze. For example, we believe it is appropriate to press the President to pursue bilateral efforts to achieve a comprehensive freeze. We also believe that all Presidential and Congressional candidates should be asked to articulate their positions on the freeze and its implementation. We do not, however, support unilateral initiatives, such as congressional suspension of funds, designed to lead to reciprocal Soviet action.

5. Does that mean the LWV opposes any unilateral action to reduce nuclear arms?

We prefer multi- and bilateral negotiations. We do not think that unilateral initiatives are the most appropriate means to achieve arms control.

6. Do you support or oppose the MX missile (or other weapons systems)?

The League's new position concerns efforts to negotiate reductions of nuclear weapons. Apart from negotiations, the LWV is currently evaluating U.S. military policy. Any positions on specific weapons systems like the MX will come at a later date.

7. Does the LWV support or oppose deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missile in Europe?

The League's new position supports negotiations to reduce these nuclear weapons. We regret the collapse of the INF negotiations. The League is currently evaluating U.S. military policy concerning NATO. Any decisions on these issues will come later next year.

8. What does the LWV think about the suspension of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) and START negotiations?

The LWV deeply regrets the suspension of these talks. We believe that arms control is essential to reduce the risk of war. We urge the U.S. to push for resumption and merger of these two sets of talks in order to move the arms control process forward.

9. Isn't that naive? (The Soviets can't be trusted.)

Arms control is not a question of trust. It's in the interest of both countries. If the terms are equitable and provisions made for verification, the security of both nations will be improved.

10. What do you mean by verification?

The LWV believes it is extremely important to ensure compliance. We recognize that absolute certainty is unattainable. Each party should be able to ensure that other parties comply with the terms of the agreement, whether using national technical means (satellites, seismic sensors and electronic monitors) or on-site inspection.

11. Does the League support build-down?

The League supports the goal of reducing nuclear weapons. We have some questions about whether the build-down will achieve real reductions and lead to greater stability. Should the START negotiations resume, we would examine build-down and any other proposals carefully.

12. Does the League think there should be cuts in the defense budget?

The League is currently studying military policy and defense spending issues. Any judgments about the appropriate level of military spending or specific weapons programs will come later next year.

13. Does the League have a position on U.S. military involvement in specific world hotspots (Lebanon, Grenada, etc.)?

Not at this time. The LWV is currently evaluating U.S. military commitments abroad. Any decisions on these issues will come later next year.

14. What does the League bring to the arms control issue? What makes you different?

The League is entering the arms control debate at a critical juncture. World tensions are high, the government's commitment to arms control is being challenged, and citizens are looking for some progress toward arms reductions. The League brings a well-informed, politically active grassroots network to the debate to help citizens translate their concerns into concrete actions.

15. How does the League reach consensus?

Every member has a voice in determining the League's position. Since May 1982 local Leagues throughout the country have been grappling with arms control issues and asking tough questions. They considered a variety of viewpoints in order to make responsible decisions on these issues. Leagues responded to a questionnaire from the national office. All responses were read, tabulated and analyzed. The national board adopted this position on December 8, 1983 after determining member agreement on these issues.

16. Did the public participate in the consensus (i.e., through the direct mail survey)?

Only members of the League set the position.

17. How many Leagues participated in the consensus?

909 out of 1197 local Leagues (76% of all Leagues.)

18. What action are you going to take to influence public policy?

Because of the newness of the arms control position, the full range of the League's action opportunities is still being developed. At its December meeting, the LWVUS board began that work by confirming that the League's arms control position includes:

- o support for a bilateral, mutually verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons, to be followed by reduction in nuclear weapons.
- o support for the merger and resumption of talks to reduce strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons (START and INF).
- o support for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- o opposition to development of new space weapons that would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
- o support for negotiations to prohibit deployment of anti-satellite weapons.

19. What is the status of these public policy issues?

Nuclear Freeze

The House of Representatives passed a resolution on May 4, 1983 calling for an immediate, mutual, verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear weapons, followed by negotiated reductions. The resolution contained a number of caveats that would allow the United States to go ahead with planned modernization programs while negotiations proceed. The Senate tabled an amendment containing the nuclear freeze without voting directly on the merits of the freeze.

The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign has adopted a new strategy for next year. While the Campaign will continue to urge the President to negotiate and all Presidential candidates to support a bilateral freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons as a first step toward reductions, the Campaign will also call on the President to initiate (and all presidential candidates to support) an immediate halt in the testing of nuclear warheads and the testing and deployment of ballistic missiles, provided that the Soviet Union halts the same activities.

In Congress, the Campaign will press for enactment of parts of a freeze, such as suspension of funds for the testing of nuclear warheads and for the testing and deployment of ballistic missiles, provided that the Soviet Union halts the same activities. The Campaign also will oppose funding for the testing, production and deployment of particular weapons systems, such as the MX, Trident II, cruise and Pershing II missiles and ABM and anti-satellite weapons, and call for the removal of currently-deployed cruise and Pershing II missiles from Europe and for Soviet reductions in intermediate-range nuclear missiles targeted on Europe. A decision to propose actual legislation and press for a Congressional vote will depend on support for these proposals.

START and INF Negotiations

The Soviet Union suspended both the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) and INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) negotiations with the United States, indicating that US deployment in Europe of Pershing II and cruise missiles has changed the overall strategic situation, which now must be reexamined. (The Soviet Union also has suspended talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), designed to reduce troop levels in Central Europe.

Some analysts believe that the Soviet action signals a reassessment of the negotiations, not a termination, and that the Soviets will seek to resume talks sometime in the future. Several European nations have proposed that the START and INF negotiations be merged. This action would help to move the negotiating process forward and provide a more equitable basis for negotiations in that the intermediate-range and strategic nuclear capabilities of both nations would be considered together. The United States and the Soviet Union have so far discouraged such thinking, indicating that the agenda would become too complicated.

Comprehensive Test Ban

Negotiations among the United States, USSR and United Kingdom on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) began in 1977. A draft treaty that would prohibit all nuclear explosive testing for military or other purposes has been largely negotiated. The draft treaty contains agreement on the basic means of effectively verifying treaty compliance, including satellites, seismic stations and on-site inspection procedures for assessing suspicious seismic data.

The Reagan Administration formally abandoned further negotiations on a CTB in July 1982, citing verification problems with two treaties signed but not ratified by the United States--the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTB), which limits underground nuclear tests, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNE) which limits nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. In September 1983 the Administration indicated that "while a CTB continues to be a long-term U.S. objective, continued nuclear testing is necessary for the continued development, modernization, and certification of war-heads, the maintenance of stockpile reliability and evaluation of nuclear weapons effects."

When Congress convened in 1983, joint resolutions were introduced in the Senate and House calling for the ratification of the TTB and PNE Treaties and for resumption of CTB negotiations. Congress recessed, however, without holding any hearings. Legislative efforts next year in support of a CTB are likely to center on hearings on nuclear testing before the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. Efforts to have support for a CTB included in the Democratic party platform also are likely.

Anti-satellite and Space Weapons

Anti-satellite (ASAT) Weapons

The US government is planning to test in the near future a device designed to shoot down Soviet satellites. The significance of this issue derives from satellites' unique role in military planning and conflict. On the one hand, satellites have a beneficial role in arms control, confidence-building and conflict resolution. They provide prompt, precise intelligence about strategic forces and other military capabilities. In a crisis they would allow each side to watch the movements of the other. If conflict erupted, chances for controlling hostilities would largely rest on satellite surveillance, the command of strategic forces via satellites and on satellite communication between adversaries. On the other hand, the unique ability of satellites to hear, see and communicate increases the effectiveness of military forces. They are therefore tempting targets as soon as hostilities begin.

In the 1960s both the United States and the Soviet Union fielded systems with ASAT capabilities. The U.S. eventually dismantled its ASAT systems and the USSR continued sporadic testing of a rather primitive system. By the late 1970s the U.S. adopted a two-track approach: develop a satellite interceptor and negotiate a treaty to ban the testing and deployment of ASAT weapons. The negotiations were halted during the Carter administration and have not been pursued since. Both nations' development programs have continued.

In August 1981 the Soviet Union submitted to the UN a draft treaty calling for a prohibition on the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The United States has not responded to this initiative. Soviet President Andropov has stated that the USSR will not test its ASAT weapon provided that the US does the same. In the U.S. Congress, attempts to delay testing of the new ASAT weapon failed in 1983, but a proviso was attached to the defense authorization bill requiring President Reagan, before starting the test, to certify that the United States is endeavoring in good faith to negotiate a ban on ASAT tests and that the initial test is necessary to avert a clear and irrevocable harm to the national security. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution urging the President to initiate a moratorium on ASAT testing, to resume negotiations with the USSR to limit or ban ASATs and to initiate negotiations to ban all space-based weapons (both ASAT and space weapons). Attempts to bring such a resolution to the Senate floor and to hold hearings in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on a similar resolution are likely next session.

Space Weapons

In March 1983 the President outlined in a national speech plans for the development of new "space weapons" designed to shoot down Soviet missiles and thus provide the United States with an antiballistic missile (ABM) space defense. The technologies involved utilize directed energy--energy produced by lasers and particle beams--which have the potential to inflict damage to a distant object at the speed of light. One such technology being pursued is the x-ray laser, which would use small nuclear explosions to activate a laser to destroy incoming missiles. Other proposals include that of the "high frontier," which envisions a multi-layer approach to destroying attacking missiles: two "layers" would be based in space, the third on the ground.

Two government panels have recommended proceeding with research and development on these technologies. Pentagon estimates of the cost of developing these weapons range from \$18 to \$27 billion over the next five years. Ultimate costs of a full-fledged space-based laser defense could reach \$500 billion, according to some estimates.

Concern about these weapons centers on the likelihood that they would violate one or more existing treaties. Testing of the x-ray laser could violate the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which prohibits the placement of ABM systems in space; the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space; and the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space. Concerns also include the potential costs of such weapons and questions as to whether they would work. The Pentagon's research director, Richard DeLauer, has stated that eight major technical problems would each require an effort equal to the Apollo moon program.

Congressional activities concerning these technologies may focus next session on resolutions calling for negotiations to ban all space-based weapons (see discussion of ASAT weapons, above) or efforts to block the appropriation of funds for weapons that violate existing treaties.



news release

CONTACT: Vicky Harian
Jerry Carton
[REDACTED]

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1983

LEAGUE ANNOUNCES SUPPORT FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE

In its first foray into the arms control debate, the League of Women Voters of the United States today announced its support for a bilateral, mutually verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, followed by reduction of those weapons.

In a related action, the League announced its deep regret that the INF and START talks have been suspended and will urge the merger and resumption of these negotiations.

These two actions are results of the League's newly determined position in support of arms control measures. The League's 111,000 members across the country participated in the development of this new position which was ratified yesterday by the League's national board of directors.

In announcing the new position, League President Dorothy S. Ridings said, "The League is entering the debate at a critical juncture. World tensions are high, the government's commitment to arms control is being challenged, and citizens are looking for some progress towards arms reductions. The League brings a well-informed, politically active grassroots network to the debate to help citizens translate their concerns into concrete actions."

--MORE--

2-2-2 League Supports Nuclear Weapons Freeze

Other actions resulting from the new position include:

- support for a Comprehensive Test Ban
- support for negotiations to prohibit deployment of anti-satellite weapons
- opposition to the deployment of space weapons that would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Ridings noted that the League strongly supports both multilateral and bilateral negotiations to achieve agreement in all arms control areas. The League believes that unilateral initiatives are not the most appropriate means to achieve arms control.

An overwhelming majority of local Leagues participated in setting this new position. "We had responses from 76 percent of our 1,197 local Leagues, an indication of their strong interest in finding solutions to the arms race," said Ridings.

Since May 1982, League members throughout the country have been studying arms control issues. They considered a variety of viewpoints in meetings and discussions at the local and state levels and responded to a questionnaire from the national office. Their responses were read, tabulated, and analyzed, and the final position was adopted yesterday by the national board after member agreement on the issues was determined.

Local Leagues are currently studying US military policy and defense spending. The national League will be evaluating the study's results in the spring of 1984.

#

NOV 2 1983

To: LWVUS
1730 M Street NW
Washington, DC 20036

From: LWV of

State

POSTMARK DEADLINE July 1, 1983

National Security Consensus on Arms Control Objectives and Criteria

Please return this completed form by July 1, 1983 to the above address. Please mark the envelope "National Security Consensus." *The national board is under no obligation to consider replies postmarked after July 1, 1983.*

Use the grid form to indicate your League's member agreement on the following consensus questions:

1. What level of importance should the U.S. government give to each listed objective or arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war?
2. Which type(s) of negotiations or initiatives (multilateral, bilateral, and/or unilateral) are *most* appropriate for achieving each objective?
3. What criteria should be used to evaluate arms control proposals, negotiations, and agreements?

QUESTION I: Please indicate the level of importance that your League thinks the U.S. government should give each listed objective of arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war. For each objective, place a check mark in one of the boxes indicated: "high," "medium," "low," "should not be an objective," or "no opinion/no agreement." In this question you are being asked to consider the level of importance of each objective on its own merits, rather than to prioritize the list of objectives, e.g., you are not being asked to indicate whether "reduce tensions" is more important than either "limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons" or "limiting the quantity of weapons."

QUESTION II: Please indicate the type(s) of negotiations or initiatives you want the League to favor in achieving each arms control objective by placing a check mark in the appropriate box or boxes indicated "multilateral," "bilateral," "unilateral." You may want to check more than one box on some lines. For example, your members may think that multilateral and bilateral negotiations are both important ways to address the "reduction of quantity of weapons."

QUESTION III: Please indicate the level of importance your League attaches to the criteria used to evaluate specific objectives of arms control negotiations, proposals or agreements by placing a number in the boxes depending on whether your League regards a specific criterion as essential (1), desirable (2), unimportant (3), or not desirable (4). The following example illustrates how the numbers should be used in responding to this question.

OBJECTIVE: TO TAKE A PHOTOGRAPH

Equipment/ Condition	Rank importance in achieving the objective
camera	1
tripod	3
scratch on lens	4
film	1
color film	2
zoom lens	2

How did your board determine member thinking on this issue?

- ☐ Unit meetings
☒ General meeting(s)
☐ Bulletin tear-off
☐ Questionnaire or special mailing
☐ Telephone poll
☐ Other (specify on separate sheet)

Size of League (number of members):

- ☒ 1-50 ☐ 101-149 ☐ 201-249
☐ 51-100 ☐ 150-200 ☐ 250 or more

To facilitate tabulation, please use a SEPARATE SHEET for comments, identifying your LWV.

League of Women Voters of

(Local League name)

(State)

SAMPLE ONLY

Signed

(Portfolio)

Please weight the criteria using the following scale:

1. Essential	4. Not Desirable
2. Desirable	5. No Opinion/ No Agreement
3. Unimportant	

LWV of Odessa State TX

3. What criteria should be used to evaluate arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements?

IF the objective of negotiations is to: THEN our LWV assigns the following weight* to these criteria:	Limit quantity of weapons	Reduce quantity of weapons	Prohibit possession of certain weapons		Prohibit first use of certain weapons		Inhibit development and improvement of weapons	Limit proliferation of nuclear weapons		Reduce tension	Other
			nuclear	nonnuclear (biological, chemical, radiological)	nuclear	nonnuclear (biological, chemical, radiological)		geographical (zones, sea space)	horizontal (to other nations)		
Equity (The terms are mutually beneficial; i.e., no party is vulnerable)	1	1	5	5	2	2	5	1	2	1	
Verifiability (The process of determining that "the other side" is complying with provisions of an agreement)	1	1	5	5	1	1	5	1	1	1	
Linkage (Tying progress in arms control to progress in other foreign or military policy goals)	2	2	5	5	2	2	5	2	2	1	
Continuity (Continues progress or builds on previous agreements)	2	2	5	5	2	2	5	2	2	1	
Confidence Building (Crisis control mechanisms, advance notification, etc.)	1	1	5	5	1	1	5	1	1	1	
Environmental Protection	1	1	5	5	2	2	5	2	2	1	
Widespread Agreement (Ratification or approval by appropriate parties)	2	2	5	5	2	2	5	1	1	1	
Other:											

SAMPLE ONLY

LWV of Odesa State TX

government give to each listed objective of arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war?

Which type(s) of negotiations or initiatives (multilateral, bilateral and/or unilateral) are most appropriate for achieving each objective? (You may check more than one box per objective).

Arms Control Objectives	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	SHOULD NOT BE AN OBJECTIVE	NO OPINION/ NO AGREEMENT	MULTI-LATERAL	BILATERAL	UNILATERAL
A. Limit quantity of weapons	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
B. Reduce quantity of weapons.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
C. Prohibit possession of certain weapons:								
1. nuclear				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
2. nonnuclear, (biological, chemical, radiological)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
D. Prohibit first use of certain weapons:								
1. nuclear	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. nonnuclear (biological, chemical, radiological)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
E. Inhibit development and improvement of weapons				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
F. Limit proliferation of nuclear weapons:								
1. geographical (e.g., zones, seas & space)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. horizontal (i.e., to other nations)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
G. Reduce tensions, (e.g., hotline)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
H. Other: _____								
I. Other: _____								

AMPLE ONLY

also JA
LCA
SD -

November 23, 1983

TO: Presidents of Dallas, Houston, Tarrant Co. Leagues

FROM: Jan Albers, Program VP

RE: December 9 release of National Security consensus position

Please see memo from LWVUS (sent very recently) regarding the release of the National Security consensus on December 9.

THEN, please let the state office know AS SOON AS POSSIBLE how many local Leagues or state units in your area you can call free of charge or at minimal cost.

After we have received your reply we will decide on the procedure to use in reaching local Leagues on Dec. 9.

Thanks much.



memorandum

THIS IS NOT GOING ON DPM

November 16, 1983

EB
JA
SO

TO: State and Local League Presidents

NOV 21 1983

FROM: Dorothy Ridings, President, and Rosalind McGee, Communications Chair

RE: Upcoming National Release of Anticipated New Consensus on Arms Control

The following information is provided in response to your need to have advance notice of major League news.

The national security consensus forms are now being tabulated and the national Public Affairs staff has begun to plan for the release of any new consensus that may result from your responses.

We anticipate that the announcement of the new position on Friday, December 9, will generate a considerable amount of media interest and will immediately be carried over the national news wire services to all parts of the country. Local news media may want to talk with a local League spokesperson as soon as the news appears on the wires.

At this time, it appears that there will only be a few hours between the time when final board action is taken and the time when the national office must release the news to the national news media.

We are therefore recommending the following procedure for coordinating the national and local parts of this story:

- 1) State League presidents should take the lead now in designating a statewide telephone tree system that can be used to contact all local Leagues quickly.
- 2) On Friday, December 9, immediately following national board action (around noon EST), the national office will call each state office and read a brief statement of our new position over the phone.** (If your state office is usually not staffed on Fridays, you will of course want to make sure someone is there to receive the call.)
- 3) The person receiving the news should activate the telephone tree in that state to get word as quickly as possible to each local League.

11:00 a.m. to
2:00 p.m. EST

We will make every effort to give the state League office about three hours to make their phone calls before the new position is released by the national office to the national news media. We now anticipate making a statement available to the media at approximately 3 pm EST on Friday, December 9.

While we realize that three hours is not much time for some of the larger states to alert all Leagues, we are asking for your understanding that we're trying to make the best of a tricky situation.

In some areas of the country, it may be desirable for the local League to hold a follow-up press briefing on this new position. Because of the complex and far-reaching nature of this issue, it will not be necessary to do so on December 9. A briefing held within a few weeks after the national announcement should still attract media interest, especially if its focus is on the local and national implications of the League adding its voice to the national debate on arms control.

** Since time is limited, these calls will be kept very brief. On the day of the release, most reporters will want quick reactions to the news of the League's taking a new position, and will not necessarily be looking for in-depth information. If asked how your League voted, explain that the national League position represents a consensus, or general agreement, of members in Leagues all across the country, and not a "vote" as such. Make it clear that all members in all Leagues had the opportunity to determine the national position. Finally, any press questions requiring detailed responses from the national office may of course be referred to the Public Affairs Department at (202) 429-1965. (Shortly after the press announcement, the national security board chair will be sending state and local League presidents a special memo including the position statement and an analysis of the consensus reports.)

FUNDAMENTALS

THE FINANCE CHAIRMAN

Vital to Leagues of all sizes is an annual fund-raising campaign. The continued success of raising money in a community is due to the competent, thorough organization of the total effort under the direction of the finance chairman. A finance chairman is a special kind of person, one who enjoys working with people, has enthusiasm for the work of the League and can transfer this enthusiasm to others.

FINANCE CAMPAIGN

Financing the League requires the help of many individuals . . . actually every League member in one way or another. The more people who will commit to helping with finance, the more successful the campaign will be.

In some Leagues the overall responsibility for the campaign is shared by co-chairmen. Administrative details are handled by one person, solicitations by another.

Basically the finance campaign asks the community for financial assistance for the operation of the League in return for what the League contributes to the community. The finance chairman develops a list of potential sources to be solicited (a prospect list), plans and organizes the campaign, recruits workers, and provides support and knowledge. A finance campaign is usually held once a year, though some Leagues may find it expedient to have some aspects of finance solicitation carried out year-round. Some large corporations require that requests for funds be made at certain times of the year which may not coincide with the League fund drive.

Every League, regardless of size, should have a finance campaign. Begin by developing a prospect list; ask your members for names of people they feel are sympathetic to the League. Consider the various ways to produce professional letters; consult a "quick copy" shop for ideas. Be sure to use the same typewriter for typing the name and address that was used in the body of the text. Money spent on professional looking letters and brochures is more than recovered in increased contributions. 12 Steps to a Superbly Successful Finance Campaign, and Dollars and Sense: The Art of Raising Money are two outstanding sources that outline in detail how to raise funds in your community.

The state League solicits contributions from corporations and other organizations that have statewide and/or nationwide operations. This solicitation is only done with the approval and cooperation of the local League board. As you are investigating potential contributors to your local League, note those with statewide interests and contact the state

LWV-Texas
4/83

Consensus was very strong in support of arms control measures to reduce the risk of war. The consensus was also very strong on limiting and reducing quantities of nuclear weapons, limiting the spread of and prohibiting first use of nuclear weapons, prohibiting first use and possession of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and reducing tensions. There was also agreement that the government negotiate measures to inhibit the development and improvement of nuclear weapons, and the long term goal of the League is the world-wide elimination of nuclear weapons.

NATIONAL OFFICE :
(202) 429-1965

[REDACTED]

Friday calling:

✓ Houston will call: Pasadena, Bay Area, Baytown, Pearland, Orange, Beaumont, Galveston

✓ Tarrant County: Call Jamie at home. They will call Arlington and Cleburne. Ask [REDACTED]

Dallas: can call ✓ Plano, Irving, Richardson, Rockwall Co. call: Rebecca Bergstesser or Pearl. [REDACTED]

✓ Brazos County: Call Doris Watson at work. Ask for her; they'll page her. [REDACTED]

E.B.
start w/LH.



LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS
1212 GUADALUPE, #109 • AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701 • (512) 472-1100

PRESS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SEPTEMBER 15, 1983

The League of Women Voters of Texas supports designating 65,000 acres in East Texas as wilderness. League president Lois Carpenter said, "It is especially important as Texas becomes increasingly urbanized that we preserve in its natural state some of the environmental diversity our state enjoys. We believe that Texas needs more wilderness area and that HR 3788 is a practical means of accomplishing it."

* no one answered
 * left message on box

LWV-Texas
 August 1983

LOCAL LEAGUE PRESIDENTS

<u>LEAGUE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>	<u>ZIP</u>	<u>TELEPHONE</u>
ABILENE	Laura Cline			
* AMARILLO	Marsha Titus			
	LWV phone			
ARLINGTON	Joyce Morgan			
✓ AUSTIN AREA	Frances McIntyre			
	LWV office			
BAY AREA	Melba Heselmeyer			
BAYTOWN	Jackie Slaughter			
BEAUMONT	Lin Owen			
✓ BRAZOS COUNTY	Doris Watson			
✓ CORPUS CHRISTI	Mary Rhodes			
✓ DALLAS	Pat Sabin			
	LWV office			
XX DENTON	Sue Smith			
	LWV phone			
* EDINBURG/McALLEN	Pat Castanon			
✓ EL PASO	Mateele Rittgers			
	LWV phone			
✓ GAINESVILLE	Nancy Williams			
GALVESTON	Lou Huyge			
	LWV phone			
✓ HOUSTON AREA	Helen Hunter			
	LWV office			
IRVING	Irma Proctor			
✓ GREATER KERRVILLE Prov	Abbie Corey			
LUBBOCK	Ruth Lauer			
MARSHALL/HARRISON CO	Greg Beil			
MIDLAND	Pat Stanley			
MONTGOMERY CO	Judith S. Zirkle			
ODESSA	Karen Johnson			
ORANGE AREA	Mariys Denison			
	(Program VP)			
PEARLAND AREA	Mary Stanford			
PLANO	Mary G. Snell			
RICHARDSON	* Sue Sloos			
	* (Mary Porter, no			
ROCKWALL CO.	Jerene Knoll			

* Co-Presidents

called Wise Co & Tarr Co

LWV-Texas LL Presidents (continued)

LEAGUE PRESIDENT ADDRESS ZIP TELEPHONE

SAN ANTONIO AREA

Sally Coughlin
LWV office

SAN MARCOS

Carol Pino

SHERMAN

Avo S. Butler

LWV phone

TARRANT CO

Jamie Luebbehusen

LWV office

TYLER

Leigh Hughes

LWV phone

VICTORIA

Helen Duckworth

WACO AREA

Patti McLaughlin

LWV phone

WICHITA FALLS

Bobbie Hampton

STATE UNITS

UNIT

CHAIRMAN

ADDRESS

ZIP

TELEPHONE

BURLESON

Lin Clark

CLEBURNE

Polly von Tungen

PASADENA

Kolores Brogna

STATE UNIT ADVISORS

BURLESON

Myrtle McMahan


CLEBURNE

Ethel Sturgis

PASADENA

Helen Hunter

TO: LL Presidents, 2nd copy to
Nat'l. Security Chmn; DPM

FROM: Marlene Muse


LWV-Texas
August 1983
LL Pres. Mailing (2); DPM
II. B. l. d.
Internat'l. Rel. --
Nat'l. Security

RE: LWVUS CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

In June I represented the LWV-Texas at a conference at Wingspread in Racine, Wisconsin on national security issues presented by the LWV-US Education Fund and funded by the Johnson, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations.

The summer national VOTER quotes two of the speakers from that conference. They bring out two important points also made by other speakers. The U.S. national security policy lacks consistency and perspective on priorities. And citizens have not been exercising their legitimate roles in national security decision-making.

Those are issues that local League leaders are dealing with as you prepare your members for two consensus reports on national security this year--the first one due in October and the second in March.

The national office has published some very good study material--two facts and issues: "The Quest for Arms Control" and "Providing for the Common Defense," in addition to a committee guide for the first phase of the study. The memorandum and committee guide that you received in June are for phase II of the study.

Leagues that have already held meetings are reporting interest from their communities on this study. As always, local universities and newspaper editors are good sources to turn to when looking for speakers.

I am serving on LWV-Brazos County's study committee and would be happy to assist anyone needing help with the study.

#

AUG 12 1983

August 19, 1983

JA
LCA
SO-

TO: LOIS CARPENTER *& state board*
FROM: MARLENE MUSE
RE: LWV-US EDUCATION FUND CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

The national security conference I attended in June, representing the LWV-Texas, was an interesting experience. It was a small conference, one person from each state, and I appreciated the opportunity to visit with people from other states. I must have covered the perimeters, because the people I remember most vividly are from Alaska, Michigan, Maine, Florida, Mississippi and Hawaii.

The conference was held at Wingspread (Racine), Wisconsin, headquarters of the Johnson Foundation. That foundation and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations funded the conference, sponsored by the LWV-US Education Fund.

The stated purpose of the Wingspread Conference was "...to prepare League leaders from states throughout the United States to conduct public education programs about U.S. national security issues, with emphasis on military policy, arms control and defense spending."

For two days, from early morning until nine in the evening we heard a total of sixteen speakers. The speakers came from government, academia, the military, business and a couple of public policy research groups. Although the briefings were generally substantive, I felt most well-read League representatives would be informed on the issues covered. I wasn't the only participant who felt **she had heard this all before.**

The League representatives tended to be either state board international relations chairs or people like me who were drafted to attend the conference. From what I could gather, few state Leagues were offering assistance to local Leagues on this study item.

The most productive part of the conference should have been the final objective: "to design strategies for effective public education programs with the goal of reaching a wide public audience." That objective was not seriously addressed due to lack of time and poor planning.

Wingspread, the conference center designed by Frank Lloyd Wright, was quite lovely. Its reputation as one of the best places in the country to hold a small meeting is well deserved. Thank you for allowing me to represent the LWV-Texas.

JUL 6 1983

VIDEOTAPES ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

Available from the Westport, Connecticut League of Women Voters, several videotapes relevant to the LWV study of national security. The Westport LWV held a series in the spring of 1982 on The Nuclear Arms Race: Past History and Future Prospects that was videotaped, and subsequently videointerviewed others in Washington. Since the national convention in Houston the Westport LWV has done some more interviewing, acquired some more footage, mostly UN TV, videotaped the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Feb. 17, 1983 on arms control negotiations and the nuclear freeze proposal, and reedited the tapes that some of you may have seen at convention. Tapes are available in three forms: 3/4 inch videotape, suitable for TV, 1/2 inch Beta and 1/2 inch VHS. There are four one hour tapes:

1. WHAT ABOUT THE RUSSIANS? What seem to be Soviet objectives? What approach to the USSR is most likely to achieve control of nuclear arms and maintain peace? Included on this tape are six Americans and five Russians. The are: RICHARD PIPES, President Reagan's advisor on the USSR on the National Security Council, RAYMOND GARTHOFF, a member of the SALT I delegation, Ambassador to Bulgaria, author of many books on Soviet military doctrine, now at Brookings, JOHN STEINBRUNER, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, JERRY HOUGH, Professor at Duke, author of four books on the USSR, MARSHALL SHULMAN, Director of the W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia, in the Carter Administration, Vance's advisor on the USSR, GEORGE KENNAN, once Ambassador to the USSR, author of our containment policy in 1947. Russians: GENRIKH TROFIMENKO, Head of the Foreign Policy Section of the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow, VLADIMIR SHUSTOV, Deputy Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN, OLEG BYKOV, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences, BORIS KRASULIN, Head of the Disarmament Section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, ANDREI GROMYKO, Foreign Minister of the USSR.

2.) WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY? What Soviet actions should be deterred? Should there be a U.S. pledge of No First Use of nuclear weapons? Can we fight a "limited" nuclear war? WALTER PINCUS, Washington Post and CBS, RICHARD GARWIN, IBM Research Labs, Columbia and Harvard, JOHN STEINBRUNER, Brookings, ROBERT MCNAMARA, Secretary of Defense, 1960-1967, LARRY SMITH, Congressional staffer for 14 years on defense matters, most recently for Sen. Hart, SEN. MARK HATFIELD, Republican from Oregon, LAWRENCE WEILER, Head of U.S. policy at the First Special Session on Disarmament, FRED IKLE, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, JERRY HOUGH, Duke, RICHARD PIPES, National Security Council, ROGER FISHER, Harvard Law.

3.) WHAT SHOULD BE OUR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES? Reductions? Eliminating first strike weapons? Stopping the testing, deployment and production of nuclear weapons? Nuclear disarmament? First half hour: FRED IKLE, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, RICHARD PIPES, National Security Council, SEN. MARK HATFIELD, (R-OR), BETTY LALL, Cornell, U.S. delegate on the UN Committee on Disarmament and International Security, HERBERT SCOVILLE, President, Arms Control Assoc., JOHN STEINBRUNER.

The second half hour focuses on the Feb. 17, 1983 hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Speaking on behalf of the Reagan Administration: RICHARD PERLE, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, ADMIRAL JONATHAN HOWE, Director of the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, Department of State. Speaking on behalf of the freeze: RAYMOND GARTHOFF, Brookings, RANDALL FORSBERG, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. Congressmen HENRY HYDE (R-IL) and JOEL PRITCHARD (R-WA) also appear in the tape.

4.) THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT AT THE UN, June 7-July 10, 1982, utilizing mostly UN TV footage. Includes footage of the NGO speeches of the World Council of Churches, International Physicians, the British Campaign for Nuclear Dis.

Contact Ann Lakhdhir, 10 Bolton Lane, Westport, CT 06880 (203) 226-5924



memorandum

June 13, 1983

JUN 30 1983

TO: Local and State League Presidents

FROM: Dorothy K. Powers, National Security Chair

RE: The attached Committee Guide, "Tooling Up for the National Security Study: Phase II," and other enclosures in this mailing.

Whether or not your League has completed the first phase of the National Security study and has reached consensus on arms control objectives and criteria, we know that many of you are anxious to get started on the next round of study and consensus on military policy and defense spending. This Committee Guide provides resource committees with some essential material for beginning your planning:

- a discussion outline for a two meeting format;
- recommended books, articles and monographs that can be ordered free of charge or at nominal costs, purchased in bookstores or reviewed in libraries;
- additional readings for more advanced study;
- a brief overview of some innovative -- and tried and true -- ways that Leagues have organized public events and special programs for members;
- a section of difficult-to-obtain facts and figures on the federal budget; and most importantly,
- a sample copy of the consensus form for the second phase of consensus.

In addition to the attached Committee Guide, we are including some other items in this mailing that should be distributed to the appropriate people in your League. You will want to retain the official green consensus form that should be completed and returned to the LWVUS by March 15, 1984. National Security Chairs will certainly be interested in the in-depth report on the League's factfinding tour sponsored by NATO earlier this year. Many of the issues covered in that report are the focus of the next phase of our consensus. You will also find in this mailing two other items related to the National Security study: "Gaining Media Visibility for the National Security Study" and "The Discussion Approach and Effective Questioning." We have purposely left these two tip sheets separate from the Committee Guide so that you can give them to the people in charge of public relations and unit chairs. But we also want to point out that the National Security Study offers Leagues an opportunity to design an organization-wide approach. The study can be used to involve all of your members, to build new leadership, to attract new members, to gain more media attention, and to provide members with a chance to test and improve communications skills.

The every member publication tentatively titled "Military Policy and Defense Spending: Options" (Pub. #534, \$1.25, 75¢ for members) is scheduled to be printed in late August, but orders can be sent in now. Be sure to check the publication catalog for ordering information. In the meantime, if I can be of any assistance to you in your preparations, please don't hesitate to contact me at the national office.

Best of luck.

COMMITTEE GUIDE

Pub. No. 533 \$1.00. June 1983

League of Women Voters of the United States, 1730 M St. NW, Washington, DC 20036

Tooling Up for the National Security Study: Phase II

FOCUS: "To evaluate U.S. national security policies and their impact on our domestic programs and our relationships with other countries."

SCOPE: "Define the nature of national security and its relationship to military spending. Assess the impact of U.S. military spending on the nation's economy and on our ability to meet social and environmental needs. Determine the effects of U.S. military policy on our relationship with other countries."

Motion adopted May 17, 1982 at LWVUS convention

AREAS OF STUDY: Following convention adoption of the study item, the national board outlined for League study three areas of public policy:

military policy: the role of military policy in providing national security, including theories, strategies, military forces and the impact of military policy on U.S. relations with other countries;

arms control: arms control initiatives and measures;

defense spending: the cost of fulfilling military policy objectives.

In order to move from study to action, the board approved three areas in which to seek member agreement/consensus:

- ☐ arms control objectives and criteria;
- ☐ military policy objectives; and
- ☐ defense spending.

Two rounds of League decision making were scheduled and later extended to October 31, 1983, for arms control objectives and criteria, and March 15, 1984, for military policy and defense spending.

This COMMITTEE GUIDE:

- ☐ supplements the COMMITTEE GUIDE for the first phase of the consensus, *Tooling Up for the National Security Study* (refer to that guide for tips on getting your study under way);
- ☐ includes a suggested outline for study and discussion for the second phase of the National Security study and consensus and a sample consensus form;
- ☐ reviews existing and forthcoming national League publications;
- ☐ suggests sources for further information; and
- ☐ provides charts showing the composition of past and current U.S. federal budgets.

National League materials for committees and members that you should have in stock:

- ✓ *Tooling Up for the National Security Study*, (COMMITTEE GUIDE), Pub. No. 529, \$1.00, with attached memo dated December 1982.
- ✓ *Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader*, Pub. No. 531, \$1.25, 75¢ for members.
- ✓ *The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How*, Pub. No. 530, \$1.25, 75¢ for members.
- ✓ "Wrap-Up: UN Special Session on Disarmament," *Prospectus 1982-84*, #1. (Also includes list of arms control agreements, definitions of selected military policy and arms control terms and resources on global security. This was the "package of materials" referred to in the June 1982 *Post Board Summary*.)
- ✓ "The Future of National Security," *National VOTER*, Fall 1982.
- ✓ "NATO in the 1980s," *National VOTER*, Winter 1983.
- ✓ "The Politics of Arms Control," *National VOTER*, Spring 1983.
- ✓ *Post Board Summaries* updating Leagues on national board decisions made on this item since June 1982.
- ✓ *Congress and the Budget: From Chaos to Control*, Pub. No. 368, 40¢.
- ✓ *NATO: Report of League of Women Voters Fact-finding Tour*, March 19-26, 1983.

Forthcoming:

- ✓ *Military Policy and Defense Spending: Options*, Pub. No. 534, \$1.25, 75¢ for members (tentative title).
- ✓ *Congress and the Budget Revisited*, Pub. No. 365, 65¢, 40¢ for members (tentative title).
- ✓ Report of June 9-11, 1983 state League leaders' conference, "U.S. National Security: Facts and Assumptions," sponsored by the League of Women Voters Education Fund.
- ✓ *National VOTER* articles will be published periodically with a focus on current national security topics.

Discussion outline: Meeting 1

I. Introduction

- ☐ Review FOCUS and SCOPE of the study as adopted by Convention 1982 and AREAS OF

STUDY outlined for this biennium.

☐ Remind members that the LWVUS already has positions "to promote peace in an interdependent world through cooperation with other nations and the strengthening of international organizations." Stress to members that this study supplements IR program in the areas of trade, economic development and the United Nations by focusing on military policy.

☐ State the goals of the two fall-winter meetings (assuming you are holding two) in preparation for the March 15, 1984 reporting deadline:

Meeting I: to review and discuss the premises and purposes of U.S. military policy, the role of nuclear and conventional weapons within this policy and defense spending priorities.

Meeting II: to achieve member understanding and agreement on military policy objectives and selected defense spending issues.

Allow approximately ten minutes for this introduction. If you are looking for places to compress, here's one. To speed up not only the introduction but also the discussion to follow, consider having the FOCUS, SCOPE and AREAS OF STUDY outlined on blackboards or flip charts. Print the LWVUS "Positions in Brief" from Impact on Issues. Also urge your members to purchase and review Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader (# 531) and Military Policy and Defense Spending: Options (#534).

II. Military policy

Review major U.S. foreign policy positions since World War II and consider the role of military policy in implementing them.

☐ Begin by reviewing Spring 1983 Meeting I discussion (if you held one). In that meeting you were asked to discuss various military policy issues with particular emphasis on those areas that affect arms control efforts, i.e., U.S. relations with other countries and weapons' roles and capabilities. Discussion questions included:

- How have U.S. foreign policy objectives changed or remained the same over the past 40 years?
- How have U.S. foreign policy objectives been implemented militarily?
- In what ways are current foreign and military policies an outgrowth of or departure from past experience?
- What impact do U.S. and Soviet military policies have on other nations?
- What purposes are served by the weapons in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals?

For the purpose of this meeting, discussion should examine *current* military policies and the role of military forces in implementing them.

Key areas for discussion

1. In what ways do U.S. military policies seek to provide national security?

Back-up questions:

- Is current U.S. military policy a continuation of or departure from past policies? Specifically, does it continue nuclear deterrence or signal a move toward a counterforce nuclear policy?
- Is military strength necessary to protect the U.S. homeland?
- Are some allies more important for the United States to defend than others?
- Should the United States be prepared to respond militarily to conflicts outside of Europe? If so, where?
- Apart from defending other nations, what if any additional interests should the United States be willing to defend militarily?

Allow approximately 15 minutes for discussion and then summarize the major points with emphasis on the purposes or missions of U.S. military forces. This is an area where presentation of basic information may speed the discussion along.

III. Military forces and their purposes

Identify and discuss the roles of nuclear and conventional forces in fulfilling U.S. military missions.

☐ Begin by recapping Spring 1983 Meeting I discussion question, "How do U.S. nuclear and conventional weapons compare to those of the Soviet Union?"

Key areas for discussion

1. What purposes do nuclear weapons serve in fulfilling U.S. military missions?

Back-up questions:

- What was the rationale for developing the strategic nuclear triad and what purposes does it serve today?
- What is the rationale behind the NATO policy of "first use" of nuclear weapons? Does it strengthen or weaken deterrence? (The issue of "first use" was discussed under the arms control objectives and criteria portion of the study and consensus. You should note that this question is being asked here with specific reference to U.S. deterrence strategy in Europe.)
- Should the United States threaten to use nuclear weapons to ensure access to vital resources and/or to respond to conflicts around the world?

2. What purposes do conventional forces serve in fulfilling U.S. military missions?

Back-up questions:

- How critical are conventional forces in defending the U.S. homeland?
- In what way does NATO strategy rely on conventional weapons?
- How does conventional deterrence compare to nuclear deterrence in terms of cost (e.g., personnel, equipment, investment, readiness)?
- How might using conventional forces (e.g., Rapid Deployment Force) to respond to conflicts outside of Europe affect the U.S. commitment to NATO?

Allow approximately 40 minutes for discussion and then summarize the major points.

IV. Introduction to the budget

Examine national priorities as reflected by the federal budget and gain an understanding of budget data.

- ☐ Study and use charts on the federal budget contained on pp. 5-6 of this COMMITTEE GUIDE. To speed the discussion along, you might have these charts available on blackboards or flip charts or as handouts.

Key areas for discussion

1. What is the allocation of funds to major functions in the federal budget?

Back-up questions:

- How have the total budget size and percentage shares of funds allocated to major budget functions changed since World War II? What are some of the reasons for these changes? (Table 1)
- What percentage of the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 budget request is devoted to defense? How does this percentage vary if different measures of defense spending are used? (Tables 1 and 3)
- How do strategic and general purpose forces compare as percentages of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget? (Table 2)
- Has the Reagan administration emphasized *investment* (procurement of new nuclear and conventional weapons systems, research and development and military construction) or *readiness* (operations and maintenance, personnel and retired pay) expenditures? Consider percentages of the DoD budget and absolute-dollar increases in each category. (Table 2)

Allow approximately 20 minutes for analysis and discussion. This is another area where advance presentation of basic information could condense meeting time or leave more opportunity for discussion. Resource Committee members may want to read in advance, Congress and the Budget: From Chaos to Control (#368), and Congress and the Budget Revisited (#365).

V. Conclusion

- ☐ Review the goal for Meeting I and summarize the group's discussion. Consider any additional readings or special assignments that may be desirable in preparation for Meeting II. Review goals for Meeting II.

Allow 5 minutes for concluding remarks.

Discussion outline: Meeting II

I. Introduction

- ☐ State the purpose and goal of the meeting:
 - to achieve member understanding and agreement on military policy objectives and selected defense spending issues.
- ☐ Review topics covered in Meeting I (if you held one) *very briefly*. You will have the opportunity to draw on the previous discussion during this meeting. If you are holding one meeting, you need to establish a framework for the discussion in advance. The best advice is to be sure that your members have read *Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader* (#531), with

If your League plans only one discussion meeting on the National Security study this fall-winter, the meeting must focus primarily on the goals stated for Meeting II in order to enable your members to reach consensus. You will need, however, to provide background on the issues covered in Meeting I in order to facilitate your discussion. Some tips on how to improve members' understanding ahead of time:

- ☐ Use all of your communications channels to encourage members to read the *National VOTER* articles "The Future of National Security" (Fall 1982) and "NATO in the 80s" (Winter 1983).
- ☐ Summarize articles, charts and diagrams from other sources in your bulletin.
- ☐ Buy enough copies of *Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader* (Pub. No. 531, \$1.25, 75¢ for members) and *Military Policy and Defense Spending: Options* (Pub. No. 534, \$1.25, 75¢ for members) for every-member distribution before the meeting.
- ☐ Expand a meeting of the resource committee to include interested members; in effect, make it into a workshop.
- ☐ Alert members to lectures and discussions organized by other groups, special TV broadcasts or radio programs covering military policy and defense spending.

special emphasis on the sections entitled "Lessons of the Past" and "Theories Underlying Current U.S. and Soviet Military Policies" and *Military Policy and Defense Spending: Options* (#534).

☐ Provide your members with the charts and diagrams on pp. 5-6 of this guide before they attend the meeting, by reprinting them in your local VOTER or sending them as a special mailing. Whether or not you held a background meeting, you should have these available on flipcharts, blackboards or as handouts at Meeting II.

☐ The discussion outline that follows is designed to parallel the consensus questions. In order to answer each consensus question, you need to consider *all* discussion questions, because the issues they focus on are interrelated. Therefore, you should wait until the end of the discussion to ask for the group's response to the consensus questions. You may want the recorder to fill out the sample copy of the consensus form as you discuss, but the group should have an opportunity to assess all of the questions at the end of the meeting. Alert members at the start of the meeting that they need to stay through the taking of consensus at the end of the session.

Allow approximately ten minutes for introduction and review.

II. Military policy and budget issues

Determine appropriate missions and characteristics of U.S. military forces and evaluate significant military budget issues.

Key areas for discussion

1. What military missions should U.S. military forces undertake?

If you held Meeting I, try to keep this discussion *brief*. If you did not hold a background meeting, review Section II of Meeting I ("Military Policy") and present the major points for a brief discussion.

2. What kinds of nuclear and conventional forces should the United States have?

Review Section III of Meeting I ("Military Forces and Their Purposes").

Back-up questions:

—Should the United States have a deterrence or a counterforce nuclear policy?

—Are some characteristics of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad (e.g., accuracy, survivability, or command and control) more important in providing deterrence than others? Which parts of the U.S. triad possess these characteristics? Do some characteristics provide capabilities beyond deterrence (e.g., first strike capability)?

—Does deterrence require a triad with three invulnerable legs? How can vulnerability, if it exists, be addressed?

—Should the United States rely more on *nuclear* deterrence and, if so, less on conventional deterrence, or vice versa? How would such changes affect NATO strategy? How do cost considerations affect these policy choices?

3. What is the appropriate balance between military investment and readiness expenditures?

Back-up questions:

—What is the purpose of military investment expenditures? Military readiness expenditures? How are they related to each other?

—How does placing emphasis on long-term investment *now* affect military spending choices in the future?

—If you were a member of the House or Senate Appropriations Committee faced with the need to reduce defense budget authority to meet the budget totals set by the Budget Committee, would you choose to reduce *investment* or *readiness* expenditures—or both equally?

4. What impact does defense spending have on the federal budget and key elements of the U.S. economy?

Back-up questions:

—How does defense spending compare to other types of federal spending in the number and types of jobs created as a result of money spent?

—If military spending continues to increase as planned over the next five years, what effect will it have on inflation?

—If the defense budget were reduced, should the savings be used to spend more in other areas (social and environmental) or to reduce the federal deficit?

Allow approximately 50 minutes for discussion.

III. Consensus

☐ Proceed to read and discuss consensus questions and record consensus.

Allow approximately 30 minutes for concluding consensus.

Meetings at a glance

Meeting I (90 minutes)

I. Introduction—10 minutes

II. Military policy—15 minutes

III. Military forces and their purposes—40 minutes

IV. Introduction to the budget—20 minutes

V. Conclusion—5 minutes


Meeting II (90 minutes)

I. Introduction—10 minutes

II. Military policy and budget issues—50 minutes

III. Consensus—30 minutes


TABLE 1
The Federal Budget Pie
(Outlays)*



Agency Totals: \$92.9 billion**
Less Offsetting Receipts: -0.2 billion
Net Total Budget: \$92.7 billion




Agency Totals: \$68.7 billion
Less Offsetting Receipts: -0.2 billion
Net Total Budget: \$68.5 billion




Agency Totals: \$119.8 billion
Less Offsetting Receipts: -1.4 billion
Net Total Budget: \$118.4 billion

Offsetting Receipts⁵ -1%



Agency Totals: \$330.6 billion
Less Offsetting Receipts: -6.4 billion
Net Total Budget: 324.2 billion

Offsetting Receipts -1%



Agency Totals: \$871.2 billion
Less Offsetting Receipts: -22.7 billion
Net Total Budget: 848.5 billion

Offsetting Receipts -2%

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1984*, March 1983 and *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1984*.

*Outlays represent actual government payments for obligations incurred.

**These figures are in current or "then-year" dollars, i.e., they reflect the value of the dollar in the year the expenditure occurred.

¹Includes Department of Defense; atomic energy defense activities (such as nuclear weapons production) conducted outside the Department of Defense; and defense-related activities such as the Selective Service System and defense stockpiles of certain materials.

²Includes all veterans' programs (compensation, pensions, education, medical care, housing loans); space programs (NASA); and international programs (foreign economic and financial assistance, military assistance, Department of State operations, and international financial programs).


³Interest paid on the public debt and other interest.

⁴Includes general science and technology (excluding the space program); natural resources and environment; energy; agriculture; commerce and housing credit; transportation; community and regional development; education, training, employment and social services; health; income security (including Social Security since 1970); administration of justice; general government; and revenue sharing and general purpose fiscal assistance.

⁵Includes employer share of employee retirement; interest received from trust funds; and rents and royalties on the Outer Continental Shelf. Offsetting receipts totalled less than 1% of the budget in 1945 and 1955.

This material may be reproduced.

TABLE 2
The FY 1984 Defense Budget: A Closer Look
President's Request
(Budget Authority)*



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1984*, March 1983.


*Budget Authority represents legal authority to enter into obligations that will result in immediate or future outlays.

¹Includes the U.S. strategic nuclear triad, command and control activities associated with the triad, and related personnel.

²General Purpose Forces include all conventional (nonnuclear) weapons, related personnel, and theater and tactical nuclear weapons. A separate breakdown of theater and tactical nuclear weapons is not available from the Department of Defense. Combat-related Activities include intelligence and communications, airlift and sealift, and Guard and Reserve forces. While some of these "combat-related forces" might support strategic missions, most are intended to serve conventional missions.

³Includes programs applicable to both strategic and conventional weapons such as research and development, central supply and maintenance, and training, medical, and other general personnel activities.

TABLE 3
The FY 1984 Federal Budget Pie: Different Perspectives
(Outlays)



Source: *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1984*.

¹Includes same categories as Table 1, but all trust funds are removed from the budget totals. Trust funds are monies earmarked for special purposes and programs, such as Social Security, Medicare and unemployment compensation, and are not available for general government spending.

²As in previous table, trust funds are excluded. Defense-related items previously appearing in other categories, however, have been added to the national defense account (see footnote 3), showing a more inclusive picture of national defense spending.

³Includes national defense (see footnote 1 of Table 1); veterans programs; foreign military sales credit; military assistance; and a portion of interest paid on the public debt.

⁴Includes space programs and international programs (excluding foreign military sales credit and military assistance).

⁵Remainder of net interest paid on the public debt and other interest.

⁶Includes all social and economic programs (see footnote 4 of Table 1) except those that are trust funds.

Recommended reading

U.S. nuclear policy

Luck, Edward C. "The Reagan Administration's Nuclear Strategy." *Current History*, vol. 82, n. 484 (May 1983): 193–196 and 232–233. \$2.95. Write: *Current History*, Publications Office, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA 19127. (Entire issue concerns U.S.-Soviet relations.)

U.S.-Soviet military comparisons

Center for Defense Information. "U.S.-Soviet Military Facts." *The Defense Monitor*, vol. XI, n. 6 (1982). 8 pages. \$1.00 single copies; 10 or more copies, 50¢ each. Write: Center for Defense Information, 303 Capitol Gallery West, 600 Maryland Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20024, Tel. (202) 484-9490. Concise comparisons of U.S. and Soviet military capabilities.

Committee on the Present Danger. *Has America Become Number 2? The U.S.-Soviet Military Balance and American Defense Policies and Programs*, June 19, 1982. Paperback, 35 pages. Write or call: Committee on the Present Danger, 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, Tel. (202) 466-7444. Analysis of U.S. defense policy and the U.S.-Soviet military balance, including numerous charts and graphs. Supports efforts to strengthen U.S. military forces.

U.S. strategic nuclear triad

Congressional Budget Office. *Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces: The Administration's Program and Alternatives*, May 1983. Free. Write: Congressional Budget Office, Publications Office, Second and D Streets, SW, Washington, DC 20515. Analysis of costs of Administration's strategic modernization plan and alternative proposals (including deletion of MX missile and emphasis on submarine-based missiles). Summary of a forthcoming CBO study.

Garrison, Mark with Tarbell, Gregory C. *Matching Nuclear Weapons to Strategy: Lessons from the MX Decision*, December 1981. Paperback, 24 pages. Multiple copies available at nominal cost. Write: Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912. Balanced analysis of Administration's unsuccessful (but recently resurrected) 1981 proposal to base MX missiles in existing silos. Publication also addresses rationale behind and capabilities of each leg of the strategic nuclear triad.

Policy of "first use"

Union of Concerned Scientists. *No First Use*, February 1, 1983. Paperback, 69 pages. \$3.00 plus postage. Write: Union of Concerned Scientists, 26 Church Street, Cambridge, MA 02238. Analyzes effects of a no-first use declaration and examines the conventional balance in Europe. Favors policy of no first use, but also presents other viewpoints.

Conventional forces

Carter, Barry. "Strengthening Our Conventional Forces." *Alternatives for the 1980s: Rethinking Defense and Conventional Forces*, n. 8 (1983): 19–41. \$4.00. Write: The Center for National Policy, 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Suite 230, Washington, DC 20036. Excellent analysis of U.S. conventional policy issues.

Congressional Budget Office. *Army Ground Combat Modernization for the 1980s: Potential Costs and Effects for NATO*, November 1982. Free. See address under "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Triad." Analysis of NATO modernization options.

European Security Study. *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s*, 1983. Paperback, 35 pages. \$1.00. Write: ESECS/American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. Report by a diverse group of Western military and civilian arms experts (including former NATO commander General Andrew Goodpastor and McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson) on proposals to improve NATO conventional forces.

Budget

Congressional Budget Office. *An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 1984* (February 1983): Chapter IV, "The Administration's Defense Budget," 53–88. Free. See address under "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Triad." Annual CBO analysis of Administration's budget request. Good overview and concise analysis.

Department of Defense. *Your Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 1984*, February 1983. Write: The Department of Defense, Public Affairs, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301 or Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Concise summary of the Department of Defense Annual Report.

Defense spending and the economy

Congressional Budget Office. *Defense Spending and the Economy*, February 1983. Free. See address under "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Triad." Analysis of the effects of defense spending on the economy.

DeGrasse, Robert Jr., Murphy, Paul and Ragen, William. *The Costs and Consequences of Reagan's Military Buildup: A Report to the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO and the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy from the Council on Economic Priorities*, 1982. Paperback, 64 pages. \$2.50 (discounts for quantities). Write: Coalition

for a New Foreign and Military Policy, 120 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002. Analysis of negative impact on competitiveness and employment generated by current increases in defense spending. (Numerous other articles on defense spending are available from the coalition.)

Alternative views of national security

Brown, Lester. "Redefining National Security." *Worldwatch Paper*, n. 14 (1977). Paperback, 41 pages. \$2.00. Write: Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036. Identifies major threats to national security, including dwindling food and energy supplies, climate modification, and inflation and unemployment.

Additional resources

Adams, Gordon. *Controlling Weapons Costs: Can the Pentagon Reforms Work?*, 1983. Paperback, 58 pages. Write or call: The Council on Economic Priorities, 84 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10011, Tel. (212) 691-8550. Analysis of the "Carlucci initiatives" concerning management reforms in the Department of Defense. Generally critical of Pentagon practices.

Anderson, Marion. *Converting the Work Force: Where the Jobs Would Be*, 1982. \$3.00 (add 20% for orders under \$20.00; discounts for quantities). Make checks payable to: Employment Research Associates, 400 S. Washington Avenue, Lansing, MI 48933, Tel. (517) 485-7655. Analyzes the creation of jobs resulting from a \$10-billion cut in military procurement and reinvestment in civilian industry.

Anderson, Marion. *The Empty Pork Barrel*, 1982. \$2.00. Write: Employment Research Associates, address above. State-by-state data on the unemployment impact of military spending. For another perspective, see "Pork-Barrel Politics: Some Congressmen Treat Military Budget As Source for Patronage." *Wall Street Journal*, April 15, 1983. Discusses congressionally mandated increases in defense spending for what are described as "pork-barrel" projects.

The Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Credibility of the NATO Deterrent. *The Credibility of the NATO Deterrent: Bringing the NATO Deterrent Up to Date*, May 1981. Paperback, 54 pages. \$4.00 prepaid. Write or call: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1616 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006, Tel. (202) 347-9353. Good analysis of threats to NATO and NATO capabilities.

Beres, Louis Rene. "Myths and Realities: U.S. Nuclear Strategy." *Occasional Paper* 32, December 1982. Paperback, 22 pages. Free. Write: The Stanley Foundation, 420 East Third Street, Muscatine, IA 52761. Critical assessment of current U.S. nuclear strategy. For more complete analysis see: Beres, Louis Rene. *Mimicking Sisyphus: America's Countervailing Nuclear Strategy*, 1982. Paperback, 130 pages. \$11.95 (discounts for quantities). Write or call: Doretha R. Bouche, Marketing Assistant, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 125 Spring Street, Lexington, MA 02173, Tel. (617) 862-6650. Good resource for study chair or member with great interest.

Boston Study Group. *Winding Down: The Price of Defense*. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1982. Paperback, 314 pages. \$7.95. (Reprint of 1979 edition.) Available at bookstores. Assessment of U.S. security needs and proposals for a less costly defense establishment. Somewhat dated.

Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1984. \$7.50 prepaid. Write: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20503. A shorter version is *The Budget in Brief*, \$5.00 (also available from GPO).

Bundy, McGeorge, Kennan, George, McNamara, Robert S. and Smith, Gerard. "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 60, n. 4 (Spring 1982): 753-768. The much-discussed proposal for a U.S. policy of no first use. See article by Karl Kaiser et al. below.

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Congressional Budget Office. *Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options* (February 1983): Chapter II, "National Defense," 27-61. Free. See address under "Recommended Reading." Annual CBO analysis of options to reduce federal budget.

de Rose, Francois. "Inflexible Response." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, n. 1 (Fall 1982): 136-150. A French analysis of NATO policy.

Department of Defense. *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984*, February 1, 1983. See address under "Recommended Reading." The most detailed presentation available of the Administration's defense program. Contains lots of charts and graphs.

Department of Defense. *Soviet Military Power*. 2d ed. March 1983. See address under "Recommended Reading." The Administration's presentation of Soviet military strength.

Department of State. "Ensuring Security in the Nuclear Age." *Current Policy*, n. 466 (March 8, 1983). Write: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC 20520. Address by Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, on U.S. nuclear strategy and arms control.

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Department of State. "Peace and Deterrence." *Current Policy*, n. 383 (April 6, 1982). Speech by former Secretary of State Alexander Haig on Administration nuclear strategy.

Department of State. "Peace and National Security." *Current Policy*, n. 472 (March 23, 1983). President Reagan's speech to the nation on the defense budget and military policy.

Fallows, James. *National Defense*. New York: Random House, 1982. Paperback, 184 pages. \$4.95. Available at bookstores. Analysis of U.S. defense policy in relation to military strategy, tactics, weapons, managers and force structures. Critical of current U.S. policy.

Federation of American Scientists. "F.A.S. Public Interest Report: Defense Spending and the Economy." *Journal of the Federation of American Scientists*, vol. 36, n. 3 (March 1983).

Foreign Policy Association. *Great Decisions '83*, 1983. Paperback, 88 pages. \$6.00. Write or call: The Foreign Policy Association, 205 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10016, Tel. (212) 481-8485. Balanced and concise analysis of major foreign policy issues, including U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-West German relations.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Paperback, 357 pages. \$9.95. Available at bookstores. Good background on the history of containment policy.

Gordon, Michael. "In the Great Nuclear Strategy Debate, The Issue Is, Where Do We Stand?" *National Journal* (May 5, 1982): 856-860. Very good basic article on competing philosophies of deterrence.

Ground Zero. *What About the Russians—and Nuclear War?* New York: Pocket Books, 1983. Paperback, 230 pages. \$3.95. Available at bookstores or write: Pocket Books, 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020. Lay person's review of historic, political, economic and cultural factors that shape Soviet society and policies.

Johansen, Robert C. "Toward a Dependable Peace: A Proposal for an Appropriate Security System." *World Policy Paper*, n. 8 (1983). Paperback, 58 pages. \$3.00. Write or call: World Policy Institute, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017, Tel. (212) 490-0010. Discusses options for reversing current trends toward declining security and increasing militarism.

Kaiser, Karl, Leber, Georg, Mertes, Alois and Schulz, Franz-Josef. "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A Response to an American Proposal for Renouncing the First Use of Nuclear Weapons." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 60, n. 5 (Summer 1982): 1157-1170. Also see letters to the editor, pp. 1171-1180. Response to McGeorge Bundy et al. (see above).

Kaplan, Fred. *Mutual Delusions: Soviet and American Thinking on Fighting and Winning a Nuclear War*, 1982. Pamphlet, 12 pages. Free. Write: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, 11 Beacon Street, Boston MA 02108. Informative discussion of the difference between official U.S. and Soviet "doctrine" regarding nuclear war and "military tactics" that would be used to fight a war.

Kaufmann, William W. "The Defense Budget." *Setting National Priorities, The 1984 Budget* (1983): 39-79. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Paperback, 224 pages. \$9.95. Write or call: The Brookings Institution, Publications, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, Tel. (202) 797-6258. Annual Brookings analysis of Administration's proposed defense budget. For an alternative perspective see: George Kuhn. *Agenda '83: A Mandate for Leadership Report*.

Kincade, William H. "Missile Vulnerability Reconsidered." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 11, n. 5 (May 1981). Though somewhat dated, this article contains a good discussion of the general vulnerability issue.

Kuhn, George W.S. "Defense." *Agenda '83: A Mandate for Leadership Report* (1983): 69-114. Edited by Richard N. Holwill. Paperback, 362 pages. \$6.95. Write: Department G, The Heritage Foundation, 513 C Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002.

Mayers, Teena. *Understanding Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: A Guide to the Issues*, 1983. Paperback, 74 pages. \$2.95. Write or call: Arms Control Research, Box 1355, Arlington, VA 22210, Tel. (703) 524-1355 or 528-5486. Very basic primer on military policy and arms control, similar in format to LWV pubs.

Newhouse, John. "Arms and Allies." *The New Yorker* (February 28, 1983): 64-81. Extensive analysis of current U.S.-NATO relations and the deployment of Euromissiles.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons*, May 1982. Write: The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Public Affairs Office, Washington, DC 20451. Official NATO-Warsaw Pact comparisons.

"Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy for Fighting a Long Nuclear War." *New York Times* (May 30, 1982): 1. Describes Administration's FY '84-'88 defense guidance, a classified, internal Pentagon planning document. Considered to be a very accurate summary of the document.

Pipes, Richard. "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War." *Commentary* (July 1977): 21-34. Though somewhat dated, this article (by a former Reagan administration nuclear strategist) outlines conservative thinking regarding Soviet military policy.

Ravenal, Earl. "The Case for a Withdrawal of Our Forces." *New York Times Magazine* (March 6, 1983): 58. Former Defense Department official argues that the United States should abandon the policy of containment and remove its troops from around the world.

"Reagan Moves on Military Priorities." *New York Times*, May 25, 1982. Describes national security decision memorandum establishing priorities for the use of U.S. military power in the event of a global war with the Soviet Union.

Reese, Michael. "Rethinking the Unthinkable"; Lerner, Michael A. "A Star Wars Defense"; and Alpern, David M. "A New Nuclear Heresy." *Newsweek* (April 4, 1983): 16-22. Article on Administration proposals for space-based antiballistic missiles.

Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, April 6, 1983. 29 pages. Write: President's Commission on Strategic Forces, Room 3E129, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301. The recently-released Scowcroft Commission recommendations regarding the MX and proposals for new, single-warhead missiles.

Rogers, Bernard. "The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 60, n. 5 (Summer 1982): 1145-1156. Informative article by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe on NATO's conventional and nuclear capabilities. (Rogers has advocated increasing NATO's reliance on conventional deterrence.)

Scheer, Robert. *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War*. Random House, 1982. Hardbound, 279 pages. \$14.95. Available at bookstores. Analyzes evidence indicating a shift in U.S. policy toward fighting and winning a nuclear war. Critical of current policy.

Sivard, Ruth Leger. *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1982, 1982*. Paperback, 44 pages. \$4.00 (25 or more, \$2.50 each). Write: World Priorities, Inc., Box 1003, Leesburg, VA 22075, Tel. (703) 777-6444 or (202) 965-1661. Analyzes world resources devoted to military and nonmilitary purposes.

Tobias, Sheila, Goudinoff, Peter, Leader, Stefan and Leader, Shelah. *What Kinds of Guns are They Buying for your Butter? A Beginner's Guide to Defense Weaponry and Military Spending*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1982. Hardbound, 384 pages. \$14.50. Beginner's guide to weapons technology and defense industry. Excerpts from the book can be found in *Ms. Magazine*, June/August 1982 and March 1983 issues.

Tsurantani, Taketsugu. "Old Habits, New Times: Challenges to Japanese-American Security Relations." *International Security* (Fall 1982): 175-187.

Turner, Stansfield and Thibault, George. "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, n. 1 (Fall 1982): 122-135. Detailed article on U.S. naval policy.

Ullman, Richard. "The Euromissile Mire." *Foreign Policy*, n. 50 (Spring 1983): 39-52. Easy-to-read analysis of negotiations on Euromissiles, particularly the issue of whether to count British and French missiles in Western totals.

United Nations. "Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures: A Summary." *Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 27*, January 1983. Ten-page summary of a study by the Group of Consultant Experts to the UN Secretary-General. Full report is contained in the annex to the report of the Secretary-General (same title as above), UN Document A/37/386. Write: Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY 10017.

U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Richard F. Kaufman. *The Defense Buildup and the Economy*. Joint Committee Print. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982. 29 pages. Assessment of the likely economic effects of the proposed defense buildup, based on testimony received from a number of defense budget experts during hearings conducted by the committee.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *East-West Relations: Focus on the Pacific*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.

Watson, Russell. "Reagan and the Russians: Andropov's Peace Offensive"; Kissinger, Henry A. "How to Deal with Moscow"; Korniyenko, Georgi. "A Plea for 'Good Relations'"; and Woodward, Kenneth. "The President Vs. The Bishops." *Newsweek* (November 29, 1982): 26-41. Series of articles on U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S. military policy.

Weiler, Lawrence D. "No First Use: A History." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (February 1983): 28-34. Background on the issue of "no first use."

"Why We Must Think About Protracted Nuclear War." *Wall Street Journal*, August 30, 1982. The author, Seymour Weiss, says that protracted nuclear war planning is supportable if it contributes to deterrence.

Leagues in the spotlight

The National Security study was adopted at Convention '82 on a wave of League enthusiasm and eagerness. So it's not surprising that Leagues immediately began working very hard to increase member and public awareness of important national security issues. Here are some interesting ideas for League programs that we've distilled from recent local and state LWV annual reports, bulletins, letters and conversations. They prove that Leagues continue to be imaginative, creative, versatile and hardworking. They also reveal that national security is a topic of high interest in the League and that resources on this timely subject are available everywhere.

In the national security field, where facts and opinions often conflict, the League can play an important role by sponsoring **public forums** to air the issues and by moderating the often raging debates. Hundreds of such meetings, discussions, debates and conferences have been sponsored by Leagues at all levels during the past year.

☐ "The Arms Race and National Security—Where to Next?" pitted the Director of the Council on Peacemaking and Religion against a state commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in a debate sponsored by the **LWV of Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky**. Similar topics generated

public discussion during meetings organized by the **LWVs of Las Vegas Valley, Nevada; Manchester, New Hampshire; Boulder, Colorado;** and countless others.

☐ Tapping resources from local colleges and high schools, the **LWVs of Princeton, New Jersey; Middlebury, Vermont; Dallas, Texas; Rochester, New York;** and **Athens, Ohio** organized debates and lecture series attracting both LWV members and the public.

☐ Other Leagues have localized the national security issue by involving students who "will be more affected by this subject than any other group," according to the **LWV of Lycoming County, Pennsylvania**, which sponsored a public meeting on arms control. Also in Pennsylvania, the **LWV of Allentown** combined the National Security study with a local program item on civil defense and held a meeting on "Preparedness in the Lehigh Valley in the Event of Nuclear Attack by Design or Accident." And the **LWV of Cuyahoga County, Ohio** organized a meeting using SOHIO Research Department specialist C.E. Thomas.

☐ At the state level, the **LWV of Georgia** creatively timed a conference on national security and arms control to coincide with its state LWV convention, thereby combining expert presentations with League workshops on arms control criteria and objectives.

Leagues' financial resources may be limited, but a good idea can go a long way with **grants** from other interested organizations.

☐ The **LWV of Montana** secured grant monies from the Montana Committee for Humanities to sponsor a series of three lectures by Dr. Paul G. Lauren entitled "National Security, Peace and the Fate of the Earth."

☐ The **LWV of South Bend, Indiana** cosponsored, with the Center for Continuing Education at the University of Notre Dame, "A Town Meeting on the Nuclear Disarmament Issue" with a grant from the Indiana Committee for the Humanities.

☐ Four hundred people attended a symposium entitled "Views on National Security" organized by the **LWV of Oregon** and partially funded by the Oregon Committee for the Humanities. The keynote speaker was Sen. Mark Hatfield (R OR).

☐ The "Quest for Arms Control: What Are Our Choices?," a conference organized by the **LWV of the Cincinnati Area**, was funded by the Ohio Committee for the Humanities. The day-long meeting included speeches on such topics as "The Evolution of Arms Control," "An Examination of the Present Administration's Proposals," "Ethics and Nuclear Arms: An Evaluation of Our Choices," and "Security from the Nuclear Freeze Perspective."

Go-see tours, a popular League technique for learning the facts first hand, can be put to good use in a local National Security study. A number of Leagues have visited military bases in their areas and spoken with the people in charge.

☐ A trip to Patrick Air Force Base was featured by the **LWV of Space Coast, Florida**.

☐ The **LWV of Nebraska** sponsored a trip to Strategic Air Command Headquarters in Omaha.

☐ The **LWV of Okaloosa County, Florida** toured Eglin Air Force Base.

☐ The **LWV of Fairbanks, Alaska** visited a distant early warning station.

The National Security study deals with some very "hot" issues, perfect for **media** use.

☐ The **LWV of San Joaquin County California's** panel discussion was televised live by Big Valley Cable.

☐ When the **LWV of Westport, Connecticut** held a series of meetings last spring on national security (with a grant from the Connecticut Humanities Council and Ploughshares Fund), the local League IR chair saw an excellent opportunity to begin working with videotapes. The League now has a series of four hour-long tapes that are available to Leagues nationwide (see *Prospectus* 1982-84, #2).

Games or role-playing also can be effective study tools.

☐ The National Security chair of the **LWV of Manatee County, Florida** is working on a game similar to the board game "Go." Players move forward and backward around the board and "if you hit 'nuclear war' you've had it!"

☐ The **LWV of Toledo-Lucas County, Ohio** put a "fill in the blanks" quiz on national security issues in its *VOTER*.

☐ A "match the word to the definition" puzzle was featured in the April *VOTER* of the **LWV of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania**.

You can cover twice as much territory by **pooling people power**.

☐ The **LWVs of Englewood Area, Tenafly and Leonia, New Jersey** are working together on the National Security study.

☐ The **LWVs of Easton, Sharon and Foxboro, Massachusetts** are, too.

☐ Inter-League Organizations (ILOs) have taken advantage of their cooperative arrangements for public meetings. The **LWV of the National Capitol Area (VA-DC-MD)** devoted its annual congressional forum to the subject of national security; the entire event was broadcast live on C-Span, the congressional cable network. A "Symposium on National Security Issues" was held by the **Alameda, California ILO**, and the **Detroit Metropolitan Area ILO** had a standing-room-only audience for its conference on national security.



League of Women Voters
of the United States
1730 M St, NW
Washington, DC 20036

JUN 30 1983

The Discussion Approach

(Excerpted from LWV of Florida Committee Guide, January 1973)

1. What is a discussion?

Differs from ordinary social conversation... differs from a debate... differs from a lecture or an informational meeting... It is based on the principle that the combined thinking and experience of the group will enrich the thinking of even the most informed and intelligent individual in the group.

2. What is accomplished by discussion?

The information and experience of each member of the group are recognized and utilized. This pooling of ideas and experiences results in a broadening of thinking of the entire group... The discussion process stimulates their thinking rather than encouraging only their passive acceptance of ideas... The conclusions arrived at are sounder than those that are the thinking of one or two people... Viewpoints and attitudes can be modified through full and open discussions in which all ideas are respected and encouraged.

3. What is the role of the discussion leader?

Although most discussion leaders are experienced, knowledgeable people in their own right and often experts in the field that is being discussed, for the purpose of the discussion the leader must adopt an entirely new attitude toward the group. For the duration of a meeting, at least, the most successful discussion leaders take the position that "You can't teach people anything. You can only give them the opportunity to learn." The group members should be encouraged to think for themselves. The leader offers little, if any, direct help beyond the raising of questions, but helps the members help themselves.

4. How does the leader accomplish this?

- ☐ By having the right attitude towards the discussion
- ☐ By preparing for the meeting carefully
- ☐ By utilizing discussion leadership skills throughout the meeting
 - climate setting
 - the effective use of questions
 - acknowledging responses in a way that encourages participation
 - keeping the discussion "on the track"
 - utilizing the problem-solving process
 - summarizing the discussion at the end

Effective Questioning

(Excerpted from LWV of Ohio September 1976 training materials)

1. To draw out a silent member:

"Does anyone who hasn't spoken care to comment?"

2. To suggest the need for sharing personal experiences:

"Does anyone know of the instances where this has worked?"

3. To call attention to points that have not been considered:

"Does anyone have any information on this point?"

4. To keep the discussion focused on the subject:

"That's interesting—but just how does this point fit in with the issues being considered?"

5. To suggest that the discussion is wandering:

"Does the group feel that this point bears directly on the issue at hand?"

6. To use conflict constructively:

"Since we do not seem to be able to resolve this difference now, could we move on to the next point? Perhaps further discussion will reveal additional information on the issue?"

7. To suggest the need for additional information:

"Do we have enough information to decide or not?"

8. To call attention to the source of information:

"Since the facts presented seem to be in conflict, may I suggest that we consider their source as a means of testing their reliability?"

9. To test the strength of a point of view:

"Is this position held by a majority of our group?"

10. To focus attention on issues rather than personalities:

"Which seems to be more important: the facts in the case or the supporters of the different points of view?"

11. To focus attention on the need for objectivity:

"How is our own interest in the outcome causing us to overlook other group interests?"

12. To prevent a few from monopolizing the discussion:

"May we hear now from some who haven't expressed an opinion?"

13. To suggest the need for closing the discussion:

"May I ask for two or three final comments before we close?"

To: LWVUS
1730 M Street NW
Washington, DC 20036

From: LWV of _____
POSTMARK DEADLINE March 15, 1984 State _____ Local League Code # _____

National Security Consensus on Military Policy and Defense Spending

Please return this completed form by March 15, 1984 to the above address. Please mark the envelope "National Security Consensus." *The national board is under no obligation to consider replies postmarked after March 15, 1984.*

How did your board determine member thinking on this issue?

_____ Unit meetings _____ Questionnaire or special mailing
_____ General meeting(s) _____ Telephone poll
_____ Bulletin tear-off _____ Other (specify on separate sheet)

Size of League (number of members as of Jan. 1, 1984)

_____ 1-50 _____ 101-149 _____ 201-249
_____ 51-100 _____ 150-200 _____ 250 or more

To facilitate tabulation, please use a separate sheet for a summary of your comments, identifying your LWV.

From: LWV of _____
(Local League name) (State)

Signed _____
(Portfolio)

- I. Listed below are a number of possible military missions that might be fulfilled by nuclear and/or conventional military forces. Which of these do you consider to be appropriate U.S. military missions and which forces would be appropriate to fulfill these missions?

For each mission listed, check "nuclear role" if you believe that nuclear weapons are appropriate in fulfilling that mission and check "conventional role" if you believe that conventional forces are appropriate. You may check *both* "nuclear role" and "conventional role" if you wish. Check "should not be a mission" if you believe that the United States should not adopt or retain the mission at all.

	Nuclear Role	Conventional Role	Should Not Be A Mission
A. Defend homeland	_____	_____	_____
B. Defend allies	_____	_____	_____
1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	_____	_____	_____
2. Japan	_____	_____	_____
3. Other allies/friends	_____	_____	_____
C. Defend access to vital resources (e.g., oil)	_____	_____	_____
D. Maintain capability to respond to conflicts around the world	_____	_____	_____
E. Other _____	_____	_____	_____

Comments _____

- II. In order to have a nuclear deterrent, the United States has developed a triad of strategic nuclear weapons composed of *intercontinental bombers*, *land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)* and *submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)*. Each leg has differing capabilities and somewhat overlapping purposes. What the United States (and the USSR) does about such weapons affects its deterrence, first-strike and counter-force capabilities.

What should the United States do regarding each leg of its strategic nuclear triad? (Check one box for each leg of the triad.)

	Eliminate	Reduce	Retain As Is	Modernize	No Opinion/ No Agreement
Air leg					
Land leg					
Sea leg					
Comments					

- III. The current U.S. role in NATO is two-fold: to provide a nuclear "shield" over NATO (with nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and with U.S. strategic nuclear weapons) and to deploy conventional weapons and troops to defend Western Europe.

A. Should the United States have the policy of "first use" of nuclear weapons in Europe? Yes ____ No ____

B. Should the United States *maintain as is*, *increase* or *decrease* its reliance on conventional forces in Europe?

Maintain As Is _____

Increase _____

Decrease _____

Comments _____

- IV. The U.S. defense budget can be divided into two broad categories: *investment* (procurement of new nuclear and conventional weapons systems, research and development, and military construction) and *readiness* (operations and maintenance, personnel and retirement pay). In preparing and adopting the defense budget, the President and Congress must make choices between these two categories. (The President's proposed Fiscal Year 1984 defense budget allocates 51 percent of its funds to investment and 49 percent to readiness.)

Within any given level of defense funding, should the United States place more/less emphasis on *investment*, which affects long-term defense capabilities, or *readiness*, which affects near-term combat capabilities?

More Emphasis Less Emphasis Equal Emphasis On Both _____

Investment _____

Readiness _____

Comments _____

- V. National security has many dimensions and cannot be limited to military policy alone. It can be defined as ensuring domestic tranquility, providing for the common defense and promoting the general welfare. Key elements include the country's ability to implement social and environmental programs and to maintain cooperative relationships with other nations. Other important components are effective political leadership and a strong economy. Therefore, in decisions about the federal budget, political leaders should assess the impact of U.S. military spending on the nation's economy and on the government's ability to meet social and environmental needs.

Do you agree ____ disagree ____

Comments _____

JUN 30 1983



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Gaining Media Visibility on National Security

The National Security study has provided new opportunities for increasing local visibility of national security issues and for highlighting the League's study process. Leagues are reporting success using tried-and-true publicity techniques and are also adding to their public relations repertoire with programming for cable television.

Do local residents know the League is in the middle of an in-depth study of vital national security concerns? And that this study will culminate in the League's taking positions on arms control and military spending? If not, it's time to let them know! Please share the following ideas with your League's public relations chair.

Columns Many Leagues that write a regular column for their local newspapers have used this outlet to focus on the study. Reprinted on the reverse side are two columns written by the LWVs of Woodland and Davis, California. One describes the scope of the consensus questions but is geared toward nonmember readers, while the other highlights material from LWVEF publications to give the reader a basic foundation on one key aspect of the nuclear arms race. Note that both columns end with information about a League meeting to encourage citizen participation. If your League doesn't have a regular column, you might ask the editor of your local newspaper if you can do a guest editorial on a national security-related topic.

News articles Some Leagues have invited reporters to observe all meetings at which national security is discussed. Straight news coverage of this kind of meeting can result in an accurate, detailed article of both the format and substance of the League's study. An added plus is the basic understanding of the consensus process that this kind of reporting promotes and the oft-forgotten fact that the local League is part of a national organization that takes positions on highly controversial national issues.

Cable television Local visibility of the League's study can be enhanced through local cable programming. Several ILOs have joined efforts to produce national security "programs" or "events" that have received cable coverage. Some ideas: a debate between an academic and a Department of Defense official; a forum involving members of Congress; a video version of an information-packed LWVEF national security publication. Of course, cable programming shouldn't preclude your efforts to interest local radio and television stations in the study. Cable should be seen as a supplementary medium with potential for increased visibility and wider dissemination of information.

Letters to the editor, editorials Firing off a timely letter to the editor to comment on breaking national security news is another way to keep the League in the public eye. Some Leagues have been successful in interesting their local newspaper's editorial board in the study, and their efforts have paid off handsomely with laudatory editorials about the important contributions the League can make to the public policy debate.

These are just a few of the ideas being used by Leagues to keep their study visible. It's not too early to start educating the media on the scope of the National Security study—they'll appreciate the background when it comes time for them to report on the positions the League reaches next year. Another bonus: possible pay-off in new members interested in the League's study.

Reprinted from the Woodland, CA Democrat, March 4, 1983.

League of Women Voters studies national security

By Audrey Doehne

The League decision to undertake a study of national security comes at a critical time in the nation's history, a time when American citizens are showing unprecedented concern over national security policies and the threat of nuclear war. Americans feel distinctly less secure than they did 15, 10 or even five years ago. At the core of the public debate are a number of questions centering on "how much is enough?"

The focus of the study adopted at the '82 LWVUS convention is "to evaluate U.S. national security, policies and their impact on our domestic programs and our relationships with other countries." The scope of the study is to "Devine the nature of the national security and its relationship to military spending. Assess the impact of U.S. military spending on the Nation's economy and on our ability to meet social and environmental needs. Determine the effects of U.S. military policy on our relationship with other countries."

Areas of study will include military policy, arms control, defense spending and the national security decision-making process. This spring at our final unit meeting, members will be seeking consensus on criteria for evaluating arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements that might reduce the risk of war. We will discuss what level of importance the U.S. government give to various arms control objectives and which type of negotiations or initiatives are most appropriate for achieving each objective.

Many questions will be addressed at a

variety of meetings by League members and the interested public. In exploring the many perspectives on what constitutes national security we will consider a variety of priorities. Is it a strong military, economic stability, domestic tranquility, environmental quality, global cooperation, assured energy supplies or survival that we most desire? What are U.S. military security objectives? What kind of military policy will best enable the U.S. to achieve its current objectives? What types and levels of military forces are necessary to implement each of these military policies? How does each of these military policies affect U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and other nations?

Theories underlining current U.S. and Soviet military policies include deterrence which sets a comprehensive rationale for preventing a nuclear war, and counterforce which sets a comprehensive rationale for fighting a nuclear war. Deterrence-based policy is designed to deter a potential adversary from initiating an attack by making clear the capability to retaliate with devastating damage. The basic assumption of counterforce theory is that the ability to hit and incapacitate military targets will deter Soviet attack.

A counterforce policy requires weapons with great speed, power and accuracy. These weapons have "first strike" implications. Historically both "massive retaliation" and "mutual assured destruction" were essentially deterrence policies. "Massive retaliation" of the Eisenhower administration, 1952-1960, envisaged using nuclear weapons to deter any type of Soviet attack. "Mutual assured destruction" of the Johnson administration,

1963-1968, sought to deter strategic nuclear attack by threatening to retaliate against Soviet cities and the general population. The Reagan strategy outlined in the fiscal 1984-88 Defense Guidance requires U.S. forces to be able to "render ineffective the total Soviet military and political power structure."

Advocates of deterrence based policies feel deterrence has been successfully tested for more than 30 years: no nuclear conflict has occurred since World War II. No nation would risk its own annihilation or global holocaust by attacking another nation with nuclear weapons, therefore, retaliatory weapons are sufficient to deter attack on the U.S. Proponents of counterforce based policies contend that the world has become less stable and that deterrence has lost its effectiveness. They feel true deterrence will result only when the Soviet Union perceives that the U.S. is prepared to fight and win a nuclear war.

Soviet strategic policy, like that of the U.S. claims to be defensive rather than offensive, aimed at deterring war rather than fighting it, yet both nations have developed or plan to develop powerful weapons that would enable them to fight a nuclear war and perhaps launch a first strike against the other. Neither nation's military policy is a model of theoretical consistency.

On March 21 there will be a general LWV meeting on the issue of National Security at the Veterans Memorial building, club room, 14th St. Davis. Guests John Youngerman, professor of physics at UCD, and Paul Craig, professor in the school of engineering, UCD, will be featured speakers. Come and join us Monday, March 21, at 7:30 p.m.

Reprinted from the Davis, CA Enterprise, March 18, 1983.

Making sense of national security

By KATHY ROBERTSON
League of Women Voters

The emphasis of the League of Women Voters' April unit meetings will be to develop criteria to use in preparing a national position in support of "efforts to reduce the risk of war." Our discussion will center primarily upon a review of arms control agreements and objectives.

To retreat from specifics for a moment, I would like to explain the league's purpose in augmenting our current international relations position.

Most closely tied to the issue of national security is our United Nations position adopted by the national board in 1977. Although this position states support for preventive diplomacy, the reduction of international tensions, the improvement of social and economic conditions worldwide, and "continuing efforts to reduce the risk of war, including negotiations on disarmament and arms control," no specific

guidelines are recommended.

Other components of our current international relations position include trade and development. Both reiterate a recognition of the need for cooperation among nations in an interdependent world. Our new national security position must provide clear parameters for judging arms control proposals as well as evaluating military policy objectives and participating in the debate regarding defense spending.

On the issue of arms control, the league will examine the evolution of arms control initiatives with an emphasis on the objectives and type of agreements achieved in the postwar era and the criteria that have been used to evaluate the progress of a negotiation, the merits of a proposal or terms of an agreement.

The subject of national security is extremely complicated; the scope of the league's ambitious study has been condensed into three basic consensus questions and graded

responses. Question No. 1 concerns recommendations regarding the level of importance that the U.S. government should give specifically listed objectives of arms control such as limiting or reducing the quality of weapons, prohibiting the possession or first use of nuclear and/or non-nuclear weapons, inhibiting the development, improvement and proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc.

Next on the agenda will be a discussion of which type(s) of negotiations or initiatives, (multilateral, bilateral and/or unilateral), are most appropriate for achieving each objective.

The final question to be considered involves weighing criteria used to evaluate arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements. Concepts such as equity, verifiability, linkage, continuity, confidence building, environmental protection and widespread agreement will be included.

The three current league positions relating to international relations — United Nations, trade and development — all stress the importance of inter-relationships within the world community and support a liberalization of restrictions in procedures and participation in global negotiations. Comprehensive national security planning which is dictated by an emphasis on internationalization would necessarily decree that foreign policy dictate military policy, and, in turn, weapons planning.

As the dangers inherent in the arms race become increasingly apparent, the league study will attempt to make sense of a myriad philosophies behind our national security policy and intelligently consider our options.

Please don't forget "Nuclear Arms and National Security," a lecture, film and discussion featuring UC Davis Professors Paul Craig and John Youngerman on Monday at 7:30 p.m. in the Veterans' Memorial Center club room, 203 E. 14th St.

League of Women Voters
1730 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

JUN 30 1983

June 1, 1983

This is going on DPM

North Atlantic Treaty Organization:

A Report of the League of Women Voters Fact-Finding Trip

March 19-26, 1983

I. Background

During the week of March 19-26, 1983 ten representatives from the local, state, and national levels of the League of Women Voters participated in a NATO fact-finding tour to Brussels, Belgium and Rome and Naples, Italy. The trip, sponsored and paid for by the NATO Information Service, was one of eight such trips made each year by U.S. groups. It was offered to the League because of its longstanding involvement in citizen education on important public policy issues and its current study of national security policy.

The League viewed the trip as an opportunity to obtain varying perspectives on such issues as the deployment of new U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, political and economic concerns within the NATO alliance, the nature of the Soviet threat to Western Europe, the prospects for current arms control efforts, and potential remedies for current tensions between the Soviet Union and the West. (For more background on these issues, see "NATO in the 1980s," National VOTER, Winter 1983 and "The Politics of Arms Control," National VOTER, Spring 1983.)

Recognizing that NATO tours are intended to present a certain perspective, efforts were made to ensure that a wide range of views was obtained during the trip. The League stressed the importance of a balanced program to the NATO liaison officer and suggested names of people outside NATO with whom its representatives might meet.

The trip began with two days in Brussels, Belgium, where the ten League visitors met with a number of officials at NATO headquarters including the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, the director of NATO's International Military Staff, the Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, a panel of Deputy Permanent Representatives to NATO from the United Kingdom, West Germany and the Netherlands, the U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO, and the director of the Flemish Committee Against Nuclear Arms (part of the Belgian peace movement). Other events in Brussels included visits to Beauvechain Air Force Base, where Belgian F-16 aircraft are stationed, the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Mission to the European Economic Community.

The trip continued with two days of meetings in Rome with political and military experts at the U.S. Embassy, officials at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the League of Women Voters of Italy and a former general of the Italian military. (For more about the Italian League of Women Voters, see "On Tour with NATO" in the National VOTER, Spring 1983.) Finally, the League travellers spent one day in Naples, Italy being briefed by the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe and the Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

In addition to the briefing sessions, LWV representatives watched a Belgian F-16 aircraft "scramble" and take off within six minutes of a surprise alert, visited the U.S. Sixth Fleet flagship and toured a guided missile destroyer. The group also attended receptions and dinners in its honor at the homes of U.S. ambassador to Italy Maxwell Rabb and others.

II. Fact-Finding

Substantively, the briefings provided information and perspectives on the following major topics: (1) The Soviet threat to Western Europe; (2) Alliance issues: (a) the deployment of new intermediate-range missiles and the balance of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe; (b) "out of area" issues such as the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force and NATO support for military actions in non-European areas; (c) the strengths and weaknesses of NATO; (d) burden sharing (the relative share of the common defense to be borne by European NATO members); (3) Economic issues: (a) U.S.-European Economic Community relations, (b) East-West issues; and (4) Southern flank issues concerning the Mediterranean, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Spain.

The following sections highlight major points made by officials in Belgium and Italy.

THE SOVIET THREAT

The threat of Soviet attack on Western Europe is currently believed to be small, provided that NATO maintains adequate conventional and nuclear defenses. Several officials commented that NATO's position had been "degraded" in recent years, while Soviet capabilities have improved. Others commented that NATO's defenses are improving.

The Soviet threat was characterized not as a question of "evil," as President Reagan indicated recently, but rather as a matter of "historical inevitability." The Soviet Union, according to officials, logically probes for vacuums and weaknesses in Western defenses; therefore, a military void would tend to encourage Soviet actions. The Soviet Union's goal is to "decouple" the United States from the defense of Western Europe by preventing the deployment of new U.S. missiles and by weakening the political cohesion of the alliance. The Soviet Union would then be in a position to employ "political blackmail" against Europe -- not by actual force but through political actions aimed at intimidating Western Europe.

NATO's defense efforts are generally not regarded as preparations against an imminent invasion but as insurance measures to guarantee that the Soviets would not attempt such an invasion. Soviet expansion, should it occur, was believed by most officials to be likely in other areas, perhaps the Mediterranean, North Africa, or the Middle East. (See section on southern flank issues.) One official, however, stated that the only type of conflict possible was in connection with a Soviet invasion of NATO's Central Front (West Germany).

Officials emphasized that Europeans react differently than the United States to the Soviet Union because of the experience of war on their own soil, the resulting division of Europe and the daily requirements of living next door to such an imposing neighbor. They appear to adopt a more practical approach to Soviet relations, commenting that the political rhetoric from Washington concerning the Soviet Union has been more harmful than productive. One official also added that the United States appears to believe that the Soviet Union can be forced to its knees economically but that most Europeans disagree with this proposition.

ALLIANCE ISSUES

INF Deployment and Conventional/Nuclear Balance

Regarding the negotiations to limit the deployment of new Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear missiles, most officials indicated that, while the "zero" option is the ideal solution, they would support some type of interim solution that would allow the U.S. to deploy some Pershing II and cruise missiles and the USSR to keep some SS-20 missiles. The need for the United States to consult its allies during negotiations was stressed repeatedly. Some officials stated that communication between the U.S. and its allies has been very good (and in general, has improved with the Reagan administration), while others called for even greater consultation. One official stated that press reports that certain U.S. negotiators were in political hot water at home dismay European governments, and he stressed the need for U.S. negotiators to maintain political credibility both at home and abroad.

Another official commented that since the United States is the only power recognized as an equal by the Soviet Union, it must be the United States that negotiates with the Soviet Union. He criticized the NATO approach as "too nice" in that every nation has a voice in decisionmaking, creating a long and drawn-out negotiating process.

American officials emphasized that the idea of deploying new missiles in Europe originated with the Europeans (specifically with former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt), not the Americans. However, the Europeans are said to be fully committed to the two-track NATO decision: negotiations to limit intermediate-range missiles and deployment of those missiles if negotiations fail.

Some of the European officials stated that Europe really does not need the new missiles but that the USSR forced the issue by deploying SS-20 missiles in the western part of the Soviet Union. Several European officials stated that the chief value of the new missiles is political, not military; i.e., NATO does not gain any technological advantage from the missiles, but deployment would send a signal to the Soviet Union regarding U.S. willingness to defend Western Europe. Other important reasons for deploying the new missiles are to increase uncertainty on the part of the USSR as to NATO's intentions and to improve the linkage between NATO's conventional and nuclear forces (the so-called "continuum of deterrence"). A representative of the Flemish peace movement, however, stated that the missiles are not needed and that public sentiment in Europe indicates a drift toward a united, nuclear-free Europe.

All of the officials agreed that NATO should maintain its policy of threatening the first use of nuclear weapons if the USSR attacks Western Europe. To abandon it, officials believed, would undermine deterrence. France and Germany reportedly took great exception to the much-heralded Foreign Affairs article on no first use. (Kennan, George, et al. "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance." Foreign Affairs, Spring 1982.) Many officials agreed, however, that increased emphasis on conventional weapons (as is being advocated by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe) would be helpful and might "raise the nuclear threshold" (delay the point at which NATO would be forced to use nuclear weapons to repel a Soviet attack). NATO is currently evaluating the proper role of new conventional technologies in NATO strategy. A few officials, however, stated that no matter how good conventional forces are, NATO will have to continue to rely principally on nuclear weapons for deterrence. And it was noted that conventional weapons are very expensive compared to nuclear weapons, and that a major conventional weapons buildup would take ten years. German officials stated that conventional and nuclear war are considered equally bad since, in either case, Germany would most likely be destroyed.

In spite of their support for a first use policy, several officials stated that they did not believe that escalation, once begun, could be limited. Thus some steps are currently being taken to reduce the reliance, or at least the appearance of reliance, on nuclear weapons in Europe. Two working groups are now considering the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and recent proposals that they be withdrawn. One group is examining the question of what the stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons should be and how many weapons are needed to implement NATO's flexible response policy. A decision is expected at the end of this year. One official acknowledged the political motivations behind this policy review, i.e., a response to public fears about the existence of nuclear weapons on European soil. Another official spoke of a little recognized aspect of NATO's "two-track" decision on missile deployment: the withdrawal of 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads (on Pershing I missiles) that was carried out in 1980. Over one-half of these missiles no longer had delivery systems.

Out of Area Issues

The term "out of area" refers to military conflicts occurring outside of Europe and their impact on NATO's defense. The major issue is the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), conceived after events in Iran in 1979 and intended to provide a highly mobile force capable of responding to conflicts in areas such as Southwest Asia or the Middle East.

NATO is currently preparing a Southwest Asia Impact Study -- an assessment of the impact of the RDF on European readiness (i.e., how the U.S. commitment to the RDF might detract from its commitment to NATO). The initial reaction seems to be that there will be a negative impact on NATO readiness. The United States was said to be unwilling to "pull its chestnuts out of Europe" in the event of a crisis outside of NATO unless the Europeans are willing to take up the slack. Europeans, on the other hand, are said to be unsure that the United States can fulfill its current European commitments, much less those outside of Europe, and are critical of a perceived U.S. tendency to define conflicts in East-West terms. The Europeans want the United States to state specifically the context in which the RDF might be used for intervention outside of Europe and the United States is seen to be unable to do so.

Italian officials stated that Italy is willing to help support the U.S. RDF but is unwilling to have the U.S. nuclear umbrella extended to non-NATO nations. Italy is willing to (1) fill gaps in Europe if the RDF forces were sent elsewhere and (2) provide logistical support on a case by case basis in Italy for the RDF. Such logistical support might include overflight and refueling rights in Italy, but no basing rights for the RDF.

Strengths and Weaknesses of NATO

In general, NATO was said to perform well in defense planning matters, not so well in economic matters, and to be hopelessly bad in resolving disputes among member nations. In economic matters, there is some fear among Europeans that the United States might use its large defense contributions to extract trade concessions from the Europeans. This was characterized as a bad policy in that it confuses NATO and non-NATO issues, and the pipeline controversy was cited as a prime example of this type of conflict. Several similar ongoing disputes among members were also cited: Greek and Turkish disagreements concerning Cyprus; the United Kingdom versus Spain over Gibraltar; and the "codfish war" between the United Kingdom and Iceland. Also cited as a problem was the existence of coalition governments within European nations and the resulting "many voices" speaking for one nation.

The issue of Spanish membership in NATO was discussed. Spain came into NATO in 1982 as a full-fledged member (i.e., as a member of the integrated military command, unlike France, which is not), but indicated reservations about accepting nuclear weapons on its soil. After Spain entered NATO, its government changed, and the new government has indicated that it is not sure about membership. Spain has not decided to withdraw from NATO, but it has not worked out arrangements for being in NATO, either. Spain was said to be very important for NATO: it was characterized as "an important piece of real estate" capable of serving as a logistics base for resupplying Europe and possessing important air bases. Spain is building a new aircraft carrier and was said to have a good air force.

France, which is not part of NATO's integrated military command, has a strong navy and sometimes participates in NATO exercises, but never places any of its forces under NATO's control. Turkey has a large standing military but poor equipment (see section on southern flank issues), and the Greece-Turkey situation presents problems for NATO planning. Italy has taken on a stronger role in NATO. Examples of Italy's new policy include the sending of peacekeeping forces to Lebanon and the Sinai and the acceptance of U.S. cruise missiles. Yet, Italy is militarily weaker than the major NATO nations and, according to some, the most geographically vulnerable of all NATO nations.

Several officials stated that budget cuts have hurt their national efforts to improve military readiness. Problems in obtaining spare parts for equipment were also mentioned, as were reductions in flying hours for aircraft. One official commented that for naval forces, the toughest challenge is to support ships in time of conflict with supplies and personnel. Such problems are said to be improving for the United States resulting from a number of changes -- improved retention of personnel due to a poor economy and large pay raises; increased emphasis on readiness expenditures; and improved morale due to the opportunity to participate in peacekeeping duty in Lebanon.

All the officials agreed that there is no near-term alternative to the Atlantic alliance and that there is no future for NATO without U.S. leadership. The United States is viewed by many to be the only nation with a NATO-wide perspective, capable of uniting disparate national interests into a common policy. Yet, some problems were cited. The ups and downs in U.S. policy caused by changing administrations are upsetting to European leaders. Isolationist trends, perceived to exist in Europe (e.g., the Green Party in Germany) and the United States, are also a problem. Another serious problem, according to some U.S. officials, is Europe's long-held perception of the United States as "big brother." These officials believe that Europe does not want to recognize its equality with the United States because it would require shouldering a larger share of the defense burden.

Changes in the way NATO operates are necessary, according to some officials. First, some feel there is too much questioning of the "head of the family" (the United States). Others believe that there should be more consultation among the allies. There is also a need to coordinate policies as an alliance and work out economic, political and military requirements on a global basis in order to produce a comprehensive policy for NATO. Most officials agreed that, in the end, it is NATO's political cohesion and not its military strength that is the real deterrent to Soviet aggression.

Burden Sharing

In general, there appear to be different public perceptions concerning burden sharing. A recent International Herald Tribune poll was cited that showed that 68 percent of American respondents believe the Europeans are not contributing enough military power to the common defense. Most Europeans, however, believe they are. Officials (both American and European) said that European nations are doing more to carry their share of the common defense burden than they are given credit for; however, economic problems have prevented large growth in their defense budgets. NATO force goals for 1984-88 would require increases in military expenditures of 4 percent annually. While it is recognized that this may be difficult to achieve in view of budgetary constraints and economic difficulties, some countries are meeting the 3 percent annual increase adopted by NATO in 1977. Norway and West Germany were mentioned as nations that are doing a very good job of meeting commitments, and NATO's overall expenditure record is said to be good. Several officials pointed out that 90 percent of NATO's ground forces and 60 percent of its air forces are European. Europeans stressed that Secretary of Defense Weinberger has stated that the allies are contributing substantially to NATO's defense effort, but his comments have not been widely publicized because the United States is trying to encourage the allies to do more.

The prevailing American view seems to be that the Europeans could do more to share defense responsibilities than they are now doing. Some Americans believe that "if we [U.S.] do more, they [European allies] do less; if we do less, they do less." The usual U.S. congressional response is to shock the allies into action by threatening to withdraw troops from Europe. One official criticized this tactic, saying that the European response would be to say that the threat must not be as great as believed and reduce their own commitments. Such a policy would also leave a gap in our deterrence.

The European view is that the United States is inconsistent and at times heavy-handed about burden-sharing issues. Several Europeans commented that the United States should do more in the conventional area and cited the lack of a draft in the United States.

Europeans also commented that they have a different view of government spending than the United States does. Several stressed that European nations believe that maintaining a social security net is crucial to their survival and that too much emphasis on military spending might irreparably damage the social fabric of Europe. In addition, while the United States has emphasized increased defense expenditures, European governments (such as Belgium and Italy) have increased their development aid to Third World nations. Their philosophy consists of providing economic aid to stabilize economies and improve the standard of living and thus prevent the development of fertile ground for the Soviet Union to exploit. One official even commented that military aid should be used only as a last resort.

Officials also discussed several issues of specific concern to Europeans, such as the sharing of new military technologies. Specifically mentioned was U.S. legislation that restricts the import of certain metals contained in high technology weapons, thereby hampering the import of European-made weapons into the United States. Several Europeans stated that their countries buy far more military equipment from the United States than the United States buys from them. NATO's goal of rationalization, standardization and interoperability was also discussed. This policy is aimed at sharing the development and production of new weapons in order to achieve economies of scale and similar weapons. Most officials felt that some progress is being made. In general, officials said that NATO needs to decide what the needs of the alliance are and assign responsibilities by country for fulfilling them.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

Officials also discussed economic relations among the United States and other NATO nations. Six studies intended to assess the economic implications of East-West relations are currently underway in NATO and other fora. One study is attempting to strengthen the list of dual-use items with strategic implications (i.e., technology transfers with possible military applications) and to control oil and gas technology and equipment. Other studies are attempting to strengthen monitoring of East-West trade, tighten credit arrangements with the USSR and complete an energy requirements study through the International Energy Agency. Another study is assessing the security implications of East-West economic relationships.

Economic disagreements continue to exist between the allies and the United States in the aftermath of the pipeline sanctions imposed by the United States. The United States has criticized the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Economic Community, which is designed to stabilize farm income and set uniform agricultural prices within the EEC, because it applies levies to imports to bring their prices into line with internal EEC agricultural prices. However, the CAP is regarded by Europeans as extremely important and is characterized as the "glue" that holds France and Germany together. Major issues of U.S. contention include wheat, beef, dairy products and sugar. On the other hand, the United States made a recent wheat sale to Egypt that was said to have overtaken 100 percent of the market that had formerly belonged to France.

One official cited a sense of "Europessimism," that is, a lack of hope for economic recovery. There is some indication of growth in the United Kingdom and West Germany, but little elsewhere. A major cause of the pessimism is unemployment, but European economies also have structural problems. A baby boom generation is coming into the labor force, but new jobs are not being created. Inefficient production, lack of labor force mobility, indexation of wages (and thus expectations) and concern about the ability to enter the high-technology age are other major industrial problems. When the United States emerges from the current recession, it is expected to be in a more favorable position than Europe. EEC nations are perceived by American officials to be more inward-looking and protectionist than the United States. There is some reason for optimism, however. Officials sensed a growing recognition in the United States that the U.S. and EEC economies are interdependent and that many American jobs in recent years are the result of exports.

SOUTHERN FLANK ISSUES

The southern flank of NATO is composed of Italy, Greece, Turkey and Spain. The region stretches from the Straits of Gibraltar on the west to the eastern border of Turkey. It is the largest of NATO's three European commands.

The southern flank is different from the rest of NATO. It contains some of the poorest nations in Europe, especially Greece and Turkey. This fact affects NATO in terms of the lack of roads, railroads and ports that would be vital in a time of crisis. In spite of their relative poverty, these nations were characterized as very willing to contribute to the NATO effort. Turkey has the largest standing army in Europe. Its equipment is poor but its personnel are well-trained and dedicated. The biggest weakness in the southern region is the friction between Greece and Turkey, which makes the coordination of defense plans difficult.

NATO's biggest concern with the southern flank is its ability to maintain air superiority in a conflict. NATO cannot match the USSR in land-based aircraft, but it can match it in sea-based aircraft. NATO's strengths in the southern region include the large number of personnel under arms and the fact that its troops are better trained by virtue of being at sea longer than Soviet troops. NATO forces would also be fighting on their own territory in any European conflict. NATO's technology is also believed to be superior to that of the Soviet Union.

NATO's problems include questions about the ability to sustain operations in a conflict by providing ammunition and spare parts for weapons. These situations are thought to be improving, as is the quality and retention of personnel. Two years ago 60 percent of Sixth Fleet ships were classified as "marginally ready" for action; today that figure is down to 28 percent.

Several general points were made. The importance of Mediterranean sea lanes in NATO's defense was stressed. In addition, the center of political instability is perceived to be shifting southward. The chance of conflict in the southern region of NATO and surrounding areas is thought by some officials to be greater than anywhere else in the world. The type and location of possible southern flank conflicts were not pinpointed, but the indications were that a regional conflict in North Africa or the Middle East might grow and eventually involve the USSR, in which case NATO would be forced to respond.

III. Summary

All of the participants agreed that a major value of the trip was the opportunity to examine and discuss issues from a European as well as a U.S. perspective. And all agreed that the highlights of the trip were the informal meetings where League representatives were free to talk to officials one on one and to probe issues that had been presented in more formal settings. The LWV group came away from this trip with a fuller, more sophisticated knowledge of the issues confronting the NATO alliance and will continue to communicate to League members, friends and neighbors some of the new-found understandings gathered in this thought-provoking exchange.

DEC 8 1982



League of Women Voters of the United States 1730 M Street, NW, Washington, D C 20036 Tel. (202) 296-1770

memorandum

December 3, 1982

THIS IS GOING ON DPM

TO: Local and state League presidents
FROM: Dorothy K. Powers, National Security Study Chair
RE: The attached COMMITTEE GUIDE

We know that you share with us an eagerness to meet the hopes expressed at Convention 82 for a speeded-up study schedule that will equip us to start acting aggressively and effectively as fast as possible in the area of national security. The national board is also aware that the study calendar we approved in September requires all of us to do a great deal of work to get ready for spring-summer consensus. This Committee Guide is just part of our effort to help you do the best job possible to get prepared. We've also speeded up the publishing cycle to get an overview publication primarily for resource committees and a publication to help members with the consensus ready by February. Since both publications will run tight against the announced calendar, we are including outlines of each of the two publications along with a resource list in this Committee Guide.

You may remember that the national board advised Leagues shortly after convention "to put in your calendar a spring 1983 membership meeting (unit or general) on the National Security Study." After the announcement in the September Post-Board Summary that we would seek consensus by July 1, 1983, many Leagues rearranged their calendars to hold two meetings. We know that many of you felt that you didn't have that kind of flexibility in your calendar, but we also know that, as time goes on, League calendars do shift. We therefore urge you to take another look now, to see if a second meeting can be squeezed in. Though the discussion outline presented in this guide is based on a two-meeting format, we've indicated how it might be done in one meeting. (But if that one meeting is a short one--for example, in units that meet over breakfast or lunch--the compression just won't work.) We urge those of you who can't hold two meetings this spring to schedule two for the next phase in fall '83-winter '84.

The following is a summary of what is contained in the Committee Guide, a review of the material that you have already received, and a description of the publications and materials that you will receive over the next few months.

THIS COMMITTEE GUIDE:

- discusses the background, scope and goal of the League National Security study;
- offers tips and techniques for managing the study;
- includes discussion outlines with resource suggestions;
- provides a sample CONSENSUS FORM (the single copy per League, to use for reporting, will be mailed later, on colored paper);
- contains outlines of two upcoming LWVEF publications: on military policy and on arms control.

YOU HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED:

- Summer 1982 National VOTER: Convention '82 coverage.
- Fall 1982 National VOTER: "The Future of National Security," pp. 11-20.
- 1982-84 PROSPECTUS #1: material on arms control, including an outline of agreements and negotiations, and a glossary of arms control terms, pp. 15-21.
- Impact on Issues 1982-84: IR section describing LWVUS position on "efforts to reduce the risk of war," pp. 31-33.
- June and September 1982 Post-Board Summary: outlines of study calendar and special activities.

YOU WILL BE RECEIVING:

- An overview publication with information on U.S. military policy, tentatively titled Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader. (This pub will be essential to resource committees during both phases of the consensus and is recommended also for League members that have already been studying national security issues).
- A publication for every-member use, tentatively titled The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How, focusing on arms control objectives and criteria.
- A publication relating defense budget issues to military policy objectives, and an overview of the decision-making process involved in making U.S. national security policy for member use during the fall-winter consensus period.
- A new version of Congress and the Budget Process: From Chaos to Control.
- An article on U.S. relations with its allies, particularly the NATO countries, in the winter 1983 National VOTER.
- Future issues of the National VOTER and PROSPECTUS, with additional information.

COMMITTEE GUIDE

League of Women Voters of the United States, 1730 M St. NW, Washington, DC 20036

Pub. No. 529 \$1.00. December 1983.

Tooling Up for the National Security Study

FOCUS: "To evaluate U.S. national security policies and their impact on our domestic programs and our relationships with other countries."

SCOPE: "Define the nature of national security and its relationship to military spending. Assess the impact of U.S. military spending on the nation's economy and on our ability to meet social and environmental needs. Determine the effects of U.S. military policy on our relationship with other countries."

Motion adopted May 17, 1982 at LWVUS convention

The League's decision to undertake a study of National Security comes at a critical time in the nation's history, a time when American citizens are showing unprecedented concern over national security policies and the threat of nuclear war. At the core of the public debate are a number of questions centering on "how much is enough?"

Do we need to strengthen U.S. defenses to deter the Soviet Union?

Should the strategic nuclear weapons of both the U.S. and the Soviets be reduced? If so, by how much?

How much money should the United States spend on defense in an era of constrained budget resources and economic uncertainty?

How many promises of support can the United States extend to other countries?

AREAS OF STUDY: To fulfill the scope and focus of the adopted motion, the national board outlined for League study three areas of public policy:

military policy: the theories and strategies that underly military policy decisions; the role and capabilities of weapons; and the impact of U.S. foreign and military policy on other nations;

arms control: the evolution of arms control initiatives and measures; and

defense spending: the cost of fulfilling military policy objectives.

In order to move from study to action, the board approved four areas in which to seek member agreement/consensus:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> arms control objectives and criteria; | reporting deadline—July 1, 1983 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> military policy objectives; | } reporting deadline—
February 1, 1984 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> defense spending; and | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> the national security decision-making process. | |

The new National Security study will build on existing international relations, social policy, government and natural resources positions. If members agree on criteria and objectives for evaluating arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, the LWV UN position will be given much needed definition that can be used to judge an arms control effort to "reduce the risk of war." By evaluating current military policy and seeking member agreement on what is needed to implement military objectives, the League may then enter fully into the debate on the federal budget, evaluating defense spending in relation to domestic and development aid spending. By examining the process by which decisions on military policy are made, the League may also find new applications for its citizen rights position.

Obviously, these two rounds of League decision making on national security, major though they are, leave many important areas unstudied and unresolved. The 1983-84 program making process will be your opportunity to let us know which, if any, additional areas of study you want to pursue.

Getting your study under way

The study chair and resource committee are the nuts and bolts of your local study. The chair deals with all phases of managing the study: recruiting committee members (don't forget the new members that you added this fall); setting committee meeting dates and drawing up the agenda for those meetings; tailoring the discussion outline to local needs; maintaining close contact with the board on such matters as the schedule for general meetings, workshops and unit meetings, the recruiting and training of discussion leaders and recorders, and the scheduling of these people, as well as resource persons, at unit meetings, and informing and involving the rest of the community.

Two League publications supply basic information on how to manage a study item and reach member agreement/consensus. They are: *In League: Guidelines for League Board* (Pub. # 275, \$2.00) and *Meaningful Meetings: The Role of the Resource Committee* (Pub. #319, 40¢). Both contain invaluable suggestions that will not be repeated here for carrying out a program item. They will make your job easier, the results more successful. *Meaningful Meetings*, in particular, is *must* reading for the committee.

With this COMMITTEE GUIDE in hand, study chairs will want to move fast in working out an overall plan for committee activities and assigning topics and appropriate bibliographies for the resource

committee. Divide the work up according to the talents of the committee members and the time they can give. Once again, don't forget to involve those new members. Be sure that each person knows when and what to report on as her/his assignment. Make the committee meetings learning opportunities. Invite a speaker or ask a member to review a book or magazine article for the group. You might consider opening up one of the committee meetings to interested members, making it a workshop. (This ploy might get around scheduling problems in the unit meeting calendar.) Use the committee meetings to learn, analyze and question the substance as well as to work on the final discussion outline for the membership meetings. Try to include background on current U.S. and Soviet military policy and proposals, as well as information that might be of special interest to your locality (an air force base, defense or aerospace industry). Remember, too, that it is the committee's job to work out what kinds of visual aids to recommend for illustrating key points, flip charts, for example.

With this as with every study, Leagues are at many different points on the spectrum of readiness, when it comes to the matter of consensus. A few have been briefing members on this subject for years, piquing member interest with bulletin inserts, workshops, speakers at annual meetings and conventions, perhaps even a full-fledged conference. Some have held a general meeting on some aspect of the consensus topic earlier in the year. Others have hitchhiked on a conference or meeting sponsored by another organization. And some have already scheduled the recommended two meetings for spring 1983. For the resource committee in a League that fits this picture, designing a plan will be a pleasure.

What if your League is one that has been able to give the National Security study little or no attention up to now? What if this year's schedule is tight and committee help scarce? What then? First of all, you're not alone. Many Leagues are in exactly this position. But we know, from past experience with national studies that presented challenges equally tough—both in complexity of materials and in time pressures—that Leagues all over the country will organize, starting right now, to do a first-class job with the resources available. A few recommendations:

- ☐ Budget your own energies.
- ☐ Make full use of printed information—that's a way of getting packaged expertise. Urge members to read the fall 1982 National VOTER article, "The Future of National Security," and excerpt quotes for the bulletin from the resources listed in the June *Post-Board Summary*, PROSPECTUS and this COMMITTEE GUIDE.
- ☐ Use people who already know the facts and the issues to present information on the issues and the policy choices. Look for resident experts in nearby Leagues, at the local high school, college or university, and in community businesses.

Some general advice. Without going back over ground well covered in *Meaningful Meetings*, we want to emphasize how important it is to hold a training session at which resource persons, discussion leaders and recorders can work out a team approach. Ideally, each would get a copy of this COMMITTEE GUIDE and of the Member Agreement/Consensus Report Form, a sample of which is attached. Make clear to the recorder that it is her/his job to deduce the thinking of the group and to complete the form.

Discussion outline: Meeting I

I. Introduction: General overview of the National Security study

- ☐ Review the FOCUS and SCOPE of the study as adopted by Convention 1982.
- ☐ Sketch the internal and external factors that signaled that the time was right for League study and action in this area: the importance and timeliness of the issue... the membership growth potential... the need to sharpen the League's position on "efforts to reduce the risk of war"... recent federal budget cuts and the League's inability to speak to major portions of the budget....
- ☐ Outline the AREAS OF STUDY for this biennium.
- ☐ Point out that study of these areas will prepare us to seek consensus in several areas. Positions will be formulated by the national board, based on reports of member agreement from local Leagues all over the country.
- ☐ State the goals of the two spring meetings (assuming you are holding two) in preparation for a July 1, 1983 reporting deadline.

Meeting I: to sharpen member awareness of the nature of national security as variously interpreted and to discuss U.S. military policy with emphasis on those areas that affect arms control efforts—U.S. relationships with other nations and weapons capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Meeting II: to review and discuss the evolution of arms control initiatives and the objectives they seek to achieve and to develop criteria for the LWV to use in applying the LWVUS position in support of "efforts to reduce the risk of war."

Allow about 10 minutes for this introduction. If you are looking for places to compress, here's one. To speed up not only the introduction but also the discussion to follow, consider having the FOCUS, SCOPE, AREAS OF STUDY and GOALS of the meeting outlined on a blackboard or newsprint.

BASIC RESOURCES on how the study was adopted and developed:

- ☐ *National VOTER*, Summer 1982, convention coverage.
- ☐ *Post-Board Summary*, June 1982 and September 1982.
- ☐ *Impact on Issues*.

II. National Security

Explore the many perspectives on what constitutes national security: a strong military... economic stability... domestic tranquility... environmental quality... global cooperation... assured energy supplies... survival....

☐ Try a warm-up exercise to elicit the group's feelings: use a poster or other visual aid that raises questions and feelings.

☐ Ask questions. Here are some possible discussion starters:

—How do you think a European, African or Soviet citizen views national security? a member of Congress or President of the United States?

—What assumptions underlie the statements people make when they state their views on foreign policy/military policy; for example:

"The United States must be number one in the world." "The United States should be self-sufficient in every aspect of social, economic and political activity." "The world's problems are inter-dependent and need concerted attention by all nations."

After a short time (10–15 minutes), summarize the group's discussion and make the link to the next step: The League's study is framed by the fact that the concept of national security means different things to different people. With that in mind, we are going to take a deeper look into military policy. Why are we going to consider military policy before moving on to arms control? Because two aspects of military policy—U.S. relations with other nations and U.S. and Soviet military capabilities—have important implications for arms control.

III. Military policy

Identify and discuss military policy issues with particular emphasis on those areas that affect arms control efforts: U.S. relations with other countries and weapons roles and capabilities.

U.S. relations with other countries

Focus first on U.S. relations with other countries in the post-World War II period. Purpose: To examine the historical record to see how the United States has related military policy to foreign policy objectives in the past, in order to understand present policies better.

Key areas for discussion (See publication outline, Sections II and V)

1. How have U.S. foreign policy objectives changed or remained the same over the past 40 years?

Back-up questions:

—In what ways have U.S. political and economic interests abroad expanded since World War II?

—How have these interests affected U.S. foreign policy objectives?

—How have Soviet policies and actions affected U.S. foreign policy objectives, especially in Europe?

2. How have U.S. foreign policy objectives been implemented militarily?

Back-up questions:

—How have U.S. military policies responded to the expansion of U.S. foreign policy interests throughout the world?

—What has been the effect of Soviet military policies on U.S. policies?

—In what cases have U.S. military policies been consistent with the foreign policy objectives they were designed to implement? Inconsistent?

3. In what ways are current foreign and military policies an outgrowth of or departure from past experience?

Back-up questions:

—Is containment of the Soviet Union a continuing priority in U.S. policy?

—How has the policy of detente changed in the past decade?

—In what ways have U.S. policies responded to the changes in Soviet policies and vice versa?

4. What impact do U.S. and USSR military policies have on other nations?

Back-up questions:

—To what extent do U.S. and Soviet foreign and military policies fuel or sustain the arms race?

—What assurances do U.S. policies provide European allies in the event of an attack on them?

—How have U.S. and Soviet policies affected the Third World?

Allow approximately 30 minutes for discussion and then summarize the major points. You may choose to treat #1 as a presentation and preserve discussion time for the other three topics.

Weapons: Roles and capabilities

In order to implement its foreign policy objectives, the United States has developed and deployed nuclear and conventional weapons and personnel (collectively termed "forces"). Purpose: to examine the roles and capabilities of forces currently in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals.

Key areas for discussion (See publication outline, Section VI)

You will have to provide some factual background for this part of the discussion. Visual aids such as charts and diagrams, presented on flipcharts or slides or pass-out sheets, will really help to move the discussion along.

1. What purposes are served by the weapons in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals (e.g., to defend the homeland... to defend Europe—Eastern or Western—from attack... to respond to threats around the world... for deterrence purposes only... as a bargaining chip in negotiations... to sustain the domestic economy... as an end in themselves, rather than as a tool of policy)?

2. How do U.S. nuclear and conventional weapons compare to those of the Soviet Union?

Back-up questions:

- Should strength be measured in terms of numbers or quality, or some combination?
- How reliable are comparisons of relative capabilities?
- How important are comparisons?

Allow approximately 30 minutes for presentation and discussion. Summarize the group's discussion by trying to link conclusions from the previous discussion of policy issues with the development of weapons, e.g., how U.S. and Soviet foreign/military policies have led to the development of weapons systems capable of protecting U.S. and Soviet interests.

If your League plans only one discussion meeting on the National Security study this spring, the meeting must focus primarily on the goal stated for Meeting II. You will need, however, to provide background on the issues covered in Meeting I. Some tips on how to improve members' understanding *ahead of time*:

- ☐ Use all your communications channels to encourage members to read the fall 1982 *National VOTER* article, "The Future of National Security."
 - ☐ Expand a meeting of the resource committee to include interested members; in effect, make it into a workshop.
 - ☐ Excerpt articles, charts and diagrams from other sources in your bulletin.
 - ☐ Buy enough copies of *Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader*, for every-member distribution prior to the meeting.
 - ☐ Alert members to lectures and discussions organized by other groups, special TV broadcasts or radio programs covering foreign and military policy.
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Discussion outline: Meeting II

I. Introduction

- ☐ State the purpose and goal of the meeting:
 - to review and discuss the evolution of arms control initiatives with emphasis on the objectives they seek to achieve;
 - to develop criteria for the League to use in applying the LWVUS position in support of "efforts to reduce the risk of war."
- ☐ Review topics covered in Meeting I. Whether or not your League held an earlier meeting(s) to discuss the issues covered in the Meeting I outline, you will want to summarize these three points to establish a framework for the discussion of arms control initiatives:
 - the many perspectives on what constitutes national security;
 - the blending/clash of foreign and military policy objectives in the post World War II era;
 - the purposes and capabilities of weapons in the U.S. and USSR arsenals.

II. Arms control

Examine the evolution of arms control initiatives with emphasis on the objectives and types of agreements achieved in the postwar era and criteria that have been used to evaluate progress of a negotiation, merits of a proposal or terms of an agreement.

- ☐ The discussion outline that follows is designed to parallel the three consensus questions. You may want the recorder to fill in the sample copy of the consensus form as you go along, rather than stopping the discussion at each phase. The recorder's written conclusions can then be read to the group for confirmation at the end of the meeting as a way to summarize the discussion.
- ☐ The four major discussion topics parallel the structure of the "every-member" publication, *The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How*, as you will realize in reviewing its outline, page 8.

- ☐ To speed your presentation and sharpen discussion, consider preparing ahead of time wall charts or other displays outlining previous arms control agreements and the status of current arms control negotiations. Use the lists provided in 1982–84 *PROSPECTUS* #1, pp. 20–21; *Security Through Arms Control?* (out of print); or Section V of *The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How* (see outline, p. 8 of this COMMITTEE GUIDE).

Historical perspective on arms control agreements

Purpose: to acquaint members with historical background on the evolution of arms control efforts to reduce the risk of war.

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Sections I, II and V)

1. How do arms control agreements of the past century reflect the changing nature of the arms race?

Back-up questions:

- What purposes were served by early agreements to codify rules of war, to establish procedures and institutions for settling international disputes and to ban certain weapons?
- In what ways have nuclear weapons changed the scope and purpose of arms control initiatives?

Allow 10 minutes for discussion.

Arms control objectives

Purpose: to identify the objectives of arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war and the levels of importance that should be given each objective. (Consensus Question I)

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Section III)

1. What have been the primary objectives of arms control initiatives since World War II?

Back-up questions:

- Compare/contrast: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); the Biological Weapons Convention with the Geneva Protocol; the Seabed or the Antarctic Treaty with the Nonproliferation Treaty.
 - In what way do agreements such as the 1963 U.S.–Soviet Hot Line Agreement seek to reduce the risk of war?
2. In deciding what level of importance to give specific arms control objectives, what factors need to be taken into consideration (e.g., how the arms race is affected... the type(s) of weapon involved... political or technical feasibility)?

Allow 15 minutes for discussion.

Types of arms control agreements

Purpose: to consider the appropriateness of multilateral or bilateral negotiations and unilateral initiatives for achieving specific arms control objectives. (Consensus Question II)

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Section IV)

1. Are there circumstances in which arms control objectives can be advanced best by involving many or most nations? A limited number of nations? One nation acting alone?

Back-up questions:

- In what way has the increase in the number of states in the international system affected arms control negotiations?
- How does nuclear weapons competition between the superpowers affect which type of negotiating forum is most productive?
- What are the possible gains or losses resulting from a unilateral initiative?

Allow 15 minutes for discussion.

Criteria

Purpose: to identify criteria that can be used to judge the quality of arms control negotiations, proposals and agreements (Consensus Question III)

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Section VI)

1. What criteria or factors have been important considerations in previous arms control agreements?

Back-up questions:

- How did the U.S. Senate apply the criteria of *verifiability*, *equity*, *linkage* and *continuity* in evaluating the SALT II Treaty?
- How has the SALT II Treaty been affected by the fact that one of the two *essential parties* has not formally ratified the agreement?
- Are so-called “adequate *verification* procedures” using national technical means sufficient for nuclear arms control agreements, or is on-site inspection necessary?

—How do the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords) and U.S.–Soviet Hot Line Agreement seek to *build confidence*?

—In what way was the Limited Test Ban Treaty affected by *environmental* considerations?

2. Does the importance of a criterion vary depending on the arms control objective?

Back-up questions:

—Is equity as important, for example, when the objective is to reduce tension as when the objective is to reduce the quantity of arms?

—Are verification procedures equally as necessary in agreements to reduce the quantity of arms, prohibit possession of certain weapons or limit proliferation of nuclear weapons?

—How has linkage been used by the U.S. and USSR in negotiations on various arms control measures?

—Is the effort to lay a framework for future negotiations, for example, more important in measures that limit the quantity of arms than in those that limit the proliferation of weapons?

—Are there some instances when environmental considerations should be given more attention?

—Could confidence-building measures be included in agreements dealing with limits, reductions or prohibition of weapons, as well as those agreements meant to reduce tensions?

—Are there some arms control objectives that can be advanced without widespread agreement?

3. Is it feasible to trade certain criteria for others, in the consideration of an agreement?

Back-up questions:

—Are there situations in which it would be advantageous to trade off all or some degree of verification, in exchange for mutually beneficial terms or improved confidence-building measures?

—Could widespread agreement be forfeited if an agreement made significant progress in limiting the quantity of arms or in prohibiting the first use of weapons?

Allow 25 minutes for discussion and proceed to the consensus questions, to summarize the group's conclusions.

Meetings at a glance

Meeting I (90 minutes)

I. General overview—10 minutes

II. National security—10 minutes

III. Military policy

U.S. relations with other countries—30 minutes

Weapons: roles and capabilities—30 minutes

IV. Summary—10 minutes

Meeting II (90 minutes)

I. Introduction—10 minutes

II. Arms control

Historical perspective—10 minutes

Objectives—15 minutes

Types of agreements—15 minutes

Criteria—25 minutes

III. Review the consensus form—15 minutes

Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader

I. Introduction

- A. Current U.S. military policy based on nuclear deterrence and preparation for one major conventional conflict and one smaller conflict
- B. Basic questions:
 - 1. What are U.S. military security objectives? What questions have been raised about these objectives and what alternatives have been proposed?
 - 2. What kind of military policy will best enable the U.S. to achieve its current objectives? What policy would support the alternative objectives?
 - 3. What types and levels of military forces are necessary to implement each of these military policies?
 - 4. How does each of these military policies affect U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and other nations?

II. Lessons of the past

- A. Historical overview establishing pattern of relations with Soviet Union
- B. Foreign and military policies of Administrations from Truman to Reagan: shifts in policies, extension of U.S. interests overseas, growth in alliances and defense strategies

III. Theories underlying current U.S. military policy

- A. Deterrence theory
 - 1. Definition
 - 2. Mutual Assured Destruction
 - 3. First use policy and flexible response
 - 4. Implications for forces
- B. Contrasting concept of "counterforce"
 - 1. Warfighting capability
 - 2. First strike implications
 - 3. Implications for forces
- C. Influence of deterrence and counterforce theories on development of U.S. military policy

IV. Theories underlying current Soviet military policy

- A. Influence of counterforce theory
- B. Influence of deterrence theory

V. Effects of U.S. military policy on other nations

- A. U.S.-USSR relations
- B. U.S. relations with allies
- C. U.S.-Third World relations

VI. Comparison of current U.S. and Soviet military capabilities

- A. Functions of military forces
 - 1. United States
 - a. Defend U.S.
 - b. Defend Europe and other allies
 - c. Respond to conflicts around the world
 - d. Protect access to resources
 - 2. Soviet Union
 - a. Defend Soviet Union against attack from Europe or Asia
 - b. Defend Warsaw Pact allies
 - c. Support client states
 - d. Protect access to resources
- B. Defense systems
 - 1. U.S./NATO
 - a. Members
 - b. Roles of U.S. and European NATO members
 - 2. USSR/Warsaw Pact
 - a. Members
 - b. Roles of USSR and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members
- C. Comparisons of capabilities
 - 1. U.S./NATO
 - a. Strategic forces
 - 1. Bombers and number of warheads
 - 2. ICBMs and number of warheads
 - 3. SLBMs and number of warheads
 - b. General purpose forces
 - 1. Land forces

2. Tactical air forces
3. Naval forces
4. Mobility forces
2. USSR/Warsaw Pact
 - a. Strategic forces
 1. Bombers and number of warheads
 2. ICBMs and number of warheads
 3. SLBMs and number of warheads
 - b. General purpose forces
 1. Land forces
 2. Tactical air forces
 3. Naval forces
 4. Mobility forces
3. Other comparisons of military capabilities
 - a. Pricing of Soviet defense capabilities in dollars
 - b. Throw-weight
 - c. Megatonnage
 - d. Percentage of gross national product spent on defense

VII. Bibliography

VIII. Glossary of terms (BOX)

The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How

I. Introduction

- A. What is the arms race?
- B. What is arms control?

II. History of arms control

- A. Early agreements prompted by proliferation of arms production, imperialist rivalries, nationalism and competing alliance systems (early 1900s—World War II)
- B. Postwar agreements prompted by fear of nuclear annihilation, fear of nuclear proliferation and worry about effects of nuclear technology on environment
- C. After mid-1950s, agreements became step-by-step efforts due to arms race and growing development of nuclear power for energy

III. Objectives of arms control initiatives

- A. Possible objectives
 1. Limit or reduce the quantity of weapons by placing controls on their future growth ("vertical" proliferation)
 2. Prohibit the possession of weapons, either those already in existence or those that have not yet been developed
 3. Prohibit the first use of certain weapons
 4. Inhibit the development and improvement of weapons through means such as test bans and qualitative restrictions
 5. Limit the proliferation of weapons, both horizontally (from one nation to another) and geographically (to groups of nations in a region or to the sea, atmosphere and outer space)
 6. Reduce tension through means such as information exchange and notification of tests and maneuvers
- B. Importance of objective
 1. How the arms control initiative affects the arms race
 2. What types of weapons the initiative affects and the inherent danger associated with the weapons
 3. Political and technical feasibility of achieving agreement

IV. Types of arms control negotiations or initiatives

- A. Multilateral
- B. Bilateral
- C. Unilateral

V. Brief descriptions of major arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements (BOX)

- A. Agreements
 1. Geneva Protocol
 2. Antarctic Treaty

3. Limited Test Ban Treaty
 4. "Hotline" Agreement
 5. Outer Space Treaty
 6. Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
 7. Non-Proliferation Treaty
 8. Seabed Arms Control Treaty
 9. "Accidents Measures" Agreement
 10. Biological Weapons Convention
 11. SALT I (ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement)
 12. Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
 13. Threshold Test Ban Treaty (U.S. has signed but not ratified)
 14. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (U.S. has signed but not ratified)
 15. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords)
 16. Environmental Modification Convention
 17. SALT II (U.S. has signed but not ratified)
- B. Proposals and Negotiations
1. Baruch Plan
 2. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and Committee on Disarmament
 3. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks
 4. Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations
 5. Chemical Weapons Negotiations
 6. Anti-Satellite Talks
 7. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations
 8. Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START)
 9. Nuclear Freeze Proposals

VI. Possible criteria for judging arms control initiatives

- A. Definition of criteria: standards by which an arms control initiative can be judged
- B. Criteria
1. Equity
 - a. Definition: terms are mutually beneficial and each party, on balance, gains security from the agreement
 - b. Examples in which equity played a major role, such as Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT I and SALT II
 2. Verifiability
 - a. Definition: process of determining, to the extent necessary to safeguard national security, that each party complies with the terms of an agreement
 - b. Examples in which verification played a major role, such as Threshold Test Ban Treaty, SALT II
 3. Linkage
 - a. Definition: process of tying progress in arms control with progress in another area of foreign or military policy
 - b. Examples in which linkage played a major role, such as Limited Test Ban Treaty, SALT I and SALT II
 4. Continuity
 - a. Definition: builds on past efforts or provides a framework for future negotiations
 - b. Examples in which continuity played a major role, such as Treaty of Tlatelolco, Non-Proliferation Treaty and SALT II
 5. Environmental protection
 - a. Definition: protects the earth's resources
 - b. Examples in which environmental protection played a major role, such as Limited Test Ban Treaty and Environmental Modification Convention
 6. Confidence building
 - a. Definition: helps to reduce the general level of tension and reduce the risk of war
 - b. Examples in which confidence building played a major role, such as the "Hotline" Agreement, "Accidents Measures" Agreement and Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
 7. Widespread agreement
 - a. Definition: All appropriate parties adhere to the agreement
 - b. Examples in which widespread agreement played a major role, such as Antarctic Treaty, Treaty of Tlatelolco, SALT I

VII. Glossary of terms (BOX)

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TO: LWV-Texas
1212 Guadalupe, #109
Austin, TX 78701

From: _____

POSTMARK DEADLINE : Oct. 14, 1983

National Security Consensus on Arms Control Objectives and Criteria

Please return this completed form by 10/14/83 to the above address. Please mark the envelope "National Security Consensus."

Use the grid form to indicate your ^{opinion} ~~League's member agreement~~ on the following consensus questions:

1. What level of importance should the U.S. government give to each listed objective or arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war?
2. Which type(s) of negotiations or initiatives (multilateral, bilateral, and/or unilateral) are *most* appropriate for achieving each objective?
3. What criteria should be used to evaluate arms control proposals, negotiations, and agreements?

QUESTION I: Please indicate the level of importance that you ^{think} ~~think~~ the U.S. government should give each listed objective of arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war. For each objective, place a check mark in one of the boxes indicated: "high," "medium," "low," "should not be an objective," or "no opinion/no agreement." In this question you are being asked to consider the level of importance of each objective on its own merits, rather than to prioritize the list of objectives, e.g., you are not being asked to indicate whether "reduce tensions" is more important than either "limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons" or "limiting the quantity of weapons."

QUESTION II: Please indicate the type(s) of negotiations or initiatives you want the League to favor in achieving each arms control objective by placing a check mark in the appropriate box or boxes indicated "multilateral," "bilateral," "unilateral." You may want to check more than one box on some lines. For example, you ^{may} ~~may~~ think that multilateral and bilateral negotiations are both important ways to address the "reduction of quantity of weapons."

QUESTION III: Please indicate the level of importance you ^{attach} ~~attach~~ to the criteria used to evaluate specific objectives of arms control negotiations, proposals or agreements by placing a number in the boxes depending on whether you ^{regard} ~~regard~~ a specific criterion as essential (1), desirable (2), unimportant (3), or not desirable (4). The following example illustrates how the numbers should be used in responding to this question.

OBJECTIVE: TO TAKE A PHOTOGRAPH

Equipment/ Condition	Rank importance in achieving the objective
camera	1
tripod	3
scratch on lens	4
film	1
color film	2
zoom lens	2

How did your board determine member thinking on this issue?

- ☐ Unit meetings
- ☐ General meeting(s)
- ☐ Bulletin tear-off
- ☐ Questionnaire or special mailing
- ☐ Telephone poll
- ☐ Other (specify on separate sheet)

Size of League (number of members):

- ☐ 1-50 ☐ 101-149 ☐ 201-249
- ☐ 51-100 ☐ 150-200 ☐ 250 or more

To facilitate tabulation, please use a SEPARATE SHEET for comments, identifying ~~your LWV~~ yourself.

Signed _____

JUN 14 1982

Ellen Goodman 5/22/82

Women for Peace, From Way Back

HOUSTON—It was 61 years ago, at the very first meeting of an organization dubbed the League of Women Voters, when Carrie Chapman Catt, the president and founder, delivered a plea for peace to a group of brand-new voters.

No one was surprised to find peace so high on the agenda. The suffragists who founded the league in the flush of victory had an ideal, would make a difference—bring a special set of values with them into politics. They could do no less than transform the world.

Well, it didn't happen that way. Yet on Monday, at the league's national convention, they turned to that issue again. A sentiment had grown up from the grass roots of this sturdy, even dogged, "good government" organization: it was time to tackle the questions of bombs and butter, national security and national insecurity.

In careful League-ish prose, the delegates approved a resolution to "evaluate U.S. national security policies and their impact on our domestic programs and our relationships with other nations."

But what is different this time isn't the sentiment. It's the new power behind this "peace" concern. We are, just now, beginning to see what those suffragists envisioned, a distinctive and real vote among women along the lines of their own values.

In the days before suffrage, women held the standards of caretaking, nurturing and peace. But they held them in "their place," at home. It took more than an amendment to change that. It took decades of growing self-confidence and access to the wider world. It took the women's movement to foster women's political independence.

We can clock the times and places when women's views began to firmly diverge from men's. From 1975 on, in polls, women have been less willing than men to sacrifice quality of life to economic growth. By 1980, 54 percent of women disapproved of building a neutron bomb while 54 percent of men approved of building one. By late 1981, women were more likely than men—by nine points—to say that the proposed Reagan cuts in social programs were too high.

Today a pack of pollsters and analysts is trying to assess this thing, the women's vote. They agree on at least three possible reasons why women are more alienated than men from Reagan and the Republican Party: women's rights issues, cuts in social programs for the poor, fear of nuclear war.

Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin described the "women's vote" to me as complicated, conflicted, still mysterious. But in one sense it is simple. All three of these concerns—equal rights, "fairness," peace—can be fairly placed under the umbrella labeled "values."

As pollster Pat Caddell reads it: "We're seeing a different perception in values, concerns, priorities. Women aren't willing to make the same trade-offs for economic growth, and they have a very real skepticism about machismo in foreign policy."

For perhaps the first time, women are bringing their values into politics, and sticking with them. For the first time, men are the followers. Over the past year, in one poll after another, women have staked out a clear position—against Reaganomics, against nuclear arms—and gradually men have drifted over to share those beliefs. If Reagan has modulated his tone on nuclear disarmament, it is largely because of this constituency.

I am not as comfortable as the suffragists in claiming higher virtue or morality for women. I can't talk about "women's values" as if all women share them and all men ignore them. It's not true.

Yet there is a real difference, a statistically significant difference. For whatever reasons—because of our culture, because of our history or because of motherhood—nonviolent convictions are more pervasive among women.

It was true that day in 1921 when Mrs. Catt spoke to the League. But 61 years later, women have finally gained enough assurance about themselves and skepticism about leaders to coalesce around this issue. Perhaps they needed distance. Perhaps they even needed the ultimate anxiety about the half-hour nuclear holocaust.

Now, in large meetings like this one across the country, and in small encounters, there is a real sense that women who have been working for their rights are also working for their values: values that put caretaking before missiles, love before glory, the urge to survive over the urge to fight.

They bring with them today the clout of their convictions.

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
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Introduction 3

1
Basic Concepts of Verification 5

2
The Politics of Verification 14

3
Soviet Views on Verification 28

4
Treaty Compliance 35

5
Compliance Diplomacy 46

Glossary 61

Talking It Over 63

Annotated Reading List 64

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September/October 1984

C
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Introduction

The importance of verifying compliance with arms control agreements is self-evident: the United States should be able to know whether negotiated agreements are being observed. The premise is simple, but the topics of verification and compliance are complex. National security experts argue about the “verifiability” of various provisions within arms control agreements and about the record of Soviet compliance. Their debates are frequently waged in language foreign to most American citizens.

This HEADLINE SERIES issue is geared to a nonexpert audience that wants to know more about verification and compliance. One does not need to be conversant with new developments in verification technology or the details of classified information to reach informed judgments. If concerned citizens take the time to familiarize themselves with the issues discussed in these pages, they can become informed participants in public debates, despite their complexities.

This book was written under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where the author is a Senior Associate in charge of the verification project. The project is supported by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund, whose staff conceived the study. Ploughshares and the Foreign Policy Association have agreed to extend the press run of this HEADLINE SERIES issue to facilitate its distribution to citizens interested in national security issues. The verification project was initiated at the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies in Washington, D.C.

A number of experts with backgrounds in arms control negotiations, congressional affairs, intelligence, diplomacy, defense, science and reporting agreed to advise and critique materials written for the verification project. Project advisers include William Beecher, Barry Blechman, Robert Buchheim, Lt. Gen. Kelly Burke (USAF, Ret.), Frank Church, William Colby, Sidney Drell, Ralph Earle II, Alton Frye, Mark Garrison, Leslie Gelb, Sidney Graybeal, Arnold Horelick, Thomas L. Hughes, Frank Jenkins, Spurgeon Keeny, Ray McCrory, Roger Molander, William Perry, George Schneider, Lt. Gen. George Seignious II (USA, Ret.), Walter Slocombe, Gerard Smith, Howard Stoertz, Strobe Talbott, Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe (USAF, Ret.), Adm. Stansfield Turner (USN, Ret.), and Paul Warnke. These advisers graciously offered the author the benefit of their considerable insight and expertise. Their names are listed here to acknowledge their help, not to suggest their endorsement of the views expressed in the pages that follow. I also wish to thank Gloria Duffy and Sara Goodgame without whose assistance this book could not have been written. Portions have been drawn from papers delivered at conferences at the University of California at Los Angeles and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and from an article in the fall 1984 issue of *Foreign Policy*.



1

Basic Concepts of Verification

With or without arms control agreements, the United States must collect and assess information concerning Soviet military capabilities. The U.S.S.R. has formidable land, sea and air power that can be projected far afield against U.S. friends and allies. Soviet nuclear capabilities can be directed with catastrophic effects against American targets in a matter of minutes. These capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, do not remain static. The size of weapon inventories changes; some older weapon systems are retired while more-capable systems take their place. Changes occur in military organizations, in training practices and in the patterns of military operations that provide clues concerning Soviet military capabilities and intentions.

U.S. political and military officials need to know as much as they can about Soviet military power in order to protect the nation's security. Arms control agreements can also promote American security by placing limits on Soviet forces and by contributing to more-predictable and stable relations with the Soviet Union. Negotiated agreements can prevent an open-ended competition that increases the likelihood of a military confrontation that neither side wants and a nuclear war that neither side can win. But the United States cannot trust the Soviet Union to

adhere to these agreements; the United States must be able to verify Soviet compliance.

Arms control limits are monitored by the same methods we use to observe Soviet military power. Specific provisions in arms control agreements may add somewhat to these monitoring tasks, or may require that U.S. monitoring capabilities be applied to answer very specific questions.

Debates about verification center around basic assumptions concerning the value of arms control, Soviet objectives and the risks of Soviet cheating. Those who are inclined to believe that arms control agreements are of limited value and that the Kremlin's hostile objectives and proclivity to cheat are immutable require very stringent verification standards for any agreement. Those who believe that arms control agreements can be of mutual benefit and that the Soviets will see the wisdom of refraining from cheating—especially cheating that is of little or no military significance—will find more-flexible verification requirements acceptable.

Compliance with complex arms control agreements cannot be verified with absolute confidence. Sometimes the provisions to be monitored are vague, either because both sides are unable or do not wish to be more precise. And even the most sophisticated monitoring devices may not clarify ambiguous events. As a result, there will always be risks involved in monitoring arms control agreements. The problem for policymakers is to determine how much risk is acceptable.

The intelligence community assigns "confidence levels" reflecting its judgment of the U.S. ability to detect prohibited activity. A "high" confidence level indicates between a 90 and 100 percent assurance of detecting a prohibited activity—or a zero to 10 percent risk that we will be uncertain about whether our treaty partner is in compliance; a "moderate" confidence level corresponds to a 50 to 75 percent chance of detection; a "low" confidence level indicates a 10 to 50 percent chance of detection.

The SALT I* (strategic arms limitation talks) interim agreement* of 1972 set limits on land-based intercontinental ballistic

**Terms in text followed by an asterisk are defined in glossary on pages 61 and 62.*

missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers. Both could be monitored with high confidence. The excavation of silos to launch ICBMs requires considerable time and heavy equipment, as does the movement and deployment of ICBMs into them. Likewise, SLBM launchers are contained in large submarines especially built over many years for this purpose. The deployment of SLBMs and their launchers can be monitored carefully. Thus, ever since the advent of overhead photography, the intelligence community has been forewarned of the deployment of new Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs and their launchers.

Even in the seemingly simple case of SALT I, however, judgments differed as to the adequacy of U.S. intelligence capabilities and the wisdom of arms control agreements limiting ICBM and SLBM launchers. Critics of the agreement argued that missiles as well as their launchers should be controlled because the missiles did not necessarily have to be launched from underground silos or submarines. Moreover, silos might be reused to launch additional missiles. Since the United States did not know the size of Soviet missile inventories, critics argued that the limitations imposed by the SALT I interim agreement were artificial and unsatisfactory.

In response to this critique, supporters of the agreement argued that it was not necessary to determine precisely the size of Soviet ICBM inventories, since the Soviets did not have facilities for and did not practice launching ICBMs except by means of underground silos. Supporters of SALT I also downplayed the military significance of excess missiles, given the amount of destruction that might be anticipated in the event of widespread nuclear detonations. Moreover, before the Soviets could launch ICBMs outside their missile silos, they would have to train to master this technique; and these activities could be monitored by U.S. intelligence analysts in time to prepare appropriate responses. Subsequent debates over verification have been quite similar; critics generally contend that agreements are not adequately broad in scope and that sufficiently broad agreements are not verifiable. Supporters argue that limited agreements are worth

achieving, and should not be held hostage to more ambitious and perhaps unrealizable objectives.

Assessments of risk are at the core of debates over verification. Some limitations may be worthwhile but difficult to monitor. Others may be monitored with high confidence, but their impact may be slight. Take, for example, limitations on throw-weight,* or the payload* of nuclear warheads and other equipment missiles can carry. Let us assume the United States could monitor a 25 percent increase in throw-weight from one generation of missiles to the next with high confidence, but that an increase in throw-weight of 5 percent can be monitored only with moderate confidence. Let us also assume that an increase in throw-weight of 25 percent could result in a substantial increase in military capabilities, whereas an increase in throw-weight of 5 percent would provide only a marginal difference. Should public officials opt for a 5 percent limitation which would be difficult to monitor, or a 25 percent limitation which would be relatively easy to monitor? On the one hand, there is a greater risk in monitoring a 5 percent limitation. On the other hand, there is a greater military risk in choosing a 25 percent limitation.

National Technical Means

Intelligence analysts and political leaders rely on sophisticated technical devices to monitor Soviet military activities. When used to monitor compliance with arms control agreements, these devices are collectively known as national technical means* of verification.

Among the many types of national technical means, photoreconnaissance satellites* are best known, perhaps because of pictures released during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 which clearly depicted the construction of Soviet missile sites on the island. Two decades later, President Ronald Reagan released photographs of military construction in Nicaragua to support his contention of widespread Soviet and Cuban support for the

Nicaraguan government. In both cases, these pictures were actually taken by reconnaissance aircraft rather than satellites. The United States has not released publicly military satellite photographs on the grounds that to do so would lead to other disclosures and reveal too much information about U.S. overhead reconnaissance capabilities. The very existence of these satellites was not acknowledged officially until 1978.

Perhaps because of the secrecy associated with U.S. picture-taking satellites, extraordinary claims have been made on their behalf, such as their ability to read numbers on license plates or see through buildings. Photoreconnaissance satellites can do extraordinary things, but they are not capable of these magical feats. The photoreconnaissance satellites' capability to distinguish objects varies depending on their specifications and mission—whether to provide wide-area surveillance or a close look at a specific object of interest. Any government official who has seen pictures taken from space can attest to their clarity. According to one former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), they can allow skilled photo-interpreters to distinguish between Guernseys and Herefords grazing in a meadow. However, satellite coverage is not always available when needed. Because of their high cost, very few picture-taking satellites are in orbit at any one time. Those orbits traverse different sections of the Soviet Union approximately once every 90 minutes.

Standard photographic techniques cannot penetrate cloud cover and are of no use during nighttime, but there are other ways to take pictures from space. Advances in radar imagery, where pictures are produced by bouncing radio waves against a field of view, are particularly important since radar can operate day and night, irrespective of cloud cover. Pictures can also be derived from the heat emitted from objects by means of thermal infrared scanners. Another useful technique is multispectral photography, where separate lenses shoot simultaneous pictures in different regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. This technique allows photo-interpreters to distinguish between true vegetation and camouflage which would not be apparent otherwise.

Engineers in the Soviet Union, like those in the United States,

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test new weapon systems extensively to have confidence that they will work as designed. Operators of this equipment also want to test it repeatedly to train their forces and to check on its reliability. These test programs usually take place over several years at specific, usually well-known, locations. From past practices, for example, U.S. intelligence analysts have come to associate launches of new missile types with one of four test locations in the Soviet Union. Missile flight tests are both inescapable and very informative.

Imagine the test launch of a new Soviet ICBM. Almost immediately, U.S. satellites with infrared sensors detect the heat of the missile's exhaust, providing early warning to American officials of the launch. (In most cases, this information only confirms previous indications of an expected launch, as U.S. analysts usually pick up preparatory signs of the test, again through national technical means.) The early-warning satellites are 22,000 miles up in geosynchronous* orbits which allow them to monitor Soviet territory continuously. After the launch, U.S. ground stations on the periphery of the Soviet Union track the missile's progress and, when possible, monitor the radio messages or telemetry* transmitted to Soviet engineers.

Airborne, sea-, and ground-based radars monitor the progress and conclusion of missile flight tests. The reentry points for long-range Soviet missile tests are in the Kamchatka peninsula in the Soviet Far East, or in the Pacific Ocean. The United States has built a large, "phased-array"* radar in the Aleutian Islands, 450 miles from Kamchatka. This radar, designated Cobra Dane, can monitor electronically Soviet warheads 2,000 miles from their impact point, continuing to track their descent through the atmosphere. Another phased array located aboard a specially equipped ship, Cobra Judy, also may be used for this purpose.

During an earlier era, Secretary of State Henry M. Stimson (1929-33) objected to U.S. code-breaking operations on the basis that "Gentlemen don't read each other's mail." Today, eavesdropping on military communications is a standard practice and a central component of intelligence collection. "Ferret" satellites and aircraft specialize in electromagnetic reconnaissance, keyed

to Soviet radar emissions and patterns of communications. The information gathered by monitoring Soviet communications helps to provide a composite picture of military programs, operations and strategy.

In 1963, the United States launched the first in a series of satellites to detect tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. These satellites have been deployed in pairs at extremely high orbits so as to provide nearly worldwide coverage at all times. To monitor nuclear weapon tests underground, the United States relies on a worldwide system of seismic stations that record the energy generated by underground explosions. For many years, experts have disputed the ability of this network of seismic stations to distinguish between tests of nuclear weapons at very low yields and earthquakes. Another point of contention has been the utility and likelihood of muffling underground nuclear weapon tests (a process known as "decoupling") to evade detection.

Cooperative Measures

While the diversity and capability of national technical means of verification are impressive, they are often insufficient to monitor military capabilities that parties may wish to include in arms control agreements. For example, no matter how good the picture-taking ability of a photoreconnaissance satellite, it cannot determine how many warheads are placed atop a missile located within a silo.

The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a bookkeeping solution to the problem of counting warheads: "counting rules"* were developed in the SALT II* treaty, signed by President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev in 1979, that allowed both sides to count deployed warheads by assigning a specified number of warheads to each type of missile. The Reagan Administration has given this approach increasing prominence in the strategic arms reduction talks (START)* that began in June 1982 but were suspended in December 1983. Counting rules are possible for warheads because U.S. and Soviet intelligence analysts can monitor the

number of warheads actually released during missile flight tests. The mechanism making these releases is known as a "bus"; it carries multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs,* dropping each one off at a precise point of the missile's trajectory.

Debates continue over what counting rules are most appropriate for specific agreements, but most observers believe that the risks associated with this technique are marginal while the benefits are substantial. Counting rules demonstrate how cooperative measures developed in arms control negotiations can make verification easier.

In the past, discussions of verification capabilities and requirements have often been confined to extremely narrow topics: How small an object can be spotted from space? Or, how well can this or that clause within an arms control agreement be monitored? While an ability to monitor a specific provision within an arms control agreement may be extremely important, a narrow focus can skew calculations of overall benefits and risks, including the broad risk of forfeiting a useful agreement by leaving out difficult-to-monitor weapons or by demanding unacceptably intrusive monitoring rights. All too often, narrow debates obscure the true strengths of U.S. verification capabilities; the United States relies on many different and complementary means of intelligence to provide it with a composite picture of Soviet military activities. As a result of these capabilities, the United States has detailed knowledge of current and prospective Soviet military developments. The last time the United States was surprised by a new Soviet program with strategic significance was when Sputnik, the U.S.S.R.'s first satellite, was launched in 1957, prior to the advent of photoreconnaissance satellites. The information garnered by national technical means has allowed American Presidents to assess Soviet military power, to structure U.S. forces accordingly, and to sign arms control agreements with the Kremlin.

In the future, debates over verification will be more intense

because new weapons like cruise missiles are being produced that are more difficult to monitor than forces included in previous agreements. Cruise missiles are highly accurate, pilotless aircraft that can be launched from air, land or sea. They can carry conventional or nuclear weapons, and can fly short or long distances. The United States and the Soviet Union are also placing greater reliance on mobile missiles instead of missiles housed in underground silos. These developments are prompted by both sides' wish to take advantage of new technological developments and their increasing concern about the survivability of their nuclear forces. As a result, each side is diversifying the platforms that can be used to launch nuclear forces and placing a premium on mobility to foil a surprise attack. At the same time, both superpowers are emphasizing accuracy in their new weapons, as each believes highly accurate forces will best deter the other and provide advantages in the event of war. The trend toward more accurate forces reinforces the trend of exploiting new technologies and making weapons less vulnerable.

As a result of these developments, political leaders and concerned citizens will be required to make difficult choices in the future: the United States can either choose to include or exclude these hard-to-verify weapons within the scope of future agreements. Including these forces will entail greater risks in verification, but excluding them will result in less meaningful agreements.



2

The Politics of Verification

In public and congressional debates over verification, familiar arguments are offered by those at opposite ends of the political spectrum. People most concerned about the dangers of the nuclear arms race are not particularly worried about verification. Those who favor arms control but are also concerned about Soviet behavior weigh the risks of verification against the potential benefits of agreements. Those most skeptical of Soviet intentions usually see little benefit in arms control agreements and call for very stringent standards of verification.

Supporters of previous treaties argued that monitoring standards should not be so exacting as to foreclose agreement, since arms control can improve U.S. security by placing limits on Soviet forces and stabilizing the most dangerous element of the competition between the superpowers. Instead, monitoring standards should be adequate to detect Soviet cheating of military consequence, and to detect it in time to take appropriate action. In this view, the Soviets may try to cheat, but if they do, they run the risk of getting caught and jeopardizing the benefits that led them to sign an agreement. As General Secretary Brezhnev told President Richard M. Nixon at the 1972 Moscow summit, "If we are trying

to trick one another, why do we need a piece of paper?" Arms controllers also argue that U.S. detection capabilities provide a deterrent to Soviet cheating, since detection would, at the very least, be embarrassing politically and could prompt a reaction that would hurt the cheater.

Those skeptical of previous agreements take a very different view of their benefits and risks. For them, agreements do not alter long-term Soviet goals, but they can hinder U.S. defense programs necessary to foil those goals. According to this view of arms control, there are few incentives—bureaucratic or otherwise—for Soviet compliance with negotiated agreements. To the contrary, the Kremlin can be expected to cheat on agreements that constrain military forces they consider necessary to achieve national objectives. The Kremlin's bureaucracy is less interested in preserving agreements than in gaining advantage—particularly when their activities do not jeopardize the agreements because of a weak U.S. response.

For those most suspicious of Soviet intentions, U.S. failure to detect cheating is no guarantee that the Kremlin is behaving itself; it means only that violations have gone undetected because of the effectiveness of the Soviet arts of deception and concealment. Since, by definition, the United States will never find anything the Soviets have successfully hidden, the possibilities of cheating—and the resulting harm to U.S. security—are endless. It follows that the only acceptable arms control agreement is one that sets strict standards for verification, contains highly intrusive monitoring provisions and a forceful policy of sanctions, and permits unilateral actions once a violation is detected.

Most Americans and their elected officials do not take dogmatic stands on verification issues. There is a wide variety of views on the value of negotiated agreements and appropriate standards of verification. Competing political slogans about "never trusting the Russians" or "trusting the Russians to act in their own best interests" provide little help for the toughest judgment calls over verification and risk. But particularly of late, the terms of political debate have been set by those at opposite ends of the political spectrum.

'Adequate' Verification, 1963-79

For nuclear arms control agreements negotiated between 1963 and 1979, American Presidents explicitly supported a flexible approach to verification requirements. The first such agreement was the limited test ban treaty* of 1963, which barred nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater. Officials in the Kennedy Administration agreed with those who contended that monitoring capabilities for a limited test ban could not detect all instances of Soviet noncompliance; they maintained, however, that these were risks worth taking in the light of the perceived benefits of an agreement. As President John F. Kennedy said in his transmittal message to the Senate:

The risks in clandestine violations under this treaty are far smaller than the risks in unlimited testing . . . No nation tempted to violate the treaty can be certain that an attempted violation will go undetected, given the many means of detecting nuclear explosions. The risks of detection outweigh the potential gains from violation, and the risk to the United States from such violation is outweighed by the risk of a continued unlimited nuclear arms race.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time, General Maxwell D. Taylor, also acknowledged the possibilities of clandestine Soviet testing. As a result the Joint Chiefs and some members of Congress pressed for "safeguards" along with ratification.

Those safeguards included an extensive underground nuclear test program, improved monitoring capabilities, and preparations to resume atmospheric tests in the event of Soviet noncompliance. In sum, the limited test ban treaty was defended and accepted on the basis that U.S. monitoring capabilities, though deficient in certain respects, were adequate when viewed in conjunction with other political and military factors.

At the outset of the SALT negotiations, President Nixon explicitly restated the requirement for *adequate* verification in his instructions to the SALT I negotiating team:

No arms limitation agreement can ever be absolutely verifiable. The relevant test is not an abstract ideal, but the practical standard of whether we can determine compliance adequately to safeguard our security—that is, whether we can identify attempted evasion if it occurs on a large enough scale to pose a significant risk, and whether we can do so in time to mount a sufficient response. Meeting this test is what I mean by the term ‘adequate verification.’

In defending the SALT I accords, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird flatly stated, “We have adequate means of verification.” Little debate followed on Secretary Laird’s conclusion, either in committee hearings or on the floor of Congress. Most agreed with Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) who stated at the conclusion of the desultory ratification debate over the antiballistic missile (ABM)* treaty in August 1972:

I do not base my approval of the treaty and the agreements upon ‘trust’ in the benign motives of the Soviet Union. No one is asked to do that. What I do base it on is Dr. Kissinger’s assurance that there is every likelihood that the agreements will be complied with because it is in the interests of the U.S.S.R. to do so.

Verification issues were of far greater concern during the SALT II hearings because the SALT II treaty included limits on qualitative missile improvements that were more difficult to monitor than the SALT I numerical limitations, and because of the compliance issues that arose from the SALT I accords. The Carter Administration’s defense of the “verifiability” of the SALT II treaty was similar to that of the Kennedy and Nixon Administrations before it. In a State Department report on the treaty, the Carter Administration presented its case in the following terms:

The anticipated SALT II agreement is adequately verifiable. This judgment is based on assessment of the verifiability of the individual provisions of the agreement and the agreement as a whole. Although the possibility of some undetected cheating in certain areas exists, such cheating would not alter the strategic

balance in view of U.S. programs. Any cheating on a scale large enough to alter the strategic balance would be discovered in time to make an appropriate response. There will be areas of uncertainty, but they are not such as to permit the Soviets to produce a significant unanticipated threat to U.S. interests and those uncertainties can, in any event, be compensated for with the flexibility inherent in our own programs.

During hearings on the SALT II treaty, senior Administration officials subscribed to these precepts, but public assurances, including those of the CIA director and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not alleviate congressional or public concerns. Unlike the SALT I debate, treaty opponents repeatedly pointed to numerous Soviet practices that could not be monitored easily. Events during the congressional review process, particularly the loss of Iranian monitoring stations after the fall of the shah in 1979 and the "discovery" of a Soviet military brigade in Cuba in 1980, heightened sensitivities over treaty verification. These specific incidents reinforced perceptions of presidential weakness, Soviet adventurousness, and disturbing trends in superpower fortunes and military capabilities.

'Effective' Verification, 1981-

Opponents of previous arms control agreements, including many in the Reagan Administration, had long felt that adequate verification was not sufficient. Moreover, these critics believed that previous agreements had been poorly crafted, allowing the Soviets to exploit ambiguities in treaty provisions in ways that were injurious to U.S. national security and the strategic balance. In this view, tougher verification provisions and more-exacting standards for determining adequacy were necessary for future agreements.

The new watchword proposed by Reagan Administration officials was *effective* as opposed to adequate verification, although the difference has never been spelled out. Presumably, effective verification measures will vary from one agreement to the next, but whether such provisions can be negotiated remains

to be seen. U.S. "verification annexes" were in the process of preparation for both the START and the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)* negotiations, which opened in Geneva in November 1981, but the annexes had not been completed when the talks came to a standstill in late fall 1983. In addition, no public attempt has been made by Reagan Administration officials to define what additional monitoring provisions they deem necessary for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Administration officials have based their opposition to resuming the test ban negotiation, suspended in 1980, on the need for continued nuclear weapon tests, as well as on difficulties in verification. Resistance within the Reagan Administration to limitations on antisatellite* weapons is likewise based on verification concerns as well as on military requirements to place Soviet satellites at risk.

A complete ban on space warfare capabilities is unlikely since any missile that can be lofted into space could be used as an antisatellite weapon. The crux of the debate is over the verifiability and utility of an agreement banning antisatellite weapon tests. Reagan Administration officials argue that such tests could be concealed, particularly tests conducted by ground-based lasers. In a report to the Congress on antisatellite arms control dated March 31, 1984, the Reagan Administration concluded,

The fact that antisatellite capabilities are inherent in some systems developed for other missions or are amenable to undetected or surreptitious development makes it impossible to verify compliance with a truly comprehensive testing limitation that would eliminate tests of all methods of countering satellites.

Given their premises that a one-sided antisatellite capability could alter the strategic balance in unacceptable ways and that some antisatellite capabilities could be tested covertly, it follows that Reagan Administration officials would prefer more-modest agreements allowing both sides some antisatellite capabilities, or no agreements at all.

Supporters of an antisatellite test ban concede a degree of risk but contend that the benefits of reaching agreement far outweigh the risks. Moreover they argue that antisatellite flight tests cannot

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be concealed from U.S. national technical means for very long or very well. While laser antisatellite tests might pose a problem, new national technical means could be developed to monitor them. More-conventional antisatellite tests seem far easier to recognize. Arguments to the contrary are reminiscent of earlier debates over the advisability of an agreement banning MIRVs during the Nixon Administration. At that time, some Administration officials were worried that the Soviets could disguise MIRV tests. Those fears now appear vastly overdrawn.

'Intrusive' Verification and On-Site Inspections

The most difficult arms control choices facing U.S. policymakers and elected officials relate to the scope of new agreements and the standards deemed necessary to monitor compliance. The range and consequences of these choices can be demonstrated by reviewing three case studies: the limited test ban treaty, the biological weapons convention, and the decision to link the inclusion of MIRVs in the SALT I accords to a requirement for on-site inspections.

In 1963, President Kennedy decided to conclude a limited agreement with the Soviet Union barring all nuclear weapon tests except those underground, instead of a comprehensive agreement banning all tests. Several reasons lay behind this choice, but all were tied to difficulties in monitoring a total ban and in obtaining Soviet agreement to intrusive measures needed to verify the absence of underground tests of nuclear weapons.

The most intrusive measure of verification to monitor treaty compliance is on-site inspections—whereby one treaty signatory allows a team of experts to inspect specific areas, installations or other facilities under agreed procedures. In the above-mentioned case, the United States and the Soviet Union at one point proposed respectively seven and three on-site inspections to monitor a comprehensive ban, but both sides were far apart on critical details of these inspections: how many inspectors would be permitted, the length of their stay, how much Soviet and U.S. territory they would be able to roam, and what transportation and inspection methods would be allowed.

Neither side made any great effort to narrow the distance between their positions on these operational questions, since neither could bridge the gap in the number of inspections to be allowed. President Kennedy was already under attack for lowering the required number of U.S. inspections from twenty to seven, while Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev later indicated he had "gone to the mat" with his Council of Ministers to be able to propose two or three inspections.

Without treaty provisions for on-site inspections, President Kennedy was in a difficult position to secure the consent of two thirds of the Senate necessary to ratify a comprehensive test ban treaty. Seismologists agreed that national technical means might not detect some Soviet underground nuclear tests, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the Soviet Union could achieve important advances by clandestine tests. The Joint Chiefs were unanimously opposed to a comprehensive test ban agreement, as were important figures in the scientific community and many influential senators.

Given this situation, President Kennedy settled for a limited test ban treaty, in which the risks of undetected Soviet cheating were far less. Even so, a treaty amendment requiring on-site inspections was offered but was defeated by a substantial margin. Most senators accepted the Kennedy Administration's position that on-site inspections were not needed to monitor a limited test ban agreement, and that to make this a condition for ratification would effectively scuttle the treaty. Moreover, the treaty without on-site inspections had the support of the Joint Chiefs, and, as it turned out, all but 19 U.S. senators.

In retrospect, many officials who served in the Kennedy Administration wish that the President had decided to push ahead with a comprehensive test ban. With the passage of time the risks associated with clandestine Soviet underground tests appear less formidable than the advancements in nuclear weapon capabilities that have occurred as a result of underground testing. However, retrospective judgments are of little help to political leaders and elected officials at the time they must make their choices.

The biological weapons convention presents a very different

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case study of the scope and verification standards for arms control agreements. In 1972, President Nixon chose the widest possible scope for agreement—a complete ban on the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisition of biological and toxin weapons. Parties to the agreement were allowed, however, to retain undefined types and quantities of biological and toxin stocks for “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”

The biological weapons convention contained no verification provisions and only the most modest compliance provisions: signatories were to consult and cooperate with one another when problems arose through “appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations.” Questions of noncompliance could be pursued by lodging a complaint, including the presentation of evidence, in the UN Security Council. States were to cooperate in carrying out any investigation initiated by the Security Council, which would inform signatories of its findings.

It was widely recognized that these standards for verification and compliance were not rigorous. Nevertheless, the Senate consented to ratification after the most perfunctory debate by a vote of 90-0. Most elected officials agreed with the Nixon Administration’s judgment not to pursue intrusive verification procedures. Biological weapons could, after all, be produced in very small facilities. Verification provisions which provided high confidence of treaty compliance would have required the right of entry into large numbers of facilities in the Soviet Union and the United States—something neither side was willing to accept. At the time, the United States had renounced unilaterally an offensive biological weapons capability. For President Nixon, his advisers and most elected officials, strict verification and compliance procedures for the biological weapons convention were less important than having the Kremlin formally subscribe to a position the United States had taken unilaterally.

With the passage of time, many have second-guessed this judgment. Questions of Soviet noncompliance with the convention have been sparked by an outbreak of pulmonary anthrax in Sverdlovsk near a suspected biological weapons facility, and by

reports of "yellow rain" in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Significantly, this evidence came to light despite the lack of verification provisions in the convention. Compliance questions relating to biochemical warfare highlight the need for satisfactory mechanisms for consultation and investigation of the evidence. They also have convinced most specialists in the field that the standards for verification and compliance established in the convention are unacceptable for future agreements.

The MIRV case study presents a third example of the importance of political decisions relating the scope of an arms control agreement to appropriate standards of verification. During the critical period 1969-71, the Nixon Administration made a calculated decision to continue flight-testing and deployment of MIRVs rather than make serious efforts to limit them in SALT I. Recommendations by some participants to slow down or to halt the MIRV test program while negotiations were under way were rejected by The White House. At the time, the Soviets were constructing 200 new ICBM silos per year and building new missile-carrying submarines at a rate of seven or eight per year. In contrast, U.S. strategic force levels were fairly static; increases in U.S. capabilities rested heavily on the deployment of MIRVs, a program with strong support in the Pentagon and in key congressional offices.

The initial U.S. negotiating position at SALT I was to link a ban on MIRVs to on-site inspections, including inspections of Soviet surface-to-air missile sites as well as the dismantling of large Soviet early-warning radars. According to the prevailing view within the Nixon Administration, MIRVs were needed to counter ABM systems. If MIRVs were to be banned, then intrusive measures were required to provide assurance that Soviet air defenses were not upgraded to provide ABM capabilities. Hence the need for on-site inspections.

The negotiating linkage between a MIRV ban and on-site inspections was unnecessary in a technical sense; it was also unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Bans on the flight-testing of MIRVs and the testing of air defense radars for ABM purposes would have been sufficient to provide assurances against MIRV

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deployment and air defense upgrades. Indeed, provisions were later worked out for the ABM treaty barring the testing of air defense radars "in an ABM mode," without provisions for on-site inspections. Monitoring a ban on MIRV testing by national technical means was far simpler, since repeated developmental and operational flight tests were required for minimal assurance that warheads could be directed accurately against separate targets. Such flight tests could not be concealed from U.S. intelligence for very long, despite the qualms expressed on this score by some Nixon Administration officials.

For their part, the Soviets were also reluctant to ban MIRVs during SALT I. At the time, the United States had already begun MIRVed developmental flight tests; the Soviets had not. Moreover, at the outset of the SALT negotiations, the Soviet Union was lagging far behind in the number of overall launchers as well as warheads. The Kremlin therefore proposed that MIRV flight-testing be permitted, but deployment prohibited—a proposition that could not be verified with high confidence except by on-site inspection, which, of course, the Soviets adamantly refused to permit.

As SALT I chief negotiator Gerard Smith later recounted, the MIRV proposals tabled by both sides were an ingenious and disingenuous mismatch. It is far from clear whether a MIRV ban could have been negotiated with the Soviet Union during this period, but in retrospect most participants regretted the U.S. decisions to exclude MIRVs from the scope of an agreement and to set such a high standard for MIRV verification. Because MIRVs remained uncontrolled in SALT I, U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces subsequently rose precipitously, impairing the security of both sides.

The lessons to be learned from these case studies depend on subjective evaluations that vary from one analyst to the next. But they all point to the importance of domestic political factors in the choice of an agreement's scope and verification standards. In the

limited test ban treaty and MIRV cases, Presidents Kennedy and Nixon chose a course of action that eased political opposition to negotiated agreements, but strong supporters of arms control would argue that short-term political considerations resulted in negative strategic consequences in the long run. On the other hand, Presidents Kennedy and Nixon succeeded in ratifying strategic arms control agreements—even if they were limited in scope.

Future debates over the scope and verification standards for new agreements will come to a head whenever accords governing hard-to-verify weapon systems like mobile missiles and cruise missiles are negotiated. Unlike the nuclear forces included in previous agreements, these weapon systems can be deployed with less-elaborate launch facilities and can be used for a variety of military purposes. For those most concerned about Soviet non-compliance, the more intrusive the U.S. methods of verification for mobile and cruise missiles, the better.

Some people consider on-site inspections necessary for hard-to-verify weapons. On-site inspections can be useful to verify the destruction of stockpiles or to confirm a ban on underground tests, but inspections for mobile and cruise missiles will still be of limited utility while being extraordinarily difficult to negotiate. Neither side is likely to allow unconditional, unlimited on-site inspections and neither is likely to agree to inspections that will provide clear evidence of a violation. Some visits may raise false alarms over cheating when ambiguous evidence turns up. Other inspections may generate a false sense of security indicating compliance at the site visited, but little more. In the final analysis, inspections are no panacea for verification problems. If all goes well, inspections can only provide intelligence analysts with high confidence of compliance at individual sites just prior, during, and immediately after the visit.

Cooperative measures, while not as intrusive as on-site inspections, can be quite helpful in monitoring mobile and cruise missiles. Cooperative measures could provide information about production rates by having sensors at production facilities that could detect the movement of missiles and their transporters from

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production facilities. Other cooperative measures could include designating the facilities that are used to produce individual types of missiles (and dedicating them entirely to such production), providing data on monthly output, and transferring missiles from production facilities to their next destination by an agreed schedule to facilitate observance by national technical means. Another set of cooperative measures would be required to simplify the process of monitoring missile deployments—such as designating missile deployment areas and prohibiting the existence of such missiles outside these areas.

Counting rules can be applied to provide bookkeeping solutions to near-insoluble monitoring problems associated with weapon systems like cruise missiles. These sorts of counting rules were applied quite successfully to bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in the SALT II treaty: if ALCMs were tested or deployed on a certain type of aircraft, then all aircraft of that type, unless otherwise modified, would fall within agreed ceilings. It is possible to envision another counting rule governing the number of ALCMs per aircraft and the number of aircraft of that type, just as MIRVed capabilities have been assigned to various missile types. These techniques for counting can also be applied to sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) although the results would be even less precise. For example, assumptions could be made concerning how many "weapon stations" are available on ships of a certain class, and how many of these weapon stations would be designated as nuclear-armed cruise missile stations. Assume, for example, that a submarine or surface ship of a certain class has space for 30 weapons of all kinds, including spares. Of these, ten could be designated as nuclear-armed cruise missile stations. If advanced long-range cruise missiles are tested or deployed on a naval platform, then all ships of that class are held accountable within agreed ceilings. Of course, additional cooperative measures would be required to assist each side in monitoring test programs governing SLCMs.

By placing greater reliance on cooperative measures and counting rules, new agreements governing mobile and cruise missiles are still possible, although they will be less precise than

previous accords. Nor will such agreements require on-site inspections if their scope is limited to deployed forces, as was the case in SALT I and II.

Those who argue most strongly for on-site inspections also generally favor broadening the scope of future agreements to include missile production and inventory limits. Even with on-site inspections, the United States will have less confidence in its ability to monitor Soviet compliance with agreements limiting missile production and inventories than with agreements like the SALT I and II accords. Moreover, inspections of missile production and storage facilities will be extremely difficult for both sides to accept.

A strong case can be made for limiting the scope of future agreements to deployed forces. At current levels of strategic forces,* production rates and inventory levels are unlikely to have a bearing on the outcome of a nuclear war or on perceptions of the military balance. Agreements that continue to focus on deployed forces would be far easier to negotiate because they would not require on-site inspections.

Critics of new agreements of whatever scope will point to the risks associated with attempts to control hard-to-verify nuclear forces. Supporters will point to the risks of leaving these forces uncontrolled. It takes little skill to postulate verification requirements that are inadequate to the task (as was the case in the biological weapons convention), or that are impossible for the other side to meet (as happened in the MIRV case). No one standard for verification is applicable to all cases, but as a general rule, the conclusion of President Reagan's Commission on Strategic Forces—which employed the services of two former National Security Council advisers, including commission chairman Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft (USAF Ret.), four former secretaries of defense, three former CIA directors, and two former secretaries of state—seems worthy of consideration: "The essential test of an effective verification system is that it will detect with a high degree of confidence any set of violations which would have a significant impact on the strategic balance. The commission believes that goal remains within our reach."



3

Soviet Views on Verification

A newspaperman who was stationed in Moscow for several years tells the story about his request to Soviet authorities to visit Murmansk. Yes, he might go, came the reply, but only by train—an arduous journey to this remote northern area. Why, when there are Aeroflot flights to Murmansk? Because foreigners are barred from these flights, which venture near sensitive military areas. Of course, these areas are covered regularly by photoreconnaissance satellites with keener eyesight than even the most enterprising journalist—a fact well known to Soviet authorities. Nevertheless, the travel restriction held.

The Soviet penchant for secrecy is well known and amply documented. Russian secrecy is a protective device with deep cultural, political as well as military roots. As a military asset, secrecy is valued highly. One branch of military science—*maskirovka*—is devoted to the arts of deception and concealment. These practices come naturally to the society that created Potemkin villages, the stage facades used to persuade Empress Catherine the Great of the indigenous development of newly acquired lands. When directed against potential foes, efforts at concealment and deception require far more elaborate plans.

While deeply ingrained, Soviet secrecy is not immutable. Foreign journalists may now fly from Moscow to Murmansk. Similarly, the Kremlin has relaxed somewhat its opposition to measures that make its military capabilities more evident and thus more amenable to arms control agreements. In some respects, the Soviets have had to bow to the inevitable: when they launched Sputnik, the first satellite to orbit the earth, they undermined their case against "open espionage" from overhead. Space satellites could perform the same photoreconnaissance missions as "spy" planes like the U-2. Unlike the U-2, however, earth-orbiting satellites had no choice but to cross national borders. When the Soviets also developed a photoreconnaissance capability from space, they had every reason to acquiesce in such activities.

It took several years for the Soviet position on the peaceful use of space to evolve. Official pronouncements at first noted the "peaceful intent" of Soviet satellites and the "provocative" nature of early U.S. satellite programs, including the Discoverer, America's first photoreconnaissance satellite, launched the same year (1960) a U-2 was shot down over the U.S.S.R. During the Berlin crisis the following year, the Soviet armed forces newspaper, *Red Star*, compared U.S. satellites to U-2 missions: "A spy is a spy, no matter what height it flies."

This Soviet position softened somewhat during the UN deliberations in 1962 on the peaceful uses of outer space. The U.S.S.R. agreed to provide the UN with orbital characteristics of its satellites, but not to identify their functions. The unreservedly hostile Soviet attitude to U.S. satellites also began to change toward the end of 1963. Surely by this time the Kremlin had a working photoreconnaissance capability. In addition, satellites of a different sort allowed both superpowers to monitor the ban on atmospheric tests contained in the limited test ban treaty.

Even after the test ban treaty was signed in 1963, Soviet military writers continued to condemn U.S. espionage from space. It was only in conjunction with the SALT I accords that positive references to national technical means of verification regularly filtered into Soviet commentaries. The role of national technical

means was codified in the SALT I agreements which approved of their use "in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law" to verify compliance with the agreements' provisions. In addition, both parties to the SALT I accords agreed not to interfere with national technical means performing these functions, and not to use "deliberate concealment measures" which impeded verification of treaty provisions. The SALT II treaty further elaborated on these principles by including a controversial provision barring the deliberate denial of telemetry whenever this practice impeded verification of treaty provisions. During missile tests, electronic signals—or telemetry—are transmitted from the missile which engineers can then utilize in evaluating the missile's performance. The United States can also utilize these transmissions to make determinations about treaty compliance. Denial could be achieved by several techniques, most notably by encryption*—the transmission of data in code.

The Soviet Union's attitude toward national technical means of verification has evolved, but it still has a way to go. The Kremlin reserves the right to take countermeasures against satellites which are used for "hostile purposes"; Soviet views toward nonsatellite national technical means, such as ground stations used to monitor treaty compliance, remain obscure; and the Kremlin is extremely sensitive about the end use of satellite-derived data for nonmilitary purposes (such as economic forecasting). Soviet maskirovka programs continue unabated, and a crude capability to destroy low-orbiting satellites has been tested.

A further positive change in Soviet attitude toward national technical means appears unlikely at the present time, with negotiations for new arms control agreements stalled, previous agreements unratified, and U.S.-Soviet relations at a low ebb. Indeed, the Kremlin has taken steps to withhold the fruits of previous negotiations, as evidenced by compliance controversies over Soviet encryption of telemetry during flight tests of new missiles.

A review of negotiations over nuclear test ban agreements can offer useful insights into Soviet views and negotiating tactics on

verification. When these negotiations began in Geneva at The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests in 1958, the Soviets demanded a veto power in all important decisions, including decisions relating to inspections. The Kremlin initially agreed to the establishment of control posts to monitor a ban on weapon tests within its borders, but the staff of each post as well as the staff director were to be Soviet nationals. A foreigner could serve as "chief control officer," and could accompany carefully circumscribed aircraft inspection flights or ground inspections. Air samplings for radioactivity would be permitted along predetermined routes, and foreign inspectors would be chosen from a registered list of names.

As negotiations proceeded, the Soviets gradually increased the number of foreigners allowed at each control post, but they refused to relinquish their veto power. Otherwise, Soviet Premier Khrushchev asserted, the Kremlin would be handing Soviet "territory over to the supervision of the aggressive NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) bloc." Still later, the Soviet Union proposed an annual quota of on-site inspections not subject to a veto—a maximum of three per year. (The United States demanded a minimum of 20, to go with 21 control posts within the U.S.S.R.) In subsequent negotiations, differences were also narrowed over the number of control posts to be located within the Soviet Union—the Kremlin accepted 15, while the United States lowered its requirement to 19. The Geneva negotiations broke down with the resumption in 1961 of nuclear weapon tests by France, the Soviet Union, and then by the United States, ending a moratorium in effect since 1958.

When negotiations resumed during the Kennedy Administration, the Kremlin at first withdrew its offer of on-site inspections, asserting that all underground tests could be detected by technical means. The Soviet position next reverted to the acceptance of two-to-three on-site inspections, but only three "automatic seismic recovery stations" were deemed acceptable on Soviet soil. The Kremlin declined to talk about the details of inspection procedures until agreement was reached on these numbers. Still later, Premier Khrushchev again withdrew the Soviet offer of on-site

inspections, saying that the U.S.S.R. would "never open the door to NATO spies." The agreement that was finally negotiated in 1963 essentially set aside disputes over the verification for subsequent negotiations, since both sides agreed that a limited test ban treaty could be monitored by national technical means.

A decade of subsequent negotiations produced the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which established a 150-kiloton limit on underground tests. In order to verify compliance and to reduce the uncertainty associated with measuring yields of underground tests by national technical means, the Soviets agreed to exchange scientific and technical data, including the geographic coordinates of the boundaries of each test site, information on geological characteristics within them, and geographic coordinates, yields, dates, times and depths of underground weapon tests to be used for calibration purposes. The yields of those tests were to be as near to the 150-kiloton limit as possible.

These provisions have never been put into effect because neither side has ratified the threshold test ban treaty. President Gerald R. Ford deferred ratification, pending completion of a companion agreement governing nuclear explosions for non-military purposes. The Carter Administration deferred ratification, opting instead to negotiate a comprehensive treaty banning all tests. The Reagan Administration has also declined to ratify the threshold test ban treaty, noting the possibility of the Kremlin providing incorrect data, and the lack of treaty provisions allowing for authentication of the data exchanged.

The companion treaty to the threshold test ban treaty, the peaceful nuclear explosion treaty, was signed in 1976 but it, too, has not been ratified. It permitted nuclear explosions for engineering and scientific projects or other peaceful purposes, but with on-site inspections for explosions with aggregate yields over 150 kilotons. For some, the Soviet willingness to allow inspection under these conditions indicated the unlikelihood of higher-yield peaceful nuclear explosions. For others, the Soviets were setting an important precedent for subsequent nuclear arms control negotiations.

The logic of inspections for a peaceful nuclear explosion treat

was hard for the Kremlin to refute, since it is difficult to distinguish peaceful explosions from tests with military applications. The Soviets consistently took the position that requirements for inspections had to be specifically and narrowly related to the tasks of verifying compliance with treaty constraints. The United States sought broader bounds. The American concern about the need for thorough inspections to provide assurance of Soviet compliance was matched by the Soviet concern that inspections would be used as a fishing expedition for espionage purposes. Even relatively simple tasks associated with these inspections, such as the use of cameras, required arduous negotiations. Soviet and U.S. concerns were resolved by providing the U.S.S.R. with access to Western monitoring devices. Two identical sets of equipment would be brought by observers—one to be retained for examination by the host country, the other to be used for measurements. Each set of equipment would contain two recorders, allowing for host and inspectors to each have a copy. The treaty also established a joint consultative commission to discuss any compliance questions that might arise.

Subsequent negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty drew on the precedent of inspections established in the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty. Progress was also made in working out the instrumentation to be used by foreign observers, including radiation monitoring devices and seismic recorders, and detailed discussions took place on the installation of unmanned seismic stations within the United States, U.S.S.R. and Britain. The Soviets agreed to accept the placement of tamperproof seismic stations, but differences remained on the number of stations needed. The Kremlin insisted that all three nations accept 10 stations, while the British insisted that a smaller number would suffice for them, since British tests are conducted at the Nevada test site.

As the test ban negotiating history indicates, Soviet flexibility on verification and cooperative measures remains constrained by deep-seated sensitivities about espionage and protection of national security, broadly defined. The Kremlin has been forthcoming in the past on verification questions when there has been a

specific reason to do so—such as to secure the benefits of a negotiated agreement—but only to the extent necessary to monitor specific provisions within that agreement. Greater openness is viewed not as an end in itself, but as tied to the object of negotiations. Nor will the Kremlin's negotiators be particularly philanthropic on verification issues. The United States needs intrusive verification provisions far more than does the Soviet Union. Soviet verification proposals invariably are inadequate at the outset of negotiations; they improve over time, but they may also be withdrawn. Attractive verification provisions will usually be offered by the Kremlin in the expectation of gain elsewhere in an agreement; they will be won by the West only in the course of hard bargaining.

As for the future, the Kremlin has indicated its openness to on-site inspections in the comprehensive test ban, chemical weapons and mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) negotiations. These agreements would involve tasks—such as checking ambiguous seismic events, destroying chemical munitions, and monitoring the withdrawal of forces through exit/entry points—that usefully can be performed by inspectors on-site.

These are unusual cases, however. Most agreements, in the Soviet view, can be monitored quite adequately by national technical means. This was the Soviet position in the INF and START negotiations before they were suspended as well as with respect to agreements governing antisatellite weapons. In the INF and START talks, the Soviets indicated a willingness to discuss cooperative measures to complement national technical means, but resisted discussions about specific provisions with far more central issues unresolved. The Kremlin has shown little interest to date in intrusive measures to monitor missile production and inventories—limitations of considerable interest to the Reagan Administration in both the INF and START negotiations. Attempts to go well beyond national technical means are usually viewed by the Kremlin either as a means for the United States to gain unwarranted intelligence data or as a smokescreen to mask a disinterest in reaching accords.



4

Treaty Compliance

Domestic debates over treaty compliance, like those over verification, have reflected deep divisions of opinion concerning the Kremlin's objectives and the value of Soviet cheating. In congressional debates, from the limited test ban to SALT II, supporters of arms control argued that Soviet leaders would be unlikely to violate agreements that were in their interest as well as ours; that U.S. capabilities to detect violations of any consequence would further serve as a deterrent; and that if violations took place, the United States could respond appropriately, including, if necessary, abrogation of the agreement in question.

During the limited test ban treaty debate, several potential compliance issues were raised by treaty opponents. Nuclear weapon tests in Lake Baikal in the Soviet Union, in deep space, behind the moon, or under a few feet of earth during periods of heavy cloud cover were deemed possible by those who foresaw a determined Soviet effort to foil U.S. national technical means of verification. The possibility of Soviet nuclear weapon tests at or just over the Chinese border was also raised.

President Kennedy was in a strong position to defuse congressional concerns over Soviet noncompliance. If the Soviets reneged on their treaty commitments in the Kennedy Administration, the

United States could be expected to respond purposefully, as in the case when the Kremlin resumed atmospheric tests in 1955. Moreover, the scenarios that envisaged testing behind the moon or in deep space seemed farfetched, and the presumed value of clandestine cheating quite marginal. A treaty amendment offer by Senator John G. Tower (R-Tex.) calling for on-site inspections was easily defeated, even though the satellites designed to detect atmospheric explosions were anticipated but not yet deployed. Those most opposed to the limited test ban treaty compiled long lists of Soviet violations and broken promises, from the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 to the Yalta agreement in 1945 but with little effect. The perceived benefits of the treaty clearly seemed worth the risk of Soviet noncompliance.

During the SALT I debate, congressional critics sent mixed messages on prospective compliance problems. Skeptics rallied behind an amendment sponsored by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) requiring future agreements to provide for equal strategic force levels. On the one hand, supporters of the Jackson amendment expressed concern not that the Soviets would cheat but that they could do great harm without resort to cheating. On the other hand, Senator Jackson and his allies were quite concerned over ambiguities in the agreements, particularly the interim agreement's provisions governing the modernization of ICBM launchers, that could be exploited by the Kremlin.

During the course of the SALT I negotiations, the United States tried to place constraints on new Soviet ICBMs, first by limiting directly missile volume, then by limiting increases in silo dimensions to accommodate new types of missiles. Both sides finally agreed that "in the process of modernization and replacement . . . dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased." Moreover, they agreed that the term "significantly increased" meant an increase of 10 to 15 percent over existing dimensions of ICBM silos, but the negotiating record did not indicate whether calculations were to be based on existing silo diameter, depth, or both. When calculated on the basis of two dimensions rather than one, the resulting increase in volume could be quite considerable—on the order of 50 percent.

During congressional hearings over the interim agreement, skeptical members of Congress were primarily interested in pinning down favorable interpretations of what would constitute permissible increases in silo volume. There was no shortage of witnesses to endorse the U.S. view that a narrow interpretation limiting increases to one silo dimension, not both, was consistent with the terms of the interim agreement. The Soviet Union did not agree to this unilateral interpretation. The SALT I limits on new ICBM launchers prevented the Kremlin from deploying additional numbers of their heaviest missiles, but did not prevent their lighter missiles from being replaced by far more capable models.

Later, this issue would be a springboard for contentious debates over Soviet SALT violations, but at that time compliance questions did not loom large on the horizon. President Nixon did not need to defend his credentials as a staunch defender of U.S. interests in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Whatever criticism was levied at the SALT I accords was deflected by the President's acceptance of the Jackson amendment and his firm commitment to proceed with the B-1 bomber, Trident submarine and various other programs to strengthen his hand in subsequent negotiations. In addition, the SALT I accords established a special channel, the standing consultative commission,* to handle any compliance questions that might arise.

Concerns over Soviet noncompliance with the SALT I accords contributed to the decision by at least one quarter of the Senate to oppose without reservation the SALT II treaty. As in the past, treaty opponents compiled lists of alleged earlier Soviet transgressions. Unlike Presidents Kennedy and Nixon, President Carter was in a weak position to rebut these charges: the perceived benefits of the SALT II treaty were not greatly appreciated, and the President's resolve in dealing with the Kremlin was widely questioned.

The Standing Consultative Commission

To set the record straight, the Carter Administration released an unclassified report of U.S. and Soviet concerns which had been

raised in the standing consultative commission since its inception. The report provided little ammunition either to committed treaty supporters or to critics. Its findings did not dispute those who argued that the Kremlin repeatedly exploited definitional ambiguities and pressed at the margins of the SALT I accords. But the Carter Administration's compliance report did refute assertions of violations, finding that in every instance of troublesome Soviet practices, "the activity has ceased or subsequent information has clarified the situation and allayed our concern."

Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter studiously avoided an accusatory approach to these compliance issues, seeking instead to fence in problems by working out mutual understandings and common definitions of ambiguous treaty provisions. The clear objective for these Presidents was to maintain the viability of the SALT I accords by halting Soviet practices that could undermine the agreements. Their approach during this period has been described by Robert Buchheim, a former U.S. commissioner at the standing consultative commission, in the following terms:

The essence of the standing consultative commission implementation task is to head off gross dislocations or irretrievable circumstances by acting early enough and finding mutually acceptable measures to sustain intact the agreements within its field of responsibility.

The initial requirement of this task is to raise potential problems for resolution before they get out of hand and become causes for undesired reconsideration of an entire agreement. Lying in the grass and building a comprehensive case for eventually jumping up and shouting 'gotcha' might be fun for some of the grass-dwellers, but it would not be a sensible way to sustain a desired agreement.

Concerns raised by the United States at the standing consultative commission included the controversy over new types of Soviet missiles, the construction of what initially appeared to be new missile silos despite SALT I's ban on such excavations, Soviet concealment practices associated with new weapon systems, and the possible testing of a surface-to-air missile (SAM) radar in "an ABM mode." Compliance questions raised during this period

were resolved in a variety of ways. For example, on the question of new types of Soviet ICBMs that were appreciably larger than their predecessors, the United States did not make headway at the standing consultative commission: despite assertions of violations, the new deployments were not inconsistent with the terms in the interim agreement but with a unilateral U.S. interpretation of the agreement. On the question of excavating new ICBM launchers, the Kremlin's position at the commission was borne out over time: as construction progressed, the United States concluded that these facilities were to control the launch of missiles, not to add to their number. After questions of Soviet concealment practices were raised at the commission in 1974, this pattern of expansion stopped.

The process of clarifying treaty obligations was often an arduous one, as was evident with the compliance problem relating to Soviet radar activity. The ABM treaty obligates both sides not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than those associated with ABM systems, the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or to test them "in an ABM mode." The picture was clouded, however, because there was no agreement on what constituted tests in an ABM mode and because the United States maintained that tests for safety and instrumentation purposes were permitted.

In 1973, U.S. intelligence began to notice Soviet practices that could encroach upon treaty provisions when a radar, eventually identified as one associated with the SA-5 air defense system, had been turned on during the flight-testing of Soviet strategic ballistic missiles. The reason why the radar had been operating was unclear and prompted considerable monitoring by the intelligence community. When, in the Ford Administration, the United States made a rigorous presentation in the standing consultative commission about how SA-5 radar tests could undermine critically important treaty limitations, these tests stopped within three weeks. It then required approximately two years of private diplomacy in the Carter Administration to work out a common agreement governing limits on the operation of air defense radars.

For supporters of the SALT process and the standing consulta-

tive commission this case study constituted a success story. For critics, it confirmed how Soviet violations had been swept under the rug by transforming the Kremlin's malpractices into the commission's "solutions." In this view, the Kremlin had unfairly gained military advantages at the expense of negotiated agreements. In contrast, Administration officials during this period took a more relaxed view of Soviet practices, assuming that whatever tests were conducted with a radar associated with the SA-5 system did not provide Soviet air defense crews with much help to counter incoming strategic ballistic missiles. No compensating military initiatives were deemed necessary in response to Soviet crowding at the margins.

To critics of the SALT process, the sluggishness of the U.S. response to compliance problems and to the pace of the Kremlin's strategic modernization programs spelled deep trouble for the immediate future. During the SALT II debate, critics argued that treaty supporters would be loathe to raise allegations of violations, regardless of the evidence. They also argued that the basis for charging the Kremlin with numerous violations was lost due to sloppy negotiating, particularly with respect to limitations on new ICBMs. The Republican party's campaign platform during the 1980 presidential campaign formally pledged to end the "cover-up" of Soviet violations of arms control agreements.

Given key positions of responsibility in The White House, the Pentagon and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, critics of compliance diplomacy as practiced under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter, pursued very different tactics. They preferred a condemnatory rather than a fact-finding and problem-solving approach in the standing consultative commission. Because they took a more alarmist view of the military implications of Soviet misbehavior, they also believed that patience was not a virtue in dealing with compliance controversies. Nor was fencing in these problems a satisfactory solution: the status quo ante or something close to it was the appropriate answer. It therefore followed that if satisfactory solutions could not be readily achieved in the commission, presidential findings of noncompliance were essential.

Initially, President Reagan declined to endorse the long list of "violations and circumventions" prepared by bitter critics of the SALT I accords but dismissed by his three predecessors. As new compliance issues relating to the unratified SALT II agreement arose, pressures from conservative members of Congress began to mount for a public accounting of Soviet transgressions. As was the case after the interim agreement was signed, the flight-testing of new Soviet ICBMs became a highly contentious issue, fueled this time by earlier assurances from Carter Administration officials that only one new type of Soviet ICBM would be allowed under SALT II. The high level of encryption associated with these missile flight tests appeared inconsistent with the SALT II provision barring such practices when they impeded verification of treaty constraints. The Soviets denied any impropriety, requesting information on data Washington believed was being concealed. Washington rejected this inquiry as a fishing expedition to compromise intelligence sources and methods, a response Moscow no doubt anticipated. Of greater concern was the unexpected construction of a new phased-array radar in Siberia, confirmed in mid-1983. Such radars are versatile enough to be used for a variety of purposes, including ballistic missile defense. The Soviets claim their new radar is for space tracking, a permissible activity under the ABM treaty. However, its siting, orientation and capabilities suggest it is better suited for providing early warning of missile attack, another permissible activity under the treaty, but not at this location.


Protracted debates took place within the Reagan Administration over whether and how SALT II questions should be discussed in the standing consultative commission. Some within the Administration argued against raising SALT II compliance issues since to do so would give the treaty, whose ratification they helped to block, unwarranted standing. At first the U.S. delegation was directed to express concerns about SALT II compliance while refusing to become engaged in a discussion of specific issues. Typically, the commission will meet twice yearly, during the spring and fall. The U.S. delegation began to discuss the issue of new missile types during the spring 1983 session; it raised the

Siberian radar issue in the fall. Other channels also were used to express U.S. concerns. Administration officials were divided over what Soviet actions would constitute a satisfactory response, but they were in accord that the Soviets were unlikely to be forthcoming. At the conclusion of the fall 1983 session, President Reagan issued a report on Soviet noncompliance. Included in the findings were citations of ICBMs that SALT critics had previously considered either unverifiable or within the permissive boundaries of the SALT II treaty.

The public release of the Reagan Administration's findings was immediately questioned by those who felt it lengthened the odds against the commission's being able to resolve issues privately. There was also something incongruous about asserting violations of "political commitments" to agreements that the Administration refused to ratify—as was the case with four of the seven citations in the President's report. The Administration's findings on SALT II noncompliance also seemed premature, given the uncertainties associated with Soviet practices and the possibility of learning more about them, either by national technical means or by waiting for responses to U.S. inquiries made during the fall 1983 session of the commission. While a report to Congress was mandated, the Congress did not set a date for its release, nor did it require findings of noncompliance in highly ambiguous cases.

The tentative language of the Reagan Administration's report on Soviet noncompliance seemed to confirm the wisdom of those who had favored accumulating more evidence before going public with a report. The citations and conclusions in the report varied greatly in degree of importance and in kind, making generalizations difficult. SALT II citations dealt with definitional issues and problems with Soviet concealment practices—the hardy perennials of previous standing consultative commission exchanges. On the troubling yellow rain controversy, important questions remained unanswered even though much data are publicly available. Each of the two principal theories explaining the phenomenon of yellow rain—biochemical warfare by the Soviet Union and its allies or toxin-contaminated bee feces and food—has strengths and weaknesses.

Soviet Missile Test Ranges



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The Reagan Administration's case on yellow rain has been bolstered by the presence of mycotoxins found in environmental and biomedical samples, by refugee, eyewitness and defector reports, and the implausibility of the thesis that honeybees are the source of the problem—or the alternative Soviet thesis that linked yellow rain to the U.S. use of herbicides in Indochina.

The case of those who believe that yellow rain is the result of natural phenomena is bolstered by the presence of pollen in toxin-containing environmental samples, questionable scientific techniques in the government's case, and the absence—with the exception of a single gas mask found in Afghanistan—of munitions or other military equipment associated with mycotoxin use. Perhaps the most difficult and troubling question of all is why the Soviets would choose this form of warfare when other effective military options are available that are not constrained by international agreements.

New evidence providing clearer answers to these questions has virtually dried up since 1982. For some, this confirms Soviet complicity in biochemical warfare and the wisdom of public diplomacy. For others, the absence of recent evidence confirms the shakiness of the Reagan Administration's case and the unscientific standards used to document it at the outset.

Another citation of possible Soviet noncompliance relates to the 150-kiloton testing limit established in the threshold test ban treaty. In this instance, national security officials in the Carter and Reagan Administrations arrived at different conclusions from the same evidence. The Carter Administration concluded that the data on Soviet testing above 150 kilotons were too ambiguous for the United States to assert Soviet violations. In contrast, the Reagan Administration concluded that "while the available evidence is ambiguous, in view of ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and in view of verification uncertainties, and we have been unable to reach a definitive conclusion," the Soviets may have violated the treaty.

The Soviets high-yield weapon tests were held at a site north of the Arctic Circle; lower-yield tests were usually conducted in Kazakhstan, a Soviet Republic adjacent to China and Mongolia.

Experts agree that American seismic readings in the past consistently inflated the yields of Soviet underground tests because of differences in local geology. Experts also agree that the magnitudes of Soviet tests at their Kazakh test site increased from 1977 to 1980. Disagreement begins over the degree to which the United States was overestimating Soviet yields. When this bias was finally adjusted at the outset of the Carter Administration, some felt the recalculations were too modest, others believed them to be too large. Then, when the readings from Soviet underground tests in Kazakhstan subsequently rose, two predictably different explanations were forthcoming. Most of those who felt the bias recalculations excessive believed the Soviets—who were presumably testing at the 150-kiloton limit to begin with—took advantage of the U.S. revisions to test at higher yields, contrary to the threshold test ban treaty. Others felt that the 150-kiloton threshold agreement forced a decision by the Soviets to phase out tests at their remote northern site. They also assumed that tests conducted at the Kazakh site had yields well below 150 kilotons, perhaps because the city of Semipalatinsk is as close to this test area as Las Vegas is to the Nevada test site. According to this theory, the Soviets gradually raised the yields in Kazakhstan to 150 kilotons to gauge the impact of higher-yield testing in Semipalatinsk.

As can be seen from this abbreviated treatment of the yellow rain and threshold test ban controversies, conclusions on Soviet noncompliance can depend as much on basic assumptions as on the evidence at hand. For those who suspect the worst from the Kremlin and from the benefits of Soviet cheating, the evidence is convincing because the Soviets can be expected to cheat. Those who suspect the worst from the Reagan Administration—and who see little or no military value from cheating—will be inclined to dismiss the allegations. Those who resist subjective judgments are left with more questions than answers in dealing with the ambiguities of treaty compliance issues.



5

Compliance Diplomacy

Compliance diplomacy is a natural extension of the negotiating process because no arms control agreement can be written to cover every future contingency. In many instances, agreements will be purposely vague because both sides may not wish to foreclose military options or because they cannot reach a mutually agreeable limitation. It is therefore unreasonable to expect that compliance problems will not arise. But it is also reasonable to expect that agreements will not be undermined at every possible opportunity. In other words, a degree of trust is unavoidable in any negotiating relationship. How treaty signatories interpret their obligations under an agreement and how they respond to compliance questions can spell the difference between erosion and construction of durable arms control agreements. Compliance diplomacy is therefore at least as important and no less difficult than the process of negotiating agreements in the first place. Compliance diplomacy can succeed when treaty signatories exercise care not to undermine previous agreements. It cannot succeed, however, when one or both parties question an agreement's worth or its future viability.

The questioning process begins when treaty signatories take steps that are not expressly prohibited but that undermine agreed limitations. These steps erode the political, if not the military, benefits of arms control agreements. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have hedged their bets in this way, although the Kremlin has been by far the worst offender. The Soviet military places considerable stock in achieving marginal advantages in gray areas, and there are few internal political or bureaucratic checks against their doing so.

The process of mutual hedging is most apparent with respect to the ABM treaty. The ABM treaty prohibits all but modest deployments of defenses against strategic ballistic missiles, but both sides reserved the right to develop defenses against shorter-range tactical ballistic missiles. Technology is blurring this distinction, which the Soviets are exploiting with the development of the SA-X-12 air defense system that may have some capability against the intermediate-range Pershing II missile, now being deployed in Western Europe. Yet if the SA-X-12 can intercept the Pershing II, it might also have some capability against SLBMs, as well. The Kremlin is also encroaching upon the ABM treaty's constraints on new fixed land-based systems by developing rapidly deployable components for such a system. Soviet practices have not as yet created burdensome military problems for the United States, judging by the Defense Department's budget priorities in fiscal year 1985: funds for improved missile penetration capabilities were voluntarily deleted by the Pentagon in an economy move. Nevertheless, military concerns will undoubtedly become greater as the hedging process continues.

The Reagan Administration is also hedging its bets against the demise of the ABM treaty, although U.S. efforts are not nearly so comprehensive or so far along as Soviet activities. Funding has begun to upgrade the Patriot air defense system to produce a tactical ABM capability. The construction of new, large phased-array radars for early warning against missile attacks is also under way in Georgia and Texas. These radars provide coverage for two thirds of the continental United States, notwithstanding a treaty provision requiring radars to be located on a country's

periphery, facing outward. They complement coverage now provided by radars constructed previously on the east and west coasts and at Grand Forks, North Dakota. None of these radars is inferior to the large Soviet phased arrays which ABM treaty critics insist have an ABM "battle management" capability.

Current ABM developments are the clearest example of how military programs, however they are characterized, can raise questions about each side's intentions and lead to the unraveling of negotiated agreements. At some point, existing agreements can erode to the extent that they cease to be in the national security interest of the disadvantaged side. Well before this point is reached, however, serious political problems may jeopardize the treaty regime. Americans in increasing numbers are beginning to ask whether it is possible to do business with a negotiating partner who regularly acts in ways that undermine solemn political compacts. For example, Soviet concealment practices may well be deeply rooted in the Russian psyche but they also raise compliance problems while generating broader concerns over Soviet intentions. Moreover, the Kremlin consistently authorizes new missile programs that provide only marginal improvements over their predecessors but produce major compliance headaches.

A parallel reevaluation must also be well under way in the Kremlin. While U.S. critics of arms control believe the Kremlin has achieved substantial gains as a result of the SALT process, it is doubtful the Soviet leadership takes a similar view. True, strategic arms control negotiations have legitimized the Kremlin's standing as a coequal to the United States, but in the Soviet view, they have not produced many concrete benefits nor are they likely to do so in the near future. No offensive U.S. nuclear weapon program has been blocked as a result of negotiated agreements, while U.S. strategic offensive capabilities have climbed at a steady rate. In the "decade of neglect" so often mentioned by Reagan Administration officials, the United States spent approximately \$1 trillion for national defense; the number of warheads carried by U.S. strategic forces doubled; the number of sea-based warheads grew fivefold. The Kremlin leadership must share the blame for its deteriorating security position: Soviet strategic

programs, which proceeded at a faster pace than U.S. efforts during the decade of the 1970s, have generated a vigorous U.S. response. But the Kremlin cannot be blamed for the vicissitudes of American politics that have contributed to the lack of progress in strategic arms control. U.S. negotiating positions and objectives have changed markedly from one President to the next, and even within the same Administration. Since 1972, no American President has managed to secure ratification of a strategic arms control agreement.

The standing consultative commission succeeded in ironing out compliance questions during the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations because neither side questioned the other's basic intentions toward the SALT agreements. Successes were possible despite the ups and downs of superpower relations because both nations had shared perceptions of the benefits of the SALT accords and the risks of their unraveling. In both capitals, these calculations have changed dramatically over the last three years. Hedges, past and prospective, are accumulating to the point where both sides are questioning each other's intentions toward previous agreements as well as the value of the negotiating relationship.

Reagan Administration officials have long held the view that the Soviets would abide by the SALT accords only until they could gain more by breaking out of treaty restraints. Numerous public statements by these officials must have heightened similar Soviet concerns about U.S. intentions. Former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. declared to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that SALT II was "dead"; Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger announced that U.S. defense programs were in conformity with SALT I and II restraints as a matter of coincidence rather than design, and the President's White House counselor, Edwin Meese III, stated that the Reagan Administration had no moral or legal commitment to abide by expired or unratified SALT agreements. Secretary of State George P. Shultz expressed similar reservations about extending SALT II limitations beyond their expiration date in 1985.

Moreover, several military programs championed by the Rea-

gan Administration telegraphed a lack of interest in maintaining SALT limitations. The Carter Administration's plans for deploying the MX missile were scrapped in favor of "dense-pack"—a scheme that would have required digging holes for new missiles, an activity prohibited by the SALT I interim agreement and the SALT II treaty. Administration officials explained that the excavations would be allowed because they were for new "hardened capsules" rather than silos, and would be completed after the expiration of SALT II, in any event. Later, the President agreed to press ahead with a second new ICBM—the Midgetman—to complement the MX. Again, its deployment would be allowed because it would take place after the terms of the SALT II agreement, which permitted only one new type of ICBM, had expired. Then the President endorsed a "star wars" defense against nuclear attack, a goal that was utterly at odds with the ABM treaty. Ongoing ABM research projects, such as the Talon Gold program to test a laser's ability to acquire and track targets in space, also would pose treaty compliance problems. Like the MX, the Talon Gold program predated the Reagan Administration, but it must have had a less ominous character to the Soviets under the auspices of an Administration committed to the SALT agreements and uncommitted to star wars. In this context, the Reagan Administration's handling of compliance issues—its public diplomacy, initial refusals to engage in standing consultative commission discussions and then issuance of a report on noncompliance—must have fueled Soviet suspicions about the Administration's future commitment to SALT limitations.

As the unraveling process becomes increasingly apparent, it also becomes increasingly difficult to stop. Both sides seek to protect themselves against worst-case scenarios by defining treaty obligations in still more-permissive ways or by exploiting ambiguities in treaty texts. Neither side is going to be left at the starting gate when its negotiating partner pulls out of the agreements. The process of encroachment on agreed limitations is not as blatant as ardent SALT critics—no doubt in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States—contend, but its damaging cumulative political impact is undeniable. Compliance problems

feed on themselves when treaty signatories question each other's long-term objectives. Political relations continue to sour and the checks against this unraveling process are weakened. In the current environment, imagine a meeting of political and military officials in the United States and the U.S.S.R.: who would argue not to hedge bets against current arms control agreements for fear of undermining them further?

It is natural for great powers to slough off restraints on their armaments when they are increasingly suspicious of their adversaries' intentions. Nevertheless, U.S. and Soviet leaders have good reason to avoid a nuclear arms competition free from even the modest constraints imposed by the SALT agreements. When the atomic and hydrogen bombs were developed, who could have predicted that nuclear forces would have reached current levels, or that requirements for improved capabilities would still be so pressing? In the absence of SALT controls, U.S. and Soviet military requirements will grow far greater still. Despite their misgivings, both nations will be driven into this accelerated competition because neither side can afford not to compete; to fall behind in the competition confers too many political, if not military, disadvantages. To avoid these pitfalls, the object of U.S. and Soviet diplomacy should be to shore up arms control agreements reached during the SALT decade.

Breaking the Deadlock

In theory, a President with Ronald Reagan's hardline, anti-Communist credentials has more leeway to brake this process of decontrol than Presidents of a more liberal bent. Likewise, conservative Presidents are better able to defuse concerns over treaty verification and compliance by appealing for public trust in their judgment that the United States can monitor Soviet compliance and respond effectively to Soviet misbehavior. By large majorities, the electorate and the Congress also would be inclined to trust Reagan's judgment that previous compliance problems should not stand in the way of new agreements. Irreconcilables in the Congress would bitterly contest these findings, but they can be isolated effectively with an erstwhile ally in The White House.

Ever since Reagan was elected, this scenario has sustained those who want the President's pragmatism to prevail over his ideology. After all, ideologues in the Kremlin have long since demonstrated an ability to deal with hardliners in The White House when it was in their interest to do so. Reagan, however, has not been an activist President with respect to negotiations, and no nuclear arms control agreement has ever been reached without the active intervention of a sitting President. He has yet to demonstrate a substantive grasp of the issues under negotiation, or a sense of priorities and trade-offs needed to achieve them. Nor does he have a strong and experienced figure to assist him in either the Cabinet or The White House. These deficiencies have been blurred by the absence of effective leadership in Moscow and the rigidity of Soviet negotiating positions. Even with key changes in personnel in the Reagan Administration, the possibility of progress in negotiations is uncertain. But without such changes, it is difficult to see how President Reagan can make headway in arms control negotiations or in compliance diplomacy.

Any President to the left of Reagan faces an entirely different set of problems on verification and compliance issues. The more such a President is inclined to take risks for arms control benefits, the more vulnerable he will be in the domestic political arena, particularly if he is perceived as lax in pursuing strategic modernization programs or unsteady in his handling of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Arms control-oriented Presidents will be especially sensitive to news leaks of compliance problems, immediately characterized as violations by those opposed to arms control agreements. There are no easy remedies to prevent compliance issues from cropping up or to resolve them after they arise. Improved national technical means of verification may encourage American Presidents to enter into agreements they might otherwise avoid, and generate support for those agreements by wider segments of the Congress and the public. But better monitoring capabilities may also generate a greater number of false alarms bearing on compliance. Nor do improved national technical means prevent problems from arising when signatories define their treaty obligations in unhelp-

ful ways. Detecting such troubling activities has not been the problem in the past; the problem lies in defining an appropriate response.

Concerns over Soviet compliance can also be alleviated somewhat by avoiding difficult-to-verify provisions. The SALT II provision governing modifications in ICBMs is a case in point. In order to allow some latitude for U.S. military planners, the Carter Administration settled on provisions permitting 5 percent leeway on certain ICBM parameters to distinguish between acceptable modifications of existing missiles and limitations on "new" missile types. This was certainly better than allowing 25 percent improvements, but the SALT II new-types provision proved exceedingly costly. It was difficult to negotiate, difficult to defend during ratification hearings, and politically damaging when Soviet missile designers and political leaders took up the challenge of shoehorning new missiles into the 5 percent rule. In addition, the new-types provision required Soviet cooperation on encryption, which was easily withheld when the United States declined to ratify the treaty.

Future Presidents would be wise to avoid these political minefields and seek alternative ways to reduce the military potential of Soviet ICBMs. Should the object of U.S. compliance diplomacy be to prevent the Soviet Union from spending billions of rubles for marginal improvements in ICBM capabilities? The number of new types of ICBMs either side deploys is less important than reducing their number of deployed warheads, tied to counting rules and constraints on ICBMs that can carry multiple warheads.

More-intrusive verification provisions, as with improvements in national technical means, may not necessarily help in treaty compliance questions. As discussed earlier, on-site inspection can be a useful tool at times, but it is hardly a cure-all for treaty compliance. Precise treaty language can also promote treaty compliance, but as previous negotiators have discovered, precise formulations are not always easy to arrive at. In the past, those most concerned about verification and compliance have called for precision in agreements reached. Now many of these voices call

for simplicity. It is difficult, however, to see how simple agreements, if we were willing and able to negotiate them, could relieve the United States of compliance questions when detailed provisions have failed to do so in the past.

In the current political environment, compliance diplomacy cannot be effective unless and until both sides clarify their intentions toward existing nuclear arms control agreements. The unratified SALT II limitations expire at the end of 1985; the SALT I interim agreement's provisions expired in October 1977. The Reagan Administration has stated its willingness not to undercut the limitations of the interim agreement and the SALT II treaty, provided the Soviet Union shows similar restraint. Soviet spokesmen have made similar conditional statements. With strained U.S.-Soviet relations and with compliance problems mounting, there is a growing prospect that limits on offensive forces will fall by the wayside. At this point, the most effective signal U.S. and Soviet leaders could make to indicate their commitment to continued SALT compliance would be to announce the extension of SALT I and II ceilings on offensive forces. An American initiative to proceed with ratification of the threshold test ban treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions treaty would also signal U.S. intent to affirm treaties negotiated during the SALT decade. The Reagan Administration has repeatedly expressed reservations about these steps, but none would harm U.S. security or alter current U.S. practices.

Official intentions toward the ABM treaty present a more difficult problem, given the scope of current Soviet activities and President Reagan's star-wars initiative. But Soviet activities do not begin to provide the Kremlin with an effective capability to defend the U.S.S.R. against nuclear attack. Likewise, star-wars research activities are a long-term proposition that will proceed in the face of daunting technical challenges and limited resources. Both sides are well aware of these constraints—constraints that provide a strong military rationale for maintaining the ABM treaty in place. Nevertheless, tests in space of new technologies with military applications will continue in both countries, even if President Reagan's objective of a futuristic defense is abandoned

by his successors. The standing consultative commission will have the difficult task of reaching common agreements on how these tests can be squared with ABM treaty obligations.

Other actions can be taken by both Washington and Moscow to restore confidence in the negotiating process. Confidence is undermined when both sides engage in public diplomacy and table one-sided negotiating positions. The U.S. Congress must play a more constructive role in future debates, recognizing the risks of torpedoing new agreements. We must avoid unrealistic and unnecessary verification requirements which foreclose opportunities for new agreements and raise Soviet questions about U.S. intentions.

For its part, the Soviet Union must be far more sensitive toward treaty constraints than it has been in the past. Parties to an agreement have a right to expect that negotiated agreements will not be consistently undermined by actions not expressly prohibited. The Kremlin must have strong leadership willing and able to say "no" to powerful interest groups that are skeptical of U.S. intentions and eager to exploit ambiguities in treaty texts. The Soviet Union must also be far more forthcoming in meeting U.S. concerns about verification. After all, cooperative measures that improve confidence in treaty compliance do not pose a threat to Soviet security and will be necessary if hard-to-verify systems are to be included in future agreements.

If U.S. and Soviet leaders are able to assuage concerns over each other's intentions toward the SALT accords, it will again be possible to iron out compliance problems in the standing consultative commission. To succeed in this task, and to regain the public's confidence in compliance diplomacy, an Administration must lay out a positive strategy for dealing with compliance issues, indicating the steps it plans to take when questions arise. As a result of previous controversies, it is no longer sufficient for a President, regardless of his political orientation, to say these allegations have no merit or that they are being addressed in quiet diplomatic exchanges.

With the downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations and increased concerns over treaty compliance, it would be wise for American

Presidents to adopt an explicit two-track strategy on compliance questions: the United States should first try to achieve a satisfactory explanation of or solution to compliance concerns through diplomatic channels, moving to countermeasures if diplomatic channels fail. For SALT-related issues, the diplomatic track should start with the standing consultative commission, where there are procedures and precedents to iron out compliance problems in mutually acceptable ways. Other diplomatic channels should be used sparingly, since the commission is best suited to resolve problems that arise. Nevertheless, it may be necessary to reinforce or facilitate the work of the commission by higher-level diplomatic exchanges. As a general rule, it makes little sense to issue public reports or presidential findings of noncompliance while the diplomatic track is being used, since "going public" will only make satisfactory solutions in private harder to achieve.

If compliance diplomacy does not yield a satisfactory solution, offsetting actions may be required. If this second track is needed, countermeasures should be proportional to Soviet activities, since overreactions would only further undermine negotiated agreements. It would be unwise to assume further undetected violations unless and until the intelligence community can document them. Countermeasures should also be within treaty constraints whenever possible, since their purpose is to convey U.S. willingness to maintain the viability of current agreements and its determination to take effective action when the viability of an arms control agreement is challenged. A positive two-track compliance strategy will place U.S. Presidents in a better position to respond to the substantive and political problems arising from Soviet compliance questions. The details for implementing such a strategy cannot be spelled out in advance, since specific responses will depend on individual cases and since Presidents must have flexibility to handle compliance problems when they arise.

Military countermeasures in response to evidence of noncompliance may be appropriate in some instances but not wise or appropriate in others. For example, the Reagan Administration has not proposed that the United States should resume development and production of biological warfare agents as a result of

evidence that the Soviet Union has not lived up to its obligations under the biological weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva protocol. A conclusive explanation for yellow rain may never be available. In the event of new reports, the most appropriate response may again be public presentation of the evidence, since private attempts to stop these practices or to elicit explanations for them have not been successful in the past. Early resort to public diplomacy makes sense when there are reports of casualties, when private bilateral exchanges are unsatisfactory, and when the arms control agreements governing these practices have no consultative or compliance provisions.

For nuclear arms control compliance questions, public diplomacy should be the course of last resort, unless the activity in question poses serious security problems that mandate quick action. Diplomatic channels tend to work slowly, especially when complex treaty provisions and military practices are involved. No substantive issue has ever been resolved quickly in the standing consultative commission. Still, the time consumed in the commission will be only a small fraction of that involved in deploying new nuclear weapon systems.

If, after the course of extended efforts by the commission, the United States receives no satisfactory explanation for Soviet activities, public reports explaining U.S. diplomatic efforts, Soviet responses, and the rationale behind U.S. countermeasures are essential. In the current controversy over the new Soviet radar in Siberia, the most sensible course of action is to reach a common understanding in the commission limiting the number of large phased-array radars, regardless of their stated purpose. If the United States cannot achieve this result in the commission and if the Kremlin continues deployment, the President could build additional U.S. radars and/or improve the penetration capability of U.S. offensive nuclear forces. The choice of countermeasures requires considerable skill since what appears proportional to one side may appear disproportionate to the other. The countermeasures must also be chosen wisely to secure congressional and public support, and to elicit an appropriate response from the Kremlin. On the latter point, the Kremlin's reading of an Administration's

intentions is critical, as is the political context in which countermeasures are adopted.

In the above-mentioned case, the most appropriate U.S. response would be to improve the penetration capabilities of U.S. offensive nuclear forces. The intent of the U.S. signal should be to uphold the viability of the ABM treaty, not to accelerate its demise. A President committed to the ABM treaty is in the best position to convey this signal. He also has the option of deploying defensive countermeasures without necessarily implying a lack of commitment to the treaty. The same action chosen by an Administration deeply skeptical of the ABM treaty would likely convey the entirely different message of preparing to withdraw from treaty constraints.

Compliance problems undermine the possibility of new agreements as well as those already in force. In a different political environment, Moscow might see the wisdom of establishing consultative bodies to handle compliance questions for those agreements that now lack them. In addition, future Presidents may find it necessary to endorse safeguards against prospective compliance problems. Like the use of proportional countermeasures in ongoing disputes, the purposes of safeguards are twofold: to encourage strict Soviet compliance and to assure the American public that U.S. interests will be protected in the event of troubling Soviet behavior.

The concept of safeguards is not new. President Kennedy committed himself to a program of underground tests and President Nixon supported several strategic modernization programs in order to secure congressional approval of the limited test ban treaty and SALT I accords, respectively. In retrospect, many have expressed misgivings over these trade-offs, suggesting it would have been wiser to initiate this process early in negotiations rather than after their conclusion. Establishing criteria for safeguards early on can help minimize the substantive and political risks of entering into an agreement. For example, an antisatellite agreement clearly poses risks if the Kremlin fails to comply, although these risks seem less injurious to U.S. security than the risks of an

unfettered competition in antisatellite warfare. If the Soviets cheat on an antisatellite test ban, there are several alternative safeguards to assure a timely and appropriate U.S. response, including the establishment of an antisatellite weapon production line which can be started if the Soviets resume antisatellite tests.

As in the case of proportional countermeasures, there is no substitute for choosing reasonable safeguards. If an Administration believes the risks of entering into an antisatellite or any other arms control agreement are inordinately large, the preferred safeguards are likely to be so excessive as to foreclose the possibilities of an accord or to minimize its value. An arms-control-oriented President is not likely to share this calculus of benefits and risks; his selection of prudent safeguards can encourage strict Soviet compliance and make a difference in the outcome of ratification debates.

It should be evident from this discussion that compliance diplomacy is at least as difficult and critical as the process of negotiating arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. To be successful at both, future Presidents will need considerable skill along with much imagination and common sense. These traits may still not be sufficient for Presidents of a moderate-to-liberal bent. They can propose well-reasoned and artful strategies to deal with verification and compliance problems and still not be in a position to convince skeptics. Arms-control-oriented Presidents must assume the unalterable opposition from ideologues on the right; their success will depend on convincing the political center that the benefits of agreements negotiated under their auspices are worth the attendant risks. Presidents with reputations for vacillation or weakness are unlikely to succeed in convincing the electorate to take these risks, particularly during periods of disturbing Soviet activities in areas unrelated to arms control agreements.

The Senate is not as hostile to arms control as it was during the SALT II debate. Events in the interim have led to second thoughts, with more senators inclined to play constructive, supportive roles. Nevertheless, approximately one fifth of the Senate

is likely to oppose future agreements executed by anyone but a conservative President—the same proportion of senators who opposed the limited test ban treaty in 1963.

Unlike conservative Presidents, moderates cannot expect to sway these votes; it would be a mistake for them to try to do so, both at the outset of negotiations or after their conclusion. The most effective way to outweigh concerns over verification and compliance is to bring home agreements that will generate widespread and enthusiastic public support. If the benefits of agreements are strongly appreciated, verification and compliance risks will not weigh heavily in public debate, as was the case during the limited test ban treaty. If public support is not forthcoming, these issues will resonate strongly, as was the case during the SALT II debate. Future agreements do not need to yield immediate, significant results to meet this criterion, but they must promise steady, progressive benefits over time. Otherwise, future Presidents most inclined to reach arms control agreements with the Kremlin may find themselves unable to secure the necessary votes for them.

In the current political environment, new agreements are unlikely to be negotiated; U.S. and Soviet leaders will be hard pressed simply to maintain agreed limitations that are only tentatively in place. Although it makes eminently good sense to honor these limitations on nuclear forces, the political dynamics of the current impasse are leading both superpowers to continue to hedge their bets. These hedges will increase the strategic capabilities of both sides while confirming bleak assessments of each other's intentions. At a time when strong political leadership is desperately needed, neither Washington or Moscow appears able to halt the slide towards decontrol.

GLOSSARY

Terms in the text followed by an asterisk are defined here.

ABM (antiballistic missile): A defense system which detects incoming missiles and then attempts to track, target and destroy them using radars and interceptor missiles.

antisatellite: A weapon system that tracks, intercepts and destroys orbiting satellites.

counting rules: Rules designed to simplify verification of numerical limits set by negotiated agreements.

encryption: The transmission of electronic signals, such as those from weapon systems under test, in code to conceal information.

geosynchronous: Relating to an artificial satellite that travels above the equator and at the same speed as the earth rotates.

INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces): Forces composed of nuclear-armed missiles and bombers with ranges over 1,000 km. but below the 5,500 km. benchmark used to define an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the SALT II agreement. Forces include the U.S. Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles and the Soviet SS-20 missiles.

interim agreement: See SALT I.

limited test ban treaty: Signed by the United States, Soviet Union and Britain in 1963, the treaty prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space or underwater but permits unlimited testing underground.

MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle): The packaging of more than one nuclear warhead atop a single ballistic missile. Each warhead can be directed to a separate target.

national technical means (of verification): Devices under national control used to monitor other countries' military activities as well as their compliance with arms control agreements. National technical means can include photoreconnaissance satellites and radars based on land, sea and in space.

payload: The carrying capacity of any aircraft or missile system. Payload may be used for bombs or missile warheads, guidance equipment and/or penetration aids.

phased-array radar: An advanced radar that scans electronically for objects traveling through space. Phased-array radars can be used for national technical means, early warning of an attack, or for ABM systems.

photoreconnaissance satellites: Satellites capable of taking high-resolution photographs in space.

SALT I and II (strategic arms limitation talks): A series of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union that began in November 1969. In May 1972, two agreements were signed. The ABM treaty, of unlimited duration, limited ABM systems; the interim agreement, of five-years' duration, limited ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers. Subsequent negotiations produced the SALT II treaty in 1979. The agreement set limits on ICBM and SLBM launchers and on intercontinental-range bombers, as well as various sublimits, including a limit on multiple warhead launchers. SALT II was not ratified by either nation but both the United States and U.S.S.R. agreed not to undercut its provisions.

standing consultative commission: A U.S.-Soviet body established to implement the SALT I and II accords and to consider problems relating to compliance.

START (strategic arms reduction talks): The START negotiations, which followed the SALT talks, began in June 1982 and were suspended in December 1983.

strategic forces: Weapons of intercontinental range included in the SALT accords. They could destroy an enemy's war-making capacity and society. The Soviet Union considers any nuclear weapon that could land on its territory a "strategic" weapon.

telemetry: Data electronically transmitted from a weapon system during testing. The data reveals much about the weapon's performance and characteristics.

throw-weight: Comparable to payload; the combined weight of all warheads, guidance systems and penetration aids carried by a missile. Throw-weight is one measure of the military potential of strategic forces.

Talking It Over

A Note for Students and Discussion Groups

This issue of the HEADLINE SERIES, like its predecessors, is published for every serious reader, specialized or not, who takes an interest in the subject. Many of our readers will be in classrooms, seminars or community discussion groups. Particularly with them in mind, we present below some discussion questions—suggested as a starting point only—and references for further reading.

Discussion Questions

What role do subjective judgments play in determining whether or not the Soviets are complying with negotiated agreements?

Do you agree with the author's assessment of why compliance problems have become more serious? If not, what do you think are the reasons for current compliance controversies? What do you think the United States should do about them?

The author asserts that the risks of noncompliance must be weighed against the benefits of arms control agreements. How can risks be minimized most effectively? Are there agreements that provide significant benefits without significant risks? What kinds of agreements offer the greatest benefits at least risk?

Do you think the United States should seek to control hard-to-verify weapons like mobile and cruise missiles? What standards of verification should be applied to them? Do you agree with the author's assertion that future agreements should be limited to deployed forces, or should they also include production and inventory limits?

Do you think it will be possible for the United States and U.S.S.R. to reach new arms control agreements, given current problems of verification and compliance?

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
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