

**Oral History Interview of
Jim Goggin**

**Interviewed by: David Marshall
November 4, 2014
Lubbock, Texas**

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Transcript Overview:

This interview features Jim Goggin, who discusses World War II, postwar Europe, his involvement with the CIA, and postwar guilt.

Length of Interview: 01:12:45

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David Marshall (DM):

The date is November 4, 2014. This is David Marshall interviewing Jim Goggin at his home in Lubbock, Texas. And you wanted to add some information from your research that produced the book. Go ahead and let me know what that was about—the dark secret.

Jim Goggin (JG):

Okay, it's something that people—a lot of people don't know about, and it has to do with what's called the "IPA" —the International Psychoanalytic Association—and the German Psychoanalytic Association, after World War II—or did I tell you this?

DM:

No.

JG:

Well, there was a lot of activity around the time the Hitler came to power in what was called the "DPG" —or the German Psychoanalytic Association—went through all kinds of changes, and the modifications, and the Jew were thrown out, and other things started to happen, but it was still called the DPG, which was the old name. Now what happened was most of the analysts were into this group called—after World War II was over, a lot of people who were Nazified, who were very Nazified, jumped into a group called the DVP, and it's a variation of the German Psychoanalytic Association. Okay, what happens here—these Nazified analysts agreed to become full-fledged Freudian analysts because they thought—and correctly so—that they could get accepted back into the international group if they were Freudians. Now, the IPA is made up of—at that time—mostly Jews, and a Freud among them. And they were fully aware—

[Phone ringing]

DM:

Pause it.

Pause in recording

JG:

Let's see. Okay, so we have this—that there's two groups now: the DVP, which is mostly Nazified German analysts, but they're willing to call themselves Freudians to get back into the club—and you have these other groups who were not so Freudian anymore, but the IPA—the Psychoanalytic Institute—accepts the—even though we're five years away from the Holocaust—accepts these Nazified analysts back into the IPA, which nobody likes to talk about, and we bring it out in this book, and it's something that no one likes to recognize, even in America it's like a little bit of a hot potato.

DM:

So the IPA probably wasn't happy that it appeared.

JG:

That's in here. And Anna Freud, herself—I mean we're talking about Jews. We're talking about—since then, it has broadened its base; there's more Christians in it—but at that time, a large majority were Jewish.

DM:

Why did they let them in?

JG:

It was ideology—psychoanalytic—that's how crazy people get about ideology in psychoanalysis. And they fought the interpersonal school, and it was bitter. That was more bitter than what happened in the Holocaust. It is repugnant, I think, to all humanitarian people who care for human beings. They tried to keep this under the rug, but it came out and it's usually only published in Europe. Europe publishes a lot more about these things that the United States does. They're more open. American psychoanalysts haven't done this a great deal. Anyway, that is the—one of the big dark secrets they have.

DM:

Uh-huh. How interesting. Did they make a real impact on the IPA?

JG:

Huh?

DM:

Did this group make a real impact on the IPA, or did it remain a small group?

JG:

Well, you know, they were submerged—there was only a small group of them, but it was, I think, very symbolic of how strong the psychoanalytic community would fight over theory rather than humanitarian ideals and democracy. We fought a war to stop that. Soldiers that came back said “Now I know why I fought the Germans,” and all kinds of other things—just regular old Americans. And here we have people so—Anna Freud is said to be more Freudian than Freud himself. I think she was a little off the beam in a lot of ways that way. Anyway, it's just one of those very interesting little things that occurred.

DM:

It is interesting, and I'm glad you brought it up. We had not talked about that when we were talking about the book, so very good. Any other—I know you've been looking back through the book since we talked last, are there any other segments in there that you'd like to emphasize?

JG:

Well, here's another little—I don't know if I made it clear that—I don't know if you know the healthcare history after World War II with Germany and our healthcare system?

DM:

No.

JG:

I have problems with our healthcare system. I looked up the history of healthcare when we were going through all that stuff twenty years ago—fifteen years ago. I started looking back, and I read the history. Not many people know this, but around 1947 the Democrats wanted to pass universal healthcare. Robert Taft, staunch Republican—my father liked him—he was more staunch than Eisenhower—my father loved him. He proposed that we have a two-tier system—that the poor could have all the basic medicine, but no frills—when they were sick, they had something serious, they get hospitalization and all that. The Democrats turned him down. And since then, the way I see it, we have built the private sector and we have built the public sector—and it has mounted like this, and now we're paying through the nose. The German healthcare system after World War II—here's what they did, which I think is very good—I think, anyway—no one wants to talk about it. They put together—they took the unions, who represented the people, and then they took the insurance companies, and then they took the large and small business. They said “We'll lock you in a room. You develop a healthcare plan, and if you don't, the government will do it.” The government has never done it. So they have one system, and people say it's extravagant and things, but their healthcare costs are so much lower than ours—and psychoanalysis is included. Believe it or not—I mean it's not included in our system—but in Germany, if you—but you have to go through various steps.

DM:

Has it remained pretty much intact since they first established it?

JG:

They have made it more stringent as time goes on, things will be—just like everywhere else, they made it tighter. There're forces, pro and con, and there're still the conservative and the social democrats, and you know, they still have the visions, but no one—no one—gets in the way of that tri-system—which, it's one system. And now we find—I'm finding—my wife got—I might have mentioned my wife broke her arm over there—multiple, very bad fracture—she went to the

hospital, she got better care there than she did here—now I'm finding that basketball players, now, when they get hip injuries, are going to Germany. I don't know if you know that Germany in the 1920s was where American physicians went to get their training. That was true. But then, when Hitler took over, it demolished the whole thing. But you know, I—

DM:

So they have a system that works?

JG:

They have a system that works. They come out at night; they take care of people. It seems to be more humanitarian—at least in my mind. I don't say that much, because I get in trouble with both Democrats and Republicans.

DM:

Well you can say anything here.

JG:

So that's one of the two things I wanted to—

DM:

Okay, well very good. I appreciate it. And I want to get your insights on some other things, as well—and these are actually topics that you had mentioned early on, before we did any interviews. I wanted to get your take, for example, on—I mean you were with the CIA in 1962, and you apparently observed the situation with the CIA during the Vietnam War, and Westmoreland—and I would like to get your input on that, as well.

JG:

Well, that has to do with counterinsurgency, partly, and it also has to do with a CIA report that I went to a conference about. And this guy was very—I mean, he was a CIA agent that was there for the whole Vietnam deal.

DM:

Can you mention his name?

JG:

I can't remember it right now. I mean, I don't mind mentioning it, but—

DM:

Maybe it'll come to you.

JG:

—but it's a book—he's written a book on Westmoreland. And what he had to say was we outnumbered—not only did we have better fighting forces and more artillery and guns and fighters and everything, but we also had—outnumbered the North Vietnamese, two to one—three to one at times—and it was his point that Westmoreland was really a problem because he didn't know how to deploy his troops, and he was trying to do too many things at the same time. He tried to take them on as a whole, and yet he was also into counterinsurgency and body counts—and he thought that was absurd. The point he was making is we have no realistic goals in that war, and just as much as Johnson would listen to him and do what he said—and Johnson never wanted to back down and not give the military what it needed—but he thought that Westmoreland was just as big a problem, if not more, because he used troops in ways that could have been done much better.

DM:

Was there an open and obvious rift between Westmoreland and the CIA?

JG:

No, not really. I'll tell you, one of the things you have in the CIA—you have so many factions there, so sometimes it's really hard to understand where they're coming from. Like they gave JFK some bad advice about Cuba, and I think they gave President Bush some bad advice about Iraq.

DM:

But you never can say it's the CIA as a whole—it's some faction within.

JG:

No, I don't think you can say that—I think it's—because I think there are legitimate—and I think the guy that led us was a real good man. I think I—did I tell you about his emotional outbursts?

DM:

No.

JG:

I never told you about his emotional outbursts?

DM:

Can you tell me about that on the record?

JG:

I can tell you this: there was a guy who was very self-centered and narcissistic among us. He was

probably the best ball player, but he always thought he knew more than everyone else—including our leader. And he was going off on him—with us—the guy walks in there, and he didn't see him, and this guy says "I'm going over to the regular CIA office and I'm going to report him." Guy takes out a pistol—did I tell you that?

DM:

Yes, yes you did mention that.

JG:

Okay—and he went a little haywire, saying—talking about politics and all us self-centered college kids. But that left a mark on me—he pointed to the American flag and said "That's what we're here for. You college kids" —and obviously, he was a foot soldier in Korea—and he thought that we were all these ideological kids just arguing, and it's really not focused on that flag up there. There's something to that—cooperation.

DM:

Well let's go—speaking of cooperation, was there cooperation between Westmoreland and the CIA? Was it an affective relationship between the army and the CIA during the Vietnam War?

JG:

According to this guy who gave—it wasn't as good as it really should be. He wasn't listening to the guys on the ground—the CIA guys that went out in the field—and the regular troops. He was not listening enough. He made this comment, that you could always find him on the tennis courts every Sunday and Saturday.

DM:

Sounds like he was as much politician as military leader, then.

JG:

That's the impression that he was giving, is that all he wanted—he kept wanting more and more troops, and never really used them as effectively as he should have.

DM:

While the CIA was in Vietnam, did the North Vietnamese have some kind of intelligence agency that was adequate for their needs? Was there an intelligence agency on behalf of the North Vietnamese? Did you ever hear anything about North Vietnamese intelligence during the war?

JG:

They had—the problem was that we never penetrated hard enough into their infrastructure, I

think. They could show up—was it Khe Sanh—they could show up with a huge army and tanks, and they'd come out of nowhere.

DM:

But we couldn't infiltrate as—

JG:

We had a hard time with—it just reminded me of the revolution when we fought the British. They marched, and they did all their stuff, and they were the greatest fighting nation in the world—and yet we beat them—fighting dirty, as they might say it—unsportsmanlike, or whatever, but the Vietcong were—you know, they built tunnels and all those things that were very hard to—they were very hard to fight.

DM:

They were illusive.

JG:

If they—we broke them at Khe Sanh, but we took a big beating, but we killed—I mean who knows how many, because we used the B-52s finally, and probably annihilated—I mean, I can't imagine how many we killed. It must have been massive. But they kept coming.

DM:

But it was difficult to know who the enemy was—kind of like it was difficult for the British to know who the enemy was over here. There were loyalists and there were patriots.

JG:

I think we faced some of the same problems over there. I think there were loyalists to—and it was so very hard to tell the difference and our soldiers always never knew who was friendly and who was foe. I think that's clear in all the research that you find, and all the—you talk to ex-soldiers who were there, I mean it was very hard to tell. People would blame—go back into their huts and things, and then you had some of the atrocities, where guys would go off the—what was it—was it My Lai—

DM:

My Lai.

JG:

Yeah, well, you know. It's sort of understandable in some ways—but not so—we're not allowed to do that. Japanese did that a lot more than us.

[Phone ringing]

Pause in recording

DM:

All right, go ahead.

JG:

I used to—I might have said this before—I used to go to sometimes anti-war movement things, and found myself—my wife—my future wife was with me and she was more or less like me. We were very patriotic, but I especially understood MacArthur, and he said “No war in Asia. Ever. We can’t win it.” And it’s absolutely true. He was not the only one of our generals who had that philosophy.

DM:

That’s interesting because he also believed [in] “no limited war,” and we did both in Asia.

JG:

What’s that?

DM:

He also said no limited warfare—and we did both, and we did it in Asia—limited warfare.

JG:

And you know, the idea of counterinsurgency—look, I’d like to see America—in some ways, I believe what Bush and Obama have tried doing, but it’s not working so well. We wiped out Iraq, and look at that mess now. We lost a lot of men. Afghanistan is the same picture. That’s Obama’s baby. I don’t like the easy answers to that. I have a terrible solution, and that’s the kind of firebombing that we did in Tokyo. But that kills everybody. I don’t know if you know about how many people we killed in Tokyo with the firebombing—a hundred and twenty thousand—more than Hiroshima or Nagasaki.

DM:

Well if there’s a lesson in all this, it seems to be “Beware what you’re stepping into.”

JG:

Yeah. You’ll hate to hear what these new lunatics are doing over there, but—

DM:

Should we be the policemen of the world?

JG:

Well, I don't think we can continue. How can we continue to do everything all over?

DM:

It seems like we emerged from World War II with this feeling that, being as powerful as we were, we could police the world. But it's—the years have gone by; the situation has changed.

JG:

I hate to think of myself as an isolationist—I'm not that—but I'll tell you what my—I don't know if I said this before, but I think down the road, China is going to be our biggest obstacle. They're still communists; they blatantly say that they're building up their armed forces. I hate to see us bleed ourselves dry with manpower, money, and everything else, and then several generations not be able to compete with them.

DM:

Right. We certainly can't compete with their population explosion.

JG:

No, it's impossible.

DM:

More manpower.

JG:

I had a lot of mixed feelings about all kinds of issues like Democrats—I mean in some ways, I don't know—wondering—is that a Republican issue, not—it used to be isolationism was Republican. Now I'm starting to find myself saying we really need to cut back. We can't keep doing this—we simply can't. We can't afford it.

DM:

There's only so much debt you can incur.

JG:

And we are doing it.

DM:

Well, these are all very difficult and ambiguous issues. Let's go to one that's more direct—and we've talked about this one. This next issue is something much more direct; we've talked about it a little bit before—I know you have some thoughts on it—and that is this interesting issue of armaments during World War II. We talked about the Sherman tanks as opposed to the German

heavier tanks in World War II—that's something you've commented on in the past, so I wanted to get that on the record.

JG:

I just read—I've taken this book out—and I have this book.

DM:

It is *Why the Allies Won* by Richard Overy.

JG:

Yeah. He makes some very good points. Yes, I do have very strong feelings about the fact—we must say that the Germans had a big head start on us and military preparation because they started to do this under cover, and they had the best machine guns, they had the best—they're 88mm cannons were great anti-aircraft, and they were deadly to any tanks. They had the best automatic—like Tommy guns and their helmets were far superior to our helmets—I think ninety-nine percent better in some ways because of the construction. But they had this head start, and they—so we have to admit that that's a problem, but I still don't understand how we never developed better tanks, and some better machine guns. Our Air Force was fantastic, but why did we keep turning out tons of Sherman tanks when it took ten to knock out one—

DM:

Do you think Army Air Corps was getting more money into military industry—into industry to produce weapons, and that left the tank division with just less to operate with, or—?

JG:

I don't understand it. I would like to study why we didn't develop—go further. They did make some attempts to place bigger guns—cannons—in some of the tanks in 1940—toward the middle and end of 1944, but that was very late, and they were still knocking off our tanks like crazy.

DM:

And the Sherman still remained the standard tank.

JG:

Absolutely. And we gave them to the Soviets, and the Soviets built a better tank—the G-34¹—it was a better tank than ours. It's hard to believe. We have a tremendous scientific and engineering capacity, so there was things that are very hard for me to understand.

DM:

Well, there was, obviously, and emphasis on airpower—and that bled over into the Navy with

¹ T-34.

aircraft carriers becoming the preeminent thing, so you have to wonder if it was just—that that seemed secondary until we were actually over there and pushing eastward on the continent.

JG:

Yeah. Now, you know what General Marshall said, why we won?

DM:

Why?

JG:

And I think that he's probably right. He said "The greatest" —really when it comes down to it, it was tactics, strategy, planning, and supply lines in both Europe and Japan that led us to victory. And the Soviets seemed to have followed that supply thing, too. For every Japanese person assigned to supply, there was a one-to-one ratio between the guys that were in supply and the guys on the front line. We had fifteen people in supply to every guy on the battle line. So we were in it, logistically—he said logistically, in terms of supply our troops both in Asia and in Europe that allowed us to keep on going, whereas the Germans believed—and the Japanese believed that their best people had to be on the front lines. Marshall was not on the front lines, and Eisenhower wasn't, and yet their idea about the overall picture seemed to be much better than the Japanese guys who fought to the death, and the German soldiers who were by far the—it took to the Battle of the Bulge before American soldiers measured up to the fighting soldiers the Germans had. But they had years ahead. I don't know if I mentioned this, but it was also—we prevailed in the Battle of the Bulge because we had one extra thing besides the soldiers' capacity to fight—Americans were independent; they could think for themselves. And it was those small bands of American soldiers that eventually slowed down the Germans' advance in the Battle of the Bulge—that pretty much stopped them. It was our engineers who blew up the bridges, they took it on themselves.

DM:

So this independence of thought meant adaptability to a situation.

JG:

Exactly—which the Germans and Japanese could never do because it was duty—just listen to orders.

DM:

Good point.

JG:

And, you know, it's an American trait, I think—it used to be, anyway—independent action. And I still think that's a very, very important factor in—

DM:

That sounds like—

JG:

I like to think it still is.

DM:

Sounds like two very valid points, as applied to World War II in particular—the logistics and the adaptability. That's interesting.

JG:

I would also think—and this is my—I would like to research this, but it's going to be another thing I really don't have the time nor money to do, but I think the Japanese and the Germans were much more narcissistic and self-centered. They thought their armies and their people were so much superior. The Germans thought they were Aryan gods—and Hitler promoted all that nonsense—and I think that just made the Americans angry. And then Japan—Japanese, too, thought their people were better than Americans, and that's why—we surrendered, they thought we were cowards and didn't mind killing us. But that was arrogance and narcissism. The Japanese—I had an analyst once I talked to about a case I had, but he had gone to Japan, and he had told me that the biggest problem the Japanese have is a certain amount of self-centeredness in their leadership—and then he had this idea which I eventually saw in one patient, which, the women especially—and even the Japanese men—there were the narcissists, and then there were the—what he called the “closet narcissists.” The closet narcissists circled around the narcissists—they were like in orbit around—and they'd do anything for them. So we get the charges and the kamikaze pilots and all that; that's during the war. But he said that that was a major problem, and why Japanese children and adolescents were killing themselves, because if they didn't live up to that standard, they were worthless. That's what the Japanese government brought them over to deal with. But he said that that concept—and I found that in one or two of my patients, a couple female patients and maybe some males I missed, but I actually saw that, that—

DM:

What, the counter-narcissist idea or the narcissist?

JG:

The narcissist would be this self-centered guy, and closet narcissists would find these people and sort of worship them.

DM:

I think when you stop to think about it, you see it in a lot of places—in the workplace, for example.

JG:

Yes.

DM:

I've never heard it put that way, thought, that's an interesting—

JG:

Well, you know, we have some analysts—they have some—that's where I can't be one theory versus another, because this guy was out of the mainstream—and there's a lot of people who have ideas that are out of the mainstream, but this—I think that's a very good idea. He talks about that, that today in industry, it's still like that. They work for their company—they still do—and I'm going back fifteen or twenty years when he told me this, but—

DM:

Makes sense. Well, and when applied to Nazi Germany and Japan during World War II, it makes sense. And another big problem with that for them is they underestimated their enemies because they thought they were superior.

JG:

Yeah, they thought they were superior. And Hitler especially, you know, and they thought he was a godlike image. And that's the problem with narcissism—we can start to have these heroes—and there's a lot of politicians that have a lot of that. It's not all bad to be somewhat narcissistic, but it has to be contained within other parts of that personality. Especially the Japanese and Germans, I think, had that to a very—it had sort of gotten into their culture. The Japanese always had it, but the Germans really developed it rather quickly—I mean from the time Hitler came into power.

DM:

Right. And there's so many factors that come into play, too. It might have been easier for it to happen in Germany because Germany was economically devastated before Hitler came along, and that just fed into people hovering around him, and they were looking desperately for somebody like him.

JG:

They were desperate. You're absolutely right about that. In '23, when a barrel of money—you went into a store to buy something and maybe you needed two barrels—and then the depression—our depression went there and—and he did a little bit what Roosevelt did—public works and things like that. But also, just like with Roosevelt, I think the tide was turning economically, so both of them had the benefit of—

DM:

They could say “We're building in the economy.”

JG:

We're building—but it's partly the—

DM:

Not necessarily what they're doing, making them look good

JG:

Not all—no—not exactly what they did all the time, but it was—things, they were changing.

DM:

Let's touch on another interesting thing regarding World War II. I find this extremely interesting, and I hope that you can talk about it. This has to do with the person you know about through a former patient of yours who was a Spitfire pilot.

JG:

Who was what?

DM:

A Spitfire pilot. Can you tell me that—can you tell the whole story?

JG:

Huh?

DM:

Can you tell me that story—how you found out about it?

JG:

Okay, it was a patient of mine—very fine woman—elegant, polite, loved her two girls, and had to stand up to—eventually decided she was not going to be sort of pushed around by her husband

anymore and so she decided eventually—I tried to work with her husband; “psychologist” meant nothing to him. She came from a very interesting background where she was very well educated, and she had a cousin, and she told me about her cousin. It sounded like she liked him a lot. He was older than her, and she looked up to him. And the whole family sort of—he was being groomed to—they were wealthy—he was being groomed to—and I guess they had a huge—they had a ranch—several big ranches out here.

DM:

These were West Texas people?

JG:

Yes—here’s your good ol’ West Texas guy, but he was extremely bright, he came back from college, and she talked about sitting around their—they had a family that, on every Sunday, they met after dinner and listened to reports from Europe—what was happening all across the world. It was a very intellectual family, which wasn’t always the norm here. Nothing wrong with that, these people were working hard for a living, but these people had the money and also had the education and sort of the commitment. So they used to listen, and when he started to—and I think—I know—there was a lot of people who opposed getting into the war.

DM:

Right, there were isolationists.

JG:

Yeah, very much so. And that was the way the family stood. And then he started to—he used to hear—I guess it was—Churchill’s speeches, but also there was an American announcer that—he came back—Edward R. Murrow, who also talked about what the Brits were going through and the bombings and all that. And all of the sudden, he started talking like the United States really needs to do something about this, and then slowly but surely—and all of the sudden—I mean I guess it happened in the—the close-knit family, the nuclear family—this was the extended family. But I guess there was some kind of a blow-up, and off—she heard that he was going to Canada.

DM:

Do you remember when that happened—what year he decided to go do this?

JG:

Yes, it was—I guess it was 1941.

DM:

Before Pearl Harbor, though.

JG:

Well, before Pearl Harbor. He fought in the Battle of Britain.

DM:

So that was '40—more or less, yeah.

JG:

That's '40. So he left earlier.

DM:

Sometime after Poland fell, probably September '39.

JG:

Yeah, and that was Poland—okay—that was, I think—she thought that was the thing that sent him. Glad you mentioned that, because that was—he had somehow a universal view, and—

DM:

Probably very unusual in this area—probably in any place in the United States at that time.

JG:

Well, not too many young men from rich families were going to do that.

DM:

So already, here you have an independent-minded young man.

JG:

Very, very independent fellow, with his own mind and own analysis about the world. He had a world view. And I must say, this woman, in my mind, had a world view, too. She had matured, and seen a lot in her life, and I thought had a very good perspective on life. But this young guy went over and fought in the Battle of Britain, survived that.

DM:

As a Spitfire pilot, is that correct?

JG:

Yeah, and I think he went from the Royal Canadian into the RAF somehow, he managed to jump into that. And I don't know—he might have fought with the Polish RAF fighters. The Polish had a group of them, too. But after they were defeated, he was sent in different places in Europe, and then he—in 1944 he wound up in India.

DM:

Okay, and before we talk about India, didn't you say he was a pretty effective Spitfire pilot—he was an ace?

JG:

I think he was an ace. He was very good. He was a very talented young man, no matter what he did.

DM:

Well, he survived until '44, for one thing.

JG:

Not many people survived that many—they say it was much better to be in the infantry than to be an American combat pilot over Europe because so many were lost—the percentages. And this guy was in it all.

DM:

And don't you wish you knew the whole story between the Battle of Britain and India, I wonder what all happened?

JG:

I would love to have been able to look into that, but I needed more information about who it was, and maybe some dog tag numbers or something. And I think if I had gotten out of my practice earlier, she might have—I'm sure she would've—she really thought highly of him. And I did mention once that: "Did anybody think of bringing him home?" And I think there was a little reluctance—even as old as his mother got about a little bit about bringing him home.

DM:

And I interrupted you—you didn't mention—I interrupted you before you could mention what happened in India in '44.

JG:

In India? Well, you know, the Japanese were—that was another major battle. The Japanese were attacking—were trying to break through the British forces, and still hopeful that they could tie up with—break that line and maybe, if the Germans ever got back into Africa, they could hook.

DM:

Maybe at the Suez Canal, or a critical point.

JG:

Exactly. That was their goal.

DM:

So what happened to this guy?

JG:

He was shot down by a Zero—I think he had two more aircraft he shot down. He was a hero. The British considered him a hero, and we never brought him back, nor give him the credit. That bothered me. He's an American hero, really.

DM:

Do you have any idea where he was shot down or buried?

JG:

Yeah, he was shot down—

DM:

Let me pause it—here.

Pause in recording

DM:

Okay, so you know where—the general area where he was buried?

JG:

It's right on the border of Burma—the Japanese were in Burma, breaking through to India. The Indians fought like hell and so did the British, to break them. They sent the—I even remember reading it, and then I can't find it again on—

DM:

Maybe you will. If you do, and there's any information you can provide, then we can record that.

JG:

I would really love to see what could be done about that. He's an American hero—a real hero. He just was ahead of his time—just like the Flying Tigers, some of those guys were—they were paid more. He wasn't paid a heck of a lot, I'll tell you that. The British made about a fourth as much as Americans. What'd the Brits say? They were overpaid, oversexed, and over here.

DM:

But obviously he was fighting with heart. I mean he made the effort to go to the Canadian air force and then over to the RAF.

JG:

Oh, no question. Anyone who did that—that tried so hard, and then became so technically good—when he went into the Battle of Britain, those German fighter pilots were the cream of the crop at that time. So he must have been darn good.

DM:

Do you think he was still in a Spitfire in India? Did you hear? Did she say whether he was in a Spitfire in India, or flying some different aircraft?

JG:

As far as she knew, he always flew a Spitfire—which they gave to the best pilots—even the Polish best pilots. The British, when they had their backs against the wall, they—

DM:

Did she ever tell you his name?

JG:

Yes she did, but—it was—after ten years—and I haven't seen her—I waited—I held my records for twenty-two years and then I got rid of—just can't keep them anymore—and they're not valid anymore.

DM:

Well, and then I know there's also client confidentiality, and I don't know how much you could disclose anyhow.

JG:

If she had been willing to talk to me—but she was really—I guess she was in her upper eighties when I called her. My reading of it—I guess she just wasn't up to talking.

DM:

But when he died and was buried in India, the family—

JG:

Huh?

DM:

You got the impression that the family wasn't making an effort to get him back?

JG:

That's a little bit of what—she was very careful not to be negative about people. But if I'm reading her right about his mother, she was not pleased with him for fighting for the Brits. I know at the beginning, very much—the father, she said, came around, but the mother—and she never went into great detail, but never seemed to have the heart to accept that.

DM:

You know, you have to wonder if the mother was a little bit bitter, because her son did this and then died—and she lost her son, and that—

JG:

I could see that. Angry at him because he—

DM:

—he cost her his own life.

JG:

Right. And they had plans for him, you know. Now there were—and her family—and her husband's family—they were very, very wealthy.

DM:

Do you know where they lived? Do you know where he was from—what town or what ranch?

JG:

They owned a lot of ranchland from all the way up from down in—maybe towards Lamesa, all the way up until you get to Turkey, and around Turkey—some of the beautiful areas round—

DM:

Off the Caprock, then.

JG:

Yeah. Some of those areas, they owned cattle and they had cotton. They owned a huge amount of land. And there's a lot of things named after that family.

DM:

Well, if I can ever get enough information—a name, or any more information, I could try to track

down, see who this guy was and specifically what happened and everything else. And that might not be for the record here—I don't know. That doesn't bother me, but—

JG:

I could try even calling her again. Maybe she's—

DM:

It's a wonderful story about—like we said—an independent mind who saw what was happening and jumped in.

JG:

Yes, and it takes a unique—I think it takes a unique individual, wherever you come from in the United States. But to come from West Texas where his whole family—and she says, you know, “He was an inspiration to me.”

DM:

And see, this is what we do at the Southwest Collection. We try to find people like this and document their lives. We don't like these things to slip away.

JG:

We shouldn't let them. That's exactly the way I felt. This man was unique. As a family, they sat and they listened—they were very interested in world events. Whatever beliefs they had, the world meant something to them. And that—I don't care where you are in the 1930s and early forties. That was unusual.

DM:

But I have to suspect it was even more unusual out here where we're so far away from such events. New York City is much closer—not just geographically—but tied into the world economy and all of that.

JG:

Absolutely.

DM:

So out here, it seems like you—

JG:

Well, we had Japanese submarines and all kinds of things. But here—that's why—even people like Buddy Holly and things, just for them to break out of some of the traditions here—he didn't live long, but he inspired the Beatles. I went to see Buddy in England. They were dancing all

over the place—in the aisles—some of them started going up on the stage. It was—I couldn't believe the Brits. They loved him. Again, that's one of the things about travel that really was a wonderful thing to see.

DM:

Yeah, that's an incredible story, too. Well I would love to track down more information on this guy.

JG:

What's that?

DM:

I'd like to track down more information on this guy, so just let me know if you come across any additional—

JG:

I will—I think I will call her again. When we get older—and I'm older already—but I think sometimes you're more on, and other times more off. Let me try to—because I know she had a real liking for this man. I think she admired him, and she kind of said she wanted to bring her girls up like that. And so they went to the best of schools in the east, and of course they came back. One died of cancer, unfortunately, after giving birth to two children, and she has not had—sad in a way. But she was a very, very dignified and lovely person—a real lady, in the old sense of the term.

DM:

I'm going to pause this just a second.

Pause in recording

DM:

Okay, go ahead.

JG:

The Germans who wanted to rid themselves of Hitler and all that background started to call May 8, 1945 “Zero Hour” because this was a new beginning, everything's different, we're going to forget about that stuff that happened in the past. I thought that was a unique way of trying to deny what happened.

DM:

Just a blank—it's a blank.

JG:

It's a blank. We don't know what happened back then.

DM:

So, by the same token, if you murder somebody you can say, "Ah, that was a blank."

JG:

There was an awful lot of that. That's where young analysts—and they—and we promoted them. I can say this—let me say this, too—let me say that our military people in Germany did a much better job in confronting the German people with what happened during the Nazi period. They made—Eisenhower and others made it very clear to them—they had to go march and they had to go into the camps and had to see all bodies and then they had films and all kinds of other things and educational programs.

DM:

Well, they had their war crimes trials right there in Nuremburg.

JG:

I think MacArthur had the same authority. He did a very good thing in some ways, but I don't think he confronted the Japanese people like Ike and the other American—like General Clay—actually they were all Republicans, but I think MacArthur was a bit of a narcissist himself. And I think he wanted to be held in great esteem by them, and so I don't think he wanted to kind of confront them fully with what they did. I don't think that crossed Eisenhower's mind. "This is what you did, it was horrible, I can't believe what you did, you are going to face what you did." That was his attitude. I think Clay was like that as well—who took over—when Eisenhower left, he left Clay in charge. I think he had some of the same tough, hard-nosed way of looking at that. But they were also very good at education and things like that, but I—MacArthur, I don't think, did any of that educational stuff, and dealing with all—because they still have all their little Japanese places where they go to and pray to their—all these—

DM:

—Shinto shrines—

JG:

—you know, I mean murderers that—and so it's not mentioned that much in history books, and things like that. They just don't fully grasp what they did.

DM:

I wonder if one reason they drove the point home in Germany is because this was the second time around, too, and Eisenhower was there to see it. There was World War I, we defeated them.

They climbed back up, there was World War II, we defeated them again—it was a second time around.

JG:

That's true, too. That was a major factor—"We're not going to let this ever happen again" —we let them get away with it in the First World War, where we didn't occupy Germany, and we were not going to make any mistakes, especially when we saw the concentration camps. And by the way, what we saw was just the—all the murder factories were in Poland—Auschwitz, Treblinka, and one other, where they gassed—they came in, they gassed two thousand at a time—those were all in Poland. We stumbled on the regular concentration camps, which were not—it was just bad—there were dead bodies all over the place because they didn't feed them, they shot them, they killed them. But these were not the factories.

DM:

Why did such a large cross-section of German society accept these things that—surely many, many people knew what was going on—maybe not all people, but—

JG:

There's controversies—there's a book out, *Willing Executioners*,² that claims that almost all the Germans knew. But it was easy not—to turn your head. In our book, we talk about the university professor. In a book by Mayer that was written quite³—maybe in '55 —and it told how inch by inch, even if their inclinations were right, they were always—there was a bit of doubt because they never saw it, they just knew it was happening, but the doubt always stopped them from fully grasping the essence of it. We have some quotes in here of the university professor who was—I can—you can see, he's a really decent man who tried to come to grips with that. And he describes when you don't see it, and you just keep hearing it, there's part of you that wants to reject it, there's part of you that may know it's true, but there's this doubt when you haven't actually seen it.

DM:

And it's extremely dangerous to speak out against it, anyhow.

JG:

—and you couldn't bet everyone wasn't reporting—it wasn't—the Gestapo was relatively small, but what they had going was the Germans were reporting on themselves. They'd turn each other in. there's a joke I can tell you about the East Germans, by the way. Have I told you about the—Eileen and I were travelling in—it was 1994, we were on our last trip—**Error! Bookmark not defined.**

² *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, by Daniel Goldhagen.

³ *They Thought They Were Free: The Germans, 1933-45*, by Milton Mayer.

Pause in recording

JG:

Okay, we were on a guided tour in a car and we passed Humboldt University, which was in the former East Berlin. And we saw all these protests signs up there. What is there to protest these days? The wall is down. And what we heard was—and he smiled—he said “Well, it turns out that our supreme court, after this going around the courts for years, has finally decided that the government was correct in nullifying—making null and void—twenty-five thousand masters degrees and fifty thousand AB⁴ degrees because they were all courses on communism, which was absolutely irrelevant—did I tell you that?”

DM:

No, huh-uh.

JG:

Okay. I had a big laugh about that. That’s one of the stories we heard. Then—I don’t know if you know the number of East Germans that—the equivalent of the KGB in Germany had people telling on each other—do you know the percent of people in East Germany that cooperated with the communists? Seventy-two percent. Seventy-two percent of the people were ratting on each other. Okay, well—okay, by 1994, you’ve got to realize this. What happened is one third of Germany was East Germany. These people were like—they had learned not to work. They were like our poor—social services, everyone was not working—so when the West Germans first—everyone’s wonderful, wonderful, we’re back together again. By 1994, their taxes are doubled. They were furious, the West Germans. So what happened—the German government decided to open all these files up. Soon there were divorces, there were shootings, there were people—mothers about children, children about parents, loved ones, married couples, and lots of people were killing each other. One of these guys says—started to complain—“This is all a government thing for us to get rid of ourselves.” So this becomes a big turmoil, and they finally asked the Chancellor, “What about it?” and he says “No comment.” He was their—probably happy—it wasn’t probably intended, but he made the best of what was a bad situation. So those were the kind of things that happened after Germany—

DM:

—reunited, reunified—

JG:

It’s kind of humorous.

⁴ Bachelor of Arts.

DM:

Pause this.

Pause in recording

DM:

Okay, and this concludes the interview for today.

End of interview



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