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
THE PEOPLE'S PICTORIAL EDITION

OF THE

CONFEDERATE SOLDIER

IN THE


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WAR

1861-1865.

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
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BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE, OR ELKHORN TAVERN, ARK., MARCH 6, 1862.

field, and on our left it extended to a large prairie field, bounded on the east by a ridge. In rear of the battery was a thicket of underbrush, and on its right, a little to the rear, a body of timber.

General McIntosh's cavalry had passed on into the large prairie field to our left, and the infantry were quite across it, close to the ridge, about six hundred yards from us. My whole command consisted of about 1,000 men, all Indians except one squadron.

The enemy opened fire into the woods where we were, the fence in front of us was thrown down, and the Indians (Watie's regiment on foot and Drew's on horseback), with part of Sims' regiment, gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Quayle, charged full in front through the woods and into the open ground with loud yells, routed the cavalry, took the battery, fired upon and pursued the enemy, retreating



BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALBERT PIKE, OF ARKANSAS.

through the fenced field on our right, and held the battery, which I afterward had drawn by the Cherokees into the woods. Four of the horses of the battery alone remained on the ground, the others running off with the caissons, and for want of horses and harness we were unable to send the guns to the rear.

The officers of my staff, Captains Schwarzman and Hewitt and Lieutenant Pike, with Captain Lee of Acting Brigadier-General Cooper's staff, rode with us in the charge. Our loss was two of Colonel Drew's men killed and one wounded. Colonel Sims had one man killed and one wounded. Of the enemy, between thirty and forty were killed in the field and around the guns. The charge was made just at noon.

We remained at the battery for some twenty minutes, when Colonel Watie informed me that another battery was in our front, beyond the skirt of underbrush, protected by a heavy force of infantry. General McIntosh's force was not near us, nor do I know where it then was. The infantry were still in their position near the ridge, across the large field on the left, and did not approach us; indeed, at one time it moved further off along the ridge. Colonel Drew's regiment was in the field on our right, and around the taken battery was a mass of Indians and others in the utmost confusion; all talking, riding this way and that, and listening to no orders from any one. I directed Captain Roswell W. Lee, of Acting Brigadier-General Cooper's staff, always conspicuous for gallantry and coolness, to have the guns which had been taken faced to our front, that they might be used against the battery just discovered, but he could not induce a single man to assist in doing so.

At this moment the enemy sent two shells into the field, and the Indians retreated hurriedly into the woods out of which they had made the charge. Well aware that they would not face shells in the open ground, I directed them to dismount, take their horses to the rear, and each take to a tree, and this was done by both regiments, the men thus awaiting patiently and coolly the expected advance of the enemy, who now and for two hours and a half afterward, until perhaps twenty minutes before the action ended, continued to fire shot and shell into the woods where the Indians were, from their battery in front, but never advanced. This battery also was thus, with its supporting force, by the presence of the Indians, rendered useless to the enemy during the action.

In the meantime our artillery had come into action some distance to our left and front, beyond a large field, extending from the woods in which we were to a line of woods beyond it, which hid the conflict from our view. Leaving the Indians in the woods, I passed beyond them to the left into the open ground nearer the conflict, and remained some time.

About 1:30 o'clock there was a very heavy fire of musketry for about ten minutes, and soon after about two regiments of our cavalry came into the field on our left front and formed in line, facing the woods upon that

side. Colonel Drew then came to me with his regiment, about 500 strong, and I sent him across the field, directing him to form in rear of the line of cavalry, and if they advanced through the woods to follow them, dismount his men nearer the other edge, and let them join in the fight in their own fashion. They crossed the field and took the position indicated.

It was just after this that I directed Sergeant-Major West, of Colonel Watie's regiment, to take some of the Cherokees and drag the captured guns into the woods, which was done, the enemy still firing over them into the woods, where he placed a guard of Cherokees over the cannon.

Soon after the cavalry force crossed to our side of the field and formed in line in front of the woods in which the Indians were, and remained there until the enemy threw a shot in that direction, when they also took shelter in the woods. During all this time I received no orders whatever, nor any message from any one. About 3 o'clock I rode toward the fenced field. I saw nothing of our cavalry, but found a body of our infantry halted on the road running along the fence by which we had originally come. It consisted of the regiments of Colonels Churchill, Hill and Rector, and Major Whitfield's battalion. Major Whitfield informed me that Generals McCulloch and McIntosh were both killed, and that 7,000 of the enemy's infantry were marching to gain our left, one body of which, at least 3,000 strong, he had himself seen. Totally ignorant of the country and the roads, not knowing the number of the enemy, nor whether the whole or what portion of General McCulloch's command had been detached from the main body for this action, I assumed command, and prepared to repel the supposed movement of the enemy.

To our left, beyond the field where our infantry had first been seen by me in the forenoon, was a wooded ridge of no great height, with a fence running along the foot of it on the west and northwest; between it and the Bentonville Road was open and level ground. I marched the infantry—Welch's squadron and Watie's regiment—across the field, dismounted the horsemen, directed all to be posted behind the fences, and sent Major Boudinot, of Watie's regiment, to inform General Van Dorn that I would try to hold the position; but upon riding up and along the ridge to the rear I found the position not tenable, as the enemy could cross it and descend upon our rear by an open road that ran over it.

At this time the firing on the field had ceased, and I saw coming into the road at the farm-house a large body of cavalry and Good's battery. It was evident enough that the field was left to the enemy, and as we were not in sufficient numbers to resist them, and the ground afforded no defensive position, I determined to withdraw the troops and lead them to General Van Dorn. Indeed, the officers assured me that the men were in such condition that it would be worse than useless to bring them into action again that day.

I accordingly sent orders to the artillery and cavalry to join me. What had become of the other troops engaged no one could inform me. I concluded they had retreated toward Camp Stephens, gaining the road by which we had come in the morning. Colonel Stone and Captain Good came to me, and I informed them of my purpose. Placing the squadron of Captain Welch in front, the infantry marching next, followed by Good's battery, with the Cherokees on the flanks, and, as I supposed, Colonel Stone's regiment in the rear, we gained the Bentonville Road, and marched on it in perfect order to the Telegraph Road.

The order sent to the Cherokees to join us had not, by some accident, reached Colonel Drew, and his regiment remained in the woods, and after a time retreated toward Camp Stephens, where, he informed me, he found Colonel Stone's regiment arrived before him. This regiment, understanding, I have learned, that part of the enemy's force was marching to attack the train, took that direction.

The infantry had, in three days, marched sixty miles, had been on foot all the preceding night, and fought that day without water, and Colonel Churchill begged me to leave them where they could procure it. When we reached the Telegraph Road I was about to conduct them to headquarters; but unable to learn the position of the two armies, or how the road came upon the field, and learning that where our forces were there was no water and that there was a running stream on the Pineville Road, about a mile and a half from the point where the Bentonville Road descends into the valley, I led them to and on the Pineville Road, intending to halt at the water, and letting the men have that, at least, as they had nothing to eat, to join the main army early in the morning. Orders from General Van Dorn caused us to retrace our steps and march to his headquarters, which we reached long after dark.

On Saturday morning I was directed by General Van Dorn to post part of Colonel Watie's men—who were my whole command, except Captain Welch's squadron—on the high ridge to our right, and the residue on another


ridge on the left, to observe the enemy and give him information if any attempt was made by them in force to turn his left flank. I accompanied those sent on the ridge to the right, and sent Captain Fayette Hewitt, of my staff, to post the others. To Captain Welch I gave permission to join any Texan regiment he chose, and he joined that of Colonel Greer, and remained with it until the action ended.

After remaining for some two hours near the foot of the ridge, on the south side, observing the enemy's infantry, heavy columns of which were in the fields beyond, and the fire of their batteries in full view of me, and seeing no movement of the infantry to the left, I recrossed the ridge, descended it and went toward General Van Dorn's headquarters. Being told that he and General Price were in the field to the left of his headquarters, I took the road that led there and halted on the first hill below headquarters, where a battery was posted, facing the Telegraph Road, and which, I was told, had been sent to the rear for ammunition. Here I heard that orders had been given for the army to fall back and take a new position. Another battery came up and the captain asked me for orders. I told him he had better place his battery in position, in line with the others, to play upon the road, and then send to General Van Dorn for orders. In the meantime I sent two officers to the general to deliver him a message, and myself remained with the batteries.

We now heard long-continued cheering in front. Bodies of our troops had come across the ridge on the right and down the Hospital Hollow, in good order apparently, and I supposed they were marching to the left to repel, perhaps, the attempt upon our left flank apprehended by General Van Dorn in the morning. Seeing no fugitives on the Telegraph Road, we supposed the cheering to proceed from our own troops and that the day was ours, when an officer rode down and informed me that the field was occupied by Federal troops, and soon after another came and told me that no one had seen either General Van Dorn or General Price for some time, and it was supposed they were captured, as the field where they were last seen was full of Federals, and he remarked to me: "You are not safe here, for the enemy's cavalry are within one hundred and fifty yards of you."

The troops that had come across the ridge and down the Hospital Hollow were now below us, on the Telegraph Road. Colonel Watie had sent to me for orders. I had sent to him to bring his men from the ridge down into the valley and there halt for orders, and I supposed he had done so; but he did not receive the order, and remained on the mountain, from which he went direct to Camp Stephens.

Just at this moment the two batteries close to me commenced to wheel, and hurried down the hill into the road.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM Y. SLACK, OF MISSOURI.
[Killed at the Battle of Pea Ridge.]

I do not know that any one gave them any order to fall back. The captain of one battery said that some one ordered it, but I think that the information of the capture of our generals was overheard, and that no order was given. No one was there to give an order. The batteries rattled down the steep hill and along the Telegraph Road, and as I rode by the side of them I heard an officer cry out: "Close up—close up, or you will all be cut to pieces!"

On reaching the road I rode past the batteries to reach a point at which to make a stand, for, having passed the road but once, and then in the night, it was all an unknown land to me. When we reached the first open level ground I halted the leading gun, directed the captain of the company in front to come into battery, facing to the rear, on the right of the plain going northward—the

battery in the rear I knew had no ammunition—saw the first gun so placed in position; rode back to the second battery and directed the only officer I could find to do the same on the left of the plain, and when I turned around to go to the front found that the gun faced to the rear had been again turned into the road, and that the whole concern was again going up the road northward. I rode again to the front and halted the leading battery at the foot of the next level, ordered it into line, facing to the rear, gave the necessary commands myself and had three guns brought into position. Two regiments of infantry were standing there in lines ranging up and down the valley, the flank of each to the enemy. I directed them to form in the rear of the batteries; but at this moment a shell was sent by the enemy up the road from the point of the hill around which we had just passed. The cry of "The cavalry are coming!" was raised, and everything became confusion. It was impossible to bring the other guns into battery.


Those already faced turned again into the road, and supposing that, of course, they would take the Bentonville Road—which, at leaving the other, ascends a steep hill—and thinking I could certainly halt them, after a slow ascent, on its summit, I galloped through the bottom and up the ravine on the left of the hill, dismounted and climbed the hill on foot, remounted at the summit, rode to the brow of the hill, looked down into the road, and found that our retreating troops, batteries and all, had passed by on the Telegraph Road, the enemy's cavalry pursuing, en route for Springfield, Mo.

Captain Hewitt and my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant W. L. Pike, had followed me, and, except half a dozen stragglers, we were alone. We waited a few moments on the brow of the hill, uncertain what course to pursue, when, on our right, as we faced the valley, and at a distance of about one hundred yards, a gun of the enemy sent a shot into the valley, and another on the other side, further off, replied with another.

We then turned and rode up the road toward Bentonville, and after riding about a mile found that the enemy's cavalry were pursuing at full speed. Leaving them in the rear by rapid riding, we turned into the woods on the right, passed around the farmhouse on the Pea Vine Ridge and rode westward between the Pineville and Bentonville roads.

We had been informed by my brigade commissary, who had come up from Camp Stephens about 10 o'clock, that our whole train had been turned back and was encamped at Pea Vine Ridge.

Three miles from the Telegraph Road we saw a small body of our retreating horsemen fired upon by the enemy's infantry, and concluded, as they had evidently anticipated our retreat, and made every arrangement necessary in view of it to destroy our retreating forces, that General Sigel, returning by the route up Sugar Creek, by which he



BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES M. MCINTOSH, OF FLORIDA.
[Killed at the Battle of Pea Ridge, March 7, 1862.]

had retreated, was in front of our train and it was lost. Owing to the circuit which we were constrained to make and to the fatigued condition of our starved horses, we were unable to gain the front of our retreating forces until after they had left Elm Springs, and learning that the Indian troops had marched from that point to Cincinnati, we joined them at that place.

The enemy, I learn, had been encamped at Pea Vine Ridge for three weeks, and Sigel's advance was but a ruse to induce our forces to march northward and give them battle in position selected by themselves.

I may add that in their pursuit of our retreating train they followed no further than Bentonville and returned from that point. I was within five miles of that place on Monday morning and was misled by information that they had taken it that morning; but they did not enter it until the afternoon.

I did not know until I reached Cincinnati what had become of the main body of our forces. I there met Captain Schwarzman and Major Lanigan, who informed me of their retreat, and that Generals Van Dorn and Price were marching from Huntsville to Van Buren, and also heard of the order to burn all the wagons on the Cove Creek Road that could not cross Boston Mountains.

Just before night, Saturday afternoon, I had met Colonel Rector in the hills, who told me he had about 500 men with him; that they were in such condition that they could not go more than six or eight miles a day, and that he thought he would take them into the mountains, hide their arms in a secure place, and, as he could not keep them together and feed them, let them disperse. He asked my opinion as to this, and I told him that no one knew where the rest of the army was; that Generals Van Dorn and Price were supposed to be captured and the train taken; that if his men dispersed with their arms they would throw them away, and that I thought the course he proposed was the wisest one under the circumstances. The enemy was pursuing on all the roads, and as it was almost impossible for even a dozen men in a body to procure food, I still do not see what better he could have done.

General Cooper, with his regiment and battalion of Choctaws and Chickasaws, and Colonel McIntosh, with two hundred men of his regiment of Creeks, came up with our retreating train at Camp Stephens, where they found Colonel Drew's regiment, and remained with General Green, protecting the train until it reached Elm Springs, where they were all ordered to march with their own train to Cincinnati.

ALBERT PIKE,
Brigadier-General.

Commanding Department of Indian Territory.

BATTLE OF NEWBERN, N. C.,

MARCH 14, 1862.

BY

BRIGADIER-GENERAL L. O'B. BRANCH.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD, March 26, 1862.

THE defensive works were located and constructed before I assumed command. The troops under my command had performed a large amount of work, but it was mainly on the river defenses, which were not assailed by the enemy. They had been originally planned for a force much larger than any ever placed at my disposal, and I was for six weeks engaged in making the necessary changes to contract them, but the failure of all my efforts to obtain implements and tools with which the troops could carry on the work prevented me from making satisfactory progress. I had circulated handbills over the State, calling on the citizens generally to assist me, and received from two counties a small party of free negroes without implements. I then inserted in the newspaper an advertisement calling on the slaveowners to hire their slaves, with implements, for a few days, and I got but a single negro.


During all this time I continued the troops at work, and when the enemy came into the river five hundred per day were being detailed to construct breastworks, with less than half that number of worn and broken shovels and axes, without pick or grubbing hoes. If the fate of Newbern shall prevent a similar supineness on the part of citizens, and especially slaveowners, elsewhere, it will be fortunate for the country.

Ten miles below Newbern, on the south side of the Neuse, is the mouth of Otter Creek. From this creek, one mile above its mouth, the Croatan breastwork runs across to an impracticable swamp about three-fourths of a mile. This is a well-planned and well-constructed work, which two thousand men and two field batteries could hold against a very large force. But from the mouth of Otter Creek to Fort Thompson, the lowest of the river batteries, is a distance of six miles of river shore, on any part of which the enemy could land and take the Croatan work in reverse. It is obvious that the breastwork was useless if I had not sufficient force to hold it and at the same time guard six miles of river shore. I had at no time been able to place four thousand men in the field at Newbern, and at the time of the battle had been seriously weakened by the re-enlistment furloughs.

Coming up the river from the Croatan work, you reach the Fort Thompson breastwork. This had been constructed from Fort Thompson to the railroad, about one mile, before I assumed command. Finding that, from inadequate force, the Croatan work might be of no avail to me, I determined to extend the Fort Thompson work about one mile and a fourth, and rest its right on a swamp. This is the work I was engaged on when the enemy appeared. In order to make the line as short as possible and to avail of a small branch by throwing it in front the line was

thrown back about one hundred and fifty yards on the railroad and thence a series of small breastworks, conforming to the features of the ground, ran off in the direction of the swamp, making an obtuse angle with the older portion of the line on the other side of the railroad. To guard this gap I directed that the old brick-kiln on the railroad should be loopholed, and the evening before the battle had ordered two 24-pounder guns to be brought from Newbern and placed in battery there. The enemy's skirmishers drove the laborers from the battery, when an hour more would have enabled them to get the guns in position. Of course I lost all the benefit I expected from it. The line of small breastworks from the railroad to the swamp was partially finished for about half the distance.

Running parallel to the river and to each other, and



BRIG.-GEN. L. O'B. BRANCH, OF NORTH CAROLINA.
[Killed at the Battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg.]

crossing the line at right angles are, first, after leaving the river, the old Beaufort Road, and then the railroad; still further on and near the swamp, the Weathersby Road. The railroad and the Beaufort Road intersect about two miles behind the breastwork, the former crossing the river on a bridge 1,840 feet long at the town of Newbern, and the latter at an indifferent private bridge about one mile and a half above Newbern. Both these bridges are accessible to gunboats, so that when we stood at the Fort Thompson breastwork, fronting the enemy, we had Neuse River on our left, Bryce Creek (an impassable stream) on our right, and the Neuse and Trent in our rear, the only possible mode of escape in case of defeat being across the two bridges I have described, five miles in our rear.

I hope this description, with the aid of the map inclosed, will put you in possession of our situation at the opening of the battle.

I omitted to state that the timber had been felled in front of the breastwork for about three hundred and fifty yards, and the space was swept by ten field-pieces, besides three navy 32-pounders, discharging grape and canister from the rear face of Fort Thompson.

It is useless to describe the river defenses, on which the largest amount of labor had been bestowed, as the enemy prudently refrained from attacking the batteries in front, and the gunboats did not come within range of their guns until they had been silenced from the rear.

I now proceed to detail the incidents of the battle.

On Wednesday, the 12th, at 4 P. M., the approach of the enemy's fleet was reported to me, and at dark I learned that twelve vessels had anchored below the mouth of Otter Creek, and about forty-five were ascending the river in their rear.

Orders were issued to Colonel Sinclair, of the Thirty-fifth Regiment, to proceed immediately with his regiment to Fisher's Landing, which is just above the mouth of Otter Creek, and to resist any attempt of the enemy to land there. Colonel Avery, Thirty-third Regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Haywood, Seventh Regiment, constituting the reserve, were ordered to proceed across the river, so as to be in position at the intersection of the Beaufort Road and the railroad at daybreak in the morning. Colonel R. P. Campbell, commanding my right wing, was instructed to guard the river shore from the mouth of Otter Creek to Fort Thompson, while Colonel C. C. Lee, who commanded my left wing, was to guard the remainder of the shore, support the river batteries and re-enforce Colonel Campbell in case he should be hard pressed. Colonel Campbell was instructed to establish his headquarters at the intersection of the Beaufort Road and the breastwork, and to collect his troops around him by daybreak. Both commanders were instructed that, in case it should be necessary to fall back from the river shore to

the breastwork, Colonel Campbell should hold that part to the right of the Beaufort Road, and Colonel Lee that part to the left of it.

These orders having been dispatched by 9 P. M., the night was spent by the troops in getting into position, and other preparations for the contest.

Having given all the necessary directions to staff officers and all others before 3 o'clock Thursday morning, and seen all the men and material forwarded from the camp and depot in Newbern, I proceeded to Colonel Campbell's headquarters. On the road I met dispatches from Colonel Sinclair and Captain P. G. Evans, commanding the pickets, informing me that the enemy were landing troops below the mouth of Otter Creek, and Colonel Vance was directed to send his regiment to the Croatan breastwork to occupy it. Railroad trains were on the spot to carry down re-enforcements or to draw off Colonels Vance's and Sinclair's regiments and Brem's battery, as the case might require.

Intelligence was soon brought to me that the enemy's gunboats, having driven Colonel Sinclair's regiment from Fisher's Landing, were rapidly landing troops at that place, and that Colonel Campbell, seeing that the Croatan breastwork was turned, had ordered Vance, Sinclair and Brem to fall back to the Fort Thompson breastwork.

My force was wholly inadequate to guard the six miles of river shore between the mouth of Otter Creek and Fort Thompson. The result was, therefore, not wholly unexpected, but I had hoped that a line of rifle pits I had caused to be made for a mile along the bluffs at and on both sides of Fisher's Landing would have enabled me to hold the enemy in check, and to inflict on him serious loss at the first moment of his placing his foot on our soil. I was, therefore, surprised when the position was yielded with a loss of only one killed and two wounded, all three of which casualties occurred in the retreat. After the abandonment of Fisher's Landing to the enemy the prompt withdrawal of Vance and Brem could alone save them from being cut off, and the enemy thus come into possession of my strongest work without having received a single shot from us.

The Fort Thompson breastwork now became my sole reliance for resisting his advance, and throughout the remainder of the day and night of Thursday the most active efforts were made to strengthen that unfinished work. Both officers and men executed my orders with unflagging energy.

In the afternoon the gunboats shelled the breastwork heavily from a position they had taken out of reach of the guns of our batteries. The composure with which all classes of my troops received this attack from an unseen foe strengthened the confidence I felt in their standing under fire.

No damage was inflicted on us by the shells, but the accuracy with which they were thrown over a thick, intervening woodland convinced me of the necessity of driving traitors and enemies in disguise from all towns and neighborhoods of which we desire to hold military possession.

During the day on Thursday the troops were posted behind the intrenchments, and it was painfully apparent that my force was not sufficient to man them even with a thin line for the finished portions of them. I was compelled to withdraw Lieutenant-Colonel Haywood, of the Seventh Regiment, from the reserve and place him on the line. The regiments were posted as follows, commencing on the left: Lieutenant-Colonel Barbour, Thirty-seventh Regiment, and Major Gilmer, Twenty-seventh Regiment, between Fort Thompson and the Beaufort country road. Lieutenant-Colonel Haywood, Seventh; Colonel Sinclair, Thirty-fifth, and Colonel Clark (militia), between the Beaufort Road and the railroad. Colonel Vance, Twenty-sixth Regiment, to the right of the railroad. A few unattached companies were placed between the regiments. My headquarters were about two hundred yards in rear of the intrenchments at the railroad, and the reserve was about two hundred yards in my rear; the cavalry regiment about half a mile to the rear. In this order the troops slept on their arms.

At 11 o'clock Thursday night Colonel Lee brought me intelligence that signal rockets had just been seen on our extreme right, from which I inferred that the enemy, having found the Weathersby Road, were in front of that portion of my line.

Orders were sent to Colonel Vance to extend his regi-

ment so that its right might rest on the Weathersby Road, and in an hour a section of Brem's battery was moving by a circuitous route to a position on that road.

On taking my position Friday morning the center appeared so weak that I dispatched my aid-de-camp to Colonel Campbell to say to him that it must be re-enforced, if possible.

At about 7:30 o'clock on Friday morning the fire opened along the line from the railroad to the river. I soon received a message from Colonel Lee that the enemy were attempting to turn our left. This proved to be a feint, as I replied to him that I thought it would. The next incident of the battle was the appearance of the enemy's skirmishers in front of Vance, and consequently on the prolongation of the line held by the militia. It was to drive the enemy from that position that I had directed the 24-pounder battery to be placed there; and supposing it was ready for service, I sent Captain Rodman, with his company, to man it, but they found the guns not mounted, and were ordered into position to act as infantry. The skirmishers of the enemy, finding themselves on the flank of the militia, fired at them a few shots from their flank files, which caused a portion of them to flee in great disorder.

I instantly ordered Colonel Avery to send five companies to dislodge them. He sent them instantly, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hoke; but before Colonel Hoke had fully got into position, though he moved with the greatest promptness and celerity, I received a message from Colonel Clark, of the militia, informing me that the enemy were in line of battle in great force on his right. I instantly ordered up the remaining five companies of Colonel Avery's regi-

ment, was directed to proceed to the Trent Bridge and hold it, while I remained with Lieutenant-Colonel Lowe at the intersection to hold the enemy in check and cover the retreat.

Remaining until there were no more stragglers in sight on either road, I directed Colonel Lowe to fall back to the Trent Bridge, which he did, the enemy showing themselves on the road as his rear guard moved off. Proceeding to the Trent Bridge I placed Colonel Campbell in command of all the forces there, with instructions to hold the bridge as long as possible for the passage of Avery and Vance, and then to move up the Trent Road or join me in town, as I might direct after reaching there, leaving with him, to conduct him, that gallant gentleman and soldier Captain Peter G. Evans, whom I had not allowed to leave my person for two days, except to obey orders. The railroad bridge was in flames before I left the intersection.

Arriving in town I found it in flames in many places and evacuated. Orders written in the street under the lurid glare of the flames were dispatched in every direction through the town to search for Colonel Lee. At Railroad Street I learned that a gunboat had already landed at one of the lower wharves. Going up Railroad Street to see whether Colonel Lee was at the Fair Grounds, I found, on reaching the depot, that the gunboats were already there, and the enemy in the Fair Grounds. Colonel Lee, finding himself in no condition to make resistance, had properly drawn off and marched up the Kinston Road. Following on, and directing all the officers I could overtake to conduct their men to Tuscarora, the nearest railroad depot, I proceeded to that place, and, having made arrangements for the transportation of the troops to Kinston by

railroad, and seen most of them off, reached that place myself at 11 o'clock on Saturday.

My loss was 64 killed, 101 wounded and 413 missing; about 200 are prisoners and the remainder at home.

The horses of Latham's battery and those of four pieces of Brem's battery were killed, and we lost in consequence ten pieces of field artillery. There were other pieces at the breastwork, but they were condemned guns from Fort Macon, belonging to no company.

The ammunition and ordnance stores at Newbern were saved, and the camp equipage and baggage of the regiments would have been saved, but we had not the field transportation with which to haul it to the railroad.

In five days after the battle I had my brigade in camp, in advance of Kinston, ready for action and but little demoralized.

I had, at an early day, placed Colonels R. P. Campbell, Seventh Regiment, and C. C. Lee, Thirty-seventh Regiment, in command of the two wings of my brigade. All the troops, except the Thirty-third Regiment and the cavalry regiment, which were in reserve, fought under their immediate command. I could have taken no better security against any errors and oversights I might commit than I did in placing those two trained and experienced officers in immediate command of the troops.


As the Thirty-third Regiment was under my own command, it is proper for me to say that its conduct was all I could desire. It moved into action with as much promptness and steadiness as I ever saw in its ranks on dress parade, and its fire was terrific. It was engaged within one hundred yards of my position, and Colonel Avery, Lieutenant-Colonel Hoke and Major Lewis did their duty fully against an overwhelming force. Its gallant colonel was captured at his post; two different couriers, whom I sent to him with orders to withdraw, having failed to reach him.

The panic alluded to occurred after the troops had left Newbern. It was in advance of me and I did not witness it, but the names of officers who contributed to it or participated in it will be reported to you if they can be discovered. It was soon counteracted by the steadiness of Colonel Lee and some other officers.

Yours very respectfully,

L. O'B. BRANCH,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

A FEW days before the battle of Gettysburg one of General Lee's soldiers questioned him as to his plans. "Are you a soldier?" asked the general. "Yes." "Then, sir, be one," said the general, as he walked away.



NEWBERN, N. C., VIEW OF, FROM THE OPPOSITE BANK OF THE NEUSE RIVER.

ment, and the whole ten opened a terrific fire from their Enfield rifles. The militia, however, had now abandoned their positions, and the utmost exertions of myself and my staff could not rally them. Colonel Sinclair's regiment very quickly followed their example, retreating in the utmost disorder.

This laid open Haywood's right, and a large portion of the breastwork was left vacant. I had not a man with whom to re-occupy it, and the enemy soon poured in a column along the railroad and through a portion of the cut-down ground in front, which marched up behind the breastwork to attack what remained of Campbell's command.

The brave Seventh met them with the bayonet and drove them headlong over the parapet, inflicting heavy loss upon them as they fled; but soon returning with heavy re-enforcements, not less than five or six regiments, the Seventh was obliged to yield, falling back slowly and in order. Seeing the enemy behind the breastwork, without a single man to place in the gap through which he was entering, and finding the day lost, my next care was to secure the retreat. This was a critical operation, as the enemy, having pierced our center, had possession of the two shortest roads to the bridges, and, besides, could approach them at pleasure with their gunboats.

Having dispatched two couriers to Colonel Avery and two to Colonel Vance with orders for them to fall back to the bridges, I moved to the intersection of the Beaufort Road and railroad to rally the troops and cover the retreat across the bridges. Here I found a train of cars with the Twenty-eighth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Lowe, who had arrived too late to reach the battlefield, and formed them to hold the enemy in check until all should pass. Colonel Lee was directed to proceed to Newbern and form all the men he could collect in the upper part of the town. The Seventh Regiment, arriving in two different

SIEGE OF FORT MACON,

MARCH 23 TO APRIL 28, 1862.

BY

COLONEL MOSES J. WHITE, C. S. A.

GOLDSBOROUGH, N. C., May 4, 1862.

A DEMAND was made for the surrender of Fort Macon on March 23d last by Brigadier-General Parke, United States Army, which demand was refused. General Parke then, having collected a large force at Carolina City, took possession of Beaufort and Shackleford Banks, thus cutting us off from any communication without the range of our guns. Having established his camp eight miles from the fort, on Bogue

At 6 A. M. on the 25th the enemy's land batteries opened upon the fort, and at 6:30 A. M. their warships, consisting of three war steamers and one sailing vessel, commenced a cross fire with rifles and 11-inch shell. The fire from both directions was immediately returned, and at 7 A. M. the ships retired, one disabled and two others in a damaged condition. The attack from land was kept up with great vigor, the enemy having immense advantage from their superior force, being able to relieve their men at the guns, while our morning reports showed only two hundred and sixty three men for duty. Our guns were well managed, but being able to do little damage to water batteries and siege guns; firing through very narrow embrasures. The enemy kept up a very vigorous and accurate fire from both rifles and mortars, dismounting guns, disabling men and tearing the parade, parapet and walls of the fort.



INTERIOR OF FORT MACON AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT, APRIL 26, 1862.

Banks, the enemy drove in our pickets on April 10th and established themselves just without the range of our guns and their pickets within one mile of the fort. In retiring before them our pickets showed great coolness, and forced the enemy to advance with caution, although flanked by a fire from the sea. The enemy, after fully establishing themselves, commenced their advance on the fort by means of ditches, using the sand hills as a covering for their working parties. With their larger force (being well protected by the sand hills) they were able, by April 22d, to establish their batteries within fourteen hundred yards of Fort Macon.

Only one sortie was made during their advance, which consisted of an attempt made with two companies to drive in their working parties and pickets on April 11th, but, they being largely re-enforced from their camp, our companies were forced to retire. Occasional firing took place between our pickets and those of the enemy at night, but without any casualties on our side. We could only annoy the enemy by the fire of our artillery, which, fired horizontally, could do them no damage and only force them to keep behind the sand hills.

Not having a mortar in the fort, we mounted six old 32-pounder carronades which had been placed in the fort for defending the ditch, with 40° elevation, and used them for throwing shell behind the enemy's coverings. Two 10-inch guns were also used for the same purpose. They were, however, so completely concealed that we could seldom ascertain the position of their working parties, and when driven from them we could not see when they returned, and from scarcity of shell could not keep up a continued fire. Had the fort been built and armed for defense from a land attack the siege might have lasted longer; but as neither was the case, the enemy were able to complete their batteries, completely masked, in a shorter time than I had hoped for. During the siege some discontent arose among the garrison, which ended in several desertions. The men complained of their fare, although furnished with full rations, and seemed to be dissatisfied with being shut up in such a small place, so near their relatives and friends, but unable to communicate with them. I am sorry to say that the officers did not act in a proper manner to suppress the difficulty. The health of the troops did not seem to be good, although we lost but one man by sickness. Nearly one-third were generally on the sick list.


On April 22d General Burnside arrived with several boats and anchored about four miles down the sound, but was forced by the fire of a rifled gun to retire and take up a position near Harker's Island.

On the 23d a demand was made by General Burnside for the surrender of Fort Macon; which being refused, a request was made that I should meet him in person the next day on Shackleford Banks upon very important business.

At 8 A. M. on the 24th I met General Burnside, as he requested. He then attempted by persuasion to produce a change in my determination, but was told that the fort would be defended as long as possible.

At 6:30 P. M., finding that our loss had been very great, and from the fatigue of our men being unable to keep up the fire with but two guns, a proposition was made to General Parke for the surrender of Fort Macon. General Parke demanded an unconditional surrender, which was refused, and the general informed that the firing would be renewed immediately. He then requested that the firing should cease until the next morning, in order that he might consult with General Burnside, and that the general should meet me the next morning at Shackleford Banks. This proposition was accepted.

On the 26th, at 7 A. M., I met General Burnside, as proposed, and a surrender was agreed to. The Southern flag was hauled down at 12 M., and the men left the fort as soon as means could be furnished. A portion crossed to Beaufort. Captain Guion's company started for New-



FORT PULASKI, COMMANDING ENTRANCE TO THE SAVANNAH RIVER, LEADING UP TO THE CITY OF SAVANNAH, GA.

bern on the 27th, and on the same day one hundred and fifty men, consisting of parts of several companies, started for Wilmington on the United States gunboat Chippewa, arriving at Fort Caswell at 7 P. M. on the 28th.

Our loss during the fight was seven killed and eighteen wounded, two dangerously. Privates Langston and Jewell I was forced to leave in the fort. All others of the wounded were brought off. A nurse was left with the two men. The fort was very much damaged and fifteen guns disabled.

M. J. WHITE, Colonel. C. S. A.

JUST before the battle of the Wilderness, Sergeant Billy Bass received a letter from his wife. She said she heard that there was to be a big battle, and she did so wish to see him before it was fought! When Billy read it he said he would like also to see her before the battle, but he would a great sight rather see her after it was over.

TWO ADDRESSES

OF

PRESIDENT JEFFERSON DAVIS

TO THE

SOLDIERS OF THE CONFEDERACY.

[These ringing appeals of our Chief Magistrate to our soldiers were issued, the first in August, 1863, and the second in February, 1864. They are worth preserving as indicating "the situation" at those important periods of our history.]

Soldiers of the Confederate States:

After more than two years of a warfare scarcely equaled in the number, magnitude and fearful carnage of its battles; a warfare in which your courage and fortitude have illustrated your country, and attracted not only gratitude at home, but admiration abroad, your enemies continue a struggle in which our final triumph must be inevitable. Unduly elated with their recent successes, they imagine that temporary reverses can quell your spirit or shake your determination, and they are now gathering heavy masses for a general invasion, in the vain hope that by a desperate effort success may at length be reached.

You know too well, my countrymen, what they mean by success. Their malignant rage aims at nothing less than the extermination of yourselves, your wives and children. They seek to destroy what they can not plunder. They propose, as the spoils of victory, that your homes shall be partitioned among the wretches whose atrocious cruelties have stamped infamy on their government. They design to incite servile insurrection and light the fires of incendiarism whenever they can reach your homes, and they debauch the inferior race, hitherto docile and contented, by promising indulgence of the vilest passions as the price of treachery. Conscious of their inability to prevail by legitimate warfare, not daring to make peace lest they should be hurled from their seats of power, the men who now rule in Washington refuse even to confer on the subject of putting an end to outrages which disgrace our age, or to listen to a suggestion for conducting the war according to the usages of civilization.

Fellow citizens, no alternative is left you but victory, or subjugation, slavery and the utter ruin of yourselves, your families and your country. The victory is within your reach. You need but stretch forth your hands to grasp it. For this and all that is necessary is that those who are called to the field by every motive that can move the human heart, should promptly repair to the post of duty, should stand by their comrades now in front of the foe, and thus so strengthen the armies of the Confederacy as to insure success. The men now absent from their posts would, if present in the field, suffice to create numerical equality between our force and that of the invaders—and when, with any approach to such equality, have we

failed to be victorious? I believe that but few of those absent are actuated by unwillingness to serve their country; but that many have found it difficult to resist the temptation of a visit to their homes and the loved ones from whom they have been so long separated; that others have left for temporary attention to their affairs, with the intention of returning, and then have shrunk from the consequences of their violation of duty; that others, again, have left their posts from mere restlessness and desire of change—each quieting the upbraidings of his conscience by persuading himself that his individual services could have no influence on the general result.

These and other causes (although far less disgraceful than the desire to avoid danger, or to escape from the sacrifices required by patriotism) are, nevertheless, grievous faults, and place the cause of our beloved country, and of everything we hold dear, in imminent peril. I repeat,

that the men who now owe duty to their country, who have been called out and have not yet reported for duty, or who have absented themselves from their posts, are sufficient in number to secure us victory in the struggle now impending.

I call on you, then, my countrymen, to hasten to your camps, in obedience to the dictates of honor and duty, and summon those who have absented themselves without leave, or who have remained absent beyond the period allowed by their furloughs, to repair without delay to their respective commands; and I do hereby declare that I grant a general pardon and amnesty to all officers and men within the Confederacy, now absent without leave, who shall with the least possible delay, return to their proper posts of duty, but no excuse will be received for any delay beyond twenty days after the first publication of this proclamation in the State in which the absentee may be at the date of the publication. This amnesty and pardon shall extend to all who have been accused, or who have been convicted and are undergoing sentence for absence without leave, or desertion, excepting only those who have been twice convicted of desertion.

Finally, I conjure my countrywomen—the wives, mothers, sisters and daughters of the Confederacy—to use their all-powerful influence in aid of this call, to add one crowning sacrifice to those which their patriotism has so freely and constantly offered on their country's altar, and to take care that none who owe service in the field shall be sheltered at home from the disgrace of having deserted their duty to their families, to their country, and to their God.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Confederate States, at Richmond, the 1st day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

By the President:


J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State.*

Soldiers of the Armies of the Confederate States:

In the long and bloody war in which your country is engaged you have achieved many noble triumphs. You have won glorious victories over vastly more numerous hosts. You have cheerfully borne privations and toil to which you were unused. You have readily submitted to restraints upon your individual will, that the citizen might better perform his duty to the State as a soldier. To all these you have lately added another triumph, the noblest of human conquests—a victory over yourselves.

As the time drew near when you who first entered the service might well have been expected to claim relief from your arduous labors and restoration to the endearments of home, you have heeded only the call of your suffering country. Again you come to tender your service for the public defense—a free offering, which only such patriotism as yours could make—a triumph worthy of you and the cause to which you are devoted.

I would in vain attempt adequately to express the emo-



MAP OF FORT PULASKI AND THE POSITIONS OF THE FEDERAL BATTERIES ON TYBEE ISLAND.

tions with which I received the testimonials of confidence and regard which you have recently addressed to me. To some of those first received, separate acknowledgments were returned. But it is now apparent that a like generous enthusiasm pervades the whole army, and that the only exception to such magnanimous tender will be of those who, having originally entered for the war, can not display anew their zeal in the public service. It is, therefore, deemed appropriate, and, it is hoped, will be equally acceptable, to make a general acknowledgment, instead of successive special responses. Would that it were possible to render my thanks to you in person, and in the name of our common country, as well as in my own, while pressing the hand of each war-worn veteran, to recognize his title to our love, gratitude and admiration.

Soldiers! By your will (for you and the people are but one) I have been placed in a position which debars me from sharing your dangers, your sufferings and your pri-

ventions in the field. With pride and affection my heart has accompanied you in every march; with solicitude it has sought to minister to your every want; with exultation it has marked your every heroic achievement. Yet, never in the toilsome march, nor in the weary watch, nor in the desperate assault, have you rendered a service so decisive in results as in this last display of the highest qualities of devotion and self-sacrifice which can adorn the character of the warrior-patriot.

Already the pulse of the whole people beats in unison with yours. Already they compare your spontaneous and unanimous offer of your lives, for the defense of your country, with the halting and reluctant service of the mercenaries who are purchased by the enemy at the price of higher bounties than have hitherto been known in war. Animated by this contrast, they exhibit cheerful confidence and more resolute bearing. Even the murmurs of the weak and timid, who shrink from the trial which make stronger and firmer your noble natures, are shamed into silence by the spectacle which you present. Your brave battle-cry will ring loud and clear through the land of the enemy, as well as our own; will silence the vain-glorious boastings of their corrupt partisans and their pensioned press, and will do justice to the calumny by which they seek to persuade a deluded people that you are ready to purchase dishonorable safety by degrading submission.

Soldiers! The coming spring campaign will open under auspices well calculated to sustain your hopes. Your resolution needed nothing to fortify it. With ranks replenished under the influence of your example, and by the aid of your representatives, who give earnest of their purpose to add, by legislation, largely to your strength, you may become the invader with a confidence justified by the memory of past victories. On the other hand, debt, taxation, repetition of heavy drafts, dissensions, occasioned by the strife for power, by the pursuit of the spoils of office, by the thirst for the plunder of the public treasury, and, above all, the consciousness of a bad cause, must tell with fearful force upon the over-strained energies of the enemy. His campaign in 1864 must, from the exhaustion of his resources, both in men and money, be far less formidable than those of the last two years, when unimpaired means were used with boundless prodigality, and with results which are suggested by the mention of the glorious names of Shiloh and Perryville, and Murfreesboro and Chickamauga, and the Chickahominy and Manassas, and Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

Soldiers! Assured success awaits us in our holy struggle for liberty and independence, and for the preservation of all that renders life desirable to honorable men. When that success shall be reached, to you, your country's hope and pride, under Divine Providence, will it be due. The fruits of that success will not be reaped by you alone, but your children and your children's children, in long generations to come, will enjoy blessings derived from you that will preserve your memory ever-living in their hearts.

Citizen defenders of the homes, the liberties, and the

altars of the Confederacy! that the God whom we all humbly worship may shield you with his fatherly care and preserve you for safe return to the peaceful enjoyment of your friends and the association of those you most love, is the earnest prayer of your commander-in-chief.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

THE LAST OFFICIAL APPOINTMENTS BY
PRESIDENT DAVIS.

The last two appointments bearing the official signature of President Jefferson Davis was made at Washington, Ga., May 4, 1865, viz.:

John H. Reagan, Acting Secretary of Treasury.
Mr. H. Clark, Acting Treasurer, C. S. A.

BOMBARDMENT OF FORT PULASKI,

APRIL 10-11, 1862.

BY

BRIG.-GEN. ALEX. R. LAWTON, C. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS DEPT. (DISTRICT) GEORGIA,
SAVANNAH, GA., April 14, 1862.

I HAVE the honor to report that the enemy opened fire on Fort Pulaski early on the morning of the 10th instant, as was evident from the rapid and continuous firing and bursting of shells, which could be seen from the city of Savannah and other accessible points of observation. As communication with the fort was cut off, my knowledge of what occurred during the first day's bombardment was derived exclusively from distant views and the sound of guns. The firing continued during the entire day, and at intervals during the night.

On the night of the 10th I attempted to communicate



BRIG.-GEN. ALEXANDER R. LAWTON, OF GEORGIA.

with the fort by a small boat, for the purpose of conveying to it a man detailed on signal service, who had recently arrived, under orders, from Richmond. He was carried there by Corporal Law, of the Phoenix Riflemen, stationed at Thunderbolt, who had successfully communicated with the fort more than once before since the steamers had been cut off.

It was observed that the fire on both sides ceased about 2 P. M. on the 11th, and these two men returned to the battery at Thunderbolt about 8 o'clock that evening. The only detailed information I have is derived from the verbal statements of these two men. They represent that they reached the fort about 6 o'clock on the morning of the 11th, in the midst of a heavy fire, both from the fort and the enemy; that soon after their arrival a breach was made in the wall at the southeast angle, nearest Tybee Island, and that before the fort surrendered this breach was wide enough to drive a four-horse team through; that the wall, which embraced seven casemates in succession, was nearly all knocked down, and that all the barbette guns which could play on their batteries at Tybee Island had been disabled; that several shots had been fired into the magazine. They further state that the ships were not engaged at all, but that all the firing was from batteries on Tybee Island, chiefly from a battery of Parrott guns at King's Landing, the nearest point of Tybee Island to the fort. As these men constituted no part of the garrison, they were advised by Colonel Olmstead to make their escape, if possible.

In reporting the statements of these two men I must express my belief that they gave an exaggerated account of the injury done to the fort, owing, perhaps, to the very exciting circumstances under which they must have entered and left it. It is truly painful to be left without any more definite or reliable details, but it is quite certain that Pulaski has fallen, as the enemy's flag has been distinctly seen flying above the ramparts, and I consider it my duty to give you these statements as they were made to me. As there have been no returns received from Fort Pulaski for some time, I can not give you the precise strength of the garrison. It consisted, however, of five companies, numbering a little over 400 men, and commanded by Colonel C. H. Olmstead. The armament consisted of five 10-inch columbiads, nine 8-inch columbiads, three 42-pounders, three 10-inch mortars, one 12-inch mortar, one 24-pounder howitzer, two 12-pounder howitzers, twenty 32-pounders and two 4½-inch (Blakely) rifle guns, with 130 rounds of ammunition per gun.

A. R. LAWTON,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

DIAGRAM OF BOMBARDMENT OF FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP, APRIL 16-19, 1862.


mortar and other guns, close against the bank on the Fort Jackson side and behind the point of woods.

At 4:15 P. M. the enemy ran out a gunboat and fired upon the fort, under the cover of which two of the mortar boats were brought out into the stream.

These boats opened fire upon Fort Jackson at 5 P. M., which was continued for an hour and a half, the enemy, under our fire, retiring behind the point of woods.

APRIL 17th.—One fire-barge sent down successfully against the enemy at 4 A. M., which drifted in among his vessels and was fired upon by them, creating considerable movement and perturbation.

During the day Captains Renshaw, Beverly Kennon, Grant, Stephenson and Hooper passed in turns with their



THE LOUISIANA.

boats below the raft, now very much disconnected and scattered, and exchanged a few shots with the hostile gunboats and mortar boats.

Two more abortive attempts were made to send down fire-barges against the enemy during the night.

APRIL 18th.—At 9 A. M. the enemy opened upon Fort Jackson with his entire mortar fleet of twenty-one vessels and with rifled guns from his gunboats. Fifteen of them were concealed behind the point of woods and the other six hauled out in stream at an angle with them (see diagram), just at the extreme range of our heaviest guns. Our fire disabled one gunboat and one mortar boat, causing those in the stream to retire behind the cover of the woods. Generally our shots fell short, for lack of elevation and in consequence of the inferiority of our powder compared to that of the enemy. Even our nearest gun, a 10-inch seacoast mortar, would not reach his boats with the heaviest charges.

The enemy ceased firing at 7 P. M., having fired this day 2,997 mortar shells.

The quarters in the bastions were fired and burned down early in the day, as well as all the quarters immediately without the fort. The citadel was set on fire and extinguished several times during the first part of the day, but later it became impossible to put out the flames, so that when the enemy ceased firing it was one burning mass, greatly endangering the magazines, which at one time were reported to be on fire. Many of the men and most of the officers lost their bedding and clothing by these fires, which greatly added to the discomforts of the overflow. The mortar fire was accurate and terrible, many of the shells falling everywhere within the fort and disabling some of our best guns.

I endeavored to get the naval forces to carry down fire-barges against the enemy so as to disperse them, but they were all let go above the raft, and with such a lack of judgment that they only lodged under the forts and did not reach the enemy.

None of the boats acted as a guard-boat below the raft at night, so that, in consequence, the enemy sent up two launches to examine the character of the raft obstructing the river.

APRIL 19th.—The mortar fleet again opened at 6 A. M. and the fire was constantly kept up throughout the day. Gunboats constantly came above the point during the day to engage the forts, but were as constantly driven back by our fire. One of them we crippled, which was towed behind the point of woods. The enemy's fire was excellent, a large proportion of his shells falling within Fort Jackson. The terre-plein, parade plain, parapets and platforms were very much cut up, as well as much damage done to the casemates. The magazines were considerably threatened, and one shell passed through into the casemate containing fixed ammunition.

One 10-inch and one 8-inch columbiad, one 32-pounder, one 24-pounder and one 10-inch siege mortar were disabled in the main work; also two rifled 32-pounders in the water battery. Bombardment continued very regularly and accurately all night. Failures again were made in sending down fire-barges.

APRIL 20th.—Some rain in the morning. Bombardment constant throughout the day, with occasional shots from the gunboats around the point. Wind very high. No fire-barges sent down to light up the river or distract the attention of the enemy at night. In consequence, between 11 and 12 P. M., under cover of the heaviest shelling during the bombardment thus far, one of the enemy's gunboats came up in the darkness and attempted to cut the chains of the raft and drag off the schooners.


A heavy fire was opened upon her, which caused her to retire, but not until she had partially accomplished her purpose. The raft, after this, could not be regarded as an obstruction. The fire continued uninterruptedly all night.

APRIL 21st.—Firing continued all day and night without interruption. Several guns were disabled. Disabled guns were repaired as far as practicable as often as accidents happened to them or their platforms. Fort Jackson by this time was in need of extensive repairs almost everywhere, and it was with extreme pleasure that we learned of the arrival during the night of the ironclad steamer Louisiana, under the cover of whose heavy guns we expected to make the necessary repairs.

APRIL 22d.—By the direction of the major-general commanding the department, everything afloat, including the towboats and the entire control of the fire barges, was turned over to Captain John K. Mitchell, C. S. N., commanding the Confederate States naval forces in the lower Mississippi River. I also gave Captain Mitchell one hundred and fifty of our best men from Forts Jackson and St. Philip, under Lieutenants Dixon and Gandy and Captain Ryan, to serve a portion of the guns of the Louisiana and to act as sharpshooters on the same vessel.

In an interview with Captain Mitchell, on the morning of this date, I learned that the motive power of the Louisiana was not likely to be completed within any reasonable time, and that in consequence it was not within the range of probabilities that she could be regarded as an aggressive steamer, or that she could be brought into the pending action in that character. As an ironclad invulnerable floating battery, with sixteen guns of the heaviest caliber, however, she was then as complete as she would ever be.

Fort Jackson had already undergone, and was still subjected to, a terrible fire of 13-inch mortar shells, which it was necessary to relieve at once to prevent the disabling of all the best guns at that fort, and, although Fort St. Philip partially opened out the point of woods concealing the enemy and gallantly attempted to dislodge him or draw his fire, he nevertheless doggedly persisted in his one main object of battering Fort Jackson. Under these circumstances I considered that the Louisiana could only be



THE MANASSAS.

regarded as a battery, and that her best possible position would be below the raft, close in on the Fort St. Philip shore, where her fire could dislodge the mortar boats from behind the point of woods and give sufficient respite to Fort Jackson to repair *in extenso*. This position (X on the accompanying diagram) would give us three direct cross fires upon the enemy's approaches and at the same time insure the Louisiana from a direct assault, as she would be immediately under the guns of both forts. Accordingly, I earnestly and strongly urged these views upon Captain Mitchell in a letter of this date (copy lost), but without avail.

Being so deeply impressed myself with the importance of this position for the Louisiana, and of the necessity of prompt action in order to insure the success of the impending struggle, I again urged this subject upon Captain Mitchell, during the latter part of the same day, as absolutely indispensable and imperative to the safety of New Orleans and to the control of the lower Mississippi. My efforts were ineffectual to get him to move the boat from her original position above the forts.

I also addressed him two other notes through the day—one in regard to sending fire-barges against the enemy, and the other relative to keeping a vigilant lookout from all his vessels, and asking for co-operation should the enemy attempt to pass during the night.

Bombardment continued throughout the day and night, being at times very heavy. During the day our fire was principally confined to shelling the point of woods from both forts, and apparently with good results, as the mortar fire was slackened toward evening. The casemates were very much cut up by the enemy's fire, which was increased at night. There was little or no success in sending down fire-barges as usual, owing, in part, to the condition of the towboats Mosher, Music and Belle Algerine, in charge of the same. This does not excuse the neglect, however, as there were six boats of the river fleet available for this service, independent of those alluded to, and fire-barges were plentiful.

APRIL 23d.—The day broke warm, clear and cloudless. No immediate relief being looked for from our fleet, the

entire command was turned out to repair damages, under a very heavy fire of the enemy.

The bombardment continued without an intermission throughout the day, but slackened off about 12 M., at which hour there was every indication of an exhaustion on the part of the mortar flotilla; hence it became evident that the tactics of the enemy would necessarily be changed into an attack with broadsides by his larger vessels. In consequence, these views were laid before Captain Mitchell, and he was again urged to place the Louisiana at the point before mentioned, below the raft and near the Fort St. Philip bank of the river, to meet the emergency. Captain Mitchell positively declined again to assume the only position which offered us every possible chance of success, and Captains (Chas. F.) McIntosh, (Thomas B.) Huger and Warley sustained Captain Mitchell in his views of the case.

Just before sundown, under a very heavy mortar fire, the enemy sent up a small boat, and a series of white flags were planted on the Fort St. Philip bank of the river, commencing about three hundred and fifty yards above the lone tree upon that shore. (See Diagram.)


This confirmed my previous views of an early and different attack from the usual mortar bombardment, especially as I presumed that these flags indicated the positions to be taken up by the several vessels in their new line of operations. As nothing was to be expected from the Louisiana, after the correspondence during the day, I could only inform Captain Mitchell of this new movement of the enemy, and particularly impress upon him the necessity of keeping the river well lit up with fire-barges, to act as an impediment to the enemy, and assist the accuracy of our fire in a night attack.

Lieutenant (Geo. S.) Shryock, C. S. N. (Captain Mitchell's aid), came on shore about 9 P. M., to inform me that the Louisiana would be ready for service by the next evening—the evening of the 24th. I informed him that time was everything to us, and that to-morrow would in all probability prove too late. Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins warmly seconded my opinion, and warned Lieutenant Shryock that the final battle was imminent within a few hours.

In regard to lighting the river, Lieutenant Shryock stated that fire-barges would be regularly sent down throughout the night every two hours, and as none had been sent up to that hour (9:30 P. M.), he left, informing me that this matter would be attended to as soon as he arrived on board. To my utter surprise, not one single fire-barge was sent down the river, notwithstanding, at any hour of this night. It was impossible for us to send them down, as everything afloat had been turned over to Captain Mitchell, by order of the major-general commanding, and the fire-barges and the boats to tow them into the stream were exclusively under his control. In consequence of this criminal neglect the river remained in complete darkness throughout the entire night. The bombardment continued all night and grew furious toward morning.

APRIL 24th.—At 3:30 A. M. the larger vessels of the enemy were observed in motion, and, as we presumed, to take up the positions indicated by the small flags planted by them on the previous evening. I then made my last and final appeal to Captain Mitchell.

The Louisiana was still in her old position above Fort St. Philip, surrounded by her tenders, on board of which was the majority of her cannoners and crew, and the other boats of the fleet were generally at anchor above her, excepting the Jackson, Captain Renshaw, C. S. N. commanding, which had been sent the day before at my



THE C. S. STEAMER GOVERNOR MOORE.

suggestion to prevent the landing of forces through the canals above.

The McRae lay near and above the Louisiana, and the steam-ram Manassas, with her tender, remained in her constant position above Fort Jackson, both with steam up and ready for immediate action.

The enemy evidently anticipated a strong demonstration to be made against him with fire-barges. Finding, upon his approach, however, that no such demonstration was made, and that the only resistance offered to his passage was the expected fire of the forts (the broken and scattered raft being then no obstacle), I am satisfied that

he was suddenly inspired, for the first time, to run the gauntlet at all hazards, although not a part of his original design. Be this as it may, a rapid rush was made by him in column of twos *en echelon*, so as not to interfere with each other's broadsides.

The mortar fire upon Fort Jackson was furiously increased, and in dashing by each vessel delivered broadside after broadside of shot, shell, grape, canister and spherical case to drive the men from our guns. Both the officers and men stood up manfully under this galling and fearful hail, and the batteries of both forts were promptly opened at their longest range with shot, shell, hot-shot and a little grape, and most gallantly and rapidly fought until the enemy succeeded in getting above and beyond our range.

The absence of light on the river, together with the smoke of the guns, made the obscurity so intense that scarcely a vessel was visible, and, in consequence, the gunners were obliged to govern their firing entirely by the flashes of the enemy's guns.

I am fully satisfied that the enemy's dash was successful mainly owing to the cover of darkness, as a frigate and several gunboats were forced to retire as day was breaking. Similar results had attended every previous attempt made by the enemy to pass or to reconnoiter when we had sufficient light to fire with accuracy and effect. The passage by was of short duration, having been accomplished between 3:30 A. M. and daylight, under a very rapid and heavy pressure of steam.

Of the part taken in this action by the Louisiana, Manassas and other vessels comprising the co-operative naval forces, I can not speak with any degree of certainty, excepting that the Louisiana is reported to have fired only twelve shots during the engagement; but to the heroic and gallant manner in which Captain Huger handled and fought the McRae we can all bear evidence. The Defiance, Captain McCoy commanding, was the only vessel saved out of the river fleet.

Shortly after daylight the Manassas was observed drifting down by the forts. She had been abandoned and fired, and was evidently in a sinking condition.

The McRae was considerably cut up in this action by shot and grape. The Resolute was run on shore about a mile above the forts, where she hoisted a white flag, but by the prompt action of the McRae she was prevented from falling into the hands of the enemy. She was subsequently wrecked and burned. The Warrior was run ashore and fired on the point just above Fort St. Philip.

Nothing was known by us of the movements of the Stonewall Jackson, the Governor Moore or the General Quitman.

The steamers Mosher, Music and Belle Algerine, in charge of the fire-barges, were all destroyed. So also was the Star.

The heroic courage displayed by the officers and men at both forts was deserving of a better success, especially after the fortitude which they constantly exhibited through the long tedium of a protracted bombardment, unsurpassed for its terrible accuracy, constancy and fury.

Thirteen of the enemy's vessels out of twenty-three succeeded in getting by, viz., the Hartford, Pensacola, Richmond, Brooklyn, Mississippi, Oneida, Iroquois, Cayuga, Wissahickon, Sciota, Kineo, Katahdin and Pinola.

In addition to the foregoing and to the Varuna and such other vessels as were sunk, there were six gunboats and one frigate engaged in this action, besides the mortar flotilla. Heavy chains were flaked along the sides of most of these vessels as an iron-proof protection.

The extent of the damage which was done to the enemy we had no means of ascertaining.

The vessels which passed all came to an anchor at or below the Quarantine, six miles above the forts, where they remained until about 10 A. M., when they all passed slowly up the river, with the exception of two gunboats, left at the Quarantine as a guard.

Shortly after the fleet above got under way a gunboat from below made her appearance with a flag of truce, and verbally demanded the surrender of the forts in the name of Commander D. D. Porter, U. S. N., commanding the mortar flotilla, under the penalty of re-opening the bombardment (which had ceased shortly after the passage) in case of refusal.

The demand was rejected, and the bombardment was

re-opened about 12 M. It continued until near sundown, when it ceased altogether. The entire mortar fleet, and all the other vessels except six gunboats, then got under way and passed down the river and out of sight under full steam and sail. A vigilant lookout was kept up above and below during the night, but all remained quiet. So long as the mortar fleet remained below, the position wherein the Louisiana could render the greatest assistance to the forts was the one below Fort St. Philip, hereinbefore mentioned, where the fire of her batteries could dislodge the enemy from behind the point of woods.

After the mortar fleet had left, however, and when the enemy had got in force above the forts, the question was materially changed, in consequence of the fact that all of our heavy guns at both forts had been mounted to bear upon the lower approaches and not on those above. The most effective position which the Louisiana could then take as a battery was in the fight above Fort Jackson, where her guns could protect our rear and sweep the long reach of river above toward the Quarantine. This would still insure her safety, as she would be under the guns of both forts. This is evident by a reference to the point (X X) on the diagram.

In several personal interviews and by correspondence with Captain Mitchell, on this date, I requested him during the morning of the 24th, while the mortar fleet was below, to place the Louisiana below the raft and dislodge it, and later in the day, when the mortar fire was nearly exhausted, to place her in the position (X X) above Fort Jackson, to assist in repelling an attack from the vessels above.

During the day she was in an unfit condition to assume

In the direction of Bird Island, and back of the salt works, a large steam frigate and an ordinary river steamer appeared in sight, the latter working her way up the bay behind Fort St. Philip, apparently toward the Quarantine.

During the day Captain Mitchell communicated with the enemy above under a flag of truce, and learned that the city had surrendered, and that the Confederate States steam-ram Mississippi had been burned by our authorities. The wreck of the floating dock or battery drifted by the forts about 4 P. M.

The Louisiana was not placed in the position required of her during the day, Captain Mitchell promising to put her there the next day, the 27th. Another raft-schooner burned for light, and all quiet during the night. No shots exchanged during the day.

APRIL 27th.—At daylight the steamer which had been observed the day before working her way up in the back bay was in view, immediately in the rear of Fort St. Philip, and near the mouth of Fort Bayou. A frigate and five other vessels were also in sight toward Bird Island, one of which was seen working her way up the bay. From ten to thirteen launches were visible near the boat back of Fort St. Philip, by means of which troops were being landed at the Quarantine above us.

About 12 M. one of the enemy's gunboats from below made her appearance under a flag of truce, bearing a written demand for the surrender of the forts, signed by Commander David D. Porter, U. S. N., commanding mortar flotilla. The forts refused to surrender.

About 4 P. M. the French man-of-war Milan, Captain Clouet commanding, passed up to the city, after asking and obtaining permission of the forts to do so. The position of the Louisiana still remained unchanged.

So far, throughout the entire bombardment and final action, the spirit of the troops was cheerful, confident and courageous. They were mostly foreign enlistments without any great interest at stake in the ultimate success of the revolution. A reaction set in among them during the lull of the 25th, 26th and 27th, when there was no other excitement to arouse them than the fatigue duty of repairing our damages, and when the rumor was current that the city had surrendered and was then in the hands of the enemy. No reply had been received from the city to my dispatches sent by couriers on the 24th and 25th, by means of which I could reassure them. They were still obedient, but not buoyant and cheerful. In consequence, I endeavored to revive their courage and patriotism by publishing an order to both garrisons.

I regret to say that it did not produce the desired effect. Everything remained quiet, however, until midnight, when the garrison at Fort Jackson revolted in mass, seized upon the guard and posterns, reversed the field-pieces commanding the gates, and commenced to spike the guns, while many of the men were leaving the fort in the meantime under arms. All this occurred as suddenly as it was unexpected. The men were mostly drawn up under arms, and positively refused to fight any longer, besides endeavoring by force to bring over the St. Mary's cannoners and such other few men as remained true to their cause and country.

The mutineers stated that the officers intended to hold out as long as possible, or while the provisions lasted, and then blow up the forts and everything in them; that the city had surrendered, and that there was no further use in fighting; that the enemy were about to attack by land and water on three sides at once, and that a longer defense would only prove a butchery. Every endeavor was made by the officers to repress the revolt and to bring the men to reason and order, but without avail. Officers upon the ramparts were fired upon by the mutineers in attempting to put a stop to the spiking of the guns.

I am greatly indebted to the Rev. Father Nachon for his efforts to quell the mutineers, through some of whom he learned that the revolt had been discussed among them for two days, and yet there was no one man among them true enough to communicate the fact to his officers.

Signals also were said to have been passed between the forts during the night, and while the mutiny was at its height. Being so general among the men, the officers were helpless and powerless to act. Under these circumstances there was but one course left, viz., to let those men go who wished to leave the fort, in order to see the number left and to ascertain what reliance could be placed upon them. About one-half of the garrison left immediately, including



BATTLE BETWEEN FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP AND FEDERAL GUNBOATS. THE LOUISIANA EXPLODING.
[From an old India-ink sketch by Admiral Walke.]

either position, for the reasons given by Captain Mitchell in his letters to me.

The intoxicated volunteers referred to were none of my men, nor did they get their liquor at the forts, as there was none on hand during the bombardment, excepting the small supplies of hospital stores in the medical department.

APRIL 25th.—No attack attempted during the day by the enemy either from above or below. The gunboats from the Quarantine above and from the point of woods below occasionally showed themselves for observation, but without firing.

During the day all the principal guns that would admit of it at both forts were prepared at once so as to traverse in a full circle and bear above or below, as necessity might require. Some of the 24-pounder barbette guns at Fort Jackson were also replaced by guns of heavier caliber to bear on the river above.

Permission was granted by the enemy to the Confederate States steamer McRae to proceed to New Orleans under a flag of truce with the wounded. Availing ourselves of the offer of Captain Mitchell, the seriously wounded of both forts were sent on board of her. As it was late when the wounded were all gotten on board, the McRae did not get off until the next morning.

Still failed during the day in getting Captain Mitchell to place the Louisiana in the light above Fort Jackson where she could act against the enemy from above.

One of the raft-schooners was burned during the night to light the river, and all remained quiet.

APRIL 26th.—A gunboat, with a white flag, dropped down from the Quarantine to escort the McRae on her mission. The McRae did not return again to the forts. Four of the enemy's steamers were in sight at the Quarantine at dawn. A gunboat occasionally showed herself below to reconnoiter.

men from every company excepting the St. Mary's cannoners, volunteers and regulars, non-commissioned officers and privates, and among them many of the very men who had stood last and best to their guns throughout the protracted bombardment and the final action when the enemy passed. It was soon evident that there was no further fight in the men remaining behind; that they were completely demoralized, and that no faith or reliance could be placed in the broken detachments of companies left in the forts.

In the meantime we were totally ignorant of the condition of affairs at Fort St. Philip, and as all our small boats had been carried away by the mutineers we could not communicate with that fort until the next morning. As the next attack upon the forts was likely to be a combined operation by land and water, and as Fort St. Philip was the point most threatened, from the nature of the country around it and from the character of the work itself, with narrow and shallow ditches, and but little relief to the main work, it was self-evident that no reduction could be made in its garrison to strengthen that of Fort Jackson, even if all the men there remained true. In fact, two additional regiments had been asked for at the Quarantine in anticipation of such an attack, to act as a reserve to strengthen the garrisons of both forts.

With the enemy above and below us, it will be apparent at once to any one at all familiar with the surrounding country that there was no chance of destroying the public property, blowing up the forts and escaping with the remaining troops. Under all these humiliating circumstances there seemed to be but one course open to us, viz., to await the approach of daylight, communicate then with

guns of the Louisiana were discharged at random as she floated down, and the boat finally blew up near Fort St. Philip, scattering its fragments everywhere within and around the fort, killing one of our men and wounding three or four others.

Captain McIntosh, C. S. N., who had been severely wounded in the discharge of his duty on the night of the enemy's passage, and who was then lying in a tent at that fort, was nearly killed also.

As far as I could learn, however, the Louisiana was fired prior to the time that the enemy's boats with white flags came to an anchor abreast of the forts to negotiate. She was fired in her first and original position without a change of any kind since her arrival at the forts.

The officers of Fort Jackson and the St. Mary's cannoners left about 4 P. M. for the city, on board of the United States gunboat Kennebec, and arrived on the morning of the 29th in New Orleans.

The officers of Fort St. Philip were sent up the next day, and all the men subsequently within a few days, as transportation could be furnished, excepting the men who revolted on the night of the 27th, many of whom enlisted with the enemy.

Upon my arrival in the city I found that the enemy's vessels were lying off the town, and that no flag, excepting that of the State of Louisiana on the City Hall, was visible upon the shore. I also learned that Flag Officer Farragut had directed it to be hauled down, and the United States flag hoisted in its stead, upon the penalty of shelling the city within forty-eight hours if the demand was not complied with, and that he had warned the city authorities to

During the first day's bombardment, when Captain Anderson was wounded, my aid-de-camp (Lieutenant William M. Bridges, Louisiana artillery) volunteered to command the two 10-inch columbiads on the main work, and I return him my thanks for the gallant and efficient manner in which he fought them during the rest of the action.

I take great pleasure in making personal mention of my volunteer aids, Captains William J. Seymour and J. R. Smith, for the valuable assistance which they rendered me at all times.

My thanks are also due to Doctors Bradbury and Foster, who volunteered their services to assist Assistant Surgeons S. Burke and C. D. Lewis at Forts Jackson and St. Philip, respectively; and most efficiently did they aid in this department. Doctor Bradbury remained at Fort Jackson until its fall and was paroled. Doctor Foster, at my request, accompanied the wounded soldiers to the city on the Confederate States steamer McRae.

Messrs. Fulda and Stickney and Sergeant J. R. Poin-dexter, Fourth Mississippi volunteers, telegraph operators, rendered the most valuable services in keeping open our communications above and below, under the most dangerous and difficult circumstances.

Although we have failed in our mission of keeping the enemy's fleet from passing the forts, and have been subjected to the deep humiliation of surrendering the charge intrusted to our keeping to the enemies of our country, I must nevertheless state, in common justice to myself and those under my command, that to the very best of our ability, with the means at our disposal, our whole duty was performed faithfully, honestly and fearlessly. If all had to be gone through with again, under similar events and circumstances, I know that we should be forced to the same results and consequences. Great as the disaster is, it is but the sheer result of that lack of cheerful and hearty co-operation from the defenses afloat which we had every right to expect, and to the criminal negligence of not lighting up the river at night when the danger was imminent and the movements of the enemy absolutely known almost to the hour of the final attack. Except for the cover afforded by the obscurity of the darkness, I shall always remain satisfied that the enemy would never have succeeded in passing Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

* * * * *

J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General, late Commanding Coast Defenses.

THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS,


APRIL 18 TO MAY 1, 1862.

BY
MAJOR-GENERAL MANSFIELD LOVELL,
Commanding at New Orleans.

VICKSBURG, MISS., May 22, 1862.

THE department is fully aware, from my official correspondence and telegraphic dispatches, of the exact nature of the defenses erected for the protection of the city of New Orleans, consisting, in general terms, of an exterior line of forts and earthworks, intended to prevent the entrance of the armed vessels of the enemy, and an interior line in the immediate vicinity of the city, which was constructed almost entirely with reference to repelling any attack made by land with infantry. Where this line crossed the river below the city it was intended to have a battery of twelve 32-pounders and ten 42-pounders, which it was considered would enable us to drive back any small number of ships that might succeed in passing the obstructions at the forts under the fire of their guns; but whether sufficient or not, no more were to be had, and subsequently, at the earnest request of the naval authorities, I transferred the 42-pounders to the steamers Carondelet and Bienville for service on Lake Pontchartrain in connection with Forts Pike and Macomb.

Immediately after I assumed command of the department, finding that there were no guns of the heaviest caliber, I applied to Richmond, Pensacola and other points for some 10-inch columbiads and seacoast mortars, which I considered necessary to the defense of the lower river; but none could be spared, the general impression being that New Orleans would not be attacked by the river, and I was therefore compelled to make the best possible defense with the guns at my disposal. Twelve 42-pounders were sent to Forts Jackson and St. Philip, together with a large additional quantity of powder; and being convinced that with the guns of inferior caliber mounted there we could not hinder steamers from passing unless they could be detained for some time under the fire of the works, I pushed forward rapidly the construction of a raft which offered a complete obstruction to the passage of vessels up the river, except through a small opening, and then only one at a time. The forts had seventy-five or eighty guns that could be brought successively to bear upon the river, were



Fort St. Philip. Mortar Boats in the Distance Shelling Forts. Fort Jackson.
THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP, CONFEDERATE VESSELS, AND THE FEDERAL GUNBOATS.
[From an old and original painting.]

the gunboats of the mortar flotilla below under a flag of truce, and negotiate for a surrender under the terms offered us by Commander Porter, and which had previously been declined.

APRIL 28th.—A small boat was procured, and Lieutenant Morse, post adjutant, sent over to convey the condition of affairs at Fort St. Philip, as well as to Captain Mitchell on the Louisiana. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenant Shryock, C. S. N., came on shore and discussed the whole question, after which they left, remarking that they would go on board and endeavor to attack the enemy above, at the Quarantine, notwithstanding that reasons had been given from time to time for not moving this vessel into her proper position, only a few hundred yards distant.

Captains Squires and Bond, Louisiana artillery, and Lieutenant Dixon, commanding the company of Confederate States regular recruits, came on shore shortly afterward from Fort St. Philip, and concurred with us that, under the circumstances, we could do nothing else than surrender, as they were not at all confident of the garrison there after the unlooked-for revolt at Fort Jackson, although none of their men had left or openly revolted. For these reasons a flag of truce was sent down to communicate with the enemy below and to carry a written offer of surrender under the terms offered on the 27th inst.

This communication brought up the Harriet Lane and three other gunboats opposite the forts, with white flags at the fore, white flags being displayed from the yards of the flag-masts at both forts, while the Confederate flags waved at the mastheads.

While negotiations were pending on the Harriet Lane it was reported that the steamer Louisiana, with her guns protruding, and on fire, was drifting down the river toward the fleet. As the wreck in descending kept close into the Fort St. Philip shore, the chances were taken by the enemy without changing the position of his boats. The

remove the women and children within the time specified. I therefore deemed it my duty to call at once upon the mayor at the City Hall and inform him of the fate of the forts below, which I did accordingly.

Learning there from one of his aids that the major-general commanding the department was still in the city, I called upon him in person and verbally reported the main incidents of the bombardment, the passage of the enemy and the capitulation of the forts.

All the officers distinguished themselves by cool courage, skill and patriotism throughout the entire bombardment, and by the patient fortitude with which they performed their duties throughout the bombardment and up to the sad night when the men took the rash and disgraceful step of rising against their officers, breaking through all discipline, and leading to such disastrous and fatal consequences. I can charitably account for it only on the grounds of great reaction after the intense physical strain of many weary days and nights of terrible fire, through which they were necessarily subjected to every privation from circumstances beyond our control, but which they had not the moral courage to share and sustain with their officers, all of whom were subjected to the same hardships in every particular.

To Lieutenant-Colonel E. Higgins, commanding the forts, my thanks are especially due for his indefatigable labors in preparing his heavy batteries preparatory to the attack, almost in the face of the enemy, and for the quiet, skillful and judicious manner in which he caused them to be fought. He was present everywhere and did his whole duty well and thoroughly.

Captain M. T. Squires, Louisiana regiment of artillery, as senior officer in charge of Fort St. Philip, under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, commanding, fully sustained every anticipation entertained of his gallantry, skill and efficiency.

manned by garrisons of well-trained artillerymen, affording a double relief to each gun, and commanded by officers who had no superiors in any service.

Under these circumstances, although I feared that the high water in the spring, with the accompanying drift, would carry away the raft, yet every confidence was felt that the river would remain closed until such time as the ironclad steamers Mississippi and Louisiana could be finished, which I was confidently informed would not be later than February 1st. The first raft constructed was not carried away by the high water and drift until the latter part of February; but with funds placed at my disposal by the citizens of New Orleans another was placed in position in March by the energetic labors of Colonel Higgins and others, and the position was again temporarily secure. No heavy guns had yet been received, although strenuous applications were made by me to get some from Pensacola when that place was abandoned. The general impression of all those to whom I applied was that the largest guns should be placed above New Orleans, not below (although I had notified the department on March 22d that, in my judgment, the fleet only awaited the arrival of the mortar vessels to attempt to pass up the river from below). By means, however, of an energetic and persevering officer, Major W. P. Duncan, commissary of subsistence, three 10-inch columbiads and five mortars were finally procured and brought over just in time to be put up as the firing commenced.

Thinking that the enemy's troops at Isle Breton were intending to land at Quarantine and act in the rear of Fort St. Philip, I ordered Colonel Szymanski's regiment of ninety-day men, armed with shotguns, to that point as a protection. I had likewise organized two companies of sharpshooters and swamp hunters, under Captains Mullen and Lartigue, which were sent down for operation upon the enemy's vessels from the banks of the river; but the high water, keeping the men day and night nearly waist-deep in the water, soon compelled them to abandon their positions.

I will here state that every Confederate soldier in New Orleans, with the exception of one company, had been ordered to Corinth, to join General Beauregard, in March, and the city was garrisoned by only about three thousand ninety-day troops, called out by the governor at my request, of whom about twelve hundred had muskets and the remainder shotguns of an indifferent description.

The river rose rapidly in April and soon drove out Szymanski's regiment, which was removed to the west bank, about six miles above Fort Jackson. The whole country became one vast sheet of water, which rose in the forts and covered places heretofore safe from its encroachments.

Under the tremendous pressure of this current and a storm of wind and rain the second raft was broken away on the night of Friday, April 11th, two days before the enemy first opened fire. The fourteen vessels of Montgomery's River Defense Expedition had been ordered by the department, when completed, to be sent up to Memphis and Fort Pillow; but, believing the danger of attack to be greater from below, I detained six of them at New Orleans, of which change the department was fully advised.

At my suggestion Governor Moore had also fitted up two steamers, which were sent to the forts below the city. A large number of fire-rafts were also constructed and towed down; and two smaller steamers were employed for the special purpose of towing these rafts into position where they could be most effective so as to leave the armed vessels free to operate against the enemy.

I telegraphed General Beauregard to send down the ironclad ram Manassas, and when the Secretary of the Navy ordered the steamer Louisiana to be sent also up the river I protested through the War Department, being satisfied that we required more heavy guns below. She was eventually permitted to go down the river on Sunday, April 20th, but not in a condition to use her motive power with effect. It was hoped that, notwithstanding this, she would be able to assume a position below Fort St. Philip, discovering the location of the mortar boats, and, being herself proof against direct fire, dislodge the enemy with her guns, which were of very heavy caliber. Knowing, also, that the incessant bombardment kept General Duncan closely confined to Fort Jackson, so that he could give no orders to the river-defense steamers, I placed the whole under the control of Captain Mitchell—the armed steamers, as well as the tugs intended to tow down the fire-rafts.

I will here state that the river-defense fleet proved a failure for the very reasons set forth in my letter to the department on April 15th. Unable to govern themselves, and unwilling to be governed by others, their almost total want of system, vigilance and discipline rendered them nearly useless and helpless when the enemy finally dashed upon them suddenly on a dark night. I regret very much that the department did not think it advisable to grant my request to place some competent head in charge of these steamers.

Learning subsequently that the Louisiana was anchored above the forts and that the fire-rafts were not sent down,

I telegraphed Captain Mitchell, requesting him to attend to it, and afterward called upon Commodore Whittle and entreated him to order the steamer to take the desired position below the forts. This he declined to do, but telegraphed Captain Mitchell, telling him to "strain a point to place the vessel there, if, in his judgment, it was advisable." No change, however, was made, and on the night of April 23d I went down myself in a steamboat, to urge Captain Mitchell to have the Louisiana anchored in the position indicated, and also to ascertain why the fire-rafts were not sent down. A few moments after I arrived the attack commenced, and the enemy succeeded in passing with fourteen ships, as described in General Duncan's report, and the battle of New Orleans, as against ships of war, was over.

I returned at once to the city, narrowly escaping capture, and giving orders to General Smith, in command of the interior lines, to prepare to make all possible resistance to the enemy's fleet at the earthwork batteries below the city, instructed Colonel Lovell to have several steamers ready to remove, as far as possible, the commissary and ordnance stores, being satisfied that the low developments at Chalmette could offer no protracted resistance to a powerful fleet whose guns, owing to the high water, looked down upon the surface of the country and could sweep away any number of infantry by an enfilading fire. These lines, as before remarked, were intended mainly to repel a land attack, but in a high stage of water were utterly untenable by infantry against guns afloat. It having been reported to me that a sufficient number of desperately bold men could easily be got together to board the enemy's vessels and carry them by assault, I authorized Major James to seize such steamers as might be necessary for his purpose and to attempt it. He called for one thousand men, by



MAJOR-GENERAL MANSFIELD LOVELL, OF MARYLAND.

public advertisement, but being able to find but about one hundred who would undertake it, he abandoned the project.

On the morning of the 25th the enemy's fleet advanced upon the batteries and opened fire, which was returned with spirit by the troops as long as their powder lasted, but with little apparent effect upon the enemy. The powder intended for this battery of 32-pounders had been transferred by me to the steamer Louisiana a few days before, under the supposition that it would render much better service from her heavy rifles and shell guns than with a battery of light 32-pounders. For the operations at these works you are respectfully referred to General Smith's report.

The greater portion of the ordnance stores, provisions, and quartermaster's property were sent from the city by rail or steamer, and a portion of the volunteers also took the cars for Camp Moore, seventy-eight miles distant, on the Jackson Railroad. The greater part of the ninety-day troops disbanded and returned to their homes. There were two or three regiments and smaller bodies of men raised for Confederate service in the city at the time, but being entirely without arms of any kind, they could be of no service, and were also ordered to Camp Moore.

I adopted this course, recognizing the perfect absurdity of confronting more than one hundred guns afloat, of the largest caliber, well manned and served, and looking down upon the city, with less than three thousand militia, mostly armed with indifferent shotguns. It would, in my judgment, have been a wanton and criminal waste of the blood of women and children, without the most remote possibility of any good result, for the enemy had only to anchor one of his ships at Kenner to command the Jackson Railroad, and he could have reduced the city to ashes at his leisure, without our being able to make any resistance whatever; or, without firing a shot, he could have starved the city into a surrender in less than three weeks, as there was not more than eighteen days' food on hand for the population, from which my troops were almost entirely

drawn. Why he did not occupy Kenner, and cut off all exit from the city immediately, I do not understand. Presuming that he would do so, as a matter of course, I had requested Captains Poindexter and Gwathmey, of the navy, to have all steamers ready in Lake Pontchartrain to carry the troops over to Madisonville, whence they could march to Camp Moore. A portion of them were taken over by this route.

Knowing that the enemy would at once seize the Opelousas Railroad, and thus cut off the troops occupying the works on the coast of West Louisiana, I sent orders to the different commanding officers at Forts Livingston, Guion, Quitman, Berwick and Chene to destroy their guns, and taking their small arms, provisions and ammunition, join me at Camp Moore.

Major Ivey brought away the troops at the two latter forts in a very creditable manner, but those at the other works became demoralized, disbanded and returned to New Orleans. I gave verbal instructions to Colonel Fuller to have the garrisons of Forts Pike and Macomb and Batteries Bienvenue and Lower Dupre ready to move at a moment's notice, as their posts were dependent on the city for provisions and often for water. It was understood that the naval steamers, in connection with other vessels in the lake, should bring away these garrisons when called upon to do so; and after my arrival at Camp Moore orders were given, on the 26th, to go for them, as I had been informed that Forts Jackson and St. Philip had been surrendered.

Finding that this report was untrue, I immediately countermanded the orders, giving instructions that they should be held until further notice; but before either order could reach Madisonville it was reported to me that the whole command was already at Covington. I advised Captain Poindexter to make his way to Mobile with his armed steamers, but he concluded to destroy them. We, however, procured from them some of the guns and ordnance stores, which I ordered immediately to Vicksburg, to be put in position there.

On the 25th Captain Bailey, of the Federal Navy, demanded the surrender of the city, and that the flags should be taken down, and the United States flag be put up over the Mint, Customhouse and other public buildings.

To this demand I returned an unqualified refusal, declaring that I would not surrender the city or any portion of my command, but added that, feeling unwilling to subject the city to bombardment, and recognizing the utter impossibility of removing the women and children, I should withdraw my troops and turn it over to the civil authorities. This I did in compliance with the openly expressed opinion of all prominent citizens around me that it would be a useless waste of blood, without being productive of any beneficial results to the cause for the troops to remain.

Captain Bailey then returned to his ship, under escort through the city (at his own request) of two officers of my staff, Colonel Lovell and Major James, and I then advised the Mayor not to surrender the city, nor to allow the flags to be taken down by any of our people, but to leave it to the enemy to take them down himself.

This advice was followed by the civil authorities; but the idea being held out, in their subsequent correspondence with the Federal officers, that they were placed in a defenseless condition by the withdrawal of the troops, but for which a different course might be pursued, I promptly telegraphed to Major James, of my staff, then in the city, offering to return at once with my command, if the citizens felt disposed to resist to the last extremity, and remain with them to the end.

I had deliberately made up my mind that, although such a step would be entirely indefensible in a military point of view, yet, if the people of New Orleans were desirous of signaling their patriotism and devotion to the cause by the bombardment and burning of their city, I would return with my troops, and not leave as long as one brick remained upon another. The only palliation for such an act would be that it would give unmistakable evidence to the world that our people were in deadly earnest.

This determination, plainly expressed in my dispatches to Major James, was read by him to the Mayor, and also to the City Council, in the presence of one or more prominent citizens. The opinion was generally and freely expressed by the Mayor and others that the troops ought not to return.

I went to the city myself, however, on the night of April 28th, and, in order that there might be no mistake, made the same proposition in person to the Mayor. He said he did not think it advisable for the troops to return; that such a step would only be followed by a useless sacrifice of life without any corresponding benefit, and urged decidedly that it be not done.

I, however, addressed the Mayor a letter declaring my willingness to return and share a bombardment with them, and waited until the night of the 29th for an answer; but, receiving none in writing, returned to Camp Moore. The same proposition was made by me in the course of the day to several prominent citizens, but was invariably discounted by them.

For a week after the withdrawal of the troops, I had a number of officers in the city, and kept trains running regularly, which brought out a large amount of government property and stores, as well as those of the State of Louisiana. Nearly everything was brought away except the heavy guns and some property which persons in their flight had destroyed, and everything might have been saved had not persons refused to work for my officers, fearing that they might be subjected to punishment by the enemy. Many also refused to work for Confederate money, which occasioned some delay and difficulty in the removal of stores.

I feel gratified, however, in being able to state that we brought away all the troops that would leave, and, including the property of the State, a greater amount in value than belonged to the government. What we failed to bring was from inability to get transportation.

In this duty I was mainly assisted by Colonel Lovell, Majors James and Bell, Captain Venable and Lieutenant McDonald, to whom the government is greatly indebted for the safety of much valuable property. It was a source of great distress to me to see the result of months of toil and labor swept away in a few hours; but it was, in my opinion, mainly attributable to the following causes, which I could not, by any possibility, control:

1. The want of a sufficient number of guns of heavy caliber, which every exertion was made to procure without success.

2. The unprecedented high water, which swept away the obstructions upon which I mainly relied, in connection with the forts, to prevent the passage of a steam fleet up the river; and—

3. The failure, through inefficiency and want of energy, of those who had charge of the construction of the ironclad steamers Louisiana and Mississippi to have them completed in the time specified, so as to supply the place of obstructions; and finally, the declension of the officers in charge of the Louisiana to allow her, though not entirely ready, to be placed as a battery in the position indicated by General Duncan and myself. On these last points I could only advise and suggest, as they appertained to a separate and independent department, over which I had no control whatever.

Opened fire on April 13th, which was kept up at intervals for five days, when the mortars opened, and from that time, with but a single intermission of a few hours, a bombardment was kept up for seven days and nights, which, for great rapidity and wonderful accuracy of range, has no parallel. More than 25,000 shells were thrown, of which not less than one-third fell within the limits of Fort Jackson; yet the garrisons held out, although wet, without change of clothing, and exhausted for want of rest and regular food, with a heroic endurance which is beyond all praise. That the enemy succeeded in passing a large portion of his fleet by the flats on a dark night, under a heavy fire, is due to no fault of the garrisons of the forts. They did their whole duty nobly and heroically, and had they been seconded, as they should have been, by the defenses afloat, we should not have had to record the fall of New Orleans.

To the officers of my staff, who underwent months of severe and arduous labor collecting supplies, creating resources with the most limited means, and preparing all sorts of materials and munitions of war by ingenious makeshifts, I return my warmest thanks. Left in the city with a small force of badly-armed militia, all opportunity for distinction or glory was cut off, yet they never flinched in their zeal and devotion to the cause. When the country knows all that was done, and in what disadvantage it was accomplished, I feel confident that its verdict will do ample justice to those who shared equally in the labors of preparation, while they were denied the glory of taking part in the defense.

The battle for the defense of New Orleans was fought and lost at Forts Jackson and St. Philip. The extraordinary and remarkable conduct of the garrisons of these forts in breaking out in open mutiny after covering themselves with glory by their heroic defense is one of those strange anomalies for which I do not pretend to account. The facts are recorded and speak for themselves. The causes will probably never be known in full.

I had frequent occasion to regret that it was found impossible to give me control of the defenses afloat as well as ashore. A single controlling head might have made all the resources more available and efficient in working out the desired results.

For a detailed description of the bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip I refer to the report of General Duncan.

* * * * *
M. LOVELL,
Major-General Commanding.

ORDERS FOR BATTLE AT SHILOH, OR PITTSBURG LANDING,

APRIL 6 AND 7, 1862.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
CORINTH, MISS., April 3, 1862.
SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 8.

IN the impending movement the corps of this army will march, assemble and take order of battle in the following manner, it being assumed that the enemy is in position about a mile in advance of Shiloh Church, with his right resting on Owl Creek and his left on Lick Creek.

1. The Third Corps, under Major-General Hardee, will advance as soon as practicable on the Ridge Road, from Corinth to what is known as the Bark Road, passing about half a mile northward of the workhouse. The head of this column will bivouac, if possible, to-night at Mickey's house, at the intersection of the road from Monterey to Savannah. The cavalry, thrown well forward during the march, to reconnoiter and prevent surprise, will halt in front of the Mickey house, on the Bark Road.



GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD, OF LOUISIANA.

2. Major Waddell, aid-de-camp to General Beauregard, with two good guides, will report for service to Major-General Hardee.

3. At 3 o'clock A. M. to-morrow the Third Corps, with the left in front, will continue to advance by the Bark Road until within sight of the enemy's outposts or advanced positions, when it will be deployed in line of battle, according to the nature of the ground, its left resting on Owl Creek, its right toward Lick Creek, supported on that flank by one-half of its cavalry, the left flank being supported by the other half. The interval between the extreme right of this corps and Lick Creek will be filled by a brigade or division, according to the extent of the ground, from the Second Corps. These troops during the battle will also be under the command of Major-General Hardee. He will make the proper disposition of the artillery along the line of battle, remembering that the rifled guns are of long ranges and should be placed on any commanding position in rear of the infantry, to fire mainly on the reserves and second line of the enemy, but will occasionally be directed on his batteries and heads of columns.

II. The Second Corps, under Major-General Braxton Bragg, will assemble on Monterey, and move thence as early as practicable, the right wing, with left in front, by the road from Monterey to Savannah, the head of column to reach the vicinity of Mickey's house, at the intersection of the Bark Road, before sunset. The cavalry with this wing will take position on the road to Savannah, beyond Mickey's as far as Owl Creek, having advanced guards and pickets well to the front. The left wing of this corps will advance at the same time, also left in front, by the road from Monterey to Purdy, the head of the column to

reach, by night, the intersection of that road with the Bark Road.

This wing will continue the movement in the morning as soon as the rear of the Third Corps shall have passed the Purdy Road, which it will then follow.

The Second Corps will then form the second line of battle about one thousand yards in rear of the first line. It will be formed, if practicable, with regiments in double columns at half distance, disposed as advantageously as the nature of the ground will admit, and with a view to facility of deployment, the artillery placed as may seem best to Major-General Bragg.

III. The First Corps, under Major-General Polk, with the exception of the detached division at Bethel, will take up its line of march by the Ridge Road, hence to Pittsburg, half an hour after the rear of the Third Corps shall have passed Corinth, and will bivouac to-night in rear of that corps, and on to-morrow will follow the movements of said corps with the same interval of time as to-day. When its head of column shall reach the vicinity of the Mickey house it will be halted in column or massed on the line of the Bark Road, as a reserve.

Meantime one regiment of its cavalry will be placed in observation on the road from Johnston's house to Stantonville, with advance guards and pickets thrown out well in advance toward Stantonville. Another regiment or battalion of cavalry will be posted in the same manner in the road from Monterey to Purdy, with its rear resting on or about the intersection of that road with the Bark Road, having advanced guards and pickets in the direction of Purdy.

The forces at Bethel and Purdy will defend their positions, as already instructed, if attacked; otherwise they will assemble on Purdy, and thence advance with advanced guards, flankers, and all other prescribed military precautions, by the road thence to Monterey, forming a junction with the next of the First Corps at the intersection of that road with the Bark Road leading from Corinth.

IV. The reserve of the forces will be concentrated by the shortest and best routes at Monterey as soon as the rear of the Second Corps shall have moved out of that place. Its commander will take up the best position whence to advance, as required, either in direction of Mickey's or of Pratt's house, on the direct road to Pittsburg, if that road is found practicable, or in direction of the Ridge Road to Hamburg, throwing all its cavalry on the latter road as far as its intersection with the one to Pittsburg, passing through Guersford, on Lick Creek. This cavalry will throw well forward advanced guards and vedettes toward Guersford and in the direction of Hamburg, and during the impending battle, when called to the field of combat, will move by the Guersford Road. A regiment of the infantry reserve will be thrown forward to the intersection of the Gravel Hill Road with the Ridge Road to Hamburg, as a support to the cavalry.

The reserve will be formed of Breckinridge's, Bowen's and Statham's brigades as now organized, the whole under command of Brigadier-General Breckinridge.

V. General Bragg will detach the Fifty-first and Fifty-second regiments Tennessee volunteers, Blount's Alabama and Desha's Arkansas battalion, and Bain's battery from his corps, which, with two of Carroll's regiments, now en route for these headquarters, will form a garrison for the post and depot of Corinth.

VI. Strong guards will be left at the railroad bridges between luka and Corinth, to be furnished in due proportion from the commands at luka, Burnsville and Corinth.

VII. Proper guards will be left at the camps of the several regiments of the forces in the field. Corps commanders will determine the strength of these guards.

VIII. Wharton's regiment of Texas cavalry will be ordered forward at once to scout on the road from Monterey to Savannah, between Mickey's and its intersection with the Pittsburg-Purdy Road; it will annoy and harass any force of the enemy moving by the latter way to assail Cheatham's division at Purdy.

IX. The chief engineer of the forces will take all due measures and precautions and give all requisite orders for the repair of the bridges, causeways and roads on which our troops may move in the execution of these orders.

X. The troops, individually so intelligent, and with such great interests involved in the issue, are urgently enjoined to be observant of the orders of their superiors in the hour of battle. Their officers must constantly endeavor to hold them in hand and prevent the waste of ammunition by heedless, aimless firing. The fire should be slow, always at a distinct mark. It is expected that much and effective work will be done with the bayonet.

By command of

GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON.
THOMAS JORDAN, Assistant Adjutant-General.

BATTLE OF SHILOH, OR PITTSBURG LANDING,

APRIL 6 AND 7, 1862.

BY

GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General Commanding.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
CORINTH, MISS., April 11, 1862.

ON the 2d ultimo, having ascertained conclusively, from the movements of the enemy on the Tennessee River and from reliable sources of information, that his aim would be to cut off my communications in West Tennessee with the Eastern and Southern States, by operating from the Tennessee River, between Crump's Landing and Eastport, as a base, I determined to foil his designs by concentrating all my available forces at and around Corinth.

Meanwhile, having called on the Governors of the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana to furnish additional troops, some of them (chiefly regiments from Louisiana) soon reached this vicinity, and with two divisions of General Polk's command from Columbus, and a fine corps of troops from Mobile and Pensacola, under Major-General Bragg, constituted the army of the Mississippi. At the same time General Johnston, being at Murfreesborough, on the march to form a junction of his forces with mine, was called on to send at least a brigade by railroad, so that we might fall on and crush the enemy, should he attempt an advance from under his gunboats.

The call on General Johnston was promptly complied with. His entire force was also hastened in this direction, and by April 1st our united forces were concentrated along the Mobile & Ohio Railroad from Bethel to Corinth, and on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad from Corinth to luka.

It was then determined to assume the offensive and strike a sudden blow at the enemy, in position under General Grant on the west bank of the Tennessee, at Pittsburg and in the direction of Savannah, before he was re-enforced by the army under General Buell, then known to be advancing for that purpose by rapid marches from Nashville via Columbia. About the same time General



MAP SHOWING THE POSITION OF TROOPS ON THE MORNING OF THE 6TH.


Johnston was advised that such an operation conformed to the expectations of the President.

By a rapid and vigorous attack on General Grant it was expected he would be beaten back into his transports and the river, or captured, in time to enable us to profit by the victory, and remove to the rear all the stores and munitions that would fall into our hands in such an event before the arrival of General Buell's army on the scene. It was never contemplated, however, to retain the position thus gained and abandon Corinth, the strategic point of the campaign.

Want of general officers needful for the proper organization of divisions and brigades of an army brought thus suddenly together, and other difficulties in the way of an effective organization, delayed the movement until the night of the 2d instant, when it was heard from a reliable quarter, that the junction of the enemy's armies was near at hand. It was then, at a late hour, determined that the attack should be attempted at once, incomplete and imperfect as were our preparations for such a grave and momentous adventure. Accordingly, that night at 1 A. M., the

preliminary orders to the commanders of corps were issued for the movement.

On the following morning the detailed orders of movements were issued, and the movement, after some delay, commenced, the troops being in admirable spirits. It was expected we should be able to reach the enemy's lines in time to attack him early on the 5th instant. The men, however, for the most part, were unused to marching, and the roads, narrow and traversing a densely wooded country, became almost impassable after a severe rainstorm on the night of the 4th, which drenched the troops in bivouac; hence our forces did not reach the intersection of the roads



MAP SHOWING POSITION OF TROOPS AT NOON.

from Pittsburg and Hamburg, in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, until late Saturday afternoon.

It was then decided that the attack should be made on the next morning, at the earliest hour practicable, in accordance with the orders of movement; that is, in three lines of battle, the first and second extending from Owl Creek, on the left, to Lick Creek, on the right, a distance of about three miles, and supported by the third and the reserve. The first line, under Major-General Hardee, was constituted of his corps, augmented on the right by Gladden's brigade, of Major-General Bragg's corps, deployed in line of battle, with their respective artillery following immediately by the main road to Pittsburg and the cavalry in rear of the wings. The second line, composed of the other troops of Bragg's corps, followed the first at a distance of five hundred yards in the same order as the first. The army corps under General Polk followed the second line, at a distance of about eight hundred yards, in lines of brigades deployed, with their batteries in rear of each brigade, moving by the Pittsburg Road, the left wing supported by cavalry. The reserve, under Brigadier-General Breckinridge, followed closely the third line in the same order, its right wing supported by cavalry.

These two corps constituted the reserve, and were to support the front lines of battle, by being deployed, when required, on the right and left of the Pittsburg Road, or otherwise act according to the exigencies of the battle.

At 5 A. M. on the 6th instant a reconnoitering party of the enemy having become engaged with our advance pickets, the commander of the forces gave orders to begin the movement and attack as determined upon, except that Trabue's brigade, of Breckinridge's division, was detached and advanced to support the left of Bragg's corps and line of battle when menaced by the enemy, and the other two brigades were directed to advance by the road to Hamburg to support Bragg's right; and at the same time Maney's regiment, of Polk's corps, was advanced by the same road to re-enforce the regiment of cavalry and battery of four pieces, already thrown forward to watch and guard Greer's, Tanner's and Borland's fords, on Lick Creek.

At 5:30 A. M. our lines and columns were in motion, all animated, evidently, by a promising spirit. The front line was engaged at once, but advanced steadily, followed, in due order, with equal resolution and steadiness, by the other lines, which were brought successively into action with rare skill, judgment and gallantry by the several corps commanders, as the enemy made a stand with his masses rallied for the struggle for his encampments. Like an Alpine avalanche our troops moved forward, despite the determined resistance of the enemy, until after 6 P. M., when we were in possession of all his encampments between Owl and Lick creeks but one; nearly all of his field artillery; about thirty flags, colors and standards; over three thousand prisoners, including a division commander (General Prentiss), and several brigade commanders; thousands of small arms, an immense supply of subsistence, forage and munitions of war, and a large amount of means of

transportation—all the substantial fruits of a complete victory, such, indeed, as rarely have followed the most successful battles; for never was an army so well provided as that of our enemy.

The remnant of his army had been driven in utter disorder to the immediate vicinity of Pittsburg under the shelter of heavy guns of his ironclad gunboats, and we remained undisputed masters of his well-selected, admirably provided cantonments, after over twelve hours of obstinate conflict with his forces, who had been beaten from them and the contiguous covert, but only by a sustained onset of all the men we could bring into action.

Our loss was heavy. Our commander in chief, General A. S. Johnston, fell mortally wounded, and died on the field at 2:30 P. M., after having shown the highest qualities of the commander and a personal intrepidity that inspired all around him, and gave resistless impulsion to his columns at critical moments.

The chief command then devolved upon me, though at the time I was greatly prostrated and suffering from the prolonged sickness with which I had been afflicted since early in February. The responsibility was one which in my physical condition I would have gladly avoided, though cast upon me when our forces were successfully pushing the enemy back upon the Tennessee River, and though supported on the immediate field by such corps commanders as Major-Generals Polk, Bragg and Hardee, and Brigadier-General Breckinridge, commanding the reserve.


It was after 6 P. M., as before said, when the enemy's last position was carried, and his forces finally broke and sought refuge behind a commanding eminence covering the Pittsburg Landing, not more than half a mile distant, and under the guns of the gunboats, which opened on our eager columns a fierce and annoying fire with shot and shell of the heaviest description.

Darkness was close at hand; officers and men were exhausted by a combat of over twelve hours without food, and jaded by the march of the preceding day through mud and water. It was, therefore, impossible to collect the rich and opportune spoils of war scattered broadcast on the field left in our possession, and impracticable to make any effective dispositions for their removal to the rear.

I accordingly established my headquarters at the Church of Shiloh, in the enemy's encampments, with Major-General Bragg, and directed our troops to sleep on their arms in such positions, in advance and rear, as corps commanders should determine, hoping from news received by a special dispatch, that delays had been encountered by General Buell in his march from Columbia, and that his main force, therefore, could not reach the field of battle in time to save General Grant's shattered fugitive forces from capture or destruction on the following day.

During the night the rain fell in torrents, adding to the discomforts and harassed condition of the men. The enemy, moreover, had broken their rest by a discharge at measured intervals of heavy shells thrown from the gunboats; therefore, on the following morning, the troops under my command were not in a condition to cope with an equal force of fresh troops, armed and equipped like our adversary, in the immediate possession of his depots and sheltered by such an auxiliary as the enemy's gunboats.

About 6 o'clock on the morning of April 7th, however, a hot fire of musketry and artillery, opened from the enemy's quarter on our advanced line, assured me of the junction of his forces, and soon the battle raged with a fury which satisfied me I was attacked by a largely superior force. But from the outset our troops, notwithstanding their fatigue and losses from the battle of the day before, exhibited the most cheering, veteranlike steadiness. On the right and center the enemy was repulsed in every



MAP SHOWING POSITION OF TROOPS AT SUNSET.



GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON.

BORN AT WASHINGTON, MASON COUNTY, KY., FEBRUARY 2, 1802.

KILLED AT THE BATTLE OF SHILOH, TENN., APRIL 6, 1862.

attempt he made with his heavy columns in that quarter of the field. On the left, however, and nearest to the point of arrival of his re-enforcements, he drove forward line after line of his fresh troops, which were met with a resolution and courage of which our country may be proudly hopeful. Again and again our troops were brought to the charge, invariably to win the position in issue; invariably to drive back their foe. But hour by hour, thus opposed to an enemy constantly re-enforced, our ranks were perceptibly thinned under the unceasing, withering fire of the enemy, and by 12 M. eighteen hours of hard fighting had sensibly exhausted a large number. My last reserves had necessarily been disposed of, and the enemy was evidently receiving fresh re-enforcements after each repulse; accordingly about 1 P. M. I determined to withdraw from so

To Major-Generals Polk, Bragg and Hardee, commanding corps, and to Brigadier-General Breckinridge, commanding the reserve, the country is greatly indebted for the zeal, intelligence and energy with which all orders were executed, for the foresight and military ability they displayed in the absence of instructions in the many exigencies of the battle on a field so densely wooded and broken, and for their fearless deportment as they repeatedly led their commands personally to the onset upon their powerful adversary. It was under these circumstances that General Bragg had two horses shot under him; that Major-General Hardee was slightly wounded, his coat rent by balls and his horse disabled, and that Brigadier-General Breckinridge was twice struck by spent balls.

For the services of their gallant subordinate com-

mand also the death of the Hon. George W. Johnson, Provisional Governor of Kentucky, who went into action with the Kentucky troops, and continually inspired them by his words and example. Having his horse shot under him on Sunday, he entered the ranks of a Kentucky regiment on Monday, and fell mortally wounded toward the close of the day. Not his State alone, but the whole Confederacy, has sustained a great loss in the death of this brave, upright and able man.

Another gallant and able soldier and captain was lost to the service of the country when Brigadier-General Gladden, commanding the First Brigade, Withers' division, Second Army Corps, died from a severe wound received on the 6th instant, after having been conspicuous to his whole corps and the army for courage and capacity.

Major-General Cheatham, commanding the First Division, First Corps, was slightly wounded and had three horses shot under him.

Brigadier-General Clark, commanding Second Division of the First Corps, received a severe wound also on the first day, which will deprive the army of his valuable services for some time.

Brigadier-General Hindman, engaged in the outset of the battle, was conspicuous for a cool courage, efficiently employed in leading his men ever in the thickest of the fray, until his horse was shot under him and he was unfortunately so severely injured by the fall that the army was deprived on the following day of his chivalrous example.

Brigadier-Generals B. R. Johnson and Bowen, most meritorious officers, were also severely wounded in the first combat, but it is hoped will soon be able to return to duty with their brigades.

To mention the many field officers who died or were wounded while gallantly leading their commands into action, and the many brilliant instances of individual courage displayed by officers and men in the twenty hours of battle, is impossible at this time, but their names will be duly made known to their countrymen.

The immediate staff of the lamented commander in chief, who accompanied him to the field, rendered efficient service, and, either by his side or in carrying his orders, shared his exposure to the casualties of the well-contested battlefield. I beg to commend their names to the notice of the War Department, namely: Captains H. P. Brewster and N. Wickliffe, of the adjutant and inspector-generals' department; Captain Theodore O'Hara, acting inspector-general; Lieutenants George Baylor and Thomas M. Jack, aids-de-camp; Volunteer Aids-de-camp Colonel William Preston, Major D. M. Hayden, E. W. Munford and Calhoun Benham, Major Albert J. Smith and Captain Wickham, of the quartermaster's department.

To these gentlemen was assigned the last sad duty of accompanying the remains of their lamented chief from the field, except Captains Brewster and Wickliffe, who remained and rendered valuable services as staff officers on April 7th.

Governor Isham G. Harris, of Tennessee, went upon the field with General Johnston, was by his side when he was shot, aided him from his horse, and received him in his arms when he died. Subsequently the Governor joined my staff and remained with me throughout the next day, except when carrying orders or employed in encouraging the troops of his own State, to whom he gave a conspicuous example of coolness, zeal and intrepidity.

I am also under many obligations to my own general, personal and volunteer staff, many of whom have been so long associated with me. I append a list of those present on the field on both days, and whose duties carried them constantly under fire, namely: Colonel Thomas Jordan,



Beauregard. Polk. Breckinridge. Johnston. Bragg. Hardee.

A COUNCIL OF WAR. THE NIGHT BEFORE THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

unequal a conflict, securing such results of the victory of the day before as was then practicable.

Officers of my staff were immediately dispatched with the necessary orders to make the best dispositions for a deliberate, orderly withdrawal from the field, and to collect and post a reserve to meet the enemy, should he attempt to push after us.

In this connection I will mention particularly my adjutant-general, Colonel Jordan, who was of much assistance to me on this occasion, as he had already been on the field of battle on that and the preceding day.

About 2 P. M. the lines in advance, which had repulsed the enemy in their last fierce assault on our left and center, received the orders to retire. This was done with uncommon steadiness, and the enemy made no attempt to follow.

The line of troops established to cover this movement had been disposed on a favorable ridge commanding the ground of Shiloh Church. From this position our artillery played upon the woods beyond for awhile, but upon no visible enemy and without reply. Soon satisfied that no serious pursuit would be attempted, this last line was withdrawn; and never did troops leave a battlefield in better order. Even the stragglers fell into the ranks and marched off with those who had stood more steadily by their colors.

A second strong position was taken up about a mile in rear, where the approach of the enemy was awaited for nearly an hour; but no effort to follow was made, and only a small detachment of horsemen could be seen at a distance from this last position, warily observing our movements.

Arranging through my staff officers for the completion of the movements thus begun, Brigadier-General Breckinridge was left with his command as a rear guard to hold the ground we had occupied the night preceding the first battle, just in front of the intersection of the Pittsburg and Hamburg roads, about four miles from the former place, while the rest of the army passed to the rear in excellent order.


On the following day General Breckinridge fell back about three miles, to Mickey's, which position we continued to hold, with our cavalry thrown considerably forward in immediate proximity to the battlefield.

Unfortunately, toward night of the 7th instant it began to rain heavily. This continued throughout the night; the roads became almost impassable in many places, and much hardship and suffering now ensued before all the regiments reached their encampments; but despite the heavy casualties of the two eventful days of April 6th and 7th, this army is more confident of ultimate success than before its encounter with the enemy.

manders and of other officers, as well as for the details of the battlefield, I must refer to the reports of corps, division and brigade commanders, which will be forwarded as soon as received.

To give more in detail the operations of the two battles resulting from the movement on Pittsburg than now attempted must have delayed this report for weeks and interfered materially with the important duties of my position. But I may be permitted to say that not only did the obstinate conflict for twelve hours on Sunday leave the Confederate army masters of the battlefield and our adversary beaten, but we left that field on the next day only after eight hours' incessant battle with a superior army of fresh troops, whom we had repulsed in every attack on our lines—so repulsed and crippled, indeed, as to leave it unable to take the field for the campaign for which it was collected and equipped at such enormous expense and with such profusion of all the appliances of war.

These successful results were not achieved, however, as before said, without severe loss—a loss not to be measured by the number of the slain or wounded, but by the high social and personal worth of so large a number of those who were killed or disabled, including the commander of the forces, whose high qualities will be greatly missed in the momentous campaign impending. I deeply regret to



LOG CHAPEL WHERE THE BATTLE OF SHILOH COMMENCED.

Captain Clifton H. Smith and Lieutenant John M. Otey, adjutant-general's department; Major George W. Brent, acting inspector-general; Colonel R. B. Lee, chief of subsistence, whose horse was wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel S. W. Ferguson and Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm, aids-de-camp; Volunteer Aids-de-camp Colonel Jacob Thompson, Majors Numa Augustin and H. E. Peyton, and Captains Albert Ferry and B. B. Waddell. Captain W. W. Porter, of Major-General Crittenden's staff, also reported for duty and shared the duties of my volunteer staff on Monday. Brigadier-General Trudeau, of Louisiana Volunteers, also for a part of the first day's conflict was with me as a volunteer aid. Captain E. H. Cummins, signal officer, also was actively employed as staff officer on both days.

Nor must I fail to mention that Private W. E. Goolsby, Eleventh Regiment Virginia Volunteers, orderly to my headquarters since last June, repeatedly employed to carry my verbal orders to the field, discharged the duty with great zeal and intelligence.

Other members of my staff were necessarily absent from the immediate field of battle, intrusted with responsible duties at these headquarters, namely: Captain F. H. Jordan, assistant adjutant-general, in charge of general headquarters; Major Eugene E. McLean, chief quartermaster, and Captain E. Deslonde, quartermaster's department.

Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson, aid-de-camp, early on Monday was assigned to command and directed the movements of a brigade of the Second Corps. Lieutenant-Colonel Gilmer, chief engineer, after having performed the important and various duties of his place with distinction to himself and material benefit to the country, was wounded late on Monday. I trust, however, I shall not long be deprived of his essential services.

Captain Lockett, Engineer Corps, chief assistant to Colonel Gilmer, after having been employed in the duties of his corps on Sunday, was placed by me on Monday in command of a battalion without field officers.

Captain Fremaux, provisional engineers, and Lieutenants Steele and Helm, also rendered material and even dangerous service in the line of their duty.

Major-General (now General) Braxton Bragg, in addition to his duties of chief of staff, as has been before stated, commanded his corps—much the largest in the field—on both days with signal capacity and soldiery.

Surgeons Foard, medical director, R. L. Brodie and S. Choppin, medical inspectors, and D. W. Yandell, medical director of the Western Department, with General Johnston, were present in the discharge of their arduous and high duties, which they performed with honor to their profession.

Captain Tom Saunders, Messrs. Scales and Metcalf, and Mr. Tully, of New Orleans, were of material aid on both days, ready to give news of the enemy's positions and movements regardless of exposure.

While thus partially making mention of some of those who rendered brilliant, gallant or meritorious service on the field, I have aimed merely to notice those whose positions would most probably exclude the record of their services from the reports of corps or subordinate commanders.

From this agreeable duty I turn to one in the highest degree unpleasant; one due, however, to the brave men under me as a contrast to the behavior of most of the army who fought so heroically. I allude to the fact that some officers, non-commissioned officers and men abandoned their colors early on the first day to pillage the captured encampments; others retired shamefully from the field on both days while the thunder of cannon and the roar and rattle of musketry told them that their brothers were being slaughtered by the fresh legions of the enemy. I have ordered the names of the most conspicuous on this roll of laggards and cowards to be published in orders.

It remains to state that our loss on the two days, in killed outright, was 1,728; wounded, 8,012, and missing, 959; making an aggregate of casualties, 10,699. This sad list tells in simple language of the stout fight made by our countrymen in front of the rude log chapel of Shiloh, especially when it is known that on Monday, from exhaustion and other causes, not 20,000 men on our side could be brought into action.

Of the losses of the enemy I have no exact knowledge. Their newspapers report it as very heavy. Unquestionably it was greater even in proportion than our own on both days, for it was apparent to all that their dead left on

the field outnumbered ours two to one. Their casualties, therefore, can not have fallen many short of 20,000 in killed, wounded, prisoners and missing. Through information derived from many sources, including the newspapers of the enemy, we engaged on Sunday the divisions of Generals Prentiss, Sherman, Hurlbut, McClelland and Smith, of 9,000 men each, or at least 45,000 men. This force was re-enforced Sunday night by the divisions of Generals Nelson, McCook, Crittenden and Thomas, of Major-General Buell's army, some 25,000 strong, including all arms; also General L. Wallace's division, of General Grant's army, making at least 33,000 fresh troops, which, added to the remnant of General Grant's forces—on Monday morning amounting to over 20,000—made an aggregate force of some 53,000 men, at least, arrayed against us on that day.

In connection with the results of the battle I should state that most of our men who had inferior arms exchanged them for the improved arms of the enemy; also that most of the property, public and personal, in the camps from which the enemy was driven on Sunday was rendered useless or greatly damaged, except some of the tents.

With this is transmitted certain papers, to-wit: order of movement, a list of the killed and wounded, a list of the captured flags and a map of the battlefield, etc., all of which are respectfully submitted.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General Commanding.



GENERAL PRENTISS' (FEDERAL) HEADQUARTERS, CAPTURED BY THE CONFEDERATES.

BATTLE OF SHILOH, OR PITTSBURG LANDING,

APRIL 6 AND 7, 1862.

BY

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WILLIAM J. HARDEE,
Commanding Third Corps.

HEADQUARTERS HARDEE'S CORPS,
ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
TULLAHOMA, TENN., February 7, 1863.

AFTER the fall of Fort Donelson the commanding general, Albert Sidney Johnson, having successfully made his retreat through Tennessee amid many difficulties, rapidly concentrated all his remaining forces at Corinth, for the purpose of inflicting a decisive blow upon the enemy. The position was important from being the center of the railroad communications passing southwardly from the Ohio River through Western Tennessee to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Mississippi River eastwardly to the Atlantic. Marshes and muddy streams in its vicinity rendered it difficult to approach, and made it strong and defensible.

The enemy, flushed with their recent success, moved forward to conquer the territory on the left of the Mississippi. Large forces were transported on steamers, conveyed by iron-clad gunboats, under the command of General Grant, to Pittsburg, while an army under General Buell, commanding the remaining forces of the United States in the west, moved from Nashville through Columbia, by land, to effect a junction with General Grant. General Johnston, having received information of these movements, resolved at once to defeat or dislodge General Grant before the arrival of the forces under General Buell. On Thurs-

day, April 3d, the Army of the Mississippi was ordered to advance from Corinth toward Shiloh, a little country church near Pittsburg, around which the forces of General Grant were encamped.

The Third Corps, then under my command, marched in advance by the Bark Road toward Shiloh, and reached Mickey's house, about sixteen miles from Corinth and eight from Pittsburg, on the morning of April 4th. A portion of Brigadier-General Cleburne's command in the afternoon engaged the cavalry of the enemy and repulsed it promptly. We took some prisoners, and bivouacked for the night.

It was the purpose of the general to continue the movement at 3 A. M. the succeeding morning, but torrents of rain having fallen, a night march over the swollen streams and flooded ravines became impracticable. The advance was suspended until dawn, when my command again marched forward.

About 10 o'clock on Saturday morning, April 5th, my corps reached the outposts and developed the lines of the enemy. It was immediately deployed in line of battle about a mile and a half east of Shiloh Church, where Lick Creek and Owl Creek approach most nearly. The right was extended toward Lick Creek, and the left rested near Owl Creek, which streams at that point are rather more than three miles apart.

The Tennessee River runs nearly due north from above Lick Creek to the mouth of Owl Creek, which creeks, after flowing nearly parallel to each other, empty into the river about four miles apart. Pittsburg is situated near the foot of the hills, and nearly midway between the

mouths of the two creeks, on the left bank of the river. This bank of the Tennessee is a range of bold, wooded hills, bordering the stream closely, which, as they recede from the river, gradually diminish, the slopes falling away from a ridge on the south toward Lick Creek, and on the north toward Owl Creek. From Mickey's, eight miles west from Pittsburg, rolling uplands, partially cultivated, interspersed with copses, thickets and forests, with small fields cultivated or abandoned, characterize the country from that point to the river.

The storm of the preceding night rendered the roads so miry that the different commands were not collected at Shiloh until 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon. This rendered it necessary to postpone the attack until the next day. Some of the troops having failed to provide themselves with provisions, or having improvidently consumed or lost them, the propriety of returning to Corinth without attacking the enemy was

urged and considered; but the commanding general determined, regardless of all objections, to force a battle the succeeding morning. By the order of battle our troops were arranged in two parallel lines; the first, under my command, being composed of my corps, consisting of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Hindman, Wood and Cleburne, numbering six thousand seven hundred and eighty-nine effective men, and the brigade of Brigadier-General Gladden, which was attached to my command to fill the interval between my right and Lick Creek. The second was composed of five brigades, under Major-General Bragg, one thousand yards in rear of mine; while four brigades, under Major-General Polk, supported the left, and three under Brigadier-General Breckinridge supported the right of the lines. The order was given to advance at daylight on Sunday, April 6th. The morning was bright and bracing. At early dawn the enemy attacked the skirmishers in front of my line, commanded by Major (now Colonel) Hardcastle, which was handsomely resisted by that promising young officer. My command advanced, and in half an hour the battle became fierce.

Hindman's brigade engaged the enemy with great vigor in the edge of a wood and drove him rapidly back over the field toward Pittsburg, while Gladden's brigade, on the right, about 8 o'clock, dashed upon the encampments of a division under the command of General Prentiss. At the same time Cleburne's brigade, with the Fifteenth Arkansas, deployed as skirmishers, and the Second Tennessee, *en echelon* on the left, moved quickly through the fields, and though far outflanked by the enemy on our left, rushed forward under a terrific fire from the serried ranks drawn up in front of the camp. A morass covered his front, and being difficult to pass, caused a break in the brigade. Deadly volleys were poured upon the men as they advanced, from behind bales of hay, logs and other defenses,

PROSPECTUS.

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It would be impossible to indicate the full contents of the book in the limited space on this circular; we, however, give below

PARTIAL TABLE OF CONTENTS.

1. FOUNDATION and Formation of the Confederacy and the Secession of the Southern States and the prominent part taken by President Jefferson Davis, members of the Cabinet and governors of the seceding States.
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9. The CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY, from the laying of the first keel to the sinking of its last vessel. Naval Engagements, Bombardments, Blockade Running, Operations of Cruisers and Privateers by Admirals Franklin Buchanan, Raphael Semmes, Captains Waddell, Mitchell, Bullock and others.
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14. FEDERAL VESSELS destroyed by the Confederate Cruisers Alabama, Nashville, Olustee, Florida, Tallahassee, Shenandoah, Sumter, etc., etc.
15. ARMIES, Corps and Geographical Commands in the Confederate States.
16. ORGANIZATION (or Roster) of all the Confederate Corps, Divisions, Brigades, Regiments, etc., and the names of officers and the important battles of the war.
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18. UNITED CONFEDERATE VETERANS, Virginia Veterans, Tennessee Bivouacs and other organizations.
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